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Abstract 
Sub-state nationalist parties mobilised and saw an increase in electoral support in the 
1960s and 1970s. A heterogeneous group of parties, they are united by their claims upon 
the state in favour of self-government. However, sub-state nationalist parties advance a 
variety of goals, ranging from more moderate forms of recognition and cultural or political 
autonomy, to more radical restructuring of the state along federal lines, to even more 
radical demands for political independence. The language, content, and arguments in 
favour of these goals varies – both between parties and within individual parties’ over 
time.  As a result, we know less than we should about self-government goals themselves. 
This research asks two core questions. Firstly, what do sub-state nationalist parties want? 
And more importantly, operating from the assumption that sub-state nationalist parties 
are strategic actors, how do their goals reflect strategic considerations, understanding of 
the contexts in which they are expressed, and their historical positions? By comparing 
three cases, a third question can be explored, assessing the ways in which variation in the 
empirical contexts in which these goals are articulated may manifest in variation in the 
framing of self-government goals.  
In this research, I argue the self-government goal presented by a given sub-state 
nationalist party can be considered a reflection of the ‘art of the possible’, a pragmatic 
articulation of what might be achieved under a system of constraints rather than the 
single-minded pursuit of self-government, regardless of its costs and consequences. 
In order to fully capture the complexity of self-government goals and the contexts in 
which they are expressed, three case studies, in two territorial contexts, are studied in 
depth. The first is the Scottish National Party, which seeks political independence for 
Scotland. The other two are parties which emerged in Flanders, the Volksunie, which 
existed between 1954 and 2001, and its successor, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.  These 
cases represent some of the most successful sub-state nationalist parties, both in electoral 
terms, particularly in recent years, and arguably in making progress towards their self-
government goals.  
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Lay Summary 
Sub-state nationalist parties are those which claim to represent a community or nation, 
mobilise in a defined territory, and seek self-government on behalf of that nation and 
territory. These parties have seen an increase in electoral support in the 1960s and 1970s 
and remain relevant as events in Quebec, Scotland, Flanders, Catalonia, and the Basque 
Country have shown.  
Sub-state nationalist parties advance a variety of goals – ranging from representation and 
accommodation within the existing state to far-reaching state reform along a federalist or 
confederalist model to exit from that state, in the form of independence. This research 
aims to examine these goals in detail and seeks to understand how these goals are shaped 
by the context in which they are articulated.  
It does so with reference to three parties, all situated on the more radical end of the 
spectrum – the Scottish National Party of Scotland, the Volksunie and its successor, the 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. The goals of each party are analysed from their origins through 
to 2014. The way in which parties engage with the international and European dimension, 
the British and Belgian states, and electoral competition and the party system when 
articulating their self-government goals are explored. 
This research concludes that parties express a self-government goal which reflects the ‘art 
of the possible’, the principle of self-government shaped and moulded by a strategic 
consideration of what might realistically be achieved
The Art of the Possible 
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Introduction 
2014 represented a pivotal, albeit ultimately anticlimactic, year for sub-state nationalist 
parties throughout Europe. Notable events included a referendum on independence in 
Scotland and the ‘mother of all elections’ in Belgium. Although beyond the remit of this thesis, 
an informal vote on self-determination also took place in Catalonia. These events drew 
massive media attention and triggered a broadening discussion of sub-state nationalism 
and self-government in the twenty-first century – ideas which had been bubbling beneath 
the surface for years but had not yet come to such a head.  
In advance of 2014, both the SNP and the N-VA spoke openly self-government. The 
level of detail, form, and content of these self-government goals were articulated in an 
interesting fashion which merited further exploration. The SNP spoke of independence 
but also integration, within the European Union and with the rest of the United Kingdom. 
The N-VA had, in the short-term, downplayed the prospect of independence, which 
remained in the party’s statutes, in favour of an ambiguously defined confederalism, 
emphasising European and Flemish structures. The visions of each party raised broader 
questions about the meaning of self-government in the twenty-first century.   
The implications of the two events have been far-reaching, including the entry into federal 
government by the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie after achieving an unprecedented level of 
support, the Scottish National Party’s remarkable success in the 2015 General Election 
and continued constitutional debates over Scotland’s place within the Union, and the 
UK’s place within Europe..  
My interest in sub-state nationalism began much earlier and largely by chance. In 2006, I 
was on a language immersion programme in Pepinster, a small village in Wallonia. I was 
living with a host family and was preparing for a weekend trip to Bruges. My host family 
warned me that I shouldn’t be practicing my French, instead I should speak English in 
Bruges in order to be treated politely. Thankful for the respite from all French, all the 
time, I heeded their advice but was intrigued by the notion that such a small country could 
be so intensely divided.  
I had largely forgotten about the issue until later that year, this time in Poland, undertaking 
a masters in European Studies. I was grappling about for a dissertation topic and in a 
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moment of procrastination, happened to check the BBC where one of the stories was 
about Bye Bye Belgium, a 2006 mockumentary produced by the Francophone public 
broadcaster, RTBF and aired on Francophone television (BBC, 2006). The 
mockumentary, which explored the premise of a unilateral declaration of independence 
by the Flemish Parliament, with the flight of the king and roadblocks at the border, was 
notable for its form but also its reception, with viewers believing it to be true. This state 
of affairs provided the inspiration for my MA dissertation, much to the chagrin of my 
supervisor, who thought until that point I was writing about Communist-era monuments 
and national identity.  
The issue of Flanders and sub-state nationalism was cast aside for several years as I 
immersed myself in a world of corporate responsibility and sustainable investment and 
only returned to my attention in 2010, when I began to consider returning to academia. 
In Belgium, the June 2010 elections had failed to result in a government, with the 
breakthrough of the N-VA, a party which was on the verge of extinction just a few years 
earlier, and another protracted period of government formation had begun. The 2011 
Holyrood elections, which saw the SNP win the most seats, made it clear that sub-state 
nationalism was not going away – indeed, if anything it was perhaps gaining more 
momentum – and I knew this was something I needed to explore.  
This period was both the best and, perhaps, the worst time to be researching these issues 
– the best because of the level of engagement and interest, and the opportunities to study 
events in real time, the worst because there was so much going on. Ultimately, the time 
frame of this research comes to a close in September 2014, a decision which reflects the 
end of a distinctive period for the parties of interest, but also a pragmatic decision about 
scope. Throughout my studies, I had the privilege to engage with events as they unfolded, 
firstly, through my role with the Future of the UK and Scotland project, and later, through 
the Centre on Constitutional Change. 
The rise and rise of sub-state nationalism 
Sub-state nationalism, in the form of political competition, has become increasingly 
salient in Western democracies, with the electoral breakthrough of sub-state nationalist 
parties in the 1960s and 1970s (De Winter, 1998; Keating, 1988; Rudolph & Thompson, 
1989). This phenomenon appears to be both old, proclaiming an attachment to an older 
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state or identity, and new, advocating for new forms of government to reflect distinctive 
needs and identity. This challenged traditional narratives of modernisation and national 
integration (Keating, 2008). 
Sub-state nationalist parties have been defined and labelled differently but in this research, 
they are understood to have four key characteristics: (1) the claim to represent a specific 
community or nation; (2) the mobilisation of the party in a specific territory; (3) the pursuit 
of a preferred constitutional or territorial outcome; and (4) the pursuit of these goals 
through democratic means.  
Although they vary in both the ways in which they manifest, they are understood to share 
a common goal, each making a ‘demand for political reorganisation of the existing national power 
structure’ for some sort of self-government (De Winter, 1998: 204). The content of this 
goal varies, both across the universe of cases and over time (as discussed below) but all 
‘make a claim upon the state’ (Urwin, 1982: 232).  
These parties have had varying levels of electoral success, but have been successful, when 
combined with other forces, in triggering some response by the central state, with states 
largely becoming more decentralised, as documented by Hooghe and Marks (2001). This 
expanded the options and resources available to sub-state nationalist parties, providing a 
political opportunity structure in which they could mobilise or pursue entry into 
government, a direct means of pursuing self-government goals (Bolleyer, 2009; 
Deschouwer, 2003; Elias & Tronconi, 2011; Hepburn, 2013).  
Rather than being overtaken by international developments, sub-state nationalism appears 
increasingly relevant in the twenty-first century as parties and people attempt to orient 
themselves in a globalising world and new forms of territorial organisation emerge. This 
dissertation represents an effort to understand these self-government goals.  
The puzzle of self-government goals 
Sub-state nationalist parties, by their nature, ‘demand for political reorganisation of the existing 
national power structure’ or ‘some kind of self-government’ for their territory (De Winter, 1998: 
204). However, the classification of these parties and their self-government goals is often 
hindered by context,language, strategy, and variation within parties and over time. 
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The labelling of goals reflects the nuances of the particular cultural, linguistic, and political 
context in which it is expressed. We see variation amongst parties, with those making 
claims to constitutional models of federalism, confederalism, and political independence, 
while others speak of more abstract and ideational principles of freedom, liberty, and self-
rule.  (Keating & Gagnon, 2012).  
Goals may also be subject to strategic manoeuvre – with parties pursuing short-term and 
long-term goals simultaneously, with no clear delineation between these goals (Toubeau 
2011: 432). Meadwell (2009) illustrates the importance of timing, citing a Breton 
nationalist who argued ‘[I]t is a question of catching the right instant. Too early you break your neck. 
Too late you lose your time’. This suggests a strategic component, present in both the means 
by which goals are to be pursued and the content of the goals themselves. 
Variation is present between parties which fall under the header of sub-state nationalist 
parties. But internal variation – both within parties at a single point in time and across 
time is also important. Although unified by a demand for self-government, there may be 
divides within a single party over what self-government might look like, intermediate steps 
versus the ultimate goal, and its strategic pursuit (Dandoy, 2010; Hepburn, 2010: 42; 
Fagerholm, 2016; Cachafeiro et al, 2006: 251). There is also likely to be variation within a 
single party over time, as parties adjust and adapt their goals in response to internal and 
external forces (Sorens, 2008: 328-9; Tierney, 2005: 162; Kellas, 2004: 11; Coppetiers, 
2003: 5). 
Research questions 
As a result of these obstacles, we know less than we should about what self-government 
means in practice. In this research, I explore two key questions. Firstly, what do sub-state 
nationalist parties want? And more importantly, operating from the assumption that sub-
state nationalist parties are rational actors pursuing goals they believe to be achievable, 
how do their goals reflect strategic considerations, understanding of the contexts in which 
they are expressed, and their historical positions? By comparing three cases, a third 
question is explored, assessing the ways in which variation in the empirical contexts in 
which these goals are articulated may manifest in variation in the framing of self-
government goals.  
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The self-government goal presented by a given sub-state nationalist party can be 
considered a reflection of what Rudolph and Thompson (1985) describe as the ‘art of the 
possible’, a pragmatic understanding of what might be achieved under a system of 
constraints rather than the single-minded pursuit of self-government, regardless of its 
costs and consequences. This suggests that sub-state nationalist parties are rational, 
strategic actors. It is in this area that my thesis makes its core contribution.  
I begin from the premise that sub-state nationalist parties balance both value rationality, 
a fundamental belief in the nation and the necessity of some degree of self-government, 
and instrumental rationality, a pragmatic approach to the realities of self-government 
(Varsheny, 2003). The goals advanced by sub-state nationalist parties will therefore reflect 
a core belief in the existence of the nation and the need for self-government as well as a 
practical consideration of the opportunities and constraints present in factors external to 
the nation. 
Three empirical contexts, are of interest in this research: the international, and more 
specifically European arena; the state in which the sub-state nation is situated; and the 
party system in which sub-state nationalist party goals are pursued. Each has been 
discussed in the literature individually but to my knowledge, no systematic analysis of a 
party’s goal in light of these contexts has been carried out. 
Self-government in Scotland and Flanders 
In order to fully capture the complexity of self-government goals and the contexts in 
which they are expressed, three case studies, in two territorial contexts, are studied in 
depth. The first is the Scottish National Party, which seeks political independence for 
Scotland. The other two are parties which emerged in Flanders, the Volksunie, which 
existed between 1954 and 2001, and its successor, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.  These 
cases represent some of the most successful sub-state nationalist parties, both in electoral 
terms, particularly in recent years, and arguably in making progress towards their self-
government goals.  
A longitudinal approach, which studies the three cases from their origins to 2014, or their 
dissolution in the case of the VU, is adopted which allows both within-case and cross-
case comparison. While this small number of cases restricts my ability to generalise more 
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widely, the focus on a limited number of important cases allows me to assess the ways in 
which changes in the forum or domain in which self-government goals were expressed 
manifest in the party’s articulation of self-government goals.  
Thesis structure 
Chapter one introduces the theoretical framework that underpins this work. In this 
chapter, sub-state nationalist parties are defined, and their origins are explored. I then 
discuss the nature of the self-government goals as advanced by sub-state nationalist 
parties, outlining a typology of goals and identifying some of the challenges classifying 
parties by goals present. I discuss sub-state nationalist parties as strategic and rational 
actors before introducing the framework used in this thesis and exploring the ways in 
which self-government goals are influenced by the empirical context in which they are 
pursued. 
Chapter two sets out the research design and methodology employed in this thesis. I first 
outline my research questions and identify the key components of this research: the self-
government goals held by each party and the empirical context which inform their 
articulation. This chapter also details the case selection, the use of comparison and the 
process of data collection and data analysis, specifically framing analysis.  
Chapter three serves three key purposes: providing a contextual introduction to the three 
cases selected for inclusion in this study: the Scottish National Party, the Volksunie, and 
the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, examining the way in which self-government goals were 
labelled from each party’s origins to the present day, and presenting an analysis of the way 
in which the purposes of self-government, whether value rational or instrumental, were 
framed in each case. The remainder of the empirical analysis is covered in the four 
chapters which follow.  
Chapter four discusses the ways in which self-government goals interact with the 
European and international context in which they are expressed, considering the influence 
of changes in the international structure, the development of European project, and the 
ways in which European and global identities were instrumentalised.  
Chapter five analyses the ways in which the structure of the embedding state influences 
the articulation of self-government goals. I focus specifically on the state and existing state 
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structures, and the ways in which these are used as a justification for self-government, the 
response of each party to both proposed and realised state reform falling short of their 
ultimate self-government goals, and a discussion of relationships between the sub-state 
and the embedding state once self-government has been achieved.   
Chapter six focuses on the pursuit of self-government with reference to the party system 
in which the sub-state nationalist parties operate, capturing an important strategic 
component. Here, the positioning of each party through which self-government is to be 
achieved and the potential of the party system to facilitate self-government is assessed. 
Chapter seven, the final empirical chapter focuses on the ways in which self-government 
was articulated by the Scottish National Party and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie in advance 
of the 2014 Scottish referendum and Belgium elections. In this chapter, I return to the 
three empirical contexts detailed above and explore them with reference to the 2014 
proposals, which for each party represents the most comprehensive statement of their 
self-government goals to date. 
This thesis comes to a close with chapter eight, which will synthesise, compare and 
contrast key findings within and across the cases. It will reflect upon the framing of self-
government goals and the empirical contexts in which they are expressed, as well as the 
meanings of self-government and the strategic behaviour of sub-state nationalist parties 
in light of these findings. It will consider the implications of framing in our understanding 
of self-government goals as well as address the contribution of this research to the broader 
literature
The Art of the Possible 
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Chapter One: Conceptualizing sub-state 
nationalist parties 
In this dissertation, I analyse the content and framing of the self-government goals 
advocated by the Scottish National Party, the Volksunie, and the Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie. This work rests on several key assumptions, derived from the literature and 
developed further throughout this research. Firstly, sub-state nationalist parties are those 
parties which advance, as their core business, the realisation of a specific self-government 
goal. Secondly, this pursuit is driven by a specific set of values held by sub-state nationalist 
parties - the right to self-determination, self-government, or sovereignty of the nation the 
party seeks to represent. Thirdly, sub-state nationalist parties are rational actors, seeking 
to pursue their goal within a specific electoral context as well as cognisant of various 
institutional realities. Finally, I argue that self-government goals, as expressed by sub-state 
nationalist parties, reflect two key components - their commitment to the values of self-
government for their nation and their interpretations of the opportunity and constraints 
unique to their particular institutional contexts. These institutional constraints include the 
international, and in particular in the case of the parties included in this research, 
European context, the structure of the embedding state, and the party and electoral 
system in which the parties compete. Changes in these institutional structures are assumed 
to have an impact on the content and framing of self-government goals.  
In the theoretical framework which follows, I first define sub-state nationalist parties and 
set out the characteristics of these parties. I then assess typologies of self-government 
goals and present an adapted model of these goals. I address my core assumption - that 
sub-state nationalist parties are rational actors - before discussing the historical 
institutionalist framework which frames this research. Finally, I present my external 
framework, identifying key institutional contexts which will be explored in this research.  
1.1 Defining sub-state nationalist parties 
Sub-state nationalist parties are treated as a distinctive party family but share common 
characteristics with parties generally. Sartori (1976: 62) defines political parties as ‘any 
political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through 
election, candidates for public office’. At their most basic, Panebianco (1988: 7) considers parties 
as ‘instruments for the realization of specific (and specifiable) goals’. Within the broader 
The Art of the Possible 
1 Conceptualizing sub-state nationalist parties  10 
classification of political parties exists a set of parties whose specific and specifiable goals 
are to advance the territorial interests at the level below the state. 
The study of these parties has been hindered by terminological complexity and competing 
definitions (Fagerholm, 2016). Parties mobilising in defence of the interests of their 
culturally distinct and territorially concentrated group have been described and defined in 
a variety of ways, reflecting their ethnic, territorial, regional, and nationalist dimensions. 
Labels include ‘ethnoregionalist’, (De Winter & Türsan, 1998; De Winter & Cachafeiro, 2002;  
Tronconi, 2006; Dandoy, 2010) ‘ethno’ and ‘ethnic nationalists’, (Connor, 1977) ‘ethno-
regionalists’ (Müller-RommelRommel, 1998; Newman, 1994), ‘ethnoterritorial’ parties 
(Rudolph & Thompson, 1985; Meguid, 2008), ‘regionalists’, (de Winter & Türsan, 1998; 
Massetti & Schakel, 2016), ‘mini-nationalists’, (Snyder, 1982) ‘peripheral’ and ‘stateless’ nations, 
(Keating, 2001; Minhahan, 2002; Friend, 2012; McCrone, 1998) ‘nations against the state’ 
(Keating, 1996), and ‘minority nationalists’ (Elias, 2009b; Lynch & Dewinter, 2008; Keating 
& McGarry, 2001; Kymlicka, 2001) Müller-RommelRommel defines the term ethno-
regionalist parties as ‘referring to the efforts of geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which 
challenge the working order and sometimes even the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding 
recognition of their cultural identity’ (Müller-RommelRommel 1998: 19). Türsan defines these 
parties as ‘ethnically based territorial movements that aim to modify their relations with the state’ 
(Türsan 1998: 5). v 
Hepburn’s work represents an attempt to reconcile the various labels and definitions 
present in the literature, adopting the broad designation of stateless nationalist and 
regionalist parties (SNRPs). She identified as SNRPs those parties whose  
‘core business is sub-state territorial empowerment, whereby empowerment involves seeking 
to represent and advance the particular interest of the stateless territory - be it referred to as 
a region, nation, people or Heimat - and where territorial interests may be economic, 
political, social, cultural or symbolic in nature’ 
Hepburn, 2009: 482.   
Although a heterogeneous, and contested, party family in terms of origins, ideology, and 
goals, we can assume that these parties, by virtue of their ambitions for territorial 
empowerment, have some common features (Fagerholm, 2016; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983: 
227).  
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For the purposes of this research, the narrower sub-state nationalist party label is adopted 
as the cases of interest to this research consider themselves to represent the nation rather 
than the region, as regionalist parties can be a broad term, designated both parties which 
compete only in the sub-state and statewide parties which have reoriented themselves 
towards the region, which might include the Christian Democrats in Flanders (Witte et 
al., 2009: 425). My designation of sub-state nationalist parties has four key components: 
(1) the claim to represent a specific community or nation; (2) the mobilisation of the party 
in a specific territory; (3) the pursuit of a preferred constitutional or territorial outcome; 
and (4) the pursuit of these goals through democratic means.  
Firstly, sub-state nationalist parties claim act on the behalf of, and represent the interests 
of, a specific community or nation, broadly defined (Hepburn, 2010; Finlayson, 1998: 
105). This community or nation can be considered as ‘the historically settled and territorially 
concentrated societies that have developed national consciousness but do not have their own sovereign state’ 
(Lluch 2014: 4).  This claim of community is important as it indicates a sense of belonging, 
often rooted in historical experiences (Urwin 1983: 225). It represents an assumption that 
the community is distinctive and should be accorded some degree of self-government on 
the basis of its distinctiveness, manifesting in political claims for recognition and 
accommodation (Keating, 2001: 2; Brubaker, 2004: 115). This often takes the form of a 
claim to self-determination, based upon the idea that these communities or ‘nations have an 
inherent right to determine their own future’ (Lecours, 2012: 104). 
The focus on mobilising the community or national group within a specific territory 
forms the second component of my criteria (Urwin 1983: 23; Türsan, 1998: 5; Bulpitt, 
1983: 52; Linz, 1985: 205) Territory is a central concern for both sub-state nations and 
nation-states (Kaplan, 1999: 31) This focus on territory implies that parties will mobilise 
only within this specific territory, competing for votes within Catalonia, Flanders, 
Scotland, Wales, or Quebec rather than on a statewide level (Massetti, 2009: 503). These 
societies should be territorially based and ‘not coincident’ with the boundaries of the state 
(Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 128). This territorial component distinguishes sub-state 
nationalist parties from those representing a minority dispersed within a state. Kellas 
(2004: 10) goes so far as to describe this as a ‘territorial imperative’. A territorial basis is 
necessary, in practical terms, for political mobilisation and may also be linked with identity 
(Keating, 2001: 3; Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 128; Murphy, 2002: 196). In assessing ethno-
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regionalist parties, Urwin (1983: 232) declares that territory is the unifying factor within 
this party family, ‘the only thing’ that they all share. 
Thirdly, sub-state nationalist parties are characterised by the pursuit of their preferred 
constitutional or territorial outcome. Acting in the name of a territorially concentrated 
national group, a sub-state nationalist parties makes claims for some degree of recognition 
or self-government, usually as a result of some sense of dissatisfaction with the structure 
or behaviour of the central state (Mikesell & Murphy, 1991: 581). These goals will vary 
both between and within parties, with the degree of self-government claims ranging from 
autonomy to full independence as discussed in section 1.2. However, parties are unified 
by their ‘demand for political reorganisation of the existing national power structure’ for some sort of 
self-government (De Winter, 1998: 204). These goals may be justified with reference to 
cultural, economic, or political grievances, in language or cultural practices, or in a 
historical legacy of independence (Keating & McGarry, 2001: 6; Hepburn, 2009: 483; 
Keating & Gagnon, 2012). Their self-government goals, and the ways in which they are 
pursued, are of interest to this research.  
Finally, I restrict my focus here on parties which operate within democratic contexts 
and use democratic, primarily electoral, means of pursuing their goals. The means 
available to sub-state nationalist parties have been classified by Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 
146-7) in descending degree of radicalism to include violence and terror, civil 
disobedience, non-electoral mechanisms of political participation, the formation of 
specific political movements, and participation within mainstream parties. For the 
purpose of this research, I exclude movements which do not manifest as political parties 
and those parties which engage in extra-parliamentary means, including violence and 
political uprisings. This is rooted in my interest in political discourse and political strategy 
as itmanifests in electoral competition. It is also rooted in an assumption that nationalist 
politics fall within the realm of what Sorens (2008) describes as ‘normal politics’. In other 
words, it should not be treated as something exceptional or irrational, exempt from the 
compromises and negotiation of everyday negotiation.   
All cases examined in this thesis share these criteria in common, but it is the third criteria, 
the preferred constitutional or territorial outcome, or self-government goal, which is the 
object of my analysis. While sub-state nationalist parties share a criteria of pursuing self-
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government, how they label and substantiate their goals can vary across time and space 
and it is this variation that is of interest in this research.  
1.2 Sub-state nationalist parties and self-government 
goals 
Sub-state nationalist parties all make a ‘claim upon the state’ (Urwin, 1983: 232).  These goals 
have been described as ‘nationalist aspirations’ (Keating 2001), ‘operational objectives’ (Rudolph 
& Thompson, 1985: 294), ‘articulated aspirations’ (Mikesell & Murphy, 1991: 582), 
‘constitutional programmes’ (Tierney, 2005: 161), and ‘self-government demands’ (De Winter & 
Türsan, 1998).  
Within these claims or demands, we can find calls for various state structures, or ‘different 
degrees of preferred self-government’ (Dandoy, 2010: 215). These encompass a wide range of 
goals, some of which can be accommodated within the state, while others require external 
articulation, ranging from recognition and protection of a national minority to political 
independence (Keating, 2001: 7). For clarity, I will refer to self-government goals, using 
this term to refer to the range of constitutional aims and objectives of a sub-state 
nationalist party, adopting Rokkan and Urwin’s definition of these goals to refer to ‘the 
relationship between the periphery in question and the core of the state after the conflict has been resolved, 
as perceived by the movement’ (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 142).  
In this section, I will explore variation in self-government goals, examining existing 
typologies and critically assessing the utility of the distinctions drawn between different 
degrees of self-government, discussing what Schlesinger (1975: 840), in his analysis of 
political parties more generally, characterises as the ‘thorny problem’ of party goals.  
1.2.1 Typologies of self-government 
Efforts have been made to classify the self-government goals of sub-state nationalist 
parties, in the form of typologies. Largely, these typologies follow a similar schema, 
presenting goals on a spectrum, from less to more radical. This presentation suggests 
degrees of self-government and a potential for movement along the spectrum. As 
discussed below, classifications of the goals of sub-state nationalist parties typically divide 
goals into demands for protection, recognition, and access to the centre, demands for 
internal self-government, including autonomy and federalism, and demands for external 
self-government, including independence, irredentistisme, and rattachisme. These goals 
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are clearly ideal types, and parties may embrace or reject these labels or employ more 
creative or euphemistic terms.  
Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 143) present a ‘pyramid of peripheral aims’, with full integration of 
a minority group sitting at the bottom of the pyramid and full independence at the top. 
They suggest a process of escalation, with acts of ‘peripheral identity building’ to be followed 
by protest and mobilisation within regional structures. Rudolph and Thompson’s (1985) 
model outlines four types of goals held by ethnoterritorial movements which speaks to 
possible motivations. These include: (a) attempts to expand the resources available to a 
specific region; (b) a shift in the nature of political authority or where decisions are made; 
(c) changing the structure of the political regime through federalisation; (d) challenging 
the legitimacy of the state in favour of independence and irredentism (Rudolph & 
Thompson, 1985: 292)  
The schemas presented by De Winter and Türsan (1998), Bugajski (1994), Dandoy (2010) 
broadly follow this model, with some instances of variation. Dandoy (2010) draws a 
helpful distinction within the protectionist category between conservative protectionists, 
who seek preservation and recognition, and participationists, who seek integration at the 
centre. Dandoy’s classification also makes note of primary goals versus future aspirations 
which is often overlooked in static models. Coakley’s (1993: 6-7) model of demands 
follows a similar line of reasoning, distinguishing between demands for equality of 
citizenship, for cultural rights, for institutional political recognition, which may include 
autonomy or influence at the centre, and finally, for secession, defined broadly to include 
independence and irredentism. The Minorities at Risk coding schema focuses on the degree 
of challenge to the state that each claim presents. The scale is designed to capture 
movement,classified as radicalization or de-radicalization (Jenne et al, 2007: 545). 
The scale of ‘articulated aspirations’ offered by Mikesell and Murphy (1991) ranges from 
recognition to independence. Within what De Winter and Türsan (1998) or Dandoy 
(2010) would class broadly as protection, Mikesell and Murphy (1991 include recognition, 
as the acknowledgement of the group's existence and respect for its language or culture 
and access in the form of affirmative action, economic assistance, and anti-discrimination. 
Internal arrangements involve mechanisms for the participation of a minority group in 
policy making at the centre, separation, including community autonomy or exemptions 
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from societal norms, and autonomy, which is used broadly to include federalism, regional 
administrative decentralisation, and federalism. Finally, independence is an external form 
of self-government. While this takes into account both institutional and policy measures, 
they also note the challenges in classifying parties in this way. ‘Between recognition and 
participation and between separation and independence are numerous shadings of gray, exemplified by the 
ambivalent notions of “qualified access” and “semi-autonomy’’ (Mikesell & Murphy, 1991: 582). 
Snyder (1982) provides a more gradated typology of the ambitions of ‘mini-nationalists’, 
distinguishing between autonomy, semi-autonomy, semi-sovereignty, devolution, 
separatism, secession and independence. He draws a distinction between separatism, 
secession, and independence, with separatism forming the goal, secession as the formal 
act, and independence as ‘goal of complete freedom’ (Snyder, 1982). His contribution 
introduces a distinction between processes and goals but the exact boundaries of the self-
government goals presented in this framework are unclear.  
Müller-Rommel’s (1994: 186-7) work classifies nationalist and regionalist parties 
according to degrees of self-government but is distinct from other classifications on the 
basis of its inclusion of a broader international or supranational context which is of 
interest to this research. His first two categories are consistent with other typologies, 
including protectionist and autonomist parties but rather than classifying independence 
parties as one bloc, he examines the specific content of their self-government goals. 
Müller-Rommel distinguishes between left-libertarian federalists, which demand more 
radical constitutional reform but also make reference to the broader European context, 
particularly, given the time it was written, the Europe of the regions, and ‘separatist parties’ 
which adopt a more traditional conception of sovereignty and reject international 
integration. This distinction is an important one, capturing the positions of parties which 
seek far-reaching autonomy within the context of both the embedding state and the 
European Community (ibid: 186-7). However, it remains limited, failing to take into 
account how the goals of a party might also reflect relationships closer to home.  
There is a growing body of work that attempts to take into account the motivations and 
strategies of sub-state nationalist parties in expressing their demands, including Meadwell 
(2009), Massetti (2009) and Lluch (2014).  Although underspecified, Meadwell (2009) 
draws a distinction between ‘sincere secessionists’, those who are committed to the pursuit of 
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political independence and ‘insincere secessionists’, those who employ claims for 
independence as a means of extracting concessions falling short of this goal. I will return 
to his work on sub-state nationalist parties as strategic actors in the following section.    
Massetti (2009) also examines motivations and primary goals. He draws a distinction 
between autonomist parties - those who seek accommodation within the existing state 
structure whether through federalism, confederalism or devolution - and secessionist 
parties - those who seek withdrawal from the existing state. He then draws a further 
distinction within these two broad categories, in a classification that speaks to means, 
motivation and strategy, an important contribution to our understanding of self-
government goals (ibid: 505).  In Massetti’s schema, the autonomist bloc is composed of 
moderate autonomists, which advance more moderate requests or follow more outspoken 
competitors, while assertive autonomists are those that ‘seek extensive autonomy for their region 
and/or lead requests for federal (or even confederal) reforms’ (ibid: 505). Secessionist parties are 
divided by their means and commitment to the cause, with a distinction made between 
extremist/violent secessionists and strongly committed and ambiguous secessionist. 
Extremist secessionists are identified by their links with terrorist organisations and use of 
extra-parliamentary mechanisms. Strongly committed secessionists are identified by the 
salience of their independence objectives, ‘keep[ing] their policy of independence and their claims 
to self-determination continuously upfront in their discourse and documents, even in periods when they 
negotiate solutions short of independence’. Ambiguous secessionists use ambiguous formulae, or 
downplay their self-government goals over time (ibid: 505). While the distinction drawn 
by Massetti on degrees of autonomy is captured in previous models, the distinction 
between ambiguous and strongly committed secessionists is a helpful one, speaking to 
both discourse and strategy. Massetti’s work also acknowledges the potential for parties 
to shift over time.  
Lluch’s 2014 model, applied to Catalan and Quebecois nationalists, focuses on the ‘visions 
of sovereignty’ or ‘orientations’ of sub-state nationalist movements in an attempt to capture 
the ‘complex rainbow of political preferences’ (Lluch, 2014: 6). This model, like earlier efforts, 
places these orientations on a spectrum, from least to most decentralising but also 
attempts to take into account some of the motivational factors at play in the pursuit of 
self-government goals. It also looks at variation within sub-state nationalist communities 
in which debates take place over the appropriate degree of sovereignty to be sought.  
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Lluch draws a distinction between federalists, autonomists, and independentists but 
introduces a motivational element to his classification by distinguishing between 
instrumental and teleological actors. Instrumental actors see autonomy as ‘a valuable vehicle 
for achieving their self-determination objectives’ but acknowledge that autonomy may be a 
stepping stone towards greater autonomy. In contrast, teleological autonomists see 
autonomy as the ‘end result of their political requests’ (ibid: 21). Lluch’s definition of 
autonomism, ‘the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government’, suggests a progression, 
or an assumption that parties will call for more powers (ibid: 177). He goes on to 
distinguish between ‘traditional federalist’ parties, in which federalism is a means of satisfying 
the demands of a sub-state nationalist community and ‘instrumental federalists’, for whom 
federalism may be a stepping stone. Independentist parties are further subdivided into 
pactists, which seek to negotiate continued political or economic association with the 
embedding state, and principled independentist, who Lluch suggests tend to advocate a 
‘complete rupture with the majority nation’ (ibid: 151). Presented as a spectrum of goals, Lluch 
identifies federalist goals as most moderate, followed by teleological autonomists, 
instrumental federalists, instrumental autonomists, and independentists goals on the 
radical end of the spectrum (ibid: 21). While Lluch’s model provides a useful insight into 
within-case variation and short and long-term self-government goals, it does not speak 
directly to the justifications for self-government, an area which this research seeks to 
expand upon.  
Although the models presented vary in their specificity and presentation, they all suggest 
that self-government goals, labelled broadly, take the form of a continuum, ranging from 
moderate demands for recognition and protection (Sorens, 2008: 326; Jenne et al, 2007: 
546; Dandoy, 2010), to demands for internal self-government, including autonomy and 
federalism (Mancini, 2008: 566), to external self-government, which includes demands 
for confederalism, political independence or irredentism. My interest in this research sits 
within the more radical end of the spectrum, encompassing demands for internal and 
external self-government which involve a radical reform or dismantlement of the 
embedding state.  
Confederalism and political independence require additional specification, due to the way 
in which the terms are employed in political discourse and their relevance to the cases 
examined here. Lluch (2014: 149) describes the use of the term confederalism by 
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nationalist politicians as ‘conceptually muddled’, departing from traditional academic 
definitions. Here, I depart from other scholars in classifying confederalism, with 
independence, as external self-government, rather than as a model of internal self-
government. Confederalist parties seek the inversion of the federal model, a scenario in 
which constituent confederal units decide which powers are awarded to the centre, a 
model which implies a shift in where autonomy lies (Dandoy, 2010: 207).  Swenden (2006: 
13), informed by its use in the Belgian case,outlines four characteristics of a confederal 
arrangement which makes it distinct from a federal arrangement, noting (1) confederal 
entities retain their sovereignty; (2) unlike in a federal structure, these entities retain their 
right to withdraw; (3) confederal centres ‘do not act directly upon the people’, and (4) decisions 
of the centre require the consent of all units. This goal suggests a desire to maintain some 
of the trappings of the state, even in a hollowed form, while at the same time according 
sovereignty to its constituent units, blurring the distinction between internal and external 
self-government. However, because of where power is considered to be located, I treat it 
as a form of external self-government. 
Definitions of independence stress three main components related to the process of 
independence or the act of withdrawl: the location of sovereignty; and international 
recognition. Firstly, the process of independence involves an act of secession or 
separation - the exit of a specified territory from a state and the formation of a new state 
(Brancati, 2014: 76; Dandoy, 2010; Wolff, 2004: 5). Put simply, state-seeking parties are 
those ‘wanting to substitute new states for the old’ (Keating, 2001). Tierney describes ‘statist 
secessionism’ in which actors seek to form a new nation-state (Tierney, 2005: 172). Secondly, 
this newly formed state is to be considered as sovereign, with the transfer of sovereignty 
from the old state to the new (Dandoy, 2010). Sovereignty is of course a contested 
concept, with both sub-state nationalists and states themselves acknowledging its 
changing nature. Finally, it will seek and achieve international legal recognition.  
1.2.2 A thorny problem of self-government goals 
While the models discussed above provide a good way of classifying and sorting sub-state 
nationalist parties at a single point in time, they are ideal types and have significant 
limitations. Scholars of party politics note the challenges in identifying the true goals of a 
party, or the ‘thorny problem of party goals’ (Schlesinger, 1975: 840). This challenge is said to 
be rooted in the plurality of goals held by members of a single organisation (Panebianco, 
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1988; 7; Schlesinger, 1975: 840), the likelihood of goals changing, and the difficulty in 
identifying the ‘true’ goal of the party (Laver, 2014), or their stated goals versus what would 
be pursued in office (Mair, 1989: 170). Laver (2014) notes that, within any party, there 
may be ‘conscious sincere private desires’, ‘publically stated positions’, ‘policies the person might actually 
implement’ and ‘policies actually implemented’. Although sub-state nationalist parties are unified 
by their raison d'être, the goal of self-government, identifying the nature and extent of 
this goal can be challenging. 
The utility of existing typologies of the goal-orientation of sub-state autonomist and 
nationalist parties is limited as a result of, and to varying degrees by: (1) the tendency to 
treat parties as static actors, obscuring both variation over time and divides within a single 
party; (2) divisions within the party; (3) the challenges of cross-case comparison as a result 
of variation in language; and (4) the tendency to take labels at face value rather than 
evaluating what these self-government goals actually contain and mean. Finally, there is a 
tendency, although diminished, of treating all sub-state nationalist parties, no matter their 
stated goals, as seeking, political independence. Each of these will be addressed in turn. 
Firstly, the classification of a given party by its self-government goal treats parties as static, 
an assumption that has been acknowledged as problematic in the literature (Hepburn, 
2010: 42; Dandoy, 2010; De Winter, 1998: 208). Temporal variation can take two forms: 
change over time in response to emerging events; and a strategic component which draws 
a distinction between near and long-term goals. Parties may adapt their goals in response 
to emerging events, for example, changing external conditions, the partial achievement of 
goals, or the response of the state. In addition, there may be a strategic temporal 
dimension, with a given party holding two or more goals simultaneously, one to be 
pursued in the near-term, with other goals for the medium to long-term, or as an ultimate 
aspiration of the party. Toubeau (2011: 432) suggests ‘it is often genuinely difficult to determine 
whether a party’s expressed goal represents a sincerely held belief or a short-term tactic for reaching a longer 
term political objective’. For example, parties may use moderate aspirations to mask more 
radical goals, or express radical goals in the hope of reaching a more moderate 
compromise. Sorens (2008: 328-9) draws a distinction between ‘unconditional secessionism’, 
in which ‘no amount of within-state autonomy that the central government is likely to offer would satisfy 
regional ambitions’, and ‘conditional secessionism’, in which some degree of autonomy might be 
favoured over none. Tierney describes this complexity, noting that parties may pursue 
The Art of the Possible 
1 Conceptualizing sub-state nationalist parties  20 
accommodation within the state while at the same time seeking opportunities for 
participation on the international stage, with sub-state nationalist parties employing ‘a 
deeply ambivalent strategy of operating more effectively inside, and when the opportunity avails itself and 
is attractive, partly beyond, the nation-state’ (Tierney, 2005: 162). Parties may pursue a more 
radical goal in the long-term while seeking to increase the power and capacity of the sub-
state government in the short term (Coppetiers, 2003: 5). They may also be willing to 
settle for less than their stated goal, accepting significant autonomy in place of 
independent statehood (Kellas, 2004: 11; Coppetiers, 2003: 5).  
Secondly, a focus on classifying parties can overlook internal divisions within the party – 
on both the ultimate goal and the strategic pursuit of this goal. Although unified by a 
demand for self-government, members of sub-state nationalist parties may have differing 
preferences or visions of what that self-government should entail (Dandoy, 2010; 
Hepburn, 2010: 42; Fagerholm, 2016). Different goals may be held by members of a 
political party, with factions advocating federalism or confederalism, while others 
advocate political independence. The stated self-government goal of a party may reflect 
internal power dynamics or the predominance of one faction or another (Gomes-Reino 
et al., 2006: 251). Internal variation in preferences has been documented both within sub-
state national societies (Muñoz & Guinjoan, 2013; Conversi, 2000; Lluch, 2012) but also 
within parties themselves, including the Volksunie (Wauters, 2005), the Scottish National 
Party (Mitchell et al, 2012; Brand, 1992). Voters may back a party but not back their self-
government goals. While these internal dynamics are beyond the scope of research, it is 
an important potential explanation of change over time. 
Thirdly, and relevant to cross-case comparisons, a reliance on a party’s self-identification 
can inhibit comparison. Labels are used differently in different contexts, making 
comparison more difficult. Parties might also be strategically ambiguous when setting out 
their goals, using an adaptation of an existing territorial arrangement, or foregoing these 
terms all together in favour of the language of freedom or home rule (Connor, 1994: 83; 
McCrone, 1998: 145). Variation can also take place over time, reflecting both the language 
and constitutional tendencies of the day (Keating & Gagnon, 2012). Parties may use the 
familiar labels of autonomy, devolution, federalism, confederalism or independence, but 
employ them in a way that reflects contemporary circumstances or political contexts. 
Some objectives are explicitly used in ways that appear to combine both radical secession 
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and continued relationships with the state from which the sub-state nationalist parties aim 
to secede, as in the goals of sovereignty-association and sovereignty partnership employed 
by the Parti Québécois in the 1980 and 1995 referendums respectively (Gagnon & 
LaChapelle, 1996). 
Fourthly, and most relevant to this research is the focus on labelling rather than content. 
While we may be able to classify parties according to their stated goals, what do these 
goals actually mean and what conditions do they reflect? Self-government goals are 
increasingly complex, reflecting dynamics internal to the state in which a party operates 
and the broader external context which is characterised by interdependence. In response, 
Hepburn (2010: 40) argues that parties are ‘searching for forms of autonomy that are less clear than 
independent statehood’. The changing nature of self-government goals is increasingly 
acknowledged when it comes to the international context, with sovereignty considered to 
have diminished salience in the contemporary world (Keating, 2001; MacCormick, 2010; 
Tierney, 2005; Keating & Gagnon, 2012). In response to processes of globalisation, 
Europeanisation, and increasing interdependence, parties may have ‘rethought their aims and 
strategy in light of these developments, often drawing on older traditions in the process’ (Keating, 2001: 
59). Keating argues that sub-state nationalist parties have been flexible, looking beyond 
Westphalian traditions to forms of coordination and management, including close 
associations. As a result, ‘independent statehood no longer means what it once did’ (Keating & 
Gagnon, 2012: 4). While these analyses provide valuable insights into a party’s 
understanding of what self-government means vis-à-vis the international institutional 
context, other contexts remain important, including the development of the internal 
structures of the state and the dynamics of the party system in which sub-state nationalist 
parties pursue their self-government goals.  
A final point should be addressed here – namely the tendency, in some older branches of 
the literature, to automatically equate the self-government sought by sub-state nationalist 
parties with the pursuit of independence, overtly or covertly (Gellner, 1983; Kaplan, 
1999). Ernest Gellner (1983: 51) describes the linkage between the nation and the state as 
nations needing statehood, just as ‘every girl ought to have a husband’ while Kaplan (1999) 
argues that state sovereignty is ‘essential’, arguing that ‘Self-described nations are either in charge 
of their political destiny or share in the goals of eventual self-determination’. Kellas’ (2004: 11) 
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assertion that nationalists ‘may settle for less’ but will ultimately seek nation-statehood 
suggests a similar perspective.  
Despite these statements, there is wide variation in the self-government goals pursued by 
parties.Explicit support of independence as a self-government goal is relatively rare within 
Western contexts (Connor, 1994: 82; Keating, 2001: 8; Tierney, 2005: 176; Norman, 2006: 
75; Brubaker, 2004: 116; Buchanan, 2004: 332). Keating (2001: 11) challenges the equation 
of a desire for self-government with a desire for independence, arguing ‘there is nothing 
inconsistent in the idea that stateless nations may have the rights to self-government which are limited by 
reciprocal obligations and the rights of other nations, and so fall short of statehood’. Sutherland (2011: 
104) calls into question ‘[t]he image of all sub-state nationalists as separatist and isolationist, obsessed 
with having their own state and achieving absolute sovereignty, complete with connotations of autarchy’ as 
anachronistic and inaccurate. This is understandable if we start from the assumption that 
sub-state nationalist parties as rational actors, seeking an achievable solution. By focusing 
narrowly on parties seeking independence as a separate class ‘is to ignore the infinitely protean 
nature of nationalist politics’ (Brubaker, 1996: 276). As a result, in this work, I accept the 
proposition, put forth by Sambanis and Milanovic (2011) that there is ‘no natural divide 
between these phenomena’, as they represent the same process. However, I contend that there 
may be a distinction to be drawn between internal and external manifestations of goals 
which may affect the level and type of engagement with the external contexts.  
More broadly, an overemphasis on classification risks introducing an artificial distinction 
between parties on the basis of their goals, when these parties may be more fruitfully 
analysed as part of the same phenomenon. There may, however, be variation in levels and 
types of engagement with the external contexts. Wewould expect parties seeking external 
self-government to engage more fully with the international and European context. 
The fact that we encounter challenges in classifying sub-state nationalist parties according 
to their self-government goals suggests something about the parties themselves. Parties 
may modify their goals to reflect the internal composition and power dynamics within 
their own parties, employing ambiguous language to maximise votes or capitalise on 
public preferences, and pursuing goals in the short and long term, viewing more moderate 
goals as a stepping stone towards more radical self-government. Each is advancing a goal 
which they consider to reconcile the need for self-government with the constraints and 
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opportunities posed by the system in which they are operating, reflecting the art of the 
possible. In the following section, I will outline my assumptions about parties as rational 
actors before turning to the dimensions of self-government. Together, they provide the 
theoretical framework for the research which follows.  
1.3   Sub-state nationalist parties: assessing strategy 
and rationality 
This research rests on the assertion that sub-state nationalist parties, like parties more 
generally, are rational actors, with self-government goals forming their raison d’être. We 
can see evidence of this rationality in two interrelated dimensions: firstly, the ways in 
which parties seek to realise their self-government goals, and secondly, the way that self-
government goals are adapted to the context in which they are articulated. The goal of 
this research is to capture the interaction between these beliefs and political behaviour, 
studying sub-state nationalist parties in what Newman describes ‘the banality of their stretch 
for political power’ (Newman, 2000: 28). 
This notion of sub-state nationalist parties as rational has been, at points, contested within 
the literature. Halliday (2000: 159) takes the position that nationalism is inherently 
irrational, ‘to apply any calculus of cost and benefit to national self-determination, to treat it as a 
normative aspiration that is subject to any other, higher, normative or prudential evaluation, is to challenge 
its self-definition’. However, there is a growing body of literature which suggests that sub-
state nationalist parties are strategic, both in their political behaviour and in the 
articulation of their self-government goals.  
In the section which follows, I will discuss the understanding of parties more generally as 
rational actors, before turning to the specific literature which explores the rationality of 
sub-state nationalist parties.. I will then present Varshney’s (2003) conceptualization of 
nationalism as an interplay between value and instrumental rationality, which will be 
underpin this work. I will then assess some of the constraints on sub-state nationalist 
parties.   
1.3.1 Sub-state nationalism: goals and strategy 
Unlike traditional parties, sub-state nationalist parties have been, at times, treated as static 
actors, unable to behave strategically in pursuit of their self-government goals. This is a 
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result of a tendency to treat nationalism as inherently irrational rather than subject to 
rational assessments of costs, benefits, and self-interest (Hardin, 1995: 14). It is also 
rooted in a now contested assumption thatsub-state nationalist parties are niche actors, 
defined by what they offer rather than their ability to adapt to the preferences of their 
supporters or voters (Meguid, 2005; 2008; Jensen & Spoon, 2010). Niche parties were 
first defined by Meguid (2005) on the basis of their rejection of the traditional class-based 
orientation of politics, their mobilization on issues outside the standard dimension of 
party politics, and positioning on a limited range of issues. Niche parties were perceived 
as less strategic, unwilling to compromise on core issues in order to enter into government 
or gain votes.  The classification of sub-state nationalist parties as niche has been 
challenged, with Hepburn (2009: 489) arguing that some sub-state nationalist parties have 
moved ‘from niche to normal’. Wagner’s (2012: 848) assessment of nicheness requires that 
parties focus exclusively on the issue of decentralisation, disregarding economic and other 
policy issues (see Elias, 2009a, Alonso, 2012, and Lluch, 2014 for discussions of the 
nicheness of sub-state nationalist parties). 
On the basis of this assumption, we can look at the broader party literature on party goals 
and the ways in which parties may modify their goals in a competitive context. We can 
understand parties in two ways, (1) as inherently conservative actors wary of the risks 
associated with shifts in positions or (2) as rational actors in pursuit of certain benefits 
shifting positions accordingly (Harmel & Janda; 1994; Harmel et al, 1995). In reality, 
parties are both opportunistic and cautious. For Janda (1990), parties are understood as 
‘adaptive agents in search of votes’, whether in present or future electoral competitions. Parties 
may shift their positions to maintain or maximise their electoral support but they act 
within certain constraints. These constraints originate from the voter, from the 
organisational structure of the party, and from the institution context in which the party 
operates (Strøm, 1990: 566). Parties therefore need to maintain a minimum degree of 
credibility, as ‘[e]ven in a world of selfish utility-maximizers a reputation for responsibility and 
reliability is worth votes’ (Budge & Keman, 1993). Smaller parties, like single-issue parties or 
substate nationalist parties, according to Harmel et al (1995: 5), may be less driven by 
electoral goals and therefore, less likely to shift in response to changes in vote share. The 
sensitivity of parties, or their predisposition to adapt their goals can be understood with 
reference to their orientation. 
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The model in which parties are votes-seeking, office-seeking, or policy-seeking, 
introduced by Strøm (1990) is at its core a model of rational behaviour by political actors. 
According to this model, each party has a ‘primary goal’, whether votes, office, or policy 
(ibid). This varies between parties in a party system, suggesting that some parties are more 
committed to policy, while others prioritise votes and still others, office (Harmel & Janda, 
1994: 265). Parties with vote-seeking, office-seeking, or policy-seeking orientations are 
faced with the question of ‘how to define their private desires (eg. for office or a theocratic state) into 
an acceptable public position that will not repel votes’ (Budge, 2006). 
Following the tradition of Downs, the parties are generally understood as vote-seeking, 
specifically vote-maximizing, moving strategically to capture the maximum number of 
votes (Downs, 1957). Votes can be used instrumentally and can be thought of as political 
currency used to purchase office or policy (Strøm, 1990: 573). Parties primarily motivated 
by votes are likely to adapt their positions to maximise votes. In contrast, small parties, 
which cater to a limited segment of the electorate may ‘defy the logic of catch-all’ competition 
and have less flexibility in their movements (Strøm, 1990). 
Office-seeking goals are closely linked with the prioritisation of votes.  Office-seeking can 
be understood as the pursuit of two objectives, firstly, the pursuit of seats within the 
parliament or representative body and secondly, of participation in the governing body or 
coalition (Strøm, 1990: 567; Wolinetz, 2006: 152). Budge and Laver explain the complexity 
in understanding office-seeking behaviour, noting that office may be a means of achieving 
power in a Downsian sense or alternatively, it maybe be valued instrumentally ‘for the ability 
that it gives to influence policy outputs’ (Budge & Laver, 1986: 490). In the context of electoral 
competition, office-seeking parties will therefore ‘avoid policy commitments which might make 
it undesirable as a coalition party and eschew electoral strategies, such as attacking electoral prospective 
partners too fiercely, which would make coalitions impossible’ (Wolinetz, 2006: 152). Even new 
parties, green, new right, or sub-state nationalist parties, tend to orient themselves towards 
the pursuit of office, at least at some levels of government (Katz & Mair, 2002). However, 
the decision might be made to exercise ‘oppositional influence’ and avoid the policy 
compromises required by participation (Strøm, 1984: 211). There is a temporal and 
contextual element to these orientations, with parties pursuing office in some contexts, 
policy in others (Harmel & Janda, 1994: 265).  
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Amidst a system in which many democratic parties are considered catch-all parties, policy-
seeking behaviour by parties is under-theorised (Strøm, 1990: 568). Despite the lack of a 
coherent theory on the subject, all parties, like governments, are obliged to formulate 
policies (Mair, 1989: 171). New parties are understood to be more policy-oriented, and 
policy-seeking parties may ‘more often than not gave greater priority to articulation or defence of its 
policies than to either the maximization of votes or securing office’ (Wolinetz, 2006: 151). The 
primacy of policy-seeking often originates at the party’s foundation, Szarka describe it as 
a ‘foundational choice to act as a political party having specific objectives' (Szarka, 2004: 305) 
These goals are interrelated and reflect strategic considerations as well as the broader 
context in which they take place. Vote-maximisers with specific policy aims may pursue 
these aims by using votes to secure their entry into office where they can directly influence 
policy. Alternatively, they may use votesto demonstrate a pressing need for action on a 
specific policy area (Pedersen, 2012: 2). In a multi-level system, parties may pursue office 
at one level while seeking the implementation of a policy, through the pursuit of votes, at 
another level.  
The literature on sub-state nationalist parties tends to overlook this model when 
examining the motivations and behaviour of sub-state nationalist parties, although the 
dilemma posed by votes, office, and policy orientations has been examined in the case of 
new right and green parties (see Heinisch, 2003; Alonso, 2012; Minkenberg, 2001). It 
provides a useful way of understanding both party behavior and conceptions of the party 
itself. Sub-state nationalist parties are vote-seeking, and indeed ‘vote-maximizing’ but may 
use votes differently than their statewide counterparts(Alonso, 2012). They may be limited 
by the fact that they campaign only within the boundaries of the nation and may also face 
limitations in exchanging these votes for office, particularly in a system which has not yet 
decentralised. Strategically, there may also be limitations on vote-maximizing behaviour; 
while statewide rivals may move to the centre to capture the maximum number of votes, 
sub-state nationalist parties may be less likely to compromise on their core self-
government goals, which makes them distinct from their political rivals. There is also 
evidence to suggest that sub-state nationalist parties are less sensitive to electoral defeat 
than their rivals, at least in regards to their core goals (Adams et al, 2006). Office-seeking 
behavior may also be limited, particularly in centralized systems or systems in which 
traditional parties are reluctant to enter into government with a sub-state nationalist party. 
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At their core, sub-state nationalist parties can be understood as fundamentally policy-
seeking, mobilizing around their raison d’être of self-government and pursuing this policy. 
However, this is not to suggest that parties are not strategic, both in their use of votes in 
pursuit of their goals, and their emphasis on these goals in the arena of party competition.  
The consideration of strategy is particularly relevant to the study of parties of interest to 
this research – electorally successful parties competing within a democratic context. 
Parties are not pursuing a pure goal but may instead adapt and modify their goal to reflect 
the system in which they are operating. Their ability to pursue this goal is dependent on 
their level of success at the polls. Evidence of this rationality is found in discussions of 
electoral behaviour, approach towards government, and within the self-government goals 
themselves. Although the vote maximizing behaviour of sub-state nationalist parties 
might be naturally limited to those within the territory, and those sharing to a degree the 
territorial ambitions of the party, parties are expected to behave as strategic actors within 
an electoral context. Alonso argues that sub-state nationalist parties are not, as sometimes 
assumed, ‘defenders of the eternal flame of national liberation’ but are instead ‘vote-maximizing actors 
in competition with mainstream left-wing and right-wing parties’ (Alonso, 2012). As a result, they 
will ‘take into account the political moves of other players; they evaluate the likely consequences of various 
actions on the fortunes of their partners and opponents’ (Detterbeck, 2012: 46). 
This is evident in a party’s positioning on other dimensions of electoral competition, 
including the left-right dimension. At their origins, sub-state nationalist parties did not 
generally adopt positions on the ideological spectrum, fearing that they would divide or 
alienate voters (Newman, 1994; Rovny, 2013). They have done so as their electoral success 
increased, and have been found at all points on the ideological spectrum (Gomez-Reino 
et al, 2006; Erk 2005; Erk; 2010; Elias et al, 2015; Alonso, 2012; De Winter, 1998; 
Guibernau, 1996; Tronconi, 2006). This ‘ideological thickening’ (Hepburn, 2009: 489) was 
motivated by a need to broaden the range of issues on which sub-state nationalist parties 
competed, often when faced with theprospect of entering into government. This two-
dimensional programmatic profile can be understood as a vote-maximizing strategy, 
combining ‘properiphery positions with issues that will attract less aligned voters’ (Alonso, 2012).  
Parties are rarely innovators, acting in ideological terms as ‘intrinsically catch-all parties’ (De 
Winter, 1998: 223).  
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Parties are also expected to take positions on the issues of the day, those which transcend 
ideological divides and introduce new arenas for competition, like globalisation and 
Europeanisation (Lecours, 2012: 279). ‘As parties that aspire to govern one day their respective 
peripheral territories, they need to show that they are able to address all the problems that worry voters’ 
(Alonso, 2012). We see this in areas of Europeanisation (Keating, 2008; Hepburn 2008; 
Hepburn, 2012; Jolly 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Elias 2000; Dardanelli, 2001), the 
welfare state (Beland & Lecours, 2006; McEwen, 2006), migration (Banting & Soroka, 
2012; Adam, 2013; Barker, 2015; Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014), and energy and 
environmental policy (McEwen & Bomberg, 2014). This is a result, in part, of the office-
seeking ambitions of these parties, in which they are required to prove that they are a 
viable and credible party of government, able to mobilise on the basis of self-government 
but also salient policies. 
Entry into government also has strategic implications. Pedersen (2012: 1) describes the 
realities of coalition, saying ‘A party has to moderate its own policy principles in order to join winning 
coalitions and influence public policy’. Moving from ‘protest to power’ can be an important and 
risky step in the lifespan of a sub-state nationalist party (Elias and Tronconi, 2011) and a 
growing body of literature captures the experience of parties in government (See for 
instance: McAngus, 2015 on Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party, and the 2011 
Elias and Tronconi edited collection). Participation in government, either alone or in 
coalition, enables sub-state nationalist parties to pursue their self-government goals 
directly rather than through influence on parties in government. Decentralisation in Spain, 
Belgium, Italy, and the United Kingdom opened up new opportunities for sub-state 
nationalist parties to pursue government at a level more appropriate to their ambitions 
(Elias, 2009a: 553). Participation at the sub-state level positions parties to act as the ‘official’ 
defender of the interests of the regions, increasing their profile and allow for negotiations 
at the centre (Hepburn, 2011: 11).  
Participation at the central level may be both more and less appealing for sub-state 
nationalist parties. The central level serves as the forum in which ‘decisions about the 
reorganization of political authority take place’, but participation here can also be fraught with 
risk, particularly for junior partners(Elias, 2009a: 553; see also Elias & Tronconi, 2011: 4). 
Albertazzi and McDonnell (2005: 966) describe the ‘eternal dilemma’ of electorally 
successful regionalist parties faced with the prospect of entry into government, a choice 
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between retaining purity at the expense of exercising influence, or gaining influence at the 
risk of losing credibility among supporters. Participation may imply recognition of the 
legitimacy of the central state which can seem at odds with the self-government goals of 
a given party (McDonnell & Newell, 2011: 447). As a result, participation is relatively rare, 
limited to the Lega Nord in Italy, the Volksunie, in the 1970s, and more recently, the entry 
of the N-VA to federal government following the 2014 elections in Belgium. 
A large and growing body of literature examines the approach of sub-state nationalist 
parties towards European integration, suggesting more creative models of self-
government (Beyers & Bursens, 2006; Dardanelli, 2012; Elias, 2011; Hepburn, 2008; 
Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Jolly, 2006; Keating, 2008). Keating speaks to theinfluence of the 
external context, identifying a growing tendency towards autonomist demands, 
representative of a ‘consensus on the desirability and legitimacy of limited self-government within the 
state and broader supranational and transnational orders’ (Keating, 2012: 13). These all suggest 
an interaction with institutional structures and systems which should be explored in 
greater detail. 
Discussions of will and capacity and the viability of a self-governing unit all suggest that 
these parties are rational actors (Hechter, 2000: 3). Meadwell (2005) argues political actors 
may be quite principled, possessing ‘prescriptive’ or ‘non-instrumental cognitive beliefs’ which 
would see political borders aligned with national borders, but in order to engage in 
politics, they ‘have to think instrumentally’, assessing the consequences of their moves. 
Lluch's analysis of visions of sovereignty made an attempt to capture some of these 
motivations in the case of Catalan and Quebecois nationalist parties. He drew a distinction 
between instrumental and teleological autonomists, with instrumental autonomists seeing 
autonomy 'as a valuable vehicle for achieving their self-determination objectives' while acknowledging 
that autonomy may be a building block or stepping stone to sovereignty, while teleological 
autonomists seek autonomy tout court, even when they might make appeals to 
sovereignty as a negotiating tactic (Lluch, 2014).  
Urwin (1992) posits that ideological development may lead to a moderation in goals as 
parties become aware that ‘the promised land would not necessarily be the one of milk and honey…’ 
suggesting a rational approach to self-government goals that is at the core of this research. 
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1.3.2 Value and instrumental rationality: the pursuit of self-
government 
Varshney’s (2003) work embodies this sentiment, viewing nationalism as both rational 
and irrational. In his work, Varshney employs Weber’s model of social action – of value 
rationality and instrumental rationality – in an attempt to capture both motivation and 
strategy. Value rationality is derived from an actor’s conscious ‘ethical, aesthetic, religious or 
other’ beliefs which exist independently of their prospect for success. These values are 
constraining, limiting the choices available to nationalist actors. In this case, ‘[s]ome spheres 
or goals of life are considered so valuable that they would not normally be up for sale or compromise, 
however costly the pursuit of their realisation might be’ (ibid: 86). For example, the belief in the 
existence of the nation would prohibit actors from supporting the assimilation into the 
majority group, even under duress. In contrast, instrumental rationality comes closer to a 
rational choice model, with actors engaging in a ‘strict cost-benefit calculus with respect to goals, 
necessitating the abandonment of goals if the costs of realising them are too high’ (ibid: 86).  
Both value and instrumental rationality are employed by sub-state nationalist parties – 
oriented towards the values of nationhood, self-determination, and self-government but 
also taking into account practical concernswhen assessing the costs and benefits of a given 
course of action. We see evidence of this in the variation of self-government goals put 
forth by sub-state nationalist parties, with parties expressing their belief in the existence 
of the nation and its right to self-determination but seeking different forms of self-
government. These goals therefore reflect rational considerations, both internal and 
external to the party.   
Claims for self-government are rooted in value rationality, the belief that the nation 
requires self-government, and instrumental rationality, with self-government serving a 
specific purpose. The claim to nationhood and therefore self-government is insufficient, 
and claims put forward by sub-state nationalist parties suggest self-government will serve 
a practical purpose (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2014: 4). Sub-state nationalist parties are 
increasingly policy focused, taking a nationalist position on ‘hot topics’ (Lecours, 2012: 279). 
These include democratic representation, economic prosperity, cultural survival, and 
social policy (Lecours, 2012; Alonso, 2012; Miller, 1995). The nature of these claims is 
closely linked with the nature of the grievance identified by a party or movement. These 
vary, both between parties and over time and can include economic incentives, rooted in 
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inequalities between the centre and the periphery as well as opportunities available to the 
sub-state nation (Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 1977; Nairn, 1977; Munoz & Tormos, 2015; 
Brancati, 2014; Gerard, 2014; Gomez Fortes & Cabeza Perez 2013; Praeger, 1997), 
conflicts over culture, language, and symbols (Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1998), a history of 
political independence (Siroky & Cuffe, 2015) and the structure of the state (Breuilly, 
1993). These justifications may also centre on specific aspects of social and welfare policy 
(Beland & Lecours, 2008; Lecours, 2012; McEwen, 2002 and 2006), and concerns about 
democratic representation (Buchanan, 1998). Other policies have also become a vehicle 
for sub-state nationalist mobilisation, with parties weighing in new issue areas, which 
include the environment (McEwen & Bomberg, 2014; Royles & McEwen, 2015; Ross & 
Jones, 2016) and immigration (Hepburn, 2009; Jeram, 2014; Barker, 2014). These are used 
as a means of stressing distinctiveness – of the sub-state nationalist party and the nation 
it claims to represent. 
1.3.3 Institutional contexts: ideas and strategy  
If we accept the proposition that sub-state nationalist parties arerational and strategic 
actors, we can argue that the context in which they operate does matter and must be 
considered. Historical institutionalism represents a productive lens through which sub-
state nationalist party goals can be analysed. Lecours (2005: 176) argues that while 
students of nationalism have not yet fully engaged with trends of new and historical 
institutionalism, these ideas can be fruitfully employed to strengthen analyses of sub-state 
nationalism. 
The adoption of a historical institutionalist perspective, according to Lecours (2005: 186), 
does not require the researcher to discount the importance of culture, identity and 
socioeconomic conditions but allows them to leverage institutions for greater depth of 
analysis. Broschek’s (2015) work on authority migration in multilevel systems employed a 
historical institutionalist approach, examining the role of ideas and processes in shaping 
whether centralisation or decentralisation occurred. He states that ‘[w]hile actors ultimately 
are the agents of continuity and change, it is necessary to uncover how they are positioned within man-
made, historically established institutional settings that guide their behavior’ (ibid: 7). This approach 
informs the theoretical framework and research design adopted.  
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In this research, I draw on principles of historical institutionalism as well as recent strains 
of discursive institutionalism which emphasises ideational and constructive concepts, in 
an effort to address some of the weaknesses of rational choice institutionalism. These 
include a tendency to remove cases from their temporal context and treat them as ‘short 
term, relatively presentist, and closely linked to particularly strategic situations with particular structures 
of payoff’ (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005). By drawing broadly on new institutionalist 
models, in what Thelen (1999) describes as ‘creative combinations’, we can emphasise and 
explore the role of ‘context, situations, and institutions’ (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005) In the 
HI view, ‘behaviour, attitudes and strategic choices take place inside particular social, political, economic, 
and even cultural contexts’ (Steinmo, 2008).  
Historical institutionalism is defined by its goals, ‘explaining real world outcomes, using history 
as an analytic tool’ (Steinmo, 2008). Historical institutionalists do stress the role played by 
institutions but also look to socioeconomic factors and the influence of the values, beliefs, 
and ideas held by the individual actors, developing a framework that accounts for the 
actor and the context in which they operate (Hall & Taylor, 2006: 946; Ma, 2007: 64). 
While actors are rational, their rationality is ‘bounded’ and preferences change according to 
context (Nee, 1998; Lecours, 2000: 517). Parties are expected to interpret and respond to 
the context in which they operate. They may be guided by their sense of how a nationalist 
party should behave in a given context, responding to proposed state reforms, entering 
into government, or advancing or rejecting certain policy platforms, according to the ‘logic 
of appropriateness’, in which actors ‘seek[s] to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, 
a membership in a political community or group’ (March & Olsen, 2011).   
This is rooted in ideas and perceptions about the values of the party and the instrumental 
pursuit of self-government goals. These ‘interpretations of the environment’ can shape the 
behaviour of actors (Hay, 2002: 166). As a result, actors ‘contextualize their preferences based 
on the particular institutional incentives that they face in different settings’ (Thelen, 1999: 376).  These 
interpretations take the form of perceptions, which Deschouwer (1992: 17) describes as 
the ‘intermediate variable’ between ‘objective facts and the reactions of the party’ or ideas.   By 
examining the ideas held by sub-state nationalist parties, uncovered through an analysis 
of their presentation and framing of issues, we can capture the ways in which they operate 
within a broader system of constraints.  
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A growing body of work, within both historical institutionalist and discursive 
institutionalist traditions and elsewhere, seeks to understand the role of ideas.  Ideas are 
considered to be at the heart of political behaviour, shaping action and strategy and 
contributing to explanations of how actors interpret their world in different contexts 
(Schmidt 2010: 8). Ideas are defined as ‘creative solutions to collective action problems’ or ‘creative 
adaptations that can be evaluated both on rational and emotive grounds’ (Steinmo, 2008).  Mehta 
(2010: 27) argues that ideas can take three forms: firstly, as policy solutions, based on a 
common definition of the problem and objectives, secondly as problem definitions, or a 
‘particular way of understanding a complex reality’; and finally, as public philosophies or 
zeitgeists. Schmidt, who coined the term discursive institutionalism, considered the fourth 
‘new’ institutionalist school, describe ideas as the ‘substantive content of discourse’, viewed as 
‘policies, programs, and philosophies’ (Schmidt, 2008: 303). The goal of discursive 
institutionalism is to go beyond ‘politics as usual’ and analyse the politics of change, the role 
of ideas in shaping political action, and understanding persuasion and deliberation in 
political discourse (Schmidt, 2010: 2).  
By examining discourse, or conducting an analysis of the frames employed by a given 
actor (a method discussed in detail in the following chapter), we can attempt to 
understand the way that actors interpret the institutional context in which they operate 
and are subsequently constrained and empowered.  We can assess these ideas in light of 
constitutional, territorial, or ideological constraints and then identify change over time. 
How do the proposals put forth by sub-state nationalist parties account for both internal 
and external constraints? How do they reflect the party’s past positions? Have they 
changed in response to crises or times in which change becomes possible? 
1.4.  The art of the possible: Self-government in light 
of empirical contexts 
Rudolph and Thompson (1985) describe the strategic behaviour of nationalist parties as 
a result of the ‘recognition of the art of the possible’, arguing that they will adapt goals to the 
current conditions and preference of voters. In keeping with this, I aim to examine the 
ways in the goals adopted by sub-state nationalist parties reflect this art, a combination of 
two key considerations – the party’s commitment to the value rational principle that a 
nation should have self-government, discussed in detail in the preceding section, and 
instrumental considerations of the institutional context, of which there are three. The 
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selection of these three institutional contexts reflects, perhaps, a broad approach to 
institutions, in order to capture the multi-faceted nature of self-government. These can 
be understood as political opportunity structures, or ‘elements in the environment [that] impose 
certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it’ (Eisinger, 1973).  These instrumental 
considerations, or empirical contexts, take three forms: (1) the international arena in 
which this self-governing entity would operate; (2) the structure and response of the 
embedding state to sub-state nationalist demands; and (3) the electoral and party context 
in which these goals are pursued. 
In this research, I don’t make assumptions about the directionality of the conditions but 
instead seek to understand how sub-state nationalist parties understand and frame their 
self-government goals in light of these institutional context. Here, I discuss the literature 
on each of these conditions and identify areas of interest which are explored in the 
empirical research which follows.  
1) Self-government, Europe, and the world 
Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 120) describe the need to consider sub-state nationalism with 
reference to political, economic, and cultural concerns but also ‘against a backdrop of the 
geoethnic, geopolitical and geoeconomic heritage of the continent’. Both claims for internal and 
external self-government are increasingly made with reference to the international, and 
for the case of European nations, the European sphere (Keating, 1992; Beyers & Bursens, 
2006; Dardanelli, 2011; Elias, 2008; Elias, 2011; Hepburn, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 1996; 
Jolly, 2006; Keating, 2008; Gomez-Reino, 2014). This is seen in the Spanish autonomous 
communities (Tierney, 2005: 172); the goals of the Parti Quebecois which stress 
continental integration (Paquin, 2016; Martin, 1995), and in the cases of interest to this 
research. The growth of paradiplomatic activity by sub-state actors also suggests a growing 
interest in the international sphere, even if independent statehood is not the end goal 
(Keating 1999; Lecours 2002; Blatter et al 2009; Paquin and Lachapelle, 2005).  In this 
section, I will explore the relationship between self-government goals and the 
international context more generally, before focusing on the European project, and the 
uses of Europe by sub-state nationalist parties.  
Sub-state nationalist parties, whether seeking internal or external self-government, are 
expected to engage with the international context – defined broadly to encompass 
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international tendencies, globalisation, and supranational integration. These include, in 
the 1950s and 1960s, processes of decolonisation (Connor, 1994) and more recent 
processes of political and economic globalisation and integration. Globalization is 
understood by political actors as ‘a set of external economic constraints with attendant political 
imperatives' (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; 147). In material terms, globalisation can be 
conceptualised as the idea that ‘the world is being rapidly molded into a shared social space by 
economic and technological forces and that developments in one region can have profound consequences on 
the other side of the globe’ (Held et al, 1999: 1).  This phenomenon has become a key referent 
of contemporary political discourse and, increasingly, a lens through which policy-makers 
view the context in which they find themselves (Hay & Rosamund, 2008: 148). Sub-state 
nationalist parties are no different – required to engage with both the concept and material 
realities of processes of globalisation.  (Kreisi et al, 2008; Haupt, 2010). 
The emergence of sub-state nationalist parties in the 1960s and 1970s, and their claims 
for self-government, was considered by some, notably Hobsbawm (1990) to be a reaction 
against modernity and globalisation. Both support for integration more broadly, and 
particularly at the European level is, even now, described as a ‘paradox’ suggesting that 
these are contrary phenomenon (Connolly, 2013; Delanty, 2006). However, there is an 
acknowledgement that international integration and sub-state nationalist mobilisation 
might be parallel processes, and sub-state nationalist parties, like their traditional 
counterparts, are actively engaged with these concepts and constraints. Globalisation and 
calls for self-government are interrelated, and taken together can be understood as 
‘encouraging minorities to explore new possibilities for autonomy within the emerging global order’ 
(Keating & McGarry, 2001). 
There is a debate within the literature on whether globalisation serves as a constraint for 
sub-state nationalist parties or an enabler. In some views, globalization, with the removal 
of borders, and political and economic cooperation, statehood becomes more accessible 
as the competences of the state decrease (Keating, 1992: 50; Meadwell & Martin, 1996: 
75; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997: 1042). Free trade agreements and international 
cooperation render independence less costly.  (Keating, 2001: 30-1, in Keating & 
McGarry). Alternatively, the changing nature of statehood makes the achievement of 
statehood less important, viewed as unnecessary for the pursuit of self-government goals 
(Keating, 2012: 14). Meadwell and Martin (1996: 74–5) argue that, from an economic 
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perspective, freer trade lowers the barrier to secession, making it more likely while 
Brancati (2014) counters that the economic benefits of integration are not universal.  
Keating (2001) outlines three possible responses of sub-state nationalist parties to the 
growing influence of supranational and transnational forces and the apparent decline of 
the state – those who feel enabled, those who feel constrained, and those who modify 
their goals. For those who feel enabled, growing integration is viewed as a means of 
externalising some of the costs of independent statehood. For the second group, 
transnational and supranational developments are viewed as constraining. Taking into 
account geography, size, and economic viability, this group may eschew independence 
and foresee a continued relationship with the larger state, seeing limitations in political 
independence. For the third group – the focus of Keating’s work - the realities of the 
post-sovereign world are accepted and negotiated. This group focuses on maximizing 
influence and autonomy rather than seeking formal recognition of their status or the 
‘trappings of sovereignty’ (Keating, 2001). This is particularly pronounced within a European 
context, described as a 'possible microcosm of globalization' and having an effect on both its 
member states and the aspirations of sub-state nationalist parties mobilising within them 
(Weber, 1995: 4). 
Whether in favour or against European integration, the issue is ‘highly significant’ as it 
‘modifies the very definition of territorial conflict and the very structure of political opportunities for these 
parties’ (De Winter and Cachafeiro, 2002: 485). We can see a shift over time in approaches 
to European integration. In its early years, the European Economic Community was met 
with some scepticism by sub-state nationalist parties, understood as a threat to cultural 
identities and yet another forum in which sub-state nations would struggle to find a voice 
(Hepburn, 2008: 547; Jolly, 2015: 81; Lynch, 1996). The 1980s gave rise to the idea of 
Europe as a potential avenue for representation of sub-state national communities, both 
within existing member states and as independent entities, enabled by the ‘Europe of the 
Regions’ (Hepburn, 2008: 548; De Winter, 1998: 208; Hix and Lord 1997: 27). Once a 
source of concern, Europe was now considered a ‘new ally in the quest for territorial autonomy’ 
for sub-state nationalist parties and Elias argues that the party family is on the whole quite 
pro-European (Elias, 2009b: 1-3). Lynch described ‘autonomy and European integration’ as 
‘intertwined’ (Lynch, 1996: 197). De Winter’s 1998 classification of parties according to 
their self-government goals included the European federalist parties, which saw their 
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future within an increasingly integrated European context (De Winter, 1998: 205). 
Although this was a brief period, it was important in the ideational development of the 
parties, presenting a challenge to traditional understandings of statehood and 
demonstrating potential for external support for self-government (Lynch, 1996; Elias, 
2008: 563). Despite the failure of the Europe of the Regions to materialise, most sub-state 
nationalist parties still ‘see the future of their nations firmly placed within the EU’, whether as an 
independent member state or a political unit with significant autonomy (Hoppe, 2007: 68) 
The European Union can thus be understood as both an enabling force, by lowering the 
economic and political costs of self-government, particularly political independence, or 
rendering it unnecessary by calling ‘into question the whole idea of the sovereign, territorially-
bounded, and exclusive nationstate’ (Keating, 2013: 11, see also Lecours, 2012; Broschek, 
2012). Jolly (2015) describes the potential views of parties, saying ‘Regionalists, resentful of 
centralization and threats of homogenization, could perceive a deeper European Union either as yet another 
threat to their culture or as an ally in their broader bargaining game with the state’.Factors which 
might enable or facilitate calls for self-government include the externalisation of many of 
the difficult questions, particularly for those parties seeing independence, allowing for free 
trade and coordination on defence.. On a pragmatic level, supranational organisations like 
the EU can be seen as a safety net (Schrijver, 2006: 28). The structure of the European 
Union, which remains, despite efforts by sub-state nationalist parties, dominated by 
member states, might also encourage the adoption of political independence demands as 
the only way to access decision-making at the European level (Laible; 2008; De Winter & 
Cachafeiro, 2002: 489). Conversely, the European Union may make self-government 
seem less pressing or relevant in an increasingly interdependent age (Meguid, 2014: 103).  
The large and growing literature explains positions on Europe and captures the strategic 
use of the European context, but does not, sufficiently capture the effect of European 
integration on the self-government goals themselves. Whether considered enabling or 
constraining, the European context has shaped the self-government goals of sub-state 
nationalist parties, providing an ‘alternative framework for developing the territorial project’ 
(Hepburn, 2010: 9, see also Elias, 2009b: 2). As a result, ‘Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan 
nationalists have tethered the traditional goal of sovereign statehood to the realities of an integrating Europe 
in which state sovereignty is constrained’ (Connolly, 2013). These changes at the European level 
are likely to have an effect on the self-government goals advanced by sub-state nationalist 
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parties and the ways in which European integration and the European Union are engaged 
with and incorporated within the self-government goals of parties is of interest in this 
research. 
2) Self-government and the state 
The second institutional context of interest is the state.  The state is defined as a ‘complex 
set of institutional arrangements for rule operating through a continuous and regulated activities and 
individuals acting as occupants of office’ (Poggi, 1978: 1). Although the strength and 
sustainability of the modern state has been questioned, it remains a central reference 
point, for both statewide actors and sub-state nationalist parties (Keating, 1992: 45). The 
state is understood as ‘contribut[ing] to a larger discourse that delineates what decision-makers can 
legitimately conceive of as politically feasible policy alternatives’ (Anderson 2007: 190, see also 
Clemens & Cook, 1998: 458). The centrality of the state is evident in Rokkan and Urwin’s 
(1982: 142) definition of a sub-state nationalist party’s goals as ‘the relationship between the 
periphery in question and the core of the state after the conflict has been resolved, as perceived by the 
movement’, with similar sentiments expressed by Mikesell and Murphy who argue that ‘no 
historical discussion of minority-group movements is possible without reference to state actions and 
reactions’ (1991: 587). 
Parties are likely to look to the state as one point of reference: defining the realm of what 
is possible and what is desirable in the context of what is available or likely to be offered 
by the centre. In this section, I will address three key components of self-government and 
the state: (1) the historical and contemporary relationship between the state and the 
nation, employed in justifying a party’s self-government campaign; (2) the sub-state 
nationalist party and its response to proposed and realised decentralisation; and (3) the 
relationship between the state and the nation in the event of radical self-government or 
independence.  
The nature of the state, particularly its development and ongoing relationships with the 
sub-state, may influence the self-government goals adopted by a sub-state nationalist party  
(Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hechter, 2000). The rise of the modern state and its 
extension of competences is often referenced as parallel and interrelated with the rise of 
sub-state nationalism. Sub-state nationalism ‘both shapes and attempts to cope with the rise of the 
modern state’ (Guibernau, 1996: 46). In Western Europe, the expansion of the state in the 
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post-war period and the state’s transformation from ‘night-watchman states’ with primary 
responsibility for security, defence, and domestic policy, to welfare states which exercised 
greater influence in the lives of their populations and contributed to sub-state nationalist 
demands (Nullmeier & Kaufmann, 2010: 81; Urwin, 1992; Hechter, 2000; Evans, 1996). 
Sub-state nationalist parties protested this centralisation, arguing it failed to take into 
account the needs and interests of sub-state nations, neglecting them in favour of the 
whole (Bogdanor, 1981: 286). Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 14) describe the reactions of 
‘peripheral regions, linguistic minorities and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the 
centralizing, standardizing, and ‘rationalizing’ machinery of the nation-state’. The global economic 
crisis of the 1970s challenged the ability of the state to manage the economy and 
exacerbated concerns among sub-state nationalists that their interests were neglected 
(Nullmeier & Kaufmann, 2010: 81; Castles et al, 2010: 6; Urwin, 1992). Subsequent 
developments, particularly in Western Europe, which challenged traditional 
understandings of state sovereignty, further exacerbated this crisis of legitimacy. The role 
of the state appears, at times, diminished, subsumed into the post-sovereign world 
(Keating, 2012; Tierney, 2005: 162; Keating & McGarry 2001). Sub-state nationalist 
parties considered this, with the changing nature of the state manifesting the the framing 
of their goals.  
Western states have transformed from above and below – in their capacities, their roles, 
and in their state structure (Elazar, 1987: 225; Swenden & Maddens, 2009: 1; Keating, 
1992: 50). Marks, Hooghe and Schakel’s (2008) analysis indicates that generally over the 
past 50 years, states have undergone processes of decentralisation. This decentralisation 
accelerated further after 1970 (Rodden, 2004; Hough & Jeffery, 2006). Falleti’s definition 
of decentralisation is employed here, as ‘a process of state reform composed by a set of public policies 
that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government in the context 
of a specific type of state’ (Falleti, 2005: 328–9). Decentralisation was motivated by several 
factors, including an understanding that this presented an opportunity for elites to transfer 
responsibility to a sub-state level of government and offload policy problems, a desire to 
respond to public opinion, or to attempt to neutralise the threat posed by sub-state 
nationalist parties (Hopkin, 2003: 220; Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 132; O’Neill, 2003: 1075; 
Swenden, 2006: 148).  
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This process of ‘political restructuring’ has shaped the opportunities available to sub-state 
nationalist parties (Bartolini 2005). However, the directionality, or whether 
decentralisation is enabling or constraining, is contested in the literature (Rokkan & 
Urwin, 1982: 144; Rudolph & Thompson, 1985: 299). This comes out most explicitly 
when one considers the ‘paradox of federalism’ (Erk & Anderson, 2009) in which federal 
political arrangements can be considered as either inhibiting or inducing secession. It is 
also relevant to more general processes of decentralisation, or what Alonso (2012) 
describes as the ‘paradox of devolution’ in which devolution ‘is intended to appease the secessionist 
threat, (but) it also offers peripheral parties the instruments to push it ahead’. Parties can be 
accommodated by reforms or invigorated by their failure, in the view of the party, to go 
far enough (Stefuriuc, 2013; Alonso, 2012). Rokkan and Urwin argue that sub-state 
nationalist parties will escalate their goals to ensure their political survival, moving up the 
‘pyramid of independence’ (1982: 144). Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.  
Decentralisation, carried out by the central state, can be understood as a means of allowing 
some degree of self-government while maintaining the territorial integrity of the central 
state (Stepan, 2005: 21). Decentralisation or territorial reorganisation to allow for a degree 
of autonomy or self-government by sub-state nations, is an attempt to ‘accommodate the 
demands and defuse them within existing boundaries’ (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 179). Keating 
defines these efforts as ‘territorial management’, ‘the efforts of central elites to cope with the territorial 
dimension of policy problems and to contain territorially based challenges to the central power structure’ 
(Keating 1988: 18). This accommodative strategy can pose a challenge for sub-state 
nationalist parties, who must decide whether to accept or reject these proposals and who 
may face increasing party competition on the issue (Alonso, 2012; Levi & Hechter, 1985: 
141; Elias & Tronconi, 2011: 19). The response to these proposals may depend on the 
self-government goals held by the individual party, whether more or less radical and the 
perception, by the sub-state nationalist party, of whether decentralisation would 
strengthen or undermine the pursuit of their goals (Massetti & Schakel, 2013).  
Alternatively, decentralisation can be considered a concession, a victory by sub-state 
nationalist parties – cementing their ownership of a self-government issue and providing 
the tools by which further self-government can be pursued. Often thought of as a means 
of neutralizing sub-state nationalist parties by ‘giv[ing] them a little so as to better disarm them’ 
(Bogdanor, 1999: 194), decentralisation can have unintended consequences, fuelling 
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demands for more. Connor warned that ethno-nationalist movements may gain support 
in the face of adversity, or denial of the legitimacy of the claims by the centre, he also 
notes that ‘it also appears to feed on concessions’ (1973: 21).  Governments are conscious of this 
perceived threat to territorial integrity and often register their resistance to 
decentralisation by arguing that concessions might be exploited by sub-state nationalist 
parties, becoming ‘the thin end of a wedge that would sooner or later – but inevitably – lead to 
independence’ (Urwin, 1982) 
This occurs in three ways. Firstly, the accommodation of demands can bolster the sub-
state nationalist party cause, legitimising both their role as the party speaking on behalf of 
the nation and the legitimacy of self-government goals (Alonso, 2012: 245-6; Falletti, 
2005: 331; Connor 1973: 21). ‘Political decentralisation is likely to produce a policy ratchet effect…a 
group of supporters who will continue to push in the direction of further decentralisation’ (Falleti, 2005: 
331). Secondly, the introduction of institutions, even those with limited capacity, supports 
a narrative of distinctiveness (Detterbeck, 2012: 34; Hepburn, 2010: 28). These 
institutions may provide a psychological boost, reinforcing confidence in ‘their ability to go 
it alone’ (Kymlicka, 1998: 137). Speaking specifically of federalism but applicable to other 
models of decentralisation, Brubaker (1996) explains the psychological function, as sub-
state nations gain ‘many of the accoutrements of real states’, they are encouraged to think and 
act accordingly. It may also freeze or institutionalize divisions between the centre and the 
periphery (Erk & Anderson, 2009: 192). Finally, and in very practical terms, the 
introduction of self-governing institutions provides the institutional levers through which 
self-government can be pursued (McGarry & O'Leary, 2009: 6; Sorens, 2009: 255). This 
is most typically understood in regards to political independence or processes of 
secession, but can be applied more generally. For sub-state nationalist parties operating 
within the decentralized context, the opportunities for them to enter into government are 
increased (Brancati, 2006: 652; Deschouwer, 2003: 215; Massetti & Schakel, 2013). Once 
there, the ability to act as state in waiting, or an ‘aspirant state’ (Beasley & Kaarbo, 2017) 
and negotiate further concessions or exit from the state is increased. 
This literature contributes to our understanding of the causes of sub-state nationalist 
mobilisation and party strategy in response to decentralisation, but largely fails to capture 
another important context – the role and relationship between the sub-state nation and 
the embedding state once the party’s self-government goal has been achieved. Keating 
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hints at this, with discussions of visions of political independence which ‘often expose the 
continuing costs, as independence advocates seek to retain the useful bits of the old state structure’ 
(Keating, 2012: 13). Lluch’s (2014: 151) distinction between pactists and principled 
independentist parties, discussed above, can be understood as a reflection of this. 
McEwen’s (2013) concept of embedded independence, developed with reference to the 
Scottish National Party, captures a similar phenomenon, with the SNP proposing the 
maintenance of several key unions in the event of independence. These goals are likely to 
be rooted in the party’s understanding of the relationship between the embedding state 
and the sub-state nation, the perceived amenability of the central state to continued 
partnership, and the presence or absence of a supporting structure which would facilitate 
such relationships, like the European Union.  
3) Self-government and the party system  
Self-government goals are developed and articulated with reference to the international 
context and the state structure but are pursued, for the parties of interest to this research, 
within the context of the party system and through party competition. As discussed in 
section 1.3, I consider sub-state nationalist parties as rational, strategic actors, and this 
strategy is illustrated by the party’s approach to electoral competition. Sub-state nationalist 
parties are actors within party systems, behaving strategically in pursuit of their goals and 
therefore subject to the domain of what Sorens (2008) describes as normal politics. As 
strategic actors, sub-state nationalist parties ‘take into account the political moves of other players; 
they evaluate the likely consequences of various actions on the fortunes of their partners and opponents’ 
(Detterbeck, 2012: 46). The structure and internal dynamics of the party system may 
impact both their behaviour in pursuit of goals and self-government goals themselves  
(Beland & Lecours, 2005: 678). 
The party system, as defined by Sartori (1976) is a ‘system of interaction between political parties’, 
in which ‘political parties do not make changes in a vacuum; change often comes in anticipation of, or in 
reaction to, changes that other political parties in the system make’, a definition which stresses 
interaction and interdependence. Party systems, Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 167) stress ‘are 
not immutable’, and the entry and success of sub-state nationalist parties to these systems 
has an impact on both the traditional parties and the sub-state nationalist parties 
themselves.  
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The literature on sub-state nationalist parties and party competition is large and continues 
to grow, with contributions on the ideological dimension of sub-state nationalist party 
competition (Rovny, 2012; Massetti & Schakel, 2015; Massetti, 2009; Newman 1997; 
Basile, 2015; Alonso et al, 2015; Erk, 2010); the nature of competition between traditional 
parties and sub-state nationalist parties (Basile, 2015; Alonso, 2012; Fabre & Swenden, 
2013); competition in multilevel elections (Elias, 2011; Detterbeck, 2012; Libbrecht et al, 
2013); and the participation of sub-state nationalist parties in government (Field, 2014; 
Tronconi, 2015; McAngus, 2015; Stefuriuc, 2012). While these represent important 
contributions to our understanding of the party system, it is also worth analysing how a 
party sees itself and its self-government goals in light of the party system in which it 
competes, and this will be the focus of my analysis. .  
Several elements of interest have been identified, including the sub-state nationalist party’s 
understanding and positioning of itself vis-à-vis the sub-state nation, self-government, 
and the party system and its approach towards its political competitors, especially in light 
of decentralisation which challenges the ability of sub-state nationalist parties to credibly 
claim to be the only party speaking on behalf of the nation. Also of interest is a party’s 
understanding of its Sartorian relevance, in the form of the use of blackmail or entry into 
coalition in pursuit of its goals. Each of these will be discussed in turn.  
Sub-state nationalist parties portray themselves, with varying degrees of credibility, as the 
defender of the nation and the medium through which self-government can be pursued. 
The party’s understanding of its own role within the system and vis-à-vis self-government 
is evident in claims to represent the interests of a specific community or nation (Hepburn, 
2000) and in its claims to secure self-government for that group. 
Sub-state nationalist parties have influence on the party system in which they compete 
and are, in turn, influenced by the actions of its political rivals. Changes in the party 
system, including the rise and fall of traditional parties, the emergence of sub-state 
nationalist competitors, and the adoption of platforms of decentralisation by rivals can 
have an impact on sub-state nationalist parties and their goals. Decentralisation is 
considered the most dramatic change – providing both challenges and opportunities to 
sub-state nationalist parties, and the bulk of my discussion will focus on its effect on the 
party system and the parties operating within it.  
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Sub-state nationalist parties, as distinct from broader movements, have pursued an 
explicitly electoral strategy in the pursuit of their self-government goals. However, their 
success at their origins was limited, statewide parties largely ignored the sub-state 
nationalist agenda until a series of high-profile electoral successes signalled public interest 
in a greater level of autonomy, allowing them to cross the threshold of relevance (Hopkin, 
2003: 228; Von Beyme, 1996: 149). Meguid’s (2008) work examines the ways in which 
traditional political actors and emergent parties interact, suggesting that traditional actors 
engage in dismissive, accommodative, or adversarial strategies in response to the 
emergence of niche parties. While the notion of sub-state nationalist parties as niche is 
heavily contested, this framework is useful for understanding the interaction between sub-
state nationalist parties, who mobilise around different issues, and their traditional 
competitors.  
While decentralization was discussed in the preceding section in light of the institutions 
of the state, it can also be analysed through the lens of party system interactions. The 
motivations of statewide parties in adopting a platform of decentralisation have been well 
documented (See for instance O’Neill, 2003; Sorens, 2008, Fabre & Swenden, 2013; 
Detterbeck, 2012; Fabre, 2008; Hopkin & Van Houten, 2009; Maddens & Libbrecht, 
2009; Meguid, 2008) and most of these contributions argue that a decision to decentralise 
is a rational choice, motivated by concerns over electoral prospects (Hepburn, 2010: 31; 
Toubeau & Wagner, 2016).  
Decentralisation has a significant effect on the party system and the actions of both 
traditional and sub-state nationalist parties operating within it (Elias, 2011; Swenden & 
Maddens, 2009: 6). Rather than reducing the salience of the issue, this process of 
decentralisation is expected to introduce or amplify the territorial dimension of electoral 
politics by allowing sub-state nationalist parties a platform to advance their goals and 
encouraging the reorientation of statewide parties towards the sub-state level (Hopkin, 
2003). Decentralisation can lead to the nationalisation or regionalisation of a given party 
system (Hepburn, 2010: 31). This involves ‘the development of distinct territorial identities and the 
transformation of politics into nationalist politics’ (Lecours, 2005: 184).  The success of sub-state 
nationalist parties, either indirectly or directly, in securing a degree of self-government for 
the nation, requires an adaptation, by both sub-state nationalist and statewide parties 
(Elias, 2011; Swenden & Maddens, 2009: 6). For traditional parties, this entails a 
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reorientation, often electoral and organizational, towards the sub-state level. While in a 
centralized state, statewide parties face challenges in credibly claiming support for a 
regionalist agenda, the introduction of region or sub-state levels of government increases 
the degree to which parties may be accountable and responsible to the sub-state areas but 
also enhances the credibility of the statewide party’s claim to advance what Alonso (2012) 
calls a ‘pro-periphery agenda’. For sub-state nationalist parties, this presents an opportunity 
to present themselves as a party of regional government rather than a source of opposition 
at the centre (Deschouwer, 2003: 215). This requires a new strategy and may render party 
competition more difficult, as they are no longer the only actors ‘constructing the sub-state 
nation or region, claiming to protect regional interests, or demanding concessions or autonomy from the 
state’ (Hepburn, 2010: 6). Levi and Hechter (1985) argue that this might contribute to the 
decline of sub-state nationalist parties. 
However, sub-state nationalist parties have proved resilient in the face of decentralisation 
and are now normal participants in decentralized systems and decentralisation provides 
further opportunities for parties to pursue their self-government goals (Belanger, 2003: 
550-1). The party’s role in government – as majority, minority, or junior partner in 
coalition may shape its positioning. Bolleyer (2008: 26) and Deschouwer (2008: 18) posit 
that some sort of moderation on the self-government goal might be required in order to 
participate in coalition. Government can be employed in multiple ways – to pursue self-
government directly, through the use of referendums or declarations in favour of self-
government or indirectly, through processes of nation-building. Participation in 
government at the sub-state level, whether alone or in coalition, positions parties to act 
as the ‘official’ defender of the interest of their regions, which can increase their profile and 
allow for negotiations from the centre (Hepburn, 2011: 11). The sub-state nationalist party 
as a party of government is closely linked with decentralisation, as participation in 
government at the centre is relatively rare, restricted to the Volksunie, the Lega Nord, and 
since 2014, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.  However, parties can often play an influential 
role from outside of government, particularly in multi-party systems (Field & Hamman, 
2015; Brancati, 2005). The participation of regional parties can negatively influence 
government stability as their demands may be more difficult to accommodate than 
demands made by other, smaller parties (Brancati, 2005: 144).  
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While the existing literature has increased our understanding of the strategic behaviour of 
sub-state nationalist parties within the party system, the attention paid to the impact of 
party competition on the self-government goals of these parties is more limited. There 
are some hints that increasing competition, from both statewide and nationalist 
competitors, might lead to radicalisation on the self-government dimension or at least 
make a strategy of moderation more difficult (Alonso, 2012; Brancati, 2005). Elias argues 
that when statewide party strategies threaten the electoral position of the sub-state 
nationalist parties, the latter shift their position, whether through moderating or 
radicalising their demands. They might also focus on other policy priorities, chiefly on the 
left-right dimension (Elias, 2011: 7). Prospective or realised entry into government might 
also lead to an increased or decreased salience of self-government goals, with parties either 
seeking to capitalise on their issue ownership or position themselves as a party of 
responsible government.  
4) The art of the possible: a framework for analysing self-
government goals 
While a large and growing literature on sub-state nationalist parties addresses the 
individual effects of international integration, the state structure, and the interaction of 
sub-state nationalist parties within their respective party system, this research represents 
a systematic attempt to analyse self-government in light of these institutional constraints. 
Each empirical context is clearly important, when we look to its development in the 
literature, but this largely focuses on behaviour, and does not always capture the ways in 
which self-government goals might be changed and adapted to reflect changes in contexts 
external to the party. As a result, I seek to understand how self-government goals reflect 
the ‘art of the possible’, the interaction between a fundamental belief in self-government 
(defined broadly to include both internal and external forms), motivated by value 
rationality, and empirical contexts - instrumental concerns which impact the form and 
feasibility of self-government.  
I begin with an assumption that underpins this research, that sub-state nationalist parties 
possess a pure goal of self-government, a preference that takes into account Varshney’s (2003) 
value rationality. Varshney builds on the definition of Weber, arguing that value-rational 
behaviour is produced by a certain set of beliefs, 'ethical, aesthetic, religious or other' which 
exist independently of their prospects for success. In the context of this research, this can 
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be understood as a link between the existence of the nation and the need for that nation 
to achieve self-government. This is clearly a simplification, with the positions of parties 
always representing both values and instrumental considerations but it is helpful in 
understanding the relationship between goals and empirical contexts and therefore, the 
mechanism of interest to this research.  
I then assume that sub-state nationalist parties are strategic actors, taking into account the 
opportunities and constraints in the system in which they operate as well internal factors 
impacting the feasibility of a given self-government goal. Therefore, the outcome of this, 
the self-government goal of a sub-state nationalist party at any point in time, reflects the 
art of the possible - what is feasible given factors internal to the nation (size, economy, 
demographics) and those factors external to the nation, what I define as empirical contexts: 
the international, and particularly the European arena, the structure and the response of 
the state, and the structure and composition of the party system in which it operates.   
 
In this research, I set out some initial expectations (section 2.1.3) but do not adopt strict 
hypotheses to be tested, as the goal of this research is not to identify the exact degree to 
which changes in the party system, state structure, or external environment might spur 
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changes in the self-government goals put forth by a given party. Rather, I explore how 
these contexts shape and constrain the articulation and strategic pursuit of a party’s self-
government goals. I’ve adopted what Bennett and Elman (2006) call a ‘causes-of-effects’ 
approach appropriate to qualitative research. This approach recognises ‘all parts are mutually 
constitutive and interconnected within a given case’ (Ragin, 2000: 27) and, therefore, no single 
cause has an independent impact on the outcome (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008: 9).  
The literature on sub-state nationalist parties largely focuses on the way that the empirical 
contexts impact the behaviour of sub-state nationalist movements – how they behave at 
a European level, how they operate within decentralized system, and how they compete 
within a party system. What this research seeks to do is unpack how these contexts – 
whether international, the state, or the party system – shape the self-government goals of 
sub-state nationalist parties. The self-government goals themselves form the object of 
analysis. The literature is strongest when it comes to the international context, with 
discussions of ‘post-sovereignty’ (Keating, 2012) and ‘qualified independence’ (2007: 54) and in 
response to the structure of the state, with McEwen’s (2013) discussion of embedded 
independence and Lluch’s (2014) distinction between pactists and principled 
independentists, but has largely overlooked the way self-government is discussed within 
a multi-dimensional space.  
This is a difficult relationship to establish directly and these factors are closely interlinked. 
Decentralisation has a direct impact on the structure of the party system and dynamics at 
the international level may have an impact on the structure and capacities of the state. As 
a result, it is difficult to disentangle a causal relationship between these factors and the 
self-government goals put forth by sub-state nationalist parties. However, we can examine 
the ideational influence that these factors have had on sub-state nationalist parties and 
their goals, by examining how parties frame their self-government goals in light of these 
conditions. In doing so, I rely on the analysis of the party’s public statements and 
discourse, drawing inspiration from both historical and discursive institutionalist 
toolboxes. Here it is important to examine changes in the empirical contexts and the 
content and articulation of self-government goals, and as a result, I adopt a longitudinal 
approach, discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Research Design and 
methodology 
In the previous chapter, I set out my understanding of sub-state nationalist parties and 
their self-government goals and examined factors which are expected to impact the 
content and framing of these goals. In this chapter, I will present the research design and 
methods which underpin this research. I argue throughout that rather than reflect an 
ambition based on the intrinsic link between nationhood and statehood, the self-
government goals articulated by sub-state nationalist parties represents the ‘art of the 
possible’ or a reflection of strategic considerations of opportunities and risks present in the 
context in which a party competes. This work therefore derives inspiration from historical 
institutionalist traditions. Broadly, I ask the following questions:  What do sub-state 
nationalist parties want? How do sub-state nationalist parties frame self-government? And how do they 
do so in light of three empirical contexts considered in this research: international and European 
integration, state structures, and party systems? 
To enhance the empirical richness of this research, I adopt a cross-national and 
longitudinal approach, examining three sub-state nationalist parties within two sub-state 
nations from their origins through 2014, or in the case of the Volksunie, from its origins 
to demise in 2001. The cases selected for comparison are the Scottish National Party and 
the Volksunie, and its successor, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. The focus on self-
government goals advanced by sub-state nationalist parties necessitated close scrutiny of 
primary party literature, and a broad array of documentary sources including speeches, 
public statements, and media accounts, totalling more than 400 discrete documents. This 
was supplemented by a small number of interviews with prominent party representatives. 
Data was analysed qualitatively, using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, 
specifically NVivo. In doing so, I employ framing analysis to identify and explore the 
construction of claims in favour of self-government.  
In this chapter, I will first discuss the unit of analysis, the sub-state nationalist party and 
the empirical contexts of interest in this research, before turning specifically to my 
research design, including the use of comparison and the case selection. Finally, I will set 
out my data collection and method of analysis, presenting my schema of framing self-
government 
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2.1 Sub-state nationalist parties and empirical 
contexts 
In the preceding chapter, I’ve examined the nature of self-government goals and discussed 
the literature on international and European integration, state reform, and electoral 
competition and sub-state nationalist parties. Before discussing my case selection and 
research design, I will first touch on two components of this research: the sub-state 
nationalist party as a unit of analysis and the nature and relevance of the empirical contexts 
in which these goals are expressed, and which are expected to shape the party’s 
articulation of their goals. A series of expectations on the ways in which these empirical 
contexts may interact with self-government goals is set out in this section. 
2.1.1 Sub-state nationalist parties as the unit of analysis 
While I will situate the party in the context of the party system, region, and state, I will 
look specifically at the party as the primary unit of analysis. Parties have long been used 
as units of analysis in political science but the idea that a single theory of parties is desirable 
or even possible has been contested by scholars (Gunther et al 2002).  
Parties have been selected as the unit of analysis for three reasons. Firstly, parties as 
organisations are expected to advance a coherent self-government goal, defined as their 
raison d’être, in contrast to movements, which may contain multiple goals. This is, of 
course, a simplification, with factions and individuals who make up these parties, holding 
different goals and strategies for the achievement of these goals. Self-government goals 
also often sit alongside other policy goals. But in each case at a given point in time, a 
prevalent self-government goal can be identified. We can, as a result, trace these goals 
over time. From a practical perspective, parties, unlike movements, have produced a 
coherent body of artefacts or data in the form of manifestos, campaign materials, 
consultation documents, and internal reports. Secondly, they, like all parties, are expected 
to be strategic actors, shaped by and shaping the context in which they operate (Urwin, 
1992; Alonso, 2012; Detterbeck, 2012: 46). This includes the electoral domain but also 
their interactions with ideas and institutions within and beyond the state. Their behaviour 
is likely to be shaped by concerns over their survival and their pursuit of goals. Finally, 
sub-state nationalist parties provide a case, or a distinct unit of analysis, which can be 
studied in detail (George & Bennett, 2005: 17-8).  
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2.1.3 Empirical contexts and expectations 
Of interest to this research is the interaction between external, empirical contexts and the 
self-government goals articulated by the party, which can be viewed as political 
opportunity structures available to the party. These include social, political, and economic 
contexts which Hay describes as ‘densely structured and highly contoured’ (2002: 209). The 
international environment, the state structure, and the party system are viewed through 
the eyes of political actors, and their interpretation of these structures will shape goals and 
pursuit of these goals. Changes have been identified in each of these contexts, with the 
progression of globalisation and Europeanisation, a widespread tendency towards 
decentralisation in Western democracies as well as direct state responses to sub-state 
nationalist mobilisation, and shifts in electoral competition and party systems. I expect a 
relationship to exist between these external contexts and the framing of self-government. 
Together, these empirical contexts are expected to interact with and influence the framing 
of self-government goals.  Some parties may be particularly sensitive to the demands of 
electoral competition, and shifts to the structure of party competition may trigger changes, 
whilst others may be more sensitive to shifts in the state structure or larger external 
contexts. However, these contextual factors do not reflect an objective reality but rely on 
the interpretation of the actors themselves. Parties may respond to similar stimuli, i.e. the 
nationalisation of the party system, state reform, or a global economic crisis in very 
different ways, reflecting their perceptions of opportunities, threats and the responses 
available to them. These changes will be unpacked and examined through the use of 
framing analysis, a qualitative technique that will be discussed in greater detail below.  
International and European dynamics:  I expect self-government goals to be framed 
with reference to the international and European contexts. I don’t make hypotheses as to 
the directionality of this relationship – as discussed in the preceding chapter, sub-state 
nationalist take a variety of position on globalisation and Europeanisation, perceiving it 
as a threat to self-government or as an enabler. But I do expect parties to respond to 
developments at the European level and frame their goals in light of these developments. 
Parties may accord different salience to the external context, and this will be shaped by 
their self-government goal. Those which purse an internal self-government goal, seeking 
enhanced authority within the existing state, may pay less attention to issues of European 
or international importance. In contrast, parties seeking external self-government are 
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expected to pay more attention to the external context in which these goals are to be 
achieved. Key events of interest include the development of the European project, the 
rise and subsequent fall of the Europe of the regions and the Euro crisis. 
State structures: Sub-state nationalism is a reaction against the status of the national 
community within the existing state structure. Self-government goals are expected to be 
articulated with reference to the state. This is true of internal self-government goals, which 
seek accommodation within the existing state, and external self-government goals, which 
seek exit from that state. Three key components are of interest here: the way in which the 
nature of the state contributes to self-government goals, understandings of its structure, 
and proposed changes to that structure, either in response to administrative efforts to 
decentralise or in response to mobilisation by sub-state nationalist parties. I expect 
processes of decentralization, federalisation, or devolution to shape the self-government 
goals of sub-state nationalist parties, whether they are viewed as an obstacle on the path 
to self-government by undercutting nationalist demands, or as a stepping stone from 
which further appeals can be launched. Decentralisation is considered to be a process 
rather than an event. 
Electoral competition and the party system: For the parties of interest to this research, 
those pursuing their self-government goals through peaceful, democratic, and electoral 
means, self-government goals are articulated in an electoral context. Parties must advance 
their goals by securing support from voters and self-government goals are shaped by what 
is feasible in a party system context. Therefore, the structure of electoral competition and 
the party system is expected to influence the framing of self-government goals. This is 
expected to manifest in two key ways: the way in which the party frames itself as a driver 
of self-government and the way it frames its approach to self-government, stressing its 
relevance, whether as a blackmail actor as a party of prospective government. 
An analysis of change is implicit in this research, seeking to understand the ways in which 
changes external to the party may contribute to changes in the framing of self-government 
goals. This underlines the benefits of both a cross-case comparison, in which variation 
can be identified in the empirical contexts between the three cases, and a within-case 
comparison, in which the interaction between a changing empirical context and the self-
government goals expressed can be explored in detail.  
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2.2 Research design and case selection 
The main aim of this research is to explore the multidimensional nature of self-
government goals and the ways in which they reflect the empirical contexts in which they 
are articulated. As a result of the need for contextual knowledge and longitudinal analysis, 
a small N comparison is therefore appropriate (Mahoney et al, 2009: 116). This is achieved 
through the within-case and cross-case comparison of three key parties: the Scottish 
National Party, the Volksunie, and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. In the section which 
follows, I will set out the rationale for my use of the comparative method, the case 
selection criteria and universe of cases, discuss some of the specificities of the Flemish 
cases, and discuss the time frame of my research.  
2.2.1 Comparing parties and self-government goals across 
time and space 
Comparisons can help us build theory and guide further research, serving as ‘a springboard 
for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings’ (Bryman, 2008: 61). Comparison is considered 
the ‘engine of knowledge’ and can help to identify empirical relationships, rather than simply 
measure them (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990: 8). To this end, two forms of comparison are 
carried out in the course of this research: firstly, a within-case analysis of change within 
each of the three parties selected for inclusion from their origins onwards and secondly, 
a cross-national comparison between the three parties selected for inclusion.  
Within-case comparison provides an opportunity to analyse, in depth, the interaction 
between a party, its self-government goal, and the context in which it is expressed 
(Mahoney, 2007: 132; Peters 1998: 137). The advantages of a within-case analysis include 
an in-depth exploration of processes and mechanisms and a premium placed on historical 
explanations (Bennett, 2004: 19). In this research, each case study is examined from its 
origins, onwards (Tilly, 1995: 1601). This allows me to identify outcomes and processes 
which are significant within the individual cases (Mjoset, 2009). These are presented in 
the form of single case analyses, allowing the party’s framing at specific points in time to 
be explored in detail. 
This is further strengthened by cross-case comparison, with the inclusion of three sub-
state nationalist parties. Given the goal of qualitative comparison is to ‘understand the 
distinctive dynamics, mechanics, and particularity of each case’, a small N research design was 
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appropriate for this research (Platt, 1998). By restricting my study to just three cases, I 
was able to develop the contextual knowledge necessary for meaningful analysis and 
examine how the specific phenomena of interest manifested in each of the three cases 
(Pierson, 2004: 6; Rueschemeyer et al, 1992: 4; Hall & Taylor, 2006: 952; Collier, 1993; 
Ragin 1991). This was also consistent with the historical institutionalist principles and 
discussed in chapter 1 which inspired this research, allowing for attention to ‘real-world 
empirical questions’, ‘historical interpretations’ and the influence of institutions on behaviour 
and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 108).  
A small N comparison allows the researcher to capture and demonstrate ‘the main character 
and originality of each situation’ (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990: 127). As a result, this was appropriate 
when related to the goal of this research - not to predict but to begin to explain the framing 
of each party (Mahoney et al, 2009: 116). My comparison was further enhanced by the 
focus on parties from their origins to 2014, which would have been more difficult, both 
analytically and practically with a larger number of cases (Lijphart 1971: 691; Gerring 
2004: 353).  
There are trade-offs to qualitative, small n research (Bennett, 2004: 20). It limits my ability 
to speak more generally about all sub-state nationalist parties, with my conclusions 
restricted to the three cases studied here.  However, I have made an effort to situate the 
individual parties in question in the broader context of sub-state nationalist parties and 
the studying of a small number of cases in intensive detail may contribute to theory-
building (Peters, 1998: 138; Hantrais, 1999: 100). As a result, in both my analysis of each 
individual case and across the three cases, I focused on bringing out the contextual detail 
and exploring the complexity of processes and mechanisms present in each of the three 
cases rather than reducing the data to quantifiable indicators. 
2.2.2 Case selection and comparison 
The selection of cases included here was to allow the key puzzle of this research – the 
framing of self-government in light of the empirical contexts in which it is pursued – to 
be developed. The three cases are not crucial cases in the sense in which Eckstein (1975) 
uses it. They are nonetheless important cases in which we would expect the interaction 
between value rationality and instrumental rationality to manifest.  In other words, by 
virtue of their goals, their levels of electoral success, and their relevance within their 
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respective systems, we would expect these parties to demonstrate rationality – adapting 
their value rational goals to reflect the context in which they operate. The three parties 
are notable for being some of the most successful and relevant sub-state nationalist parties 
within their respective political contexts, and ones I believe possess with sufficient 
similarities to allow for fruitful comparison (Przeworski & Teune, 1970: 39).   
The position, discourse, and behaviour of political parties is of interest to this research 
and my universe of cases was restricted to those which met the criteria for sub-state 
nationalist parties outlined in chapter one (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004: 660)  This includes 
(1) the claim to represent a specific community or nation; (2) and the mobilisation of the 
party in a specific territory; (3) in favour of a preferred constitutional or territorial 
outcome; and (4) the pursuit of these goals through democratic means. Additional criteria 
were identified, guided by my interest in the influence of European integration and state 
reform or decentralisation. The case selection was restricted to parties with systemic 
relevance, which by virtue of this relevance will have to produce detailed self-government 
goals which take into account the contexts in which they take place. Relevance varies over 
time but it is clear that all three parties have a profound impact on their respective systems. 
The universe of cases, or parties which meet these criteria is quite small, and include 
parties active in Flanders, Wallonia, Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, and the Basque Country.  
I do not, in this research, adopt a most-different-systems-design or a most-similar systems 
design when selecting cases as I am not seeking to test theory and identify direct causal 
relationships. Instead, inspired by Skopcol and Somers (1980) comparative historical 
approach, I adopt a ‘contrast of contexts’ approach which allows me to identify the unique 
features of an individual case and examine the way in which these might shape the 
processes at work and outcomes in each.  
My case selection strategy seeks to ‘address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically 
equivalent phenomena - even if expressed in substantively different terms - across different contexts’ 
(Locke & Thelen, 1998). While we see variation in the self-government goals expressed 
by each party, there is a functional equivalence which allows for fruitful comparison – all 
three parties seek a degree of self-government and frame this self-government in light of 
the empirical context in which it was pursued 
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The Scottish National Party, the Volksunie, and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, meet the 
criteria outlined above. They make claims to represent the Scottish or Flemish nations, 
compete for voters within the boundaries of this territory, mobilise on the key dimension 
of self-government and pursue these goals through democratic, and electoral means. The 
three parties are paradigmatic democratic sub-state nationalist parties, making claims for 
self-government within the territories of Scotland and Flanders on the basis of national 
distinctiveness. They are also some of the most successful sub-state nationalist parties 
when we evaluate their electoral results, success in achieving their self-government goals, 
whether in full or in part or directly (through participation in government) or indirectly 
(by pressuring rival parties to enact reforms) and as a result of their participation, either 
at the centre or at the sub-state level. There is, naturally, variation in the level of success 
and the pace of development for each party. The SNP has spent much of its lifetime on 
the fringes of electoral politics, only achieving sustained representation in the 1970s. This 
is in contrast to the Volksunie and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie which both experienced 
a rapid growth in support quite early on in their respective lifespans. These are what Ragin 
would describe as positive cases, or some of ‘the best possible instances of a phenomenon to be 
explained’ (Ragin, 2009). We can also consider them as cases that meet the criteria of 
serving as ‘ideal types’ or recognised instances of a specific phenomenon due to their 
success and systemic relevance.  (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012: 179).  
The objective of case study research is aimed at developing a comprehensive 
understanding of just a few cases, allowing us to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
the phenomenon of interest (Collier et al, 2004: 87). As a result, I was interested in 
contextual detail, examining ‘regularities, patterns, mechanisms and recurrent processes’ rather than 
a specific, and measurable relationship between different factors.  
2.2.3 The Case(s) of Flanders 
The Flemish parties merit further discussion, as the Volksunie emerged in the 1950s only 
to dissolve in 2001. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie was the official successor of the 
Volksunie, receiving the institutional resources of the party, although it failed to achieve 
sufficient support to maintain the party name. This raises the question in this research 
about whether the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie is truly new or is as Mair asks ‘old wine in new 
bottles’ or ‘new wine in whatever sort of container modern tastes might find appealing’? (Mair, 1999: 
217). The N-VA consciously situates itself as a successor, describing its roots as ‘a young 
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political party whose ancestry is rooted in democratic Flemish nationalism’, evolving from the 
Volksunie (N-VA, 2017). It is largely treated as such in the literature on the party (Van 
Haute, 2011; Deschouwer, 2009; De Winter et al, 2009; Hooghe et al, 2006).  Beyens et 
al (2015) ask if the N-VA is ‘born again’ or ‘born anew’ in an article which employs Barnea 
and Rahat’s (2011) framework to assess newness, examining labelling, ideology, voter, 
formal status, institutions, activists, representatives, and policies. They ultimately conclude 
that the evidence is mixed, arguing ‘newness’ is multi-dimensional, and the N-VA has drawn 
on both the legacy of the Volksunie as well as developed new policies and priorities. It 
may, with the increase in electoral success and changes in membership and voters, have 
become more new since its origins, and the party is characterised as ‘combining newness and 
continuity, heritage and conscious strategic choices’ (Beyens et al, 2015: 7). 
Ultimately, the decision to structure this research around three cases, rather than treating 
the Flemish nationalists as a single case, is an attempt to reflect this complexity. I therefore 
treat the two parties as separate entities, but attempt, in my analysis, to identify instances 
of continuity and change in the framing of self-government goals from the Volksunie to 
the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. This allows for enhanced within-case comparison as well as 
cross-case comparison.  
2.2.4 Time frame 
To capture changes within the party and within the contexts in which it operated, a 
longitudinal analysis is employed for this research (Pierson, 2000: 72). This is in in keeping 
with the historical institutionalist traditions which inspire this research, reflecting an 
acknowledgement that a party’s origins will shape its present (Hay, 2002: 14). This also 
allows me to capture temporal variation in both the self-government goal and the 
empirical context in which it is articulated. Many of the processes of interest in these 
research are not short-term processes, but involve a gradual evolution, and by employing 
a longitudinal approach, this can be captured.  
In light of this, the three parties are studied from their origins to dissolution (in the case 
of the Volksunie) and from their origins to 2014, for the Scottish National Party and the 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. This research concludes with the May 2014 federal elections in 
Belgium, which marked the start of government negotiations, and the September 2014 
referendum on Scottish independence. By adopting a longitudinal approach, I can capture 
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temporal variation in both the empirical contexts and internal party dynamics. These 
include:  (1) the emergence and acceleration of European integration, encompassing times 
when this project has progressed or stalled; (2) changes in the structure of the British and 
Belgian states, with an extended process of federalisation in Belgium and asymmetric 
devolution in the United Kingdom; (3) and shifts in the party system, both as a result of 
these state structure shifts but also reflecting general patterns of party system change. 
Each of these will be explored in more detail in the contextual introduction of each 
chapter.  
This long-time period (spanning a total of 140 years between the three parties) does pose 
both methodological and practical challenges which should be addressed. By covering 
parties from their origins to the present day (or dissolution), my access to primary sources 
was limited, particularly in the early years of the SNP and the Volksunie. Interpretations 
of documentary data could not be verified through interviews and the range of older 
sources was comparatively limited. In light of these constraints, the decision was made to 
focus on providing snapshots of key points in time, rather than a detailed process tracing 
of a party’s political development, step by step. These key moments are highlighted in 
each empirical chapter.   
2.3 Data collection 
The focus of this research on the articulation of self-government goals necessitated the 
study of documentary evidence, or discursive texts (Van Dijk, 2002). The corpus of this 
research includes campaign literature (manifestos and programmes, leaflets, speeches, and 
political advertising), conference documents, parliamentary statements, memoirs and 
biographies, and accounts of party history. A selection of supplementary interviews were 
conducted as a means of verifying my analysis and media coverage, particularly for key 
events. The material selected for analysis was obtained from party archives, web pages, 
national libraries, research institutes, and print and online media. In total, this numbered 
about 400 individual documents.  
Manifestos form a core data source throughout this research, providing a means of 
tracing a party’s publicly stated position on an issue at key points in time. Manifestos are 
advantageous for political research due to their content and format. They represent an 
‘open, public statement of the party’s ideas and proposed policies, and a concrete embodiment of the party’s 
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construction of itself, its relations to other agents and its interactions with the context as a whole’ (Breeze, 
2011: 10). This is in contrast with other sources of evidence which may represent the 
views of a faction or individual within the party (Budge, 2006: 51). Manifestos are unique 
in their ubiquity, as all major parties produce them, their availability within the public 
domain and for their largely consistent format which simplifies temporal analysis 
(Volkens, 2001). They are characterised by clarity, simplicity and repetition of language 
(Budge, 2001: 51). They are at once the ‘hymn sheet’ and ‘source book’ for political activists 
and as a result, provide a comparable data source appropriate for longitudinal research 
(Kavanagh, 1991: 7) 
Manifestos were collected from the party’s origins to present. Where manifestos were not 
available, constitutional documents and party statutes which include a clear statement of 
the self-government goals of the party were substituted.  In the case of the SNP, a 
manifesto was not published for each election, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s, a 
period in which the number of seats contested was very low. Somerville (2013: 15) 
described the challenges of policy research during this period in the party’s history, as it 
possessed ‘no official policy, only a string of pamphlets, leaflets, articles and statements which had to be 
pieced together in order to gauge Party tendencies’. In light of this, I’ve used policy statements for 
this period, which may not reflect the electoral context and may also reflect the views and 
preferences of a particular leader, rather than an agreed party statement. The collection 
for the Volksunie was more complete, with the congress texts which formed the basis for 
the party manifestos compiled by the party and made available in academic libraries. 
Manifestos of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie were gathered from the party’s archives and 
website. Manifestos were, at the outset of this research, intended to form the bulk of the 
dataset.  However, due to the limited attention paid to self-government goals within these 
texts as well as high levels of repetition from year to year, additional sources were needed, 
particularly as my interest in the three empirical contexts external to the party developed.  
I gathered a variety of additional party documents, published by the parties themselves 
and external institutions. This included parliamentary records, government publications 
and records of speeches made by party leadership. These were taken from parliamentary 
and government websites, research institutes, and national and university archives as well 
as from media archives. Documents were selected for their relevance to the international 
and European context, the state structure, and the party system and included publications, 
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speeches and transcripts of parliamentary debates on further European integration, 
proposed state reforms, and media accounts of electoral competition. These primary 
sources were supplemented by media accounts which is consistent with my interest in 
framing – how a party represents its goals to an external rather than an internal audience. 
Reports from the media were also used to provide contextual data and capture responses 
to emerging events, particularly those which took place between election years where 
manifestos offered more comprehensive coverage. 
My collection of archival and documentary data was supplemented by fourteen elite 
interviews with current and former party officials. The aim of the interviews was to test 
my analysis and interpretation of the party literature and to gain further insight into party 
policy rather than to gather a representative sample of views (Goldstein, 2006: 669). In 
selecting subjects, I engaged in purposive sampling, or selecting respondents ‘on the basis 
of what they might know to help the investigator fill in the pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper 
alignment of pieces already in place’ rather than attempt to create a representative sample 
(Abernach & Rockman, 2002: 673). The selection of subjects was informed by 
recommendations from colleagues, research into prominent figures and availability of 
subjects. Interviews took place between February and August 2014, with interviews with 
N-VA and Volksunie representatives taking place in the early spring, prior to European, 
federal and regional elections which took place in May 2014. The data collection for the 
SNP took place in late spring and summer, just a few months in advance of the 
referendum.  Interviews took place in the offices of the subjects, in Edinburgh, Brussels, 
Antwerp, and Leuven and lasted between 45 minutes and 60 minutes. Interviewees were 
informed as to the subject of my research in advance.  
Ultimately, interviews were used to supplement the overall analysis rather than as a core 
data source for two key reasons: access and data quality. The proximity of my fieldwork 
to campaign periods in Belgium and the referendum in Scotland restricted my access to 
key figures within the parties. My initial period of fieldwork in Belgium was limited to 
archival work as it fell just before the publication of the party’s confederalism proposals 
and as a result, politicians were unwilling to discuss these. Access in Scotland was better 
but also influenced by the referendum campaign. Initial interviews confirmed my decision 
to use this data source as a more limited component in the research as subjects largely 
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focused on the upcoming campaigns and seemed reluctant to speak to past party positions 
or activities.  
I was also struck with the discipline demonstrated by some interviewees. In interviews 
with members of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, I was informed of the artificial nature of 
the Belgian state with many of my interviewees using very similar language. Interviews 
with former party leadership (of both the SNP and leaders of the Volksunie) were more 
instructive but were also likely coloured by time and perspective, particularly as several of 
the Volksunie interviewees had left politics altogether or had joined other parties. While 
earlier interviewing would have perhaps alleviated some of this campaign focus, access 
before the publication of the Scottish Government’s white paper detailing the party’s 
position on independence and before the endorsement of the N-VA’s confederalism 
proposals was not possible. Although I considered carrying out a second round of 
interviews after the election and referendum, I felt these would be unduly coloured by the 
referendum and election results and would offer limited further insight for the purposes 
of my research questions.  
The publication of two key documents, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
and the N-VA’s Change for Progress provided an opportunity to examine the most recent 
and most developed self-government goals of the two parties in greater detail than was 
previously possible. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie published its congress text Change for 
Progress on 31 October 2013, for approval at the party’s January 2014 congress. The 649 
page white paper, Scotland’s Future: Your guide to an independent Scotland was published by the 
SNP-led government on 26 November 2013. These two documents represent the most 
comprehensive statements to date on these parties’ self-government goals, and their 
publication provided an opportunity to conduct a focused analysis of how these goals are 
constrained by the three contextual arenas of interest to this research. I also gathered 
speeches, debate transcripts, editorials, blog posts, and social media content surrounding 
these two events. The results of this analysis will be presented in chapter 7.  
2.4 Data analysis: framing analysis 
The goal of this research is to capture and explain the framing of self-government goals 
over time and between cases in response to a party’s understanding of the empirical 
contexts in which it operates. Evidence is found in the language employed by parties in 
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the key texts identified above, with language considered to be the ‘meat and gristle of political 
life’ (Gerring, 1998: 298). To that end, my method combines a textual analysis, more 
specifically the analysis of frames. Rather than looking at a party at a single point in time, 
I trace and analyse the use of frames over time, to identify instances of change. This allows 
me to explore the relationship between institutional incentives, or empirical contexts, and 
the way in which political parties justify their self-government goals that would be 
impossible to extract directly (Thelen, 1999: 376). By examining the framing of their goals, 
or the ways these institutions are defined and problematized, we can identify the ideational 
factors which shape this research. Frames allow us to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ the 
ideas of actors (Goffman, 1974: 614).  
Discussions of politics and policies are inherently frame focused ‘as politicians intentionally 
and necessarily emphasize different messages and arguments in a policy debate’ (Schaffner & Sellers, 
2010: 1). However, it wasn’t until recently that frames were used by political scientists, 
with framing research typically confined to scholars of media and communication and 
social movement studies. Heibling et al (2010, see also Heibling, 2014) looked towards 
framing analysis as a means of understanding the justification of immigration policy. New 
works in studies of territorial politics make use of these techniques. The special issue of 
Party Politics organised by Elias, Szocsik and Zuber (2015) employed an analysis of frames 
which sought to examine the ways in which regional and statewide parties decided how 
to engage with issues falling outside the centre-periphery dimension. These works suggest 
the potential of framing analysis in the study of political parties.  (Field and Hamann, 
2015; Basile, 2015). Other notable works include Moufahim et al's (2015) study of the use 
of frames by the Vlaams Belang and Chaney's (2013) work on statewide parties' framing 
of Scottish and Welsh decentralization.  
On a basic level, frames represent the definition of a problem and a potential solution to 
the problem (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614; Entman, 1993: 52).   Frames are defined as 
‘values, beliefs, goals, rhetoric, ideological elements… slogans, tactics, motivations, portraits of “us” and 
“them”, prognoses and diagnoses’ (Johnston & Noakes, 2005: 12) While many instances of 
framing analysis focuses on the impact on audiences, my use of frames focuses on their 
articulation by frame makers. Framing allows us to capture some of the strategy inherent 
in political communication as actors attempt to justify and bolster support for their claims 
through their interpretation of external events.  
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Of interest to this research is the process by which issues are re-examined and reframed 
in response to changing political conditions as well as the ways in which frames are 
articulated across contexts. In the empirical chapters which follow, I examine the 
interaction between the goal of self-government, broadly defined, and the empirical 
context in which it is pursued, asking how self-government goals are framed with 
reference to the opportunities and constraints inherent in these contexts and how these 
contexts are used to justify the pursuit of self-government. Within each empirical context, 
I selected dimensions, or aspects of an area, that were expected to be of interest, informed 
by the theoretical literature on sub-state nationalist parties. These included, for example, 
within the international context, the uses of European identity, and the relationship 
between the sub-state nation and the world.  
Framing analysis is inherently comparative, with researchers identifying common frames 
between actors within a single movement, within comparable movements, and across 
both time and space. However, a framing comparison of the type conducted here, both 
within-case and cross-national, is less common within the existing literature. By adopting 
a longitudinal approach, changes in the framing of self-government goals, in response to 
changes in the empirical context, can be identified. Between cases, we can identity 
similarities and differences in the construction of arguments in favour of their goals. This 
necessitated a process of open and iterative coding close engagement with the source 
material, and a process of constant comparison. Below, I present a high-level overview of 
my coding schema.  
As discussed above, my data collection for this project rendered an enormous amount of 
data, more than 400 discrete documents and countless pages of documents, in English, 
Dutch, and French. The use of NVivo software as a depository for all relevant documents, 
precis, and interview notes facilitated the coding and analysis of documents and the 
identification of frames. For each manifesto, I produced a summative content analysis or 
precis, allowing me to identify the core goal and areas of interest, a process recommended 
when working with long texts (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Rapport, 2010). In this process, 
the self-government goal was identified, discussions relevant to the empirical contexts 
were highlighted, and key points and quotes were logged.   
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All relevant documents were coded according to the areas of interest and frames 
employed. My coding process was inductive and followed the three steps set out by Miles 
and Huberman (1994) : (a) an initial open code, in which general themes were identified; 
(b) axial coding: a coding of all documents, with patterns labelled; (c) selective coding and 
refining of the coding process.  
I first conducted an open code on each documents, identifying broad themes as they 
emerged (Van Gorp, 2010: 94). This open code was based on key theoretical themes as 
identified in the literature. I first coded text according to the policy area or general area to 
which they referred. This provided an opportunity to deepen my familiarity with the 
material and identify areas where further research was required. Broadly, my coding took 
the following form: 
Preliminary coding schema 
Self-government goals The stated self-government goal of the party and 
words used to describe it.  
International issues References to self-government and the international 
or European context 
The state and state structures References to the state, state structure, and the 
relationship between the broader state and the sub-
state nation 
The party system References to the pursuit of self-government with 
the party system 
 
My second round of coding was more focused, drawing on both on my initial impressions 
from the open coding process as well as the themes the literature suggests might emerge. 
I developed a codebook of recurring frames, both between cases and over time. 
Ultimately this coding of frames was too granular – focused on the content rather than 
general use of frames and in some cases, these frames were only evident in one or two 
instances. Upon reflection, a more general coding schema was developed in the third stage 
of coding and I revisited my sources with this coding schema in mind. This was organised 
according to context – allowing for comparable frames to be identified but also for 
variation to emerge. For example, within the international empirical context, I examined 
three main dimensions: (1) self-government and the world; (2) self-government and 
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European integration; and (3) international and European identities. Within each 
dimension, frames are identified. Some of these are shared between parties, for instance, 
the framing of the nation as a European nation, while others remain unique to each party. 
The absence of a specific frame can be equally important as its presence. A summary of 
the specific dimensions explored in each chapter is presented below.  
 
The use of NVivo versus other manual methods of content analysis was crucial to allow 
for the verification of coding and adjustments as my analysis developed (Wickham & 
Woods, 2005). The search function also allowed me to test certain hypotheses, identifying 
when a specific phrase or language emerged and examining earlier texts.  
2.5 Presentation of analysis 
The analysis of self-government goals is divided into five key chapters, the first of which 
provides a contextual introduction to the three parties selected for inclusion in this study 
as well as traces self-government goals and the framing of purposes of self-government 
over time. The presentation is inspired by analytic narratives, which present ‘detailed and 
textured account of context and process, with concern for both sequence and temporality’ (Levi, 2003).  
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The following three chapters address each of the three empirical contexts discussed 
above: the international and European context, the state context, and the party system 
context. The final empirical chapter looks specifically at the 2014 campaigns, examining 
the SNP and the N-VA. This provided an opportunity to examine the self-government 
proposals at close range and analyse the interaction between the framing of self-
government generally, the role Europe and the international context played in these 
visions of self-government, the ways in which each party framed the state, and how they 
positioned themselves within an electoral context. In each chapter, I present a brief 
contextual introduction, identifying key events, in acknowledgement of Steinmo’s 
exhortation that ‘one cannot even define what a rational act is without examining the context of that 
behaviour’ (Steinmo, 1996: 7). 
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Chapter Three: Continuity or Change? 
Evaluating self-government goals over time 
The study of sub-state nationalism has been, at times, hindered by terminological 
complexity and artificial divides between parties on the basis of their self-government 
goals. This research attempts to bridge this divide, studying three parties which would 
seem to place themselves on different points on the continuum of self-government, but 
who share important commonalities in their pursuit of these goals and their justification 
for them. In this chapter, I present and begin to unpack these self-government goals as 
well as their justification.  
This chapter serves three purposes, two contextual and one analytical. The first purpose 
is to provide a brief introduction to each of the parties, detailing their origins, political 
development, and identifying key moments in their lifespan.  
The second purpose is to demonstrate the evolution in the labelling and definition of each 
party’s self-government goals over time, examining both the language used to describe 
these goals and what that might entail. The goal of this exercise is to study changes over 
time and examine the content of these goals in more detail. Toubeau (2011: 432) discusses 
the challenges in identifying the goals of such parties, and this becomes apparent in the 
analysis presented here. We see variation in the labelling of goals – employing both 
constitutional terms like federalism, confederalism, and independence, but also more 
ambiguous and emotive language of freedom and autonomy.  We also see the ways in 
which these concepts may be stretched, departing from legal definitions to adapt to their 
individual context.  
Finally, I examine the framing of the purposes of self-government, according to the party. 
In doing so, I employ Varshney’s (2003) framework of value and instrumental rationality 
detailed in chapter one. Turning first to values, I operationalise a value rational frame as 
containing an assumption that a nation requires self-government and that self-
government allows for the self-actualisation of a national community. Instrumental 
frames are those made on the basis of the ‘what for’ of self-government, and can include 
themes of democracy, economic prosperity, social policy or cultural development. These 
frames reflect the specific political or economic circumstance of the territories in question, 
with parties arguing in favour of self-government to address certain conditions.  
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My emphasis on value and instrumental rationality rests on an assumption that these 
rationales will contribute to the way in which the party engages with the empirical contexts 
in which it operates. One would expect a party which wholly justified its goals with 
reference to value rationality would be insensitive to changes in the empirical contexts in 
which it operated, while a party which employed only instrumental rationality, or both 
value and instrumental rationality would be more sensitive to contextual constraints.  
This chapter is organised by party, and I begin with the eldest party, the Scottish National 
Party, before moving onto the Volksunie, and then the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, a 
convention maintained in the chapters which follow. I conclude with a comparative 
analysis across the cases of the labelling of self-government and its purposes over time.  
3.1 The Scottish National Party 
The SNP has a long history, one characterised by electoral victories and defeats and 
periodic debates over its territorial goals, strategy and ideology. It has grown from a party 
at the fringes of UK and Scottish politics to one at its very core (Leith, 2008: 84-5). Soule 
et al (2012: 1) assess the systemic relevance of the SNP, noting it has ‘gone from being a 
peripheral, at times ephemeral, movement, represented by a party that struggled to gain democratic 
representation, to a point where explicit political nationalism is an ever present feature of Scottish politics’.  
The Scottish political space of the 1920s was a crowded one, with home rule associations, 
parties, and interest groups pursuing various political and cultural goals (Lynch, 2002: 5). 
The SNP was formed, in 1934, as a result of the merger between the National Party of 
Scotland and the Scottish Party to pursue explicitly political aims (Newell, 1998: 111; 
Lynch, 2002: 45; Mitchell et al, 2012: 13). The National Party of Scotland, formed in 1928 
by Scottish intellectuals and with a left-leaning inclination and independence stance, first 
contested elections in 1929 but lacked the organisational capacity to make an impact 
(Harvie, 1998: 99; Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 137; Lynch, 2002: 36). The Scottish Party 
offered a more moderate self-government goal of Home Rule, specifically within the 
Empire, and a more right-wing ideological perspective (Lynch, 2009: 36; Cameron, 2010: 
170). Mitchell describes the Scottish Party as ‘a loose coalition of Liberals and Tories brought 
together by support for a moderate measure of home rule and a distaste for the NPS’ (1996: 181). After 
the two parties merged, the nascent SNP avoided taking an ideological position, speaking 
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instead of the need for self-government. More radical members of the NPS were expelled 
(Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 137). 
The SNP struggled to make an electoral impact in its early years, lacking organisational 
resources as well as a coherent message, having ‘a surfeit of poets and a lack of politicians’ 
(Mitchell, 1996: 25) Harvie (1998: 173) describes the SNP’s early days as a ‘modest family 
business’ with the ‘simplicity of eighteenth-century Scottish religious dissent: a single political tenet which 
was ‘one thing needful’’, the pursuit of Scottish self-government rather than a broader 
programme of social and economic policy. The start of the war complicated things 
further, and Kellas characterises the state of the party as ‘torn by schisms, reminiscent of by-gone 
Presbyterian conflicts, and were generally regarded as cranks’ (Kellas, 1968: 202). It struggled to 
develop a coherent position on the conflict and the conscription of Scottish officers 
(Mitchell, 1996: 185; Lynch, 2002: 51). Internal divisions over self-government and the 
means by which it should be pursued also emerged, with the Scottish Convention, led by 
John MacCormick, emerging from the SNP in 1942 and adopting a platform in favour of 
home rule within a federal UK (Mitchell, 1996: 123). Under MacCormick’s leadership, the 
Scottish Convention gained support in the post-war period, with an estimated two million 
people signing the Scottish Covenant, obscuring the work of the SNP (Lynch, 2002: 2; 
Harvie, 1998: 170-1).  
Despite these conditions, the wartime period represented an opportunity for the SNP. 
Not privy to the political truce between the main parties, it was able to contest seats as 
they became available (Cameron, 2010: 191; Lynch, 2002: 53; Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 
140. It first passed the threshold of representation in the 1945 Motherwell by-election 
with the election of Robert McIntyre but lost it in the General Election of the same year 
(Harvie, 1998: 169). 
In the post-war period, the British political system saw a return to business as usual and 
the subsequent emphasis on reconstruction, welfare state expansion, and economic 
centralisation left little political space for territorial demands (Lynch, 2002: 2). As a result, 
the SNP was to remain a ‘resilient little sect’ for more than two decades (Harvie 1998: 169). 
Its electoral activities were limited to contests in which it could afford to pay (and forfeit) 
deposits should it not succeed in passing the required threshold of 12.5 percent (Lynch, 
2011: 238). The party contested only 43 seats between its formation in 1934 and 1964. 
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Organisationally, its capacity was limited (Jaensch, 1976: 306; Hutchison, 2001: 85). It did 
not publish formal manifestos during this period, and possessed ‘no official policy, only a 
string of pamphlets, leaflets, articles and statements which had to be pieced together in order to gauge Party 
tendencies’ (Somerville, 2013: 15). It faced competition from the Scottish Convention, 
which sought to exercise its influence over traditional parties rather than stand candidates 
for election (Mitchell, 1996: 85). The SNP’s persistence in the face of these challenges was 
credited to a ‘small group of individuals who were sufficiently committed to Scottish independence to 
keep the party going during its darkest years’ (Lynch, 2002: 2). 
 
Until the 1960s, the party had little systemic relevance, failing to gain seats or even put 
the issue of Scottish autonomy on the political agenda (Harvie, 1993: 88). However, in 
the 1960s, the perception that both Conservative and Labour governments had failed to 
address Scotland’s economic problems lent credibility to its message (Hutchison, 2001: 
122; Newell, 1998: 107). The 1960s saw organizational expansion, more detailed policies, 
and marketing collateral which allowed it to more effectively communicate and campaign 
(Lynch, 2009: 628; Hutchison, 2001: 119; Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 141). The most 
notable innovation was the ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ campaign (Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 141). 
As Hutchison suggested, the oil issue ‘allowed the Nationalists to position themselves as the 
guarantors of the maintenance of the Welfare State and full employment, just at the time when Labour’s 
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Winnie Ewing’s 1967 victory in the Hamilton by-election was significant – showcasing 
the party as young and modern and placing Labour on notice that the SNP could present 
a threat, even in the safest seats (Cameron, 2010: 281; Harvie, 1998: 178-9; Kellas, 1968: 
203). Until this point, Gordon Wilson, party leader, describes the SNP as ‘a very successful 
protest movement’ which menaced statewide parties but had not yet experienced a victory 
(Wilson, 2009). Although Ewing lost her seat the following general election, the win gave 
the party a new sense of confidence, a sense augmented by the doubling of vote share in 
the 1970 General Election and winning a seat in the Western Isles (Ishiyama & Breuning, 
1998: 142). It increased the seats to seven in February 1974 and eleven in October 1974. 
Although it would not, until 2015, surpass this number in a UK General Election, it had 
crossed the threshold of representation in a decisive way and benefited from an increase 
in membership and attention. It appealed to voters experiencing social and geographic 
mobility, and those in search of a new political identity (Hearn, 2000: 4; McCrone, 2001: 
118). 
Mitchell (1996: 174) describes the period between 1967 and 1979 as the party’s drunk 
period, in which expectations rose about the SNP’s ascendency and the inevitability of 
self-government. Kellas defines the SNP in 1970 as a sort of Social Democratic party, 
‘rather more collectivist than the Liberals and yet apparently opposed to centralisation and bureaucracy’. 
The ambiguity inherent in its position was a subject of intense debate, with some, 
particularly newer, younger members advocating the adoption of a left-wing position to 
challenge Labour for its base while others emphasised its position aloof from ideological 
politics (Lynch, 2009: 627). Labour applied the pejorative ‘Tartan Tories’ while 
Conservatives described the SNP as left-wing.  
The party’s electoral success from the late 1960s incentivised action on the part of both 
the Conservative and Labour Parties. However, proposals which fell short of political 
independence exposed internal tensions, between so-called fundamentalists, viewing 
devolution as a dangerous distraction from its independence objective, and gradualists, 
who viewed devolution as a positive step towards independence (Cameron, 2010: 298; 
Mitchell, 1996: 212; Hutchison, 2001: 124; Hepburn & McLouglin, 2011: 389). This 
debate is encapsulated as the choice between ‘independence nothing less’ or devolution as a 
route towards Scottish self-government (Mitchell et al, 2012: 21). Although the SNP voted 
to support the Labour government’s proposal in the 1979 referendum, campaigning was 
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lacklustre, hindered further by the amendment which required 40 per cent of the entire 
Scottish electorate to vote yes (Harvie, 1998: 195). The defeat of the referendum, a result 
of its failure to overcome the electoral threshold, led to the party voting with the 
Conservatives in a vote of no confidence against the Labour government (Newman, 1996: 
38). The subsequent election saw the defeat of the SNP, which lost 9 of 11 seats (Ishiyama 
& Breuning, 1998: 142). 
Soule et al (2012: 1) describe this outcome as a ‘twist of political irony’, which marked the 
start of nearly two decades of political centralisation and Conservative rule. Further 
tensions emerged over the party’s ideological positioning, its self-government goals and 
the viability of fundamentalist and gradualist strategies (Mitchell, 1996: 224). The 79 
Group represented the first significant organised ideological faction within the SNP, 
advocating the adoption of leftist social and economic policies in an effort to challenge 
Labour (Hutchison, 2001: 145; Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 142; Lynch, 2009: 630). It 
also favoured ‘full independence’ as 'a prerequisite for the fundamental change in society which would 
lead to the social and economic restructuring of Scotland' (79 Group, 1979). The group drew on 
younger middle class professionals for its leadership and support (Ishiyama & Breuning, 
1998: 142), and in 1982, the 79 Group was expelled from the SNP (Mitchell, 1996: 221). 
Despite the suspension, many key figures remained in the party, including future leader 
Alex Salmond (Harvie, 1998: 201, Hearn, 2000: 54; Mitchell, 1996: 230) 
The SNP’s vote share fell further in the 1980s, mustering only 11.7 per cent of the vote 
at the 1983 general election, signalling a need for change (Newman, 1996: 40). Gordon 
Wilson led the charge to re-evaluate three key aspects of SNP policy - devolution, Europe 
and defence - in an effort to bring the SNP into the political mainstream (Mitchell et al, 
2012: 29). It struggled throughout the 1980s, however, facing competition from the 
Labour Party on the issue of devolution (Harvie, 1998: 238). 
Civil society mobilisation on the issue of devolution grew throughout the 1980s. The 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, a cross-party civil society group, was launched in 1980, 
and included Labour and SNP members. In 1989, the Claim of Right was published and 
signed, asserting the sovereignty of the Scottish People and committing its signatories to 
a Scottish Assembly (Cameron, 2010: 332; Mitchell, 1996: 101; Newell, 1998:  110; 
McCrone and Lewis, 1999: 17). The SNP declined to participate in the Scottish 
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Constitutional Convention that resulted from the Claim of Right, fearing the campaign 
would be dominated by Labour and would serve as a distraction from the cause of 
independence (Mitchell et al, 2012: 31; Lynch, 1996: 1). A press release announcing the 
withdrawal questioned the efficacy of the measure and its dominance by the Labour Party. 
'Scotland lost out in 1979 because of a rigged referendum. It is our view that the SNP cannot take part 
in a rigged Convention which can neither reflect nor deliver Scottish demands' (SNP, 1989). Remaining 
on the fringes of this broader movement, the SNP was undercut by Labour which was, 
through its participation, able to ‘recapture the mantle of Scotland’s national party’ (Mitchell, 
1996: 129). However, there were signs the party was willing to adopt a gradualist approach 
to self-government, remaining sceptical of the potential of devolution, but willing to 
accept it as a stepping stone towards independence. In January 1995, it had abandoned its 
‘Independence and Nothing Less’ policy in favour of a gradualist ‘Highway to Independence’, doing 
so in light of growing calls for a devolved legislative body for Scotland (Mau, 2005). 
Following their 1997 General Election victory, the Labour government introduced a 
referendum for more powers for Scotland. While the 1979 referendum was put forth by 
‘an exhausted minority government desperately clinging to power’, the 1997 vote took place in much 
different circumstances (Cameron, 2010: 347). The campaign was aided by the unity of 
the pro-Yes vote parties, including the SNP, as well as what Harvie (1998: 245) describes 
as the ‘surgical decapitation’ of Scottish Conservatives who were in disarray following the 
1997 election which left them with no representation in Scotland. The SNP pledged to 
support devolution, but also intended to use the Parliament as a stepping stone for 
independence (Mau, 2005). 
Devolution opened up new opportunity structures, allowing the SNP to entertain the 
prospect of participation in government and use this position to pursue its self-
government goals (Mitchell et al, 2012: 1). The party shifted its attentions, focusing its 
efforts on ‘forming a government in Edinburgh rather than being a marginal presence at Westminster 
and in Brussels’ (Lynch, 2009: 632). While the party gained 35 seats in the 1999 election, 
rendering it the official opposition in the Scottish Parliament, its failure in 2003 to 
improve on this number meant disappointment within the party. The party was struggling 
make an impact in a space in which its main rival could claim to represent the national 
interests.  (Ichijo, 2012: 24). The party focused on internal organisational reforms and saw 
changes in leadership in response to disappointing electoral results (Mitchell et al, 2012: 
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40; Cairney, 2011). John Swinney resigned in 2004 and Alex Salmond stood for election 
with Nicola Sturgeon as deputy (Mitchell et al, 2012: 45). Nicola Sturgeon became leader 
of the SNP at Holyrood with Salmond as 'a Nationalist leader in exile' until 2007 when he 
was elected to Holyrood. After Alex Salmond’s return, the party adopted a regional-list 
strategy – appealing to voters in 2007 to elect Alex Salmond for first minister (Johns et al, 
2009). This move capitalised on the nationalist leader’s personality.  
 
In 2007, the Scottish National Party entered national office for the first time, winning a 
narrow victory over Labour. It benefited from negative perceptions of Labour’s 
performance in government and the study of the 2007 election by Johns et al (2009) 
stressed the importance of valence politics rather than constitutional issues in this contest. 
The election of the SNP in 2007 precipitated increasing attention to constitutional change 
(Cairney, 2011). For the UK parties, this took the form of the Calman Commission, set 
up to review the powers of the Scottish Parliament with a view to increasing fiscal 
accountability and strengthening the Union (Calman Commission, 2009). The SNP 
Government’s parallel process, the National Conversation explored the alternative 
constitutional options facing Scotland and extoled the virtues of independence (ScotGov, 
2009). Although the party was elected with a manifesto commitment to hold an 
independence referendum, its status as a minority government prevented it from securing 
the necessary legislation. Harvey and Lynch (2012) explain that by delaying the 
referendum, the party was able to further its policy aims, helping the SNP ‘detach itself from 
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a landslide victory, securing 53% of seats in a voting system designed to prevent single 
party majority government, paving the way for a referendum (Cairney, 2011). 
Although ultimately unsuccessful in 2014, the SNP has had, and continues to have, an 
enormous influence in the Scottish political landscape. Its rise was slow, however. Not 
until seven decades after its foundation did the party enter office and command the tools 
of government to help pursue independence directly.   
3.1.1 Changes in the form and content of self-government 
The SNP has, from its origins, advanced a vision of external self-government, over time, 
labelling this goal differently – using the political term of independence, self-government, 
and home rule, or more emotive terms of freedom. Hassan (2011) described the SNP as 
possessing a ‘relaxed attitude to what independence and statehood are’ but upon careful 
examination, we can see a consistent commitment to political independence, although an 
independence articulated with reference to continued relationships with the United 
Kingdom and within broader international structures. The content of these goals has 
evolved over time, reflecting the external and state contexts which will be discussed in 
chapter four and chapter five respectively.  
At its origins, the SNP was vague about its goals, focusing on ‘self-government’ as a more 
general term. This was a result of the merger of two parties who were at different points 
on the continuum of self-government (Johns & Mitchell, 2016: 92-6). The more radical 
National Party of Scotland sought to ‘restore the independent National status of Scotland’. 
However, this entailed some shared competences with England and continued 
coordination through the Commonwealth (Finlay 1992: 194-5). The Scottish Party sought 
a more moderate form of home rule, explicitly embracing shared rights and 
responsibilities, particularly regarding the Empire (Finlay 1992: 185; Cameron 2010: 170; 
Mitchell, 1996: 181). When the SNP formed in 1934, it called for ‘self-government for Scotland’, 
including ‘the establishment of a Parliament in Scotland which shall be the final authority on all Scottish 
affairs’. It also sought mechanisms for the joint management of the British Empire and 
coordination on defence, foreign policy, and customs (SNP, 1934). Mitchell (1996: 182) 
describes the differences between the two parties as reconciled ‘by the simple expedient of 
stressing their joint commitment to Scottish self-determination’, leaving it up to the Scottish people 
to determine what form this would take. For the newly created SNP, this self-government 
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was to be embedded within the context of the Empire (Robertson 2006; Kennedy 2006). 
In the 1940s, it called for political independence, which included the ‘revocation of the Treaty 
of Union of 1707 and the restoration of political independence to Scotland’, while still situating these 
demands within the context of continued cooperation, both internationally and with the 
British state, discussed in detail in chapter four and chapter five (SNP, 1945). The term 
independence was not consistently employed by the party until much later.  
TH Gibson, party leader in the 1950s, engaged directly with the issue of terminology in a 
1951 address, asking ‘What do we mean when we use the phrases “Home Rule,” “Self-government”, 
and “Statehood”?’ Intriguingly, he did not use the word independence. Self-government 
meant ‘The restoration of Scottish National Sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish 
Government freely elected by the Scottish people’ (Gibson, 1951). In this scenario, the Westminster 
Parliament would not have any authority ‘in or over Scotland’ (ibid). The party’s 1952 
document, Scotland’s Present Position, continued to use the language of self-government 
rather than independence, with self-government denoting the status of ‘a free and equal 
nation within the Commonwealth and under the Crown’ (SNP, 1952). This language of self-
government rather than independence was also used in the 1960 document Speaking for 
Scotland (SNP, 1960).  
A shift emerges in the 1960s, with a notable increase in the use of the language of 
independence, although often accompanied by more ambiguous language of sovereignty 
or freedom. The SNP’s 1964 Draft Constitution for an Independent Scotland described its aims 
as a ‘free, independent, democratic nation’, in which sovereignty rests with the people. The stated 
goal was often ambiguous throughout the 1960s, focusing on the opportunities of a ‘New 
Scotland’ or ‘Freedom’ (SNP, 1967; SNP, 1968). Its 1968 policy statement, then the most 
comprehensive to date, The SNP and You, referred heavily to freedom. ‘'What we seek for 
Scotland is plain - Freedom through Unity - Freedom and power to rule herself, reform herself, respect 
herself’ (SNP, 1968). Its aim was described as 'The achievement of a democratic, independent 
government in Scotland…’ with Scotland having ‘political independence with full control of our affairs, 
and opportunities to take the initiative in the economic interdependence of European and world trade' 
(SNP, 1968). This reflects, in part, a broader global tendency of decolonisation, and the 
use of this language of liberation represents an attempt to legitimise self-government 
goals. The SNP reiterated its founding objectives in the 1979 Return to Nationhood and on 
membership cards, pledging itself to the pursuit of: 
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‘Self-Government for Scotland: that is, the restoration of Scottish National Sovereignty by 
the establishment of a democratic Scottish Parliament within the Commonwealth, freely 
elected by the Scottish people, whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as 
may be freely entered into by it with other nations or states of international organisations 
for the purpose of furthering international co-operation and world peace’  
SNP, 1979. 
Independence was explicitly highlighted in manifestos from 1979 onwards. A 
radicalisation of the party’s language took place in the 1980s following the failed 
devolution referendum, a defeat at the polls, and a broader process of introspection within 
the party. The 1983 manifesto was described as a ‘Manifesto for Independence’, with a de-
emphasis on the British connection (SNP, 1983). Voters in 1987 were called to ‘vote for 
their national freedom’ and the need for Scotland to ‘regain her independence’ and ‘win back our 
Parliament’ was stressed. Independence was regularly used from 1988 onwards, embodied 
in the tagline of ‘independence in Europe’. This entailed both political independence – the 
long-standing goal of the SNP - but also reflected the party’s conversion to membership 
of the European Union. Independence, according to the SNP was ‘the immediate, logical and 
clear cut answer to the question of how Scotland should be governed’ (SNP, 1992). It sought an 
independent Scottish Parliament, embedded within Europe (SNP, 1997).  
With devolution, the party maintained its independence goals, but incorporated 
devolution as part of the process, or a stepping stone to independence. Self-government 
was understood as ‘21st century independence’. This hinted at an acknowledgement of the 
interdependences and constraints of the modern world and allowing for continued 
cooperation, both with the rest of the United Kingdom and within international and 
supranational bodies. The Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation, the final report 
which resulted from the National Conversation process, published by the SNP minority 
government, defined independence as a scenario in which  
‘Scotland would assume all the responsibilities and rights of a normal European state, 
including membership of the European Union and other international bodies, the ability to 
determine economic policy, including the currency, and full responsibility for defence and 
security’  
ScotGov, 2009 
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The SNP’s goal of political independence was broadly consistent over time. However, it 
varied on the degree of integration within broader structures that it would entail, with the 
SNP looking to both the British Isles and the European Union to provide a supporting 
framework for their self-government ambitions. Notably the language of the party 
evolved, reflecting internal divides over independence and the popular language of the 
time. This evolution was described by former party president Gordon Wilson in a research 
interview as a ‘conscious’ choice:  
‘Sovereignty was always there, so it’s a technical term. And it’s relevant at the present time. 
Independence is a harder term, and it didn’t start coming in until probably the late ‘70s, 
early ‘80s at a guess. And it wasn’t always used’.  
Wilson, 2014 
The evidence above suggests independence was, in fact, used frequently, with the 1950s 
proving an exception. However, inconsistencies in the articulation of the self-government 
goal over time suggests strategic considerations and competing tendencies within the 
party.  
3.1.3 The purposes of self-government: pure and utilitarian  
The Scottish National Party’s framing of the purposes of self-government engaged 
directly with value rationality, primarily linked with an assumption that a nation should 
have a state. But it also engaged with instrumental rationality, speaking to the practical 
and material ways in which self-government could benefit the nation. This duality was 
present throughout the SNP’s lifespan – with self-government allowing national and state 
borders to coincide, as well as the achievement of political and economic goals.  
These themes were developed explicitly by Neil MacCormick, a legal scholar and later 
SNP MEP who made an enormous contribution to the SNP’s intellectual development.  
From the perspective of pure nationalism, ‘Scottish independence may be seen as a means to an 
end or as an end in itself. To see it as an end in itself is to adopt a very pure nationalist principle: simply 
because Scotland is a nation, she ought to become a separate state…’ (N. MacCormick, 1970: 52).  
In contrast, ‘utilitarian nationalism’ stresses independence ‘as being the best means to the well-
being of the Scottish people’ (MacCormick, 1970: 52). In the party’s 1974 manifesto, it justified 
its pursuit of self-government with reference to both principles and practical solutions: 
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‘Self-government is a matter of principle: but it also provides the only effective way of dealing with the 
practical problems that are facing the people of Scotland’ (SNP, 1974).  
Three frames will be discussed: (1) the value rational frame which operates from the 
assumption that a nation must have a state; (2) the notion, also rooted in value rationality, 
that self-government is necessary for the self-actualisation of the nation and the national 
community; and (3) the instrumental rational frame that suggests self-government is a 
means of pursuing broader social and economic goals. While the salience of instrumental 
and value rational frames has varied throughout the party’s lifespan, both remain 
important and present in the justification in self-government goals.  
1. A nation must have a state 
The framing of self-government as a value in and of itself, separate from any instrumental 
concern, is present throughout the SNP’s history, but takes different forms over time. In 
a 1951 address entitled The SNP. What it is and what it stands for, party president TH Gibson 
described the purpose of self-government in idealistic terms, stressing the necessity for 
nations to have a state in order to fulfil more universal values of peace and prosperity  
‘And where nationhood and statehood coincide, then the combination has always proved to 
be the greatest and best influence in co-operation between nations and national states, and 
for the advancement of peoples both spiritually, and materially, and above all for peace’  
TH Gibson, 1951.  
He continued, making an explicit link between nationhood and statehood, arguing 
‘Nationhood is not easily repressed for all time, and it strives status – that is statehood, which after all is 
the practical application of nation-hood’ (ibid). This argument is developed in Sandy McIntosh’s 
100 Home Rule Questions in which he attributes the SNP’s demands to principle rather than 
practical considerations: ‘Scotland’s demand for self-government is not based on the fact that she is 
self-supporting, but on the inalienable right of every self-respecting country to rule its own affairs’ 
(McIntosh, 1966). 
In a speech in the House of Commons on the Scotland and Wales bill, Donald Stewart 
asserted the value rational position of the SNP, saying the aim of the SNP – the 
independence of Scotland – ‘arises from the fact that Scotland is a nation. It proceeds to a 
constitutional principle – the right to self-determination of that nation’ (HC Deb 13 December 1976 
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vol 922 c1025). What Neil MacCormick would call ‘pure nationalism’ was largely articulated 
within the context of a ‘normal nation’ which suggested both an inherent congruence 
between a nation and statehood and the abnormality of the status quo. The SNP’s self-
government goal was to ensure this congruence, or to restore Scotland to the status of 
‘normal nation’, or the independence which ‘is taken for granted by other nations’ (SNP, 1983).  
Although this link is drawn between nationhood and self-government, it is moderated by 
an emphasis on self-determination, allowing Scots to exercise their sovereignty through a 
vote for independence, whether via the channel of the SNP, or directly in a referendum.  
2. Self-government as self-actualisation 
Self-government, according to the SNP, would allow for the restoration of confidence 
and self-worth to the Scottish nation. This frame of self-actualisation was repeatedly 
employed by the party, implying a criticism of the status quo, which rendered Scotland 
dependent – unable to realise its ambitions as a nation and take responsibility for its own 
affairs. The party’s 1967 document, The Scotland We Seek, set out the conditions under 
which Scotland would be ‘[p]olitically born again’ and able to fulfil its ambitions as a New 
Scotland. Billy Wolfe’s 1972 conference speech, reprinted in Scotland Lives (1973) stressed 
this theme of self-actualisation and revival and the SNP’s role in mobilising around these 
issues. 
'It is for the SNP to play a vital role in educating the Scottish public to realise that Scottish 
independence means other freedoms as well. It means freedom from the cultural and social 
stereotypes imposed on us by the imperialist past with which the English are so obsessed. It 
means freedom to express ourselves and to act as we ourselves decide. It means freedom to 
be a nation again'  
Wolfe, 1973: 17. 
Embedded within this narrative of self-actualisation was one of responsibility – allowing 
Scotland to stand up on its own two feet and be responsible for its own successes and 
failures. 'The point is that independence will restore to Scots people a sense of responsibility and, much 
more important, the reality of responsibility for their own future' (N. MacCormick, 1970: 53). In a 
December 1976 debate on the Scotland and Wales Bills, SNP MP Margaret Bain 
explained:  
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‘We do not want to look for scapegoats. We want the rights and responsibilities of taking 
our own decisions. If errors are made, they will be our errors, and we cannot then blame 
Westminster or the English. We can blame ourselves, and I think that that is an important 
and fundamental right for all nations and for all people’  
    HC Deb 13 December 1976 vol 922 c1449. 
Gordon Wilson described the desire for Scots to take on new responsibilities and exercise 
them, noting ‘If the power of decision-making is taken away from an area, its opportunities for self-
development are correspondingly limited’ (HC Deb 14 January 1976 c459). This focus on self-
government as responsibility was linked with the party’s support for devolution, both in 
the 1970s and in the 1990s. On the opening of the Scottish Parliament building, Presiding 
Officer George Reid returned to the theme of responsibility discussed by Bain and Wilson 
in the 1970s, describing of the Parliament as ‘A place where now, with devolution, if we make 
mistakes they are our mistakes – and we can no longer blame anyone else’ (Reid, 2004).  
In the introduction to her autobiography, Winnie Ewing described the nature of Scottish 
nationalism as focused on the self-actualisation of the nation. 'Our national freedom is about 
freedom for each one of us - the freedom to fulfil our potential' (Ewing, 2004: ix). Independence was 
therefore necessary ‘to allow us to be the people we can be’ (Ewing, 2004: 355).  In a speech at 
the 2005 party conference, Alex Salmond spoke of the disappointment Scots felt with 
devolution, a product of overruns in costs for the Scottish Parliament building, expense 
scandals and an absence of leadership from the main UK parties. In his concluding 
remarks, he said ‘Scotland needs Independence, self-determination and self-respect’ (Salmond, 2005). 
Nicola Sturgeon reiterated this =in a 2006 Scottish Parliamentary debate on the Future of 
Scotland, with independence discussed as a means of restoring self-confidence and 
accountability to Scotland ‘The freedom to control our own destiny and to reach our full potential is 
as important for Scotland’s people as it is for our nation’ (SP OR 6 September 2006, col 27249).  
This frame of self-actualisation became supplemented by one of self-government as a 
means, allowing Scotland to realise its ambitions in both moral and practical matters.   
3. Self-government as a means 
Although the SNP stressed the importance of the nation and national self-actualisation, 
self-government was always discussed as a means by which specific policy goals could be 
pursued and problems particular to Scotland could be addressed. It employed pragmatic, 
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policy-oriented arguments, stressing an agenda focused on securing prosperity for the 
residents of Scotland, although not one always informed by a coherent left-right ideology. 
These arguments were both diagnostic, identifying the ills of the current state structure, 
and prognostic, detailing how a self-governing Scotland would do better in the domains 
of culture, the economy, democracy and social policy.  
From its origins, the SNP sought self-government but also to improve the social and 
economic conditions of Scotland which allowed it to weigh in on other policy areas 
beyond self-government. One of its earliest publications Our Aim is Freedom focused on 
the opportunities offered by independence to secure greater prosperity, saying: 
‘We believe that the Scottish people should have in its own country the control of natural 
monopolies of land, transport, electric power, and minerals and the control of currency and 
credit, that all Scots may share in the riches of their own land and enjoy a higher standard 
of living that they have yet know’  
SNP, ca 1940s.  
In Robert McIntyre’s 1944 pamphlet, Some Principles for Scottish Reconstruction, he asked 
‘When Scotland is self-governing, what kind of country will we make it?’ a question which 
exemplifies the challenge which faced the SNP in articulating both why self-government 
was necessary and what a self-governing Scotland might look like. These concerns were 
also detailed in The Scottish National Party Demands for Scotland, a pamphlet outlining its 
postwar strategy and concerns (SNP, ca1940s). Poor health outcomes, the number and 
quality of housing, inequality, unemployment, and industrial decline were all, at various 
points, highlighted as problems affecting Scotland and ones that could be remedied by 
self-government. Neil MacCormick (1970: 53) characterised Scotland as a ‘sick society’, 
prescribing ‘an independent centre of political life in Scotland to take control of Scottish affairs’ as a 
cure.  
Billy Wolfe documented an effort by the party to de-emphasise nationalism in the 1960s 
and 1970s, arguing ninety per cent of Scots are already nationalists but needed convincing 
on the details. In Scotland Lives, Wolfe sets out the purpose of self-government, noting it 
is not a panacea but an opportunity.  
‘It has always been clear to the SNP that the first priority is the attainment of self-
government; not that having a Parliament in Scotland is going to work a miracle overnight, 
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but self-government will enable us to do things for ourselves in our own way with our own 
resources’  
Wolfe, 1973: 14. 
To secure the support of voters, the SNP should focus on answering two questions - ‘Will 
Scotland be prosperous and secure with a government of our own?’ and ‘Can the SNP show that it has 
the policies and the men and women to lead an independent Scotland in an efficient and democratic way?’ 
(Wolfe, 1973: 147).  In its February 1974 manifesto, voters were asked ‘Do you want to be 
“Rich Scots” or “Poor British”?’ arguing in favour of self-government on economic grounds. 
Nationalism as an ideology was to be ‘essentially practical’, a modern response to the 
concerns of the Scottish people rather than the fulfilment of a nationalist principle (I. 
MacCormick, 1970: 93) 
As the party developed its social democratic ideology, the emphasis on the purpose of 
self-government became more pronounced. Independence was necessary to create a new 
society, one ‘based on justice, fairness and freedom. It will be a society in which the rights of our people 
are clearly defined. From this we can ensure Scotland is protected from the many failings and injustices 
experienced under the UK system’ (SNP, 1987). The paper’s draft Constitution for an Independent 
Scotland, published alongside its manifesto for the 1997 Westminster election, stated the 
purpose of independence as one defined by policy.  
‘By making that choice, Scotland will place itself in a position to take maximum advantage 
of its rich abundance of natural resources and native talents and will be able to speak 
directly to the world, contributing from its store in appropriate fashion both to the 
international order and to those nations who are less advantaged’  
SNP, 1997a. 
This suggests an increasingly pragmatic and instrumental framing of self-government and 
is consistent throughout the devolutionary period. Its proposals from 1999 onwards 
focused on economic development, social justice and the furtherance of Scotland’s 
interests. In its first Holyrood manifesto, the SNP described the opportunity facing 
Scotland as ‘a nation that can use its wealth for its own priorities, creating not just a rich country but a 
rich society’ (SNP, 1999). The party’s continued commitment to self-government was 
motivated by policy goals, with Alex Salmond detailing in his 2007 programme for 
government ‘the transformation of our country in each and every one those policy areas can best be 
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achieved through that normal, independent status’ (Salmond, 2007) . Independence would allow 
Scotland to develop policies, both at home and abroad, which would reflect Scottish 
values and the instrumental framing of self-government reflected the issues of the day. 
The Scottish Government publication Your Scotland, Your Voice, published by the SNP-led 
government as part of the National Conversation process focused on the limitations of the 
current constitutional settlement in the domains of health, social welfare, justice, and 
education and spelled out how the powers of independence might be used to facilitate 
improvements in these areas (ScotGov, 2009).  
This pragmatic approach reflected the ideals of the SNP but was also intended to make 
independence more palatable to those hesitant to support nationalism as a matter of 
principle rather than purpose. Alex Salmond’s 2010 Perth conference speech stressed this 
pragmatism: ‘For be assured, I do not want independence for its own sake, but for the sake of the people 
here and now and those to come’ (Salmond, 2010).  
While self-government was persistently portrayed as a means through which specific 
policy goals could be pursued, those goals shifted over time, reflecting both the ideological 
development of the SNP and the adoption of a centre-left platform, as well as the specific 
social and economic concerns facing Scotland. 
The SNP’s justification of its self-government goals is thus both a reflection of its value 
rational assumptions about the need for a nation to have a state, and instrumental 
assumptions about the need for self-government to fulfil certain policy goals. Value 
rational assumptions were particularly salient in the party’s earliest manifestos, while later 
manifestos stressed the more instrumental or pragmatic justifications of independence. 
This framing was also employed by the Volksunie, with some variation on the salience of 
value rational versus instrumental goals.  
3.2 The Volksunie 
The Volksunie is notable as a sub-state nationalist party for its rapid rise, entry into 
government at the centre, success in fulfilling many of its self-government objectives, and 
collapse in the face of this success. The VU emerged in the postwar period, with claims 
to represent those marginalised within the highly pillarised and divided Belgian political 
system. It owed its roots to the older Flemish Movement, which at its origins focused on 
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cultural matters, but adopted political demands following the First World War (Rochtus, 
2012: 273). The VU emphasised its democratic credentials in an effort to remove the 
stigma of Flemish nationalism following its association with radical right elements in the 
1930s and duringthe German occupation (De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 284; Rochtus, 
2012: 273). 
 
Upon its emergence, the Belgian political system was heavily defined by partisan 
alignment with the traditional pillars and divided over the Royal Question1 and the School 
Pact2. In response, the Volksunie offered a cross-pillar Flemish democratic alternative, 
advocating an open vision of politics and participatory democracy in a postwar Belgium 
(Delwit & Van Haute, 2001: 15). Its core platform included three key components: (1) 
                                                 
1 The Royal Question focused on the behaviour of Leopold III towards the Nazis during the Second World 
War. The debate focused on his return following the war and a referendum on the issue was held in 1950, 
with cross-national divides in voting patterns. Flemings voted 72% in favour of his return, in contrast to 
42% of Walloons. In response, Leopold abdicated in favour of his son (van Goethem, 2010: 195) 
2 The school pact, agreed in 1958, addressed a long-standing conflict between Catholics, Socialists, and 
Liberals over the management and financing of education. Catholics had historically expressed resistance 
to the expansion of the secular education system in Belgium, which conflicted with postwar educational 
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federal restructuring of the Belgian state; (2) amnesty for those convicted of collaboration 
during the Second World War and, (3) the industrialisation of Flanders (CRISP, 1966). 
The VU first stood for election in 1954, under the name of Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie 
but did not formally become a party until following the election, removing Christelijke 
from its name. It returned its first representative in 1958 and became increasingly relevant 
in Sartorian terms throughout the 1960s as community issues dominated the agenda (De 
Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 285). By the 1960s, there was signs of its growing relevance, 
and we witness mainstream parties ‘playing on regionalist sentiments’ in order to attract support 
at the centre (Reuchamps & Caluwaerts, 2014: 51). In 1965, the Volksunie became the 
fourth party in Belgium. A contemporaneous account describes the ‘powerful influence on 
Belgian political life’ of the VU, representing ‘real force in Flanders, for which it must be taken into 
account to explain the current political climate’ (CRISP, 1966).  
The party system was shifting, with traditional parties increasingly orientated towards their 
territories and the emergence of regionalist counterparts in Wallonia, the Rassemblement 
Walloon and in Brussels, the Front Democratique de Francophones (Newman, 1995: 45; 
Dandoy, 2013: 63). They were, however, unlikely to collaborate, differing on their 
objectives and mistrustful of one another, as ‘[t]he Flemings wanted political power to match 
their new economic power; the Walloons wanted political power to counter their economic decline’ (Saey, 
Kesteloot, et al. 1998: 175). 
Issues of community conflict were also increasingly salient, with the debates about the 
language border providing an opportunity for the Volksunie to take a stand on the issue, 
raising its political profile. A debate took place within Belgian political parties over 
whether the language border should be determined by decennial language census or 
permanently fixed. The 1962-1963 language laws determined that these borders would be 
fixed, which reflected the preferences of the Volksunie (De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 
284). Rather than reducing community conflict, this led to a widening of the self-
government agenda beyond language. The subsequent redistribution of seats to reflect 
demographic realities also contributed to the salience of this issue. This resulted in 'a 
parliament in which representatives are supposed to represent their own language group' (Sinardet, 2010: 
352). 
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This contributed to regionalist tensions within the traditional parties, with a new 
generation of politicians mobilising to defend the interests of their regions. The Christian 
Democrats, Liberal and Socialist parties split into Flemish and Francophone branches in 
1968, 1972, and 1978 respectively, allowing them to better mobilise and counter the 
regionalist threat (De Winter et al, 2006: 934). All new parties which formed following 
1978 were explicitly organised along community lines (Dandoy, 2013: 53). This increased 
the salience of the cleavage and placed state reform on the political agenda (Swenden & 
Jans, 2006: 880). 
In the 1970s, the VU began to position itself as a party of prospective government, with 
a growing emphasis on policies beyond state reform (Govaert, 1993: 7). It was no longer 
a linguistic party, but a ‘party of power’ (ibid: 9). It participated in negotiations following the 
March 1974 elections but ultimately decided to support the government from outside – a 
response to the refusal by the Rassemblement Walloon to participate in government. The 
VU entered into government just two decades after its first participation in a general 
election. Joining the government was a source of internal tensions, which is consistent 
with the literature on government participation for non-mainstream parties. Some felt the 
‘intransigent position [of the party] had met its limits’, and prepared themselves for the 
compromises that government participation entailed (Van Haute, 2011: 212).  
The party’s participation in the government formed after the 1977 elections and Egmont 
Pact that resulted from the coalition negotiations was contested. One third of the National 
Council voted against the measure and the membership at large opposed it (De Winter, 
2011: 34). The Volksunie was punished for its participation in the ultimately failed 
negotiations, losing 30% of its vote.  
Entry into government was a source of contention within the party and exacerbated 
existing tensions between more radical and moderate elements (Govaert, 1993: 18). 
Factions emerged, including the Vlaams Blok, which, at its origins, supported Flemish 
independnece but later expanded to include a far-right policy profile, focused on 
immigration and anti-politics (Walgrave & De Swert, 2004; Mudde, 2000:177; Hossay, 
1996: 354; Breuning 1997; Breuning & Ishiyama 1998). The Vlaams Blok outbid the 
Volksunie on the issue of self-government and provided an alternative for voters 
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disillusioned with the more progressive platform of the VU or its moderation on the issue 
of self-government.  
Despite internal objections and the electoral consequences, the VU maintained its 
commitment to participation in government. It joined the central government in 1988 - 
1991 (Martens VIII). It also participated in the Flemish Executive in 1981 -1985 (Geens 
I), 1988 -1992 (Geens IV) and 1992 - 1995 (van den Brande II). It was in the Flemish 
Government from 1999 until the party dissolved in 2001 (Dewael - Somers). 
Volksunie Performance 1995 - 1999 
Year Election Vote share 
1995 Flemish Parliament 8.96 
1995 Belgian Chamber* 7.8 
1999 Flemish Parliament 9.25 
1999 Belgian Chamber* 8.9 
Belgian Chamber results denote percentage of Flemish voters 
In contrast to its rapid rise, its decline and fall was a protracted process, with periods of 
resurgence and revival. The VU’s successes – in placing issues of Flemish self-government 
on the political agenda, in entering into government, and in furthering the federalisation 
of the Belgian state – may ultimately be responsible for its demise.  
Because of its ‘big tent’ approach to nationalism, the Volksunie faced tensions within its 
membership. More traditional voters struggled with the party’s adoption of a more 
progressive ‘post-industrial’ agenda in the 1970s (Newman, 1995: 51). There were also 
divides on both the prioritisation of state reform, the degree of state reform necessary 
and the means by which it was to be carried out. Following the successful federalisation 
of the Belgian state in 1993, the VU struggled to redefine its role. It attempted to mobilise 
voters around further self-government but also around progressive social issues and 
disillusionment with the nature of Belgian politics, beset by scandals. The challenges of 
balancing its role as an opposition party at the federal level and a party of government at 
the Flemish level may also have contributed to this confusion.  
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Internal tensions preoccupied the party (Wauters, 2005) and it saw the defection of 
leadership and members, satisfied they had achieved their core objective and feeling free 
to seek out a party which aligned more closely with their views on socioeconomic policy 
(Delwit & Van Haute, 2001: 18). This led to discussions within the party regarding its 
stance on a wide range of social and political issues but also what can be described as the 
‘volksunie-sation’ of the Flemish parties as MPs and members from Volksunie disbanded to 
Flemish Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Socialist Parties, taking their calls for further 
Flemish autonomy with them (De Winter et al, 2006: 939). Paradoxically, the VU began 
to unravel at a time in which there was a strong degree of consensus among the Flemish 
parties on the direction of travel for Belgian decentralisation as well as comparatively 
strong performance by the VU, increasing its voters by 60,000 in 1999 in comparison to 
1995 and being included in regional coalition. However it was a crowded political space. 
In 1999, the Handvest voor Vlaanderen, endorsed by the Flemish Parliament, set out Flemish 
demands for further state reforms (Swenden 2013: 6).  As a result, ‘the regional branches of 
the mainstream Flemish parties had become the main protagonists in the post federalization phase’ (De 
Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 295). The party agreed, following the 1999 elections, to 
participate in the Flemish regional government, their participation necessary to block the 
Vlaams Blok but argued its participation was contingent on progress of reforms at the 
centre. However, the decision was contentious within the party (Govaert, 2002). 
In response to these tensions, three factions emerged within the party, which reflected 
existing tendencies obscured by the need to secure Flemish self-government prior to 
federalisation. Johan Sauwen’s group, Niet Splitsen, advocated the case for continuity, 
while Geert Bourgeois highlighted the need for a return to democratic nationalism 
emphasising conservative values, and Bert Anciaux advocated a more progressive 
nationalism as an alternative to conservative flamingantisme (Delwit & Van Haute, 2001: 
21). In 2001, faced with a contentious leadership debate and deep-seated concerns about 
its ideological direction, members were asked in 2001 to endorse or reject the following 
statement ‘the different tendencies which exist at the heart of the VU can no longer coexist. It would be 
impossible to stand together in the 2003 elections’ (Delwit & Van Haute, 2001: 20; Wauters, 2005: 
337). Fifty-eight percent of responding members agreed, triggering a party conference in 
which different proposals were presented for consideration.  
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Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, led by Geert Bourgeois, emerged as a result of this vote and 
reaffirmed the party’s commitment to democratic nationalism without adopting the 
progressive tendencies within the party. Out of the eight Volksunie deputies sitting at the 
federal level, two joined the Flemish liberals, one Spirit, one Agalev, and four remained 
with N-VA, leading to the further Volksunie-sation of the traditional Flemish parties and 
making the space into which the N-VA would emerge, even more crowded.  
The VU can be understood, in many ways, as a victim of its own success. It rapidly rose 
to relevance and became, in 1977, one of the only sub-state nationalist parties to enter 
into government at the centre. In 1993, with the federalisation of the Belgian state, it 
largely achieved its original self-government goals. Its fall came at a time in which it was 
electorally successful, receiving 10% of the vote in a highly fragmented party system. De 
Winter (2011: 27) attributes its demise to the fact it crossed the threshold of government 
too frequently, making policy trade-offs without significant return on their investment 
and this would be a lesson learnt by the N-VA.  
3.2.1 The moving target of self-government 
In contrast to the SNP, which began on the radical end of the spectrum of self-
government, the Volksunie displays progression in its self-government goal, from internal 
self-government through a federalist model, to external self-government, either in the 
form of confederalism or independence. There was also more variation over time, with 
brief periods of radicalisation, and a distinction drawn by the party between goals to be 
pursued in the short-term and long-term ambitions. This variation may be attributed to 
two main factors. Firstly, the systemic relevance of the party shaped its articulation of its 
goals, as it was considered from the 1970s onwards, as a party which could be included in 
governing coalition. As a result, it had to advance goals which would be pursued in the 
immediate term. Secondly, it can be linked to both the success and failure of the party in 
pursuing reform of the Belgian state – with radicalisation or a move along the continuum, 
linked to the failure of state reforms and to its success. 
At the VU’s origins, it adopted the goals of the Flemish nationalist movement of the 
1930s, focusing on both culturally protectionist objectives, including the recognition of 
the Flemish language and access of Flemings to decision-making at the centre, and state 
reform in the form of federalisation (De Winter, 2011: 39). Its expansion from the cultural 
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to the socioeconomic domains were motivated by ‘The dangers of the world as well as a unified 
Europe’ necessitating federalisation and a statute of political autonomy for Flanders and 
Wallonia (VU, 1955). Federalism was defined vaguely as a ‘positive political system’ which 
would allow for the pacification of community conflict (VU, 1967). The party’s vision of 
federalism was a dual federation, with Flanders and Wallonia forming the federal units 
(VU, 1969). Each deelstaat would have extended powers with each possessing ‘the 
maximum of self-government that is compatible with Belgium as a sovereign country’ (VU, 1962). In 
its 1967 proposals, it called for the devolution of culture, administration, health, housing, 
family policy, socio-economic policy, planning and public works and public order, while 
leaving the federal government to manage foreign policy and defence, general economic 
and political policy, public finance and social legislation (VU, 1967). The party 
incorporated other issues, including the environment and social issues throughout the 
1970s.  
Both the labelling and content of the party’s goals shifted in the late 1970s and 1980s with 
its goal referred to as confederalism or integral federalism, seeking extended competences 
from Flanders and Wallonia. This radicalisation was motivated, in part, by the failure to 
achieve federal reforms through the Egmont Pact and a split within the party between 
more radical factions. It acknowledges this and appears to argue confederalism is 
undertaken reluctantly, given the failure of federalism to materialise, saying ‘In the current 
circumstances, the Volksunie’s objective is best realised in a confederation or a very far-reaching federation 
within Europe of the peoples and regions’ (VU, 1979). However, the opportunity for gradual 
reform had passed and the party noted ‘That page had been turned. What might have been achieved 
in two or three stages must be demanded and conquered in one go’ (VU, 1978). In this context, the 
objectives of Flemish self-government could not be achieved in a federal structure.  
The party envisaged Belgium as a federation or confederation of two independent units, 
Flanders and Wallonia, each with its own legislative chamber and own executive authority. 
The Brussels area would be designated as a capital and the status of the German-speaking 
area would be determined by those inhabitants (VU, 1979).  In this model, ‘all state power 
belongs to Flanders and in Wallonia, except those expressly assigned to the federation, confederation or 
supranational institutions’ (VU, 1979). Its language radicalised further in 1981, proclaiming 
‘the Volksunie wants a Flemish state. NOW!’ and proposed a reform which would see the 
‘dislocated state of Belgium’ transformed into a confederation between Flanders and Wallonia.  
The Art of the Possible 
3 Continuity or Change?  92 
After the radical agenda of 1979, the VU focused 
on state reform in the short term, with a long 
view towards a confederal structure, which was 
further elaborated in 1987 within a European 
context. Confederalism was to provide a 
framework for Europe and for the Belgian state, 
particularly in light of a move towards further 
integration in the form of the European 
Monetary Union. National power was ‘an interim 
transitional arrangement’ and its goals reflected a 
desire to move towards a deeper level of 
European integration (VU, 1987). Its 1987 
manifesto focused on a zelfstandig or an 
autonomous Flanders within both Europe and Belgium. 'The Volksunie remains committed to 
the development of a true and confederal Europe of the nations....In light of this, the Volksunie wants to 
transform the Belgian state into a confederation of Flemish and Walloon states' (VU, 1987). Rather 
than devolving powers to the confederal units, the confederal units would decide what 
should be ceded to the central government and how funding would be arranged (VU, 
1987). Competences identified as reserved included defence, constitutional matters, 
constitutional rights and freedoms, basic principles of social security, foreign policy and 
the minimum powers necessary to meet the conditions of the EMU (VU, 1987).  
The proposed and realised federalisation of the Belgian state, a fulfilment of the 
Volksunie’s original goals, required a rethink of what it would stand for. Its terminology 
and goals from the 1990s onward were vague – speaking of autonomy, independence, and 
integral federalism, reflecting divides within the party on the centrality and nature of self-
government (Van Haute, 2011: 211; Deschouwer, 1999).  Confederalism largely 
disappeared from party programmes. The agreement on federalisation as considered to 
be transitional, ‘particularly as the objectives of the Volksunie were not fully met’ and in 1993, it 
called for radical zelfstandig, or autonomy for Flanders. This restructuring, the party 
affirmed ‘is the main goal for the VU’ (VU, 1993) and included control over financial matters 
and an end to fiscal transfers. A focus on integral federalism, or a deeper form of 
federalism within the Belgian state, emerged as part of an emphasis on democratic 
1985 Volksunie poster calling for a 'free Flanders' 
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development and good governance as well as a long-term emphasis on Flemish 
independence within ‘federal Europe of the nations’ (VU, 1987; 1982). This escalated in the 
1995 manifesto, with the party explicitly stating: ‘The ultimate goal of the state (re)formation 
remains, for the Volksunie, an independent Flanders within a federal Europe of the peoples and regions’ 
(VU, 1995). It also included full membership of the United Nations, suggesting a more 
radical goal of political independence, but one heavily embedded within the European 
Union (VU, 1995). 
The VU supported the Roadmap for Flanders, published by the Flemish Parliament in 1999, 
and involving restructuring of the Belgian state structure from 3+3 to 2+2, a reduction in 
the status of Brussels and the German speaking community, fiscal and financial 
autonomy, and the transfer of competences in a variety of domains (Swenden 2013: 6; De 
Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 296; Deschouwer, 2013: 339). However, it did so while calling 
for further reforms along confederal lines (Brassine, 2005: 31). This was to be an interim 
arrangement, until which point European integration was sufficiently developed to fulfil 
the functions of the Belgian state. 
Throughout its lifespan, the Volksunie appeared agnostic on the structure and labels of 
self-government, focused more on achieving the necessary powers for Flanders than 
securing the trappings of statehood. In response to concerns about its labelling of its self-
government goals, the VU argued it ‘rejects the word fetishism and confusing or misleading use of 
the concepts of federalism, confederation or separatism. It is not the name of the reform that is important, 
but the content, and the purpose to which it is addressed’ (VU, 1981). This was evident both in the 
means by which it sought to achieve its goals, through participation in government, with 
the necessary compromises that would entail, and its framing of the purposes of self-
government. However, an escalation along the continuum of self-government can be 
documented, with the party moving from a federal model in which a limited range of 
cultural and economic competences would be accorded to the constituent units of the 
Belgian federation to far-reaching confederalism or integral federalism, with the units 
deciding what they would share. External self-government, in the form of political 
independence, was mooted at various points, but under specific conditions – a breakdown 
in negotiations with Francophones or sufficient development at the European level which 
would allow the EU to supplant the functions of Belgian state. Unlike the SNP, for whom 
independence served as the final destination, the Volksunie was vague about where the 
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process of federalisation and transfer of competences would end, positioning itself to 
respond to emerging events and opportunities, particularly at the European level, 
discussed in chapter four. 
3.2.2 Self-government for purpose and principle 
The Volksunie framed the purpose of self-government in light of both value and 
instrumental rationality. From a value rational perspective, self-government enabled the 
construction and development of the Flemish nation and was required in order to 
facilitate the self-actualisation of the Flemish people. However, the majority of its 
discourse focused on instrumental concerns – whether linguistic, democratic, or 
economic. Self-government was required to allow Flemings to address their own 
problems and present their own solutions.  
1. Self-government as self-actualisation 
In the VU’s value rational framing of the purposes of self-government, it spoke of self-
government as necessary for the development of the Flemish nation and for its defence 
against the threat of assimilation, and later as necessary to allow Flanders to achieve its 
full potential.  
At its origins, the Belgian state structure was viewed as an existential threat to the nascent 
Flemish nation. The party’s first manifesto spoke of ‘a disturbing picture of decline and 
disadvantage’ (VU, 1955). The Belgian state was considered a Francophone state, serving 
Francophone economic and political interests and stifling the ability of Flemings to 
prosper, both economically and culturally (VU, 1957). It described, in an extraordinary 
session in response to attempts by the central government to address the language barrier, 
the ‘denationalisation of the original Flemish community and the Flemish people, and the immigration 
influx in Brussels’ (VU, 1961). This was precipitated by a ‘150 year-long deliberate policy of the 
Frenchification by the Belgian unitary state’ (VU, 1961). It warned of progressive centralization 
‘a direct threat to our people’ in both Flanders, where economic interests were ignored by the 
Francophone central state and in Brussels and Flemish Brabant ‘which is threatened with 
colonization’ (VU, 1961). In the party’s view, ‘A nation can only achieve its essential destiny if it 
has its own structure’ (VU, 1973/1975) and ‘frees itself from any guardianship of dependency’, a pure 
nationalist perspective(VU, 1977). The current constitutional arrangement inhibits this, ‘If 
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a nation does not have a sufficient degree of political autonomy, then, especially if it is a minority, it will 
soon be the object of oppression’ (VU 1973/1975).  
In its 1970 manifesto, it spoke of the right of Flemish youth to realise their ambitions 
within a self-governing Flanders: 
‘They have a right to live in a Flanders which can manage its own affairs. They have an 
inalienable right to live amongst people who do not have to constantly spend their energy to 
maintain or secure their elementary rights, but can quietly and freely work on their welfare 
and the welfare of each individual’  
VU, 1970.  
The party’s characterisation of the Belgian state as a threat to Flemish values and 
prosperitywas most explicit in the 1970s and 1980s, representing a more radical position 
adopted by the party following the failed Egmont Pact. In advance of the 150th anniversary 
of the Belgian state, the Volksunie asked ‘What is there to celebrate?’, saying, ‘the Volksunie 
wishes to emphasise that there is no reason for enlightened Flemings to commemorate the establishment of 
a state that has attempted to alienate us from our Dutch identity’ and remains an impediment to 
the development of the Flemish people (VU, 1979) 
As federalism seemed imminent, the party described its path towards the realisation of 
Flemish self-government and the essence of the nation, saying ‘We are finally on our way to 
the Flemish state, the essential linkage between the district and the world’ (VU, 1987). It had moved 
from a language of survival and self-government as necessary to combat existential threats 
against the nation to one in which self-government would allow the Flemish nation to 
flourish. 
‘The Flemish state reform is only a means, however important, to build a Flemish nation. 
This incarnation of the Flemish nation must be a society where the free development of 
individual citizens, coupled with being aware and responsible towards others, is fully 
possible’  
VU, 1988.  
It set out its plan for this, which included improvements to democracy and maintenance 
and reinforcement of individual rights (VU, 1987). This was to be part of a renewal of 
political culture in Flanders, with new ideas and an emphasis on democracy, transparency, 
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and accountability (VU, 1988). The 1990 congress text spoke of a ‘richness in diversity’ and 
stressed the importance of community, self-determination and autonomy for both the 
individual and the community, and the nation within the wider world (VU, 1990). 
Federalism was to be ‘a guide for building society, from the individual to the world community’ and 
in favour of autonomy, which will ‘lead to a renewed and better Flanders’ (VU, 1990).  
This shift in language – with the party moving from a need to self-government to protect 
Flanders to a need for self-government to allow it to further prosper can be attributed to 
material changes in Flanders.  
2. Self-government for a purpose 
From its origins an instrumental argument was made in favour of self-government, 
accompanied by a variety of cultural and economic policy proposals aimed at the party’s 
prospective supporters (VU, 1955; VU, 1956). These issues were defined broadly and the 
VU rejected proposals for linguistic autonomy as insufficient, saying 'As Flemish 
nationalists, we believe that the Flemish question is a national matter for the Flemish people, as such it 
includes all sectors of society, it is not just a language issue, a cultural issue, a social or economic issue, but 
these together’ (VU, 1961).  The policies stressed by the party, or the purposes of self-
government, changed over time, reflecting first the issues of language rights and access 
before expanding into economic concerns, and in the 1990s, post-materialist policy 
proposals. This took three key forms: firstly, a means of ending conflict between Flemings 
and Walloons; secondly, a means of pursuing economic goals, and thirdly, to allow for 
the appropriate democratic representation of Flanders within the Belgian state. 
Self-government, in its various forms, was framed as a means of ending continuous and 
counterproductive conflict between Flemings and Walloons which was rooted in different 
identities, desires, and interests. The party argued the two communities were now so 
different that ‘a unitary government is no longer acceptable’, and as a result, ‘only federalism can put 
an end to the constant nationalist conflict between the peoples’ (VU, 1962). Federalism was described 
as a remedy to the status quo, ‘The Belgian house in which Flemings and Walloons huddle together 
and quarrel’ would be replaced by a compromise ‘Under a single roof and behind a single façade, 
Flemings and Walloons live as they like in their own apartments’ (VU, 1965). 
The underrepresentation and underperformance of Flanders, both in economic matters 
and in public life, was at the heart of the Volksunie’s proposals. The party’s economic 
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rationale for self-government has a temporal component, from its origins through the 
1960s and from the 1960s to its demise. Reynebeau (2012: 9) describes a shift in the party’s 
discourse, from rallying against ‘contemptuous Francophone elites’ neglecting the interests of 
Flanders to ‘wasteful or extravagant Walloons, who benefit from Flemish wealth without gratitude’, 
reflecting the change in the economic position of Flanders vis-à-vis Wallonia.  
Self-government was to bring an end to the systematic suppression of Flanders by the 
unitary state, which manifested culturally as well as economically (VU, 1959). The party 
focused its economic proposals on what it perceived as its core constituents - farmers, 
the middle classes, and merchants at its origins although it situated itself as transcending 
traditional class cleavages.  At its origins, a bleak picture of the Flemish economy was 
painted, focusing on ‘decline and disadvantage’ and offering self-government as a remedy 
(VU, 1957). It proposed ‘industrialization through self-government’ (VU, 1957). The existing 
situation, or ‘undeniable disadvantage’ was attributed to the weakness of government and 
mainstream parties (VU, 1965). From the 1960s onwards, the economic argument in 
favour of self-government shifted with economic growth (Saey et al. 1998: 175). There 
was now ‘no question of dependence or of subordination to Wallonia’ but rather a situation in which 
a prosperous Flanders subsidised a declining Wallonia (VU, 1969). Flanders did not, 
according to the VU, ‘get its share of the cake’ (VU, 1971). It therefore demanded ‘Flemish 
pennies in Flemish hands’, a refrain also adopted by the N-VA (VU, 1977). Self-government 
would prevent Flanders from being dragged down by Wallonia. With the economic 
decline in the 1980s, the Volksunie called for a ‘rapid and drastic extension of the current 
inadequate proposals, towards a full and broad self-government’, which according to the party, was 
necessary to ‘safeguard Flemish welfare’ (VU, 1982).  
Self-government would ensure democratic representation for Flanders, increasing both 
self-rule and input at the central level of government. The VU rarely advocated the 
wielding of its demographic majority, but argued it sought to have Dutch recognised as 
equal in status (VU, 1956). This was considered as a concession to Francophones, but 
one the Volksunie was willing to make in the interest of an agreement (VU, 1956). It 
warned of state reforms which sought parity as the ‘murder of the democratic right to vote’ (VU, 
1965).  By the 1970s, this message became more explicit, as a result of the recent successes 
of the Volksunie which allowed Flemings to channel their identity and the increasing 
economic confidence of Flanders. ‘The Flemish people are themselves in recent years becoming 
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increasingly aware of their identity: they are aware of their real political, social, and economic significance 
in this country… Since then, the Flemings naturally claim what belongs to them’ (VU, 1971).  
The democratic argument in favour of self-government became more pronounced in the 
1990s in light of political scandals, and accelerated as the party allied with the ID21 which 
defined itself as a radical democratic party (VU & ID 21, 1999). Self-government 
proposals were paired with broader institutional developments, arguing in favour of 
bringing decision-making closer to the people with reference to the local, national, and 
European context (VU, 1993). This included democratic reforms, direct participation in 
government with provisions for binding referendums, although not on the issue of self-
government, an end to mandatory voting, the introduction of direct elections to the 
central government, and a reduced role of both the monarch and the senate (VU & ID21, 
1999).  
The VU’s framing of the purpose of self-government acknowledged areas of value 
rationality, with a link made between the need for self-government in order to 
acknowledge the distinctiveness of the Flemish people, but primarily focused on 
instrumental rationality, with self-government framed as a means to improve democratic 
representation, the position of Flemings, and the material circumstances of Flanders. 
Its instrumental approach to self-government afforded it some flexibility when pursuing 
its self-government goals. Compromises and intermediate steps could be accepted and 
even embraced as a means of furthering the instrumental goals of self-government – 
pacifying community conflict, boosting the economy, and increasing democratic 
representation. The VU acknowledged this flexibility directly in its 1978 manifesto, 
describing state reform as the means to an end, with a choice to be made between 
‘federalism, confederalism, and independence’ (VU, 1979). 
These positions were largely adopted by the Volksunie’s successor, the Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie, which shifted ideologically to the right but maintained an emphasis on self-
government as a means of pursuing specific policy goals.  
3.3 The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie emerged as a result of the split of the Volksunie, with its 
leadership having secured sufficient support to maintain the Volksunie’s organisational 
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resources but not the name. The party consisted of the VU’s more conservative and 
nationalist supporters and sat ideologically to the right of the Volksunie at the time of its 
demise (Huysseune, 2016; Beyens et al, 2015). In its Statement of Principles, the N-VA 
situates itself in the democratic Flemish nationalist tradition of the Volksunie and 
emphasises its commitment to continuing the process of state reform.  
‘Building on 45 years of successful work by the Volksunie, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
is launched with a renewed, ambitious task: to shape a humanitarian nationalism of the 
21st century in Flanders. No glorification of our own people, not constantly looking 
backward, but a clear vision on the challenges of today and tomorrow’ 
           N-VA, 2001: 1. 
The party stressed its democratic nationalist credentials, focusing on both Flemish self-
government and the pursuit of socioeconomic policies which reflected the mainstream 
preferences of the Flemish voter (Rochtus, 2012: 269; Huysseune & Dalle Mulle, 2015).  
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie Performance: 2003 - 2014 
Year Election Vote share 
2003 Belgian Chamber  4.9% 
2004* Flemish Parliament 26.1% 
2007* Belgian Chamber  18.5% 
2009 Flemish Parliament 13.1% 
2010 Belgian Chamber  28.3% 
2014 Flemish Parliament 31.88% 
2014 Belgian Chamber 29.8% 
*Denotes electoral cartel with CD&V and N-VA 
The N-VA’s chances of success appeared minimal, emerging as it did an intensely 
crowded Flemish party space in which mainstream parties could credibly claim to 
represent the Flemish interests and called for further state reform beyond federalism 
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(Deschouwer, 2013: 338; De Winter et al, 2006: 28; Adams, 2014; Gerard, 2014: 259). 
With the exception of the Socialists and Greens, all parties worked to highlight their 
Flemish credentials, with Vlaams appearing in their party names (Deshouwer, 2013: 346; 
Fitzmaurice, 2004: 150). De Winter et al (2006: 939) describe the ‘Volksunie-sation’ of the 
Flemish party system, both as a result of policy changes and the movement of former VU 
politicians into the ranks of traditional parties. In contrast, there was not a similar 
mobilisation in favour of Wallonia and state reform on the Francophone side (Blaise, et 
al, 2009: 17). 
The party’s first election presented a challenge, both from within, with limited 
organisational resources, and from systemic efforts to mitigate some of the fragmentation 
of the Belgian political system with the introduction of an electoral threshold of 5% 
(Cadranel, 2003: 59; Onclin & Reuchamps, 2011: 11; Hooghe et al, 2006: 357; Hooghe 
and Deschouwer, 2011: 638; Reuchamps et al, 2014: 1089). In response, and in order to 
ensure its survival, it began to explore an electoral cartel with the CD&V which was 
excluded from government at the centre in 1999, for the first time since 1958 and was 
keen to burnish its Flemish nationalist credentials. 
In January 2002, faced with polling which predicted poor results for N-VA, the party 
initiated talks with CD&V in order to pursue an electoral cartel in the 2003 federal 
elections but in the end decided to enter the elections alone, fearing the CD&V’s 
commitment to state reform was insufficient (Van Haute, 2011: 205; Trefois & Faniel, 
2007: 7). Polling in advance of the 2004 regional elections which indicated the party’s 
performance would not improve, and may even fall below the results achieved in the 2003 
elections served as the impetus for the cartel’s formation (Hooghe et al, 2006: 365; Trefois 
& Faniel, 2007).  In 2004, following disappointing results in the previous elections, both 
parties returned to the negotiating table, forging an electoral cartel. Together, they issued 
a joint programme entitled ‘Flemings deserve more respect’ and calling for the transfer of a 
range of competences and the fulfilment of the 1999 Resolutions of the Flemish 
Parliament. The cartel allowed the Christian Democrats to position themselves as strong 
supporters of the Flemish cause and allowed N-VA access to the brand and resources of 
one of the most powerful parties in Flanders (Deschouwer, 2013: 341). However, the 
parties remained distinct, issuing separate manifestos in addition to a common electoral 
platform (Dandoy et al, 2013: 334). The ‘Flemish Cartel’ was justified as a means of pursuing 
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Flemish independence, but through a more gradual means (N-VA, 2007). The cartel 
gained 26 percent of the votes at the Flemish regional elections, allowing CD&V to head 
the regional government and N-VA to enter the governing coalition as well as secure six 
seats in the regional Parliament (De Winter, 2011: 46-7). They were also able to amplify 
their demands at the central level (Deschouwer, 2009).  
The salience of state reform increased, with tensions in the governing coalitions and the 
production of Bye Bye Belgium, a mockumentary produced by the RTBF exploring the 
possibility of a universal declaration of independence bringing public attention to the 
issues (Sinardet, 2008: 1023). Francophone parties remained opposed, ‘demanding nothing’, 
which allowed the N-VA to mobilise around these issues (Sinardet, 2008: 1023; Pilet and 
van Haute, 2008: 548) 
Perceived failures by the CD&V to take meaningful action on state reform and the 
growing success and recognition of the N-VA as an independent party began to take a 
toll on the cartel (Govaert, 2009: 63). In September 2007, Geert Bourgeois resigned from 
his post in the Flemish Government, placing the N-VA in opposition at the federal and 
regional level and able to reinforce its political ambitions (Van Haute, 2011: 205). The 
cartel came to an end in 2008, with the party seeing an increase in its electoral success 
from the 2009 onwards.  
It abstained from the Leterme federal government, rejecting proposed reforms as ‘too vague 
and too conditional’ but voted in favour of the governing coalition, with the exception of 
Bart de Wever who symbolically abstained (Govaert, 2009: 40). In the 2009 regional 
elections, there was a loss of support for the three traditional parties and a sense that, 
given the N-VA’s success, ‘Flemish nationalism is back’ (Govaert, 2012: 7). It entered into 
government at the Flemish level, countering critiques of its ability to govern (Andre & 
Depauw, 2015: 229). 
Federal elections were called in April 2010 following the departure of the Open VLD 
from the federal coalition on the basis of the failure to deal with the issue of electoral 
boundaries and voters’ rights in Brussels-Halle Vilvoorde. In these elections, the N-VA 
became the largest party in Flanders, while the Parti Socialiste remained dominant in 
Wallonia, leading to a protracted and ultimately unsuccessful process of government 
formation (Abts et al, 2012: 448; De Winter, 2012: 18). The N-VA maintained its agenda 
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setting function and was able to pressure traditional parties into maintaining a hard-line. 
De Winter described the options facing the party, either successfully negotiating a 
significant state reform, although one that would fall short of its ultimate goal, or: 
‘play the formation game for some time, securing that the N-VA’s concessions to the 
Francophones would be covered by the other Flemish parties to be invited to the formation 
talks. And then, after some months it could blow up the negotiations on grounds that the 
Francophones were still not lenient enough, while the other Flemish parties would have 
appeared eager to make a deal with the Francophones mainly seeking office rewards’ 
De Winter, 2012: 18. 
A pattern emerged, in which N-VA and the CD&V critiqued the Francophone parties for 
their failure to negotiate radical reform, while Francophone parties blamed the Flemish 
parties for their counterproductive role in negotiations (Abts et al, 2012: 432). In July 
2011, the N-VA rejected the proposals for government quitting the negotiation while the 
Flemish and Walloon traditional parties, joined by the Greens, reached an agreement of 
in October 2011 and took office in December after the longest period of government 
formation to date. 
The local and provincial elections were viewed as an indictment of the federal 
government, with state reform viewed by the N-VA as insufficient. Writing in advance of 
the elections, De Winter (2012: 21) argued the party would position itself vis-à-vis its 
Flemish rivals as the only party which could credibly defend Flemish interests and pursue 
confederal reforms. In his victory speech, De Wever warned Francophones that 
meaningful state reform was coming in 2014 and they should prepare themselves (De 
Wever, 2012) 
Behind the party’s extraordinary success sits a diverse range of voters which may cause 
difficulties in the future. A survey of N-VA supporters found 27% selected state reform 
as a very important motivation for their vote choice, with 23% selecting it as most 
important (Hooghe et al, 2011). The N-VA’s membership was described as the least pro-
Belgian party, with the exception of the VB (Swyngedouw & Abts, 2011: 15). However, 
supporters of the N-VA are diverse, rooted in both ‘pro-Flemish community positions’ but also 
‘a cynical attitude towards the political system, intolerance towards migrants, rightist vision on equality, 
defenders of law and order solutions, and a liberal vision on the role of the state’ (De Winter, 2012: 
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22). There is also some evidence to suggest in 2010, it attracted voters which were more 
oriented towards the right and less committed to the issue of state reform (Swyngedouw 
& Abts, 2011: 17). Its growth can be attributed, in part, to the media presence of Bart de 
Wever, particularly his highly publicised media appearances (Blaise et al, 2010: 16; Casert 
2011). As a result, the party must balance the demands of voters which prioritise Flemish 
self-government and those who prioritise socioeconomic goals. Confederalism, allowing 
for a gradual transition towards full self-government in the long-term, and the pursuit of 
policy goals in the short-term, serves as an intermediate step for the N-VA. 
In just thirteen years, the N-VA grew from a marginal actor whose chances of survival 
seemed minimal to the largest party in the Belgian state, incontournable or necessary to the 
formation of the federal government. This extraordinary growth is considered to be the 
result of a potent ‘cocktail which consisted of a will for political change, the leader of the party, the 
Flemish question, the programme of the party and its image’ (Swyngedouw & Abts, 2011: 21).  
3.3.1 Self-government: short- and long-term goals 
Despite its comparatively short lifespan, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie has demonstrated 
some movement in its self-government goals. While the call for an ‘independent Flanders, a 
member state in a democratic Europe’ remains in the party’s Statement of Principles and Statutes 
since its foundation in 2001, it has drawn a distinction between goals to be pursued in the 
near-term, through a process of government negotiation and the ultimate aspirations of 
the party (N-VA, 2001). 
The N-VA’s long-term aspiration of self-government involves political independence, but 
an independence which is never articulated without reference to the supporting context 
of the European Union. In its 2003 manifesto, it defined its goal as a ‘Flemish member state 
of the European Union’, recognised like Sweden, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, suggesting a 
traditional form of independence (N-VA, 2003). It called for ‘a free Flemish state’, ‘not an 
island in the ocean, but a full member state in the European Union’ (N-VA, 2003). The party denied 
charges it was separatist, arguing that its self-government goal was not outright 
independence but independence within a larger European project. However, unlike its 
Scottish counterpart, there was no explicit discussion in the statutes or manifestos of how 
this self-government goal was to be achieved.  
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Despite possessing, at its origins, a radical self-government goal of political independence, 
the party suggests this would be achieved through a gradual process, employing the 
language of the hollowing of Belgian state, the evolution, dissolution, and evaporation, 
rather than a sharp break with the existing state structure.  In a national day speech, N-
VA member of the Flemish Parliament and then leader of the Parliament, Jan Peumans 
referred to self-government as an ‘open question’, saying the Flemish Parliament is ‘the product 
of a dream of autonomy’ which will be followed by the further transfer of powers as a part of 
a gradual process of evolution (Peumans, 2010). In a 2011 interview with the 
Francophone media, Bart de Wever said that the party only proposes ‘the long-term evolution 
of Belgium, in stages’, as a result, ‘to speak of a Plan B would be stupid’ (Buxant, 2012). In a 2011 
interview with the New Yorker, Bart de Wever envisaged the dissolution of the Belgian 
state, ‘I think Belgium will be snuffed out slowly. Slowly, like a candle, barely noticed by anyone’ 
(Baruma, 2011). Self-government was therefore positioned as a reasonable, moderate 
response to the inefficiencies of the Belgian state rather than a revolutionary proposal: 
We are not revolutionaries, we are opposed to this sort of radicalism. No one wants to 
break this country, no one wants chaos. We are in support of a gentle evolution which leads 
to more autonomy and the strengthening of democracy, an evolution which permits Flemings 
and Walloons to become stronger as well as maintain the solidarity between the north and 
the south of the country. 
         de Wever, 2010.  
This gradual dissolution of the Belgian state was to be preceded by confederalism. In a 
2003 proposition for constitutional reform, issued jointly by MPs from the CD&V and 
the N-VA, this gradual nature is explained: 
'State reform is not something accomplished once and for all.... The majority of Flemish 
parties has therefore arrived at the conclusion that we need to transform, at least in the first 
phase, the institutions of this country into a confederal structure'  
Belgium Chamber of Representatives, 2003. 
The party’s 2004 manifesto explains this change, saying that while it proposed Flemish 
membership in the EU in the long-term, in the immediate term, it sought to ensure the 
realization of the 1999 Flemish resolutions and the transfer of core competences (N-VA, 
2004). Independence, from 2004 onwards, was continually framed as a long-term goal 
indicating a desire to position the N-VA as a moderate party and as an acceptable coalition 
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partner. In 2007, again in electoral cartel with the CD&V, the party reaffirmed its 
commitment to Flanders as an EU member state, saying ‘The ultimate goal of the N-VA: 
Flanders as a self-governing state in a democratic Europe’, a goal which allows Flanders to break 
free of an underperforming Belgium and realise its policy objectives (N-VA, 2007). 
However, confederalism was introduced as an interim stage, with the pursuit of the 1999 
Flemish Parliament resolutions, the split of BHV, and the further transfer of important 
competences to the Flemish Parliament short-term priorities (N-VA, 2007). 
This was to involve ‘a clear, open confederal arrangement whereby the centre of gravity, both in terms 
of resources and powers, lies with the deelstaten. A modern democratic state is built from the bottom’ (N-
VA, 2007: 8). It was described as a Copernican revolution, reversing the distribution of 
competences in favour of the member states of the Belgian confederation – Flanders and 
Wallonia. In a 2010 speech on the Flemish national day, Jan Peumans described an 
arrangement in which the ‘constituent entities behave as nation states’ (Peumans, 2010). 
Confederalism was, however, vaguely defined, particularly in regards to the status of 
Brussels. The party was critiqued for this ambivalent position and a more concrete agenda 
emerged, presented to congress in October 2013 and forming the platform for the 2014 
campaign as it proposed to enter into government (discussed in chapter seven).  
Even while it expressed a radical goal of independence (largely between 2001 and 2007), 
the N-VA stressed it was not a revolutionary party and foresaw a gradual evolution and 
the evaporation of the Belgian state. Since 2007, independence has been deemphasised, 
considered a long-term goal, with the immediate emphasis focused on a confederal 
restructuring of the Belgian state. The party’s adoption of confederalism as a near-term 
self-government goal signalled a moderation, a practical intermediate step which could be 
pursued over the course of government formation. The N-VA ‘uses it to signal that it is a 
moderate party, gradually passing to confederalism as a step towards its final objective, an independent 
Flemish republic and full member state of the EU’ (De Winter, 2012: 28).    This may be attributed 
to two factors: the position of Flemish voters, generally less supportive of Flemish 
independence than in Scotland and the party’s framing of self-government as a tool to 
empower and enrichen Flanders rather than a principal (discussed in the following 
section) (Huysseune, 2016: 2). In an interview in the Francophone Le Soir, party co-
founder Eric Defoort justified this, not as a betrayal of its founding principles, but a 
commitment to the needs and preferences of those who support them.  ‘The N-VA has 
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no intention of betraying the million voters who placed their trust in us last June. The 27% of Flemings 
who voted for us did not vote for Flemish independence but for the fundamental restructuring of this state’ 
(Le Soir, 2012). There is also evidence of divides within the party on the prioritisation of 
self-government vis-à-vis other policy goals, discussed in chapter seven. 
3.3.2 Self-government: for principal and policy 
The N-VA’s framing of the purposes of self-government took two key forms, but with 
varying levels of emphasis. Firstly, it drew on value rational arguments, arguing the nation 
was an essential building block for society. Secondly, and more salient in its framing, was 
the argument that self-government was to serve a specific purpose, allowing for the 
pursuit of socioeconomic policies.  
The N-VA’s 2001 manifesto focused on pragmatism, describing its goals purposeful, 
motivated by policy objectives: 'Our Flemish nationalism is not an end, but a means by which we 
can arrive at more democracy and better government' (N-VA, 2001). It denied that Flemish 
nationalism reflected a regressive tendency or a romantic idea of an outdated ideal of the 
nation-state, ‘This has nothing to do with a throwback to the past, but with the future: good governance, 
democracy, welfare, employment and prosperity’ (N-VA, 2004). In an interview with the 
Francophone press, Jan Jambon, member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives of 
the N-VA described the party’s goal of independence, ‘as not an end in and of itself. It is a 
means. The objective is an economy which works well, with low levels of poverty and people at work’ 
(Jambon, 2012). In an preface to the book The Flemish Movement explained to Francophones by 
Alain Destexhe, de Wever argues the self-government goals of Flemish nationalists reflect 
practical concerns for the future of Flanders and Wallonia rather than a manifestation of 
historical grievances: 
‘They also do not constitute a reaction to the cultural dominance of Francophones, nor to 
the claimed denigration of the Flemish people…The motivation for the pursuit of Flemish 
autonomy is not rancour, but a thirst for democratic governance and efficiency. For Flemings 
and for Francophones'  
De Wever, 2011a. 
This focus, on Flemish nationalism as modern, pragmatic, and policy-focused served two 
key purposes: distancing the N-VA from the Vlaams Belang and appealing to a wide range 
of voters. However, there was an emphasis on the Flemish nation and national identity 
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which can be attributed to the intellectual influence of Bart de Wever, who often cites 
scholars of nationalism in his public discussions. 
1. The nation as a building block for society and democracy 
Although the N-VA eschews traditional notions of sovereignty and nation-statehood in 
favour of a ‘modern’ vision of society, nationalism remains central to its justification of its 
self-government goals (de Wever, 2008: 27). The nation is considered to be the building 
block of society and necessary for democratic functions. However, the party and its 
leadership argued in favour of a civic nationalism rather than the ethnic nationalism 
present in the Vlaams Belang. (de Wever, 2010b).  
Nationalism was considered to be ‘at the basis of all existing democracies’, as a ‘source of solidarity 
which makes it possible to work together towards an inclusive society without any discrimination between 
people’ (N-VA, 2007: 70). Nations, according to Bart de Wever, in a 2011 blogpost ‘provide 
the democratic structure to build bridges between communities… We cannot separate democracy from a 
community that serves as the basis for organization’ (De Wever, 2011a). Implicit here is a critique 
of the Belgian state which lacks a sense of national identity and community necessary for 
the functioning of a democracy. Nationalism is necessary to build solidarity within 
communities and as the basis for communication and cooperation between communities. 
‘Identity gives the answer to the question who belongs to the people and who doesn’t. In that way it creates 
a democratic community’ (De Wever, 2011a).  
The Flemish nation is defined by the party, inclusively, by those possessing ‘the will, the 
choice, to live together’ but with an emphasis on common cultural and linguistic experiences 
(Buxant, 2012). Flemings are a: 
‘community of six million people formed by destiny, who can recognize themselves as players 
of the same team because they have a name…The Flemings have a definite territory, a 
common history, and a cultural pattern. That binds us to each other at such a level that we 
can communicate and act with each other more easily than with outsiders’  
De Wever, 2009. 
In the Charter for Flanders, published by the Flemish Parliament in 2012 although ultimately 
not implemented, the Flemish nation is defined as ‘a social and democratic constitutional state 
and forms a nation with its own language and culture, with a political tradition of democracy and respect 
for local autonomy, private initiative and freedom of association’ (Flemish Parliament, 2012). This 
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definition of nationhood was included at the insistence of the N-VA.This nation is 
considered to be rooted in language, culture, territory, and behaviour 
2. Self-government and the pursuit of socioeconomic policy 
The Volksunie positioned itself as a programmatic party – pursuing self-government as a 
core objective but doing so in pursuit of better policy and governance for Flanders and 
the N-VA adopted a similar approach, although with more ideological coherence than its 
predecessor. Self-government is considered not an ends in and of itself, but a means to 
an end.  Ico Maly (2016) has classified the nationalism of the N-VA as ‘scientific nationalism’, 
focused on intellectual debates over what would serve Flemish interests rather than 
strength of feeling. This self-government goal is explicitly expressed with reference to the 
purpose: ‘In its efforts to improve governance and democracy, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie logically 
proposes an independent Flanders, a member state in a democratic Europe’ (N-VA, 2001). This is 
consistent with the positions of rival parties, with an argument for Flemish self-
government made on the basis that the statewide system is inefficient, failing to account 
for the economic and political needs of Flanders and Wallonia (Bouteca et al, 2013: 1; 
Sinardet, 2008). The N-VA also distanced itself from the cultural movement, speaking in 
favour of socioeconomic reforms, with De Wever describing Flanders as having ‘achieved 
cultural emancipation. That is no longer part of our discourse. We're interested in democracy and efficiency’ 
(Baruma, 2011).  
Instead, self-government is a means of pursuing ideologically informed policy goals. 
Confederalism was allow the Flemish confederal state to reduce the role of government, 
encourage personal responsibility, and pursue a migrant integration policy which stressed 
Flemish language and identity (Beyens et al 2015). In a 2008 interview, Bart de Wever 
described Belgium as ‘an enormous debt, constant community fighting, large difficulties in making 
compromises. For Flanders, Belgium is the level where there are only problems’.  Self-government 
would allow the resolution of these problems. In its 2009 manifesto, it argued self-
government was a means of securing prosperity for future generations.  
‘If we want to ensure that our children and grandchildren will continue to know prosperity 
and well-being, we have to change the existing structures. The state reform is about that, 
and therefore is also crucial. It has to do with tailored policies, with efficiency, with cost 
savings, with justice, with socio-economic revival’  
N-VA, 2009. 
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It was also a means of ending economic transfers between Flanders and Wallonia, 
embedded in what Jamin (2011) describes as producerist narratives, which juxtapose the 
hard-working and hard done by Flanders with a dependent Wallonia. The party’s 2003 
proposal for constitutional reform, drafted with the CD&V, spoke of an increasingly 
confident and assertive Flanders ‘'Flanders is not egoist or egocentric, but she is no longer a docile 
dairy cow’ to be exploited by Wallonia (Proposition for declaration of the revision of the 
constitution, 24 March, 2003). In a speech to university students in Heidelberg, de Wever 
argued Flanders was to Belgium what Germany is to Europe, responsible for subsidising 
the poorer economies of the south. ‘Why does Flanders want more autonomy? Because it is tired 
of being the Germany to Belgium’ (de Wever, 2012). 
A fundamental argument about democracy was also made, with self-government allowing 
not only for the pursuit of different socioeconomic goals, but also political ones. Belgium 
was critiqued for its undemocratic nature, with De Wever explaining it ‘is not a democracy, 
but a partiocracy. Or, more precisely, it is the sum of a Flemish particracy and a Francophone particracy' 
(de Wever, 2010b). Self-government would allow democratic improvements, ensuring 
voters got the government they voted for and enhancing democratic participation, an 
argument linked to a value rational claim that self-government was a building block.  
The N-VA’s emphasis on pragmatic concerns in its justification of its self-government 
goals reflected its ideological focus but also a strategic dimension, allowing it greater 
flexibility in its approach to the structure of its goals. In an article in De Standaard, political 
scientist Dave Sinardet described the denationalisation of the N-VA’s discourse. ‘The 
discourse of the N-VA has been ‘denationalised’ and rests on rationality, good governance and numbers. 
The nationalists without a nation. But with a calculator’ (Sinardet, 2009). The focus on policy 
rather than nationalism left it free to accept further state reform falling short of its initial 
goals, provided they serve the interests of Flanders. It also allowed it to modify its goals 
in order to adapt to changing circumstances. These policies also made the party palatable 
to voters who are not committed to the idea of Flemish independence, or even further 
state reform. 
3.4 Continuity and change in self-government goals 
All three parties, by virtue of their classification as sub-state nationalist parties, adopt a 
core self-government goal. However, we can identify variation in this goal over time. 
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Despite it being the oldest and most enduring of the three, the SNP demonstrated the 
most continuity, advocating for external self-government in the form of political 
independence, from its origins to the present.  
There has, however, been some important variation in both the labelling of the goal, with 
self-government, independence, and freedom employed at various points in time, and its 
content, with reference to both the international context and the British state. In contrast, 
the Volksunie demonstrated a process of radicalisation, moving from a more moderate 
goal of federalisation, to confederalism, to self-government within the European Union. 
The VU’s demand was, however, contingent on both the failure of the Belgian state to 
accommodate self-government and the European Union to develop sufficiently to 
supplant the Belgian state. Finally, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie has moderated over its 
short lifespan, calling for political independence, albeit within the context of the European 
Union at the outset, and later minimising these goals in favour of a confederal 
restructuring in the near term..  
All three parties employed a mix of value rational and instrumental rational framing of 
their self-government goals. Self-government was rooted in the existence of the nation 
but this argument was insufficient on its own. Instrumental concerns – whether social, 
economic, or democratic – were important, and reflect the ideological positioning of each 
party, but were also based on an assumption about the existence of the national 
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community and the right to self-government this entails. None of the three parties framed 
their self-government goals with exclusive reference to principles, but neither did they 
frame their goals in purely pragmatic terms. These justifications entailed an appeal to both 
the head and the heart.  These findings are consistent with those of Dalle Malle (2015), 
who in an analysis of the N-VA and the SNP found that instrumental arguments are 
employed to justify self-government claims, rather than principled or remedial arguments. 
However, Dalle Malle perhaps understates the degree to which principled arguments are 
employed, a result of the fact that these arguments are often closely linked. 
Together, within-case variation on both the goals and justifications for goals suggests a 
rationality – in response to changes in political systems, supporting structures, and 
economic and social conditions. The SNP, however, tends to stress independence as the 
natural state for a nation, rather than something that should be pursued on purely 
instrumental grounds. Self-government goals are likely to change in response to changes 
in the empirical contexts in which the individual parties operate and these will be explored 
in the chapters which follow. 
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Chapter Four: Self-government in Europe and 
the world 
Sub-state nationalist parties do not pursue their self-government goals in isolation, but 
instead situate these goals in a broader environment – with reference to the party system 
in which they are pursued, the structure of the state in which they inhabit, and the 
international mileu. These goals reflect opportunities and constraints inherent in the 
existing system. This chapter examines the interaction between self-government goals 
advanced by the Scottish National Party, the Volksunie, and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
and the global and European context in which they are articulated.  
By adopting a longitudinal approach, this discussion captures a rapidly shifting external 
context between each party's origins, two of which primarily predate European 
integration and the contemporary period. This includes increasing globalisation which 
challenges both the host state and the nations of Flanders and Scotland, the development 
and acceleration of European integration, the rise and fall of the Europe of the regions, 
the process of European Union enlargement as well as the global economic crisis and the 
sovereign debt crisis. Each of the three parties has engaged, albeit to varying degrees, with 
these phenomena, taking different positions over time. 
In this chapter, I will explore how sub-state nationalist parties understand and frame the 
link between self-government and the international context. In doing so, I am guided by 
the literature which suggests parties will have differing approaches to international and 
European integration, depending on their self-government goals and position within a 
global economic and political system.  (Keating, 1992; Beyers & Bursens, 2006; 
Dardanelli, 2011; Elias, 2008; Elias, 2011; Hepburn, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Jolly, 
2006; Keating, 2008).  Keating (2001) outlines three possible tendencies of sub-state 
nationalist parties in response to the growing influence of supranational forces, including 
the European Union – those who interpret integration as an enabling factor, those who 
interpret it as a constraint, and those who modify their goals in response, accepting and 
negotiation the realities of a post-sovereign world. I argue all three fall within the third 
group, adapting their self-government goals to reflect these changing dynamics.  
In my analysis of party framing of self-government and the external context, I examine 
three key dimensions relevant to the international and European sphere: (1) self-
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government and the world, which considers the way in which self-government is framed 
with reference to the international context; (2) self-government and European integration, 
and the uses of Europe in the articulation of goals; and (3) international and European 
identities. Within these dimensions, specific frames are identified and developed within 
each case. They are not all present in each case, with the Volksunie paying little attention 
to identities, while the N-VA focuses exclusively on the second dimension of self-
government and European integration. A distinction should also be drawn, in regards to 
the European elements, between Europe as an ideational concept and the institutions and 
policies of the European Union and specific aspects of institutional policy. 
In this chapter, I examine each party individually, presenting a brief contextual 
introduction of the party and the external context and highlighting areas of variation. The 
Scottish National Party, with its explicitly external self-government goal of independence, 
is expected to pay more attention to both European and international dynamics – situating 
and adapting this goal with reference to the international context in which it takes place. 
In contrast, the Volksunie is expected to dedicate less attention to external aspects of self-
government, as the more moderate goal of federalism (and later confederalism) were to 
be pursued within the Belgian state structure. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, born into a 
world in which European integration was already well underway, and with more radical 
independence and confederalist goals than its predecessor, is also expected to be rooted 
in a European space. However, I expect less attention paid to the wider world given its 
insistence, from its origins onwards, that self-government would always be realised within 
the European Union.  
4.1 The Scottish National Party: Continuity and 
change in the pursuit of self-government 
From its origins, the SNP pursued a radical and externally-oriented form of self-
government, whether described as independence, freedom, or sovereignty and as a result, 
it engaged deeply with the external manifestation of its goals. However, the level and 
forum in which integration and cooperation would take place changed over time, 
reflecting the international dynamics and external context in which it mobilised as well as 
its positioning vis-à-vis the British state and the European project.  
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At its origins, the SNP adopted a positive approach towards the Empire, understanding 
it as an external construct which would support and facilitate Scottish self-government as 
well as an asset to which Scotland and England, as co-creators of empire, had equal rights 
and obligations (MacKenzie 1993: 730). As the Empire declined, the self-government 
goals of the Scottish National Party were situated within the Commonwealth and within 
the British Isles. It defined its aim in 1952 as ‘self-government for Scotland as a free and equal 
nation within the Commonwealth and under the Crown’ (SNP, 1952).  
Although the decline of Empire removed one of the supporting constructs for Scottish 
self-government, the precedent of independence within the Commonwealth allowed the 
party to reinforce its objective of self-government. The process of decolonisation and 
independence within the Commonwealth was employed to bolster demands. The 
Commonwealth was defined as ‘the more fruitful principle of a freely associated community of self-
governing states' and the recently independent states of Ceylon, Hindustan and Pakistan were 
to be examples for Scotland and Wales in their journey to independence (Young, 1947). 
Although it has little political relevance, the process of independence, as undertaken by 
Commonwealth nations, remains a point of reference for the party: ‘the path to independence 
has been well mapped-out by other countries. In this century, nearly fifty Commonwealth nations have 
harmoniously untied the knot linking them to London’ (SNP, 1992). 
European integration was more complex and dramatic changes in the SNP’s position can 
be traced over time. At the party’s origins and as the prospect of post-war cooperation 
was tabled, it was generally supportive of integration. In a letter from Robert McIntyre to 
Robert Schuman, sent in June 1950, McIntyre wrote  
‘It cannot be taken that responsible Scottish opinion supports the British Government in 
its policy of non-cooperation in Europe and insistence on absolute sovereignty. This latest 
manifestation of English Nationalism and Isolation is deplored’  
McIntyre, 1950. 
However, the SNP prioritised relationships within the British Isles and the broader 
Commonwealth rather than with European neighbours.  
In the 1960s, as the United Kingdom approached membership, the SNP took an openly 
hostile approach which continued in the 1970s (Wilson, 2009). The leadership pledged to 
lead the opposition to EEC membership being imposed on Scotland against its will 
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(Macartney, 1990). It campaigned against membership in the 1975 referendum on whether 
the UK should remain within the European Communities, calling into question the 
legitimacy of the vote under the terms of union. It also called for constituency level counts 
rather than a central count which would obscure geographic differences in results (HC 
Deb 24 April 1975 vol 890 c822). Scottish voters ultimately voted to stay within the EEC, 
although at a narrower margin than their counterparts elsewhere (Nagel, 2004). In the 
1979 party manifesto, the SNP set out its position on the EEC as affiliation rather than 
full membership, a statement which acknowledged the will of the Scottish people but also 
the party’s desire to maintain certain components of national sovereignty (SNP, 1979) 
The SNP’s stance changed in the 1980s, with European membership becoming central to 
its vision of independence, part of a broader re-evaluation of party policy following its 
1979 defeat. The party adopted a policy of ‘Independence in Europe' at its 1988 conference 
and was from this point forward committed to European Union membership. The details 
of this relationship shifted, with the party speaking favourably of the Euro, contingent on 
UK participation, in the 1990s and early 2000s (SNP, 1997; 1999; 2001). It advocated, in 
2001, cooperation in the domains of defence, foreign affairs, trade and the environment 
as a means of mitigating some of the limitations of small states but sought to maintain 
national vetoes on issues of natural resources, taxation, and the development of a 
European constitution (SNP, 2001). The proposal to use the Euro was dropped in 2009 
(Brown Swan & Petersohn, 2017: 71). Self-government goals were often described as ‘21st-
century independence’ suggesting these goals were more nuanced than traditional conceptions 
of independence (SNP, 2001). In the run-up to the 2014 referendum, addressed in detail 
in chapter seven, the party proposed European Union membership and the maintenance 
of relationships with the rest of the United Kingdom, a model which McEwen (2013) 
describes as a form of ‘embedded independence’.  
We can chart these relationships through the analysis of frames. Between 1934 and the 
21st century, the SNP’s vision of self-government was articulated with reference to 
Scotland’s place in the world, its place in Europe, and the identity of Scotland as both an 
international and European nation. Firstly, I examine conceptions of self-government and 
the world, which includes three key frames: (1) the changing but enduring conception of 
sovereignty; (2) the idea that rather than isolating Scotland, self-government would allow 
for further integration in the global community; and (3) the frame of normal nationhood, 
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which suggests the self-government sought by the SNP was not something exceptional, 
but normal. Self-government and European integration is a dimension in which we see 
more variation over time, with its framing shifting from (1) one of Europe as a threat to 
Scottish self-government and sovereignty, to (2) opposition as contingent, on both 
structures within the state and developments at the European level, to (3) pragmatic 
support for integration which began in the 1980s. The party engaged with the third 
dimension, of global and European identities, at a more superficial level, viewing Scots as 
a global people and contrasting this with the more exclusive identities of their English 
counterparts. 
4.1.1 Self-government and the world: Sovereignty, integration, 
and normal nationhood 
The SNP's proposals for self-government were always made with reference to the 
international context – whether the Empire, the Commonwealth, the European Union, 
and the British Isles. Its discussions of the international dimension focused on the 
importance of a modern and nuanced definition of sovereignty, independence as offering 
integration rather than isolation, and the idea that Scotland sought 'normal' nationhood 
rather than something exceptional. These frames were employed throughout the party's 
lifespan, with variation seen in the context in which self-government would take place 
rather than arguments in favour of integration. 
1. Changing conceptions of sovereignty 
The SNP justified its emphasis on cooperation, whether within the Empire, the European 
Union, or the British Isles, by suggesting conceptions of sovereignty had evolved, 
becomingsomething to be shared rather than jealously guarded. Although an emphasis on 
a more traditional conception of sovereignty emerged in the context of EEC membership 
debates. In an early document published shortly after the Second World War, it argued: 
‘Final peace can only come about when the Nations are willing to surrender a large part of 
their national sovereignty into the hands of an international World Authority. When that 
day comes Scotland will be as ready as any to make her contribution towards the ultimate 
good of humanity’  
SNP, 1945.  
At the same time, the sovereignty of Scotland would ‘be limited only by such agreements as will 
be freely entered into with other nations in order to further international co-operation and world peace’ 
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(SNP, 1948). Nationalism was understood to facilitate internationalism or effective and 
positive contributions to the wider world. ‘In Economics, as elsewhere, only Nationalism will 
make possible real internationalism’ (Young, 1947). The party’s openness was highlighted as a 
point of distinction between England and Scotland, and it critiqued the UK, arguing 
‘Narrow National Sovereignty is a thing of the past and the sooner the English learn this, the better it 
will be for the world’ (SNP, 1968).  
The party’s position on sovereignty seemed to shift as the UK explored membership in 
the Common Market. The possession and maintenance of sovereignty were one of the 
key areas of contestation in the debate over the UK's position in the Common Market. 
In a House of Commons debate, Donald Stewart framed his opposition largely in terms 
of its loss, saying 
‘Hon. Members should never lose sight of the fact that we shall lose our sovereignty. It is no 
argument to say that no country can be completely isolationist these days. Whether or not a 
country can stand on its own feet is no reason to reduce what sovereignty a country has. Why 
should we surrender our sovereignty to Europe and thereby be at the whim of others?’  
Stewart, HOC debate, 23 July 1971 
Speaking in 1974, Winnie Ewing described the European project as more than a customs 
union, warning ‘[i]t will become much more centralised, with much more power of decision in Europe 
and much more loss of sovereignty to us’ (HC Deb 11 June 1974 vol 874 c1527). The ways 
decisions were taken at the European level, with no input from sub-state units would 
render Scotland ‘powerless and without a voice or vote’ (SNP, 1974). The 2002 document 
Principles of the Constitution asserted the right of people to self-determination and to 
sovereignty over the territory and natural resources, 'limited only such agreements as may be 
freely entered into by it with other nations or states or with international organisations' (SNP, 2002). It 
acknowledged the constraints on a sovereign nation, but argued sovereignty itself retained 
an intrinsic value,the basis on which participation and integration could take place (SNP, 
2005). Independence as a result   
‘is not inconsistent with an interdependent world but essential to participating in it. The 
powers of a Nation State may evolve but being one remains the prerequisite to participation 
in matters dealt with collectively by Nation States' 
         MacAskill, 2004.  
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On this basis, independence allowed for integration rather than isolation within the 
international community.  
2. Integration rather than isolation 
Throughout its lifespan, the SNP repeatedly stressed independence would bring 
integration rather than isolation, bringing to an end the situation in which Scotland was 
cut off from the world through its incorporation in the United Kingdom. This framing 
was present throughout the party's lifespan, in a broadly similar form, but reflecting the 
supporting structure of the day. Its 1945 document The Policy of the Scottish National Party 
discussed the party’s vision of self-government, foreseeing the future of an independent 
Scotland firmly within an international context. In this text, it acknowledged Scotland’s 
status as a small nation, whose interest were best served through integration rather than 
isolation. It proposed the development of an effective League of Nations and the creation 
of a forum for collective security and foresaw Scotland acting, in partnership with 
Scandinavian democracies, to encourage this (SNP, 1945). The party rejected ‘the narrow 
and restricted policies of the parish pump’, and pledged that an independent Scotland would act 
in partnership with England, the Commonwealth, and with European neighbours (SNP, 
1952).  
In a text which tackled the myths which circulated about the SNP's independence 
objective, the SNP asserted independence was not separation, instead, it would ‘end this 
unnatural separatism forced upon us by the present Union’, putting Scotland back on the map 
(SNP, 1968). The current state of affairs, with Scotland unrepresented on the global stage 
was the true sources of isolation, leaving Scotland subsumed within England and cut off 
from the rest of the world. Winnie Ewing described the party’s vision of independence 
‘with an internationally minded Scotland, sitting where all other free peoples of the world sit, sharing 
directly in our responsibility for this fragile planet and those who live on it’ and pledged that an 
independent Scotland would be altruistic, peaceful, and welcoming (Ewing, 2004: xiii). In 
a speech to the foreign press in 2011, Alex Salmond argued: 
‘Indeed, no man is an island, and likewise, no country exists in isolation. We are all 
interdependent, more so now than in Hemingway's time. Each nation is connected with one 
to the other in a balance. And each, of course, has its own special gifts to bring' 
         Salmond, 2011c. 
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3. Normal nationhood rather than Scottish exceptionalism 
The SNP's self-government goal was justified with the frame of normal nationhood – 
viewed as a rational desire for self-determination and self-government enjoyed by 
countries throughout the world, rather than a desire to promote the superiority of the 
Scottish people and nation. The frame first emerged in the 1950s and became more 
explicit throughout the party's manifestos, continuing to the present day. It suggests the 
SNP's self-government goals are not rooted in exceptionalism but a desire to take on the 
rights and responsibilities of other nations. ‘It claims no more than is already possessed by an 
array of nations ranging from Canada to Ceylon’ (SNP, 1952). The case for independence was 
rooted in the ambition ‘to do what every other country in the world does and take the responsibility 
for the government of our own affairs in our own hands' (SNP, ca 1960s). Normal nationhood was 
addressed specifically in the 1968 edition of The SNP and You, with the party stating that 
'[w]e want for Scotland what is normal for a nation— political independence with full control of our 
affairs, and opportunities to take the initiative in the economic interdependence of European and world 
trade' (SNP, 1968). This normal nation returned in a 1978 publication, and in 1987, 
reference was made to the ‘national and natural rights of independence’ (SNP, 1987). An 
independent Scotland would be, according to the party ‘like most other modern democracies’ 
(SNP, 1987). In the 1990s, this normal status would be exercised within a European 
context, ‘We believe that we have much to contribute as well as gain from the restoration of Scotland to 
the status of a normal European country’ (Scott, 1998: 91).  Independence, in the view of the 
party, was not a revolutionary act, but simply allowing Scotland to ‘become a normal nation, 
playing a normal part in the world’ and independence being the ‘normal status for wealthy small nations’ 
(SNP, 1997).   
National status was motivated by policy goals, with Alex Salmond noting in the party’s 
first programme for government that ‘the transformation of our country in each and every of those 
policy areas can best be achieved through that normal, independent status’ (Salmond, 2007). Salmond 
returned to this theme of a normal nation in a 2008 speech, saying ‘Scotland’s ambitions for 
our nation within Europe are not any sort of anomaly or ‘Scottish exceptionalism''.  This desire for 
external self-government, or Scottish independence, shaped the party's approach to 
European integration, although in different ways at different points in time.   
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4.1.2 The role of Europe: from threat to contingent opposition 
to a pragmatic enabler of self-government 
The SNP’s position on Europe has undergone an evolution, from a positive position in 
the postwar years, but a sense of distance, before taking a negative position as the United 
Kingdom approached membership. Three frames can be identified in the party’s 
discussions of European integration and Scottish self-government and there is a temporal 
component to these. Firstly, it framed European integration as a threat to Scottish 
sovereignty, a situation in which one foreign power would be exchanged for another. This 
frame predominated through the 1960s and 1970s. Secondly, its opposition was framed 
as contingent, embodied by the tagline ‘No voice, no entry', and employed by the party in the 
1970s. This suggested under the current situation, the SNP would oppose membership in 
the EEC but in the event of independence, in which membership could be negotiated by 
Scotland, its stance might change. Finally, its position shifted further in the 1980s, with 
the adoption of the 'independence in Europe' platform in 1988. This support was considered 
pragmatic, with European integration enabling Scottish self-government. 
The party's approach to European integration is often filtered through the lens of 
domestic politics and Europe has been employed instrumentally to distinguish between 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. This distinction is evidenced both by its 
opposition to European integration, which was said to be detrimental to Scotland's 
interests and would entail trading one distant authority for another and by its positive 
approach from the 1980s onwards, in which a distinction was again drawn between pro-
European Scotland and Eurosceptic England. 
1. The European threat to Scottish sovereignty 
A column in the 23 April 1955 Scots Independent captured the debate within the party. It 
noted objections to the EEC may be rooted in the fact ‘that all this only means exchanging one 
controlling authority for that of a whole set of nations’ but alternatively, European integration 
could be understood as a ‘safeguard’ for small nations. By the 1960s, however, the party’s 
framing of the European project became more hostile, culminating in the campaign for a 
No vote in 1975. For the SNP, Europe was a threat to Scottish sovereignty. By the late 
1960s, Gordon Wilson describes a sense within the party that independence was imminent 
and an investment in active policy development was made. A statement of principles 
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published in the 1960s by the Foreign Affairs Committee to the National Council stressed 
the need to maintain Scottish sovereignty, stating: 
‘Scotland should avoid such political, defensive or economic entanglements as might lead to 
a loss of essential sovereignty which might force Scotland to adopt policies inconsistent with 
the wishes of the Scottish people or might prejudice her future trading position and interfere 
with her ability to control and develop her own economy’  
cited in Wilson, 2009: 50.  
Although this was not immediately adopted, it was indicative of a growing tendency within 
the party which emphasised a more traditional approach to sovereignty. Should the UK 
enter the Common Market before Scottish independence, it pledged, Scotland would not 
necessarily be bound by these commitments (Wolfe, 1973: 560). 
The SNP at this time framed European integration as hostile to the interests of Scotland 
and a force which would inhibit Scottish self-government. In 1967, Billy Wolfe spoke 
about the risks to Scotland in the event of UK membership: 
‘For Scotland it is the eleventh hour, because if we are taken into the European Common 
Market as a region of Greater England before having at least a handful of Scottish 
National Party Members of Parliament at Westminster as evidence of the Scottish political 
renaissance, it will be much more difficult for us to fight our way to a position of freedom 
and dignity and effectiveness’  
Cited in Wolfe, 1973. 
The EEC was, according to Billy Wolfe ‘founded on fear, on authoritarianism and on greed’ 
(Wolfe, 1973). Should the UK join, Scotland’s sovereignty would be further undermined, 
leading to a scenario in which ‘tiny Luxembourg will have more sovereignty than the ancient nation 
of Scotland which has contributed more than any other nation to the thinking of mankind’ (HC Deb 
24 Feb 1970 vol 796 C1086). Donald Stewart, the MP from the Western Isles 
acknowledged the necessity of sharing sovereignty but warned of its loss altogether in a 
1971 debate on the UK and the European Communities, saying   
‘Hon. Members should never lose sight of the fact that we shall lose our sovereignty. It is no 
argument to say that no country can be completely isolationist these days… Why should we 
surrender our sovereignty to Europe and thereby be at the whim of others. The hon Member 
for Paisley said that as a result of our entry the British tail will wag the European dog. 
What a hope! If we try that we shall find that the British tail will be bitten off, and there 
will be no question of our having a chance to be twice shy’  
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HC Deb 23 July 1971 vol 821 c1929. 
The EEC also posed an economic 
threat to Scottish industries and the 
livelihood of Scots. A poster (see inset) 
from the 1970s warned of rising food 
prices and competition from foreign 
labour, warning of the economic 
consequences of entry to the EEC 
(SNP, 1970). 
2. Opposition as contingent 
Although Billy Wolfe, National 
Convenor from 1969 to 1979, was an 
outspoken critic of the European project, describing SNP opposition as ‘almost instinctive’, 
the party’s discourse and campaign reflected a frame of contingency (Wolfe, 1973). 
Opposition to the Common Market and the EEC were articulated not as an objection to 
the idea of cooperation at the continental level but a rejection of the form this cooperation 
took and Scotland’s lack of voice within the process. This suggested that if integration 
were to take a different form, or if an independent Scotland had a direct voice in the 
process of integration, the party’s position could be subject to change.  
In 1966, the SNP outlined its position, viewing the Common Market as an opportunity 
for cooperation with Europe and with the rest of the United Kingdom. It was opposed 
to Scotland’s entry ‘as long as she is incorporated with England’, but saw potential in cooperation 
following independence, saying ‘An independent voice and vote in Common Market affairs would 
not only ensure maximum benefit for Scotland, but would also be to the advantage of our main trading 
partner, England', with Scotland, England, and Northern Ireland forming a British voting 
bloc (SNP, 1967). This contingency was encapsulated in the motto used for the 
subsequent referendum campaign of ‘No voice, No entry’.  
There was also an element of political strategy, with Stephen Maxwell citing an 
opportunity to raise the party's profile in its opposition. The SNP sought to position itself 
as the only party speaking with one voice, appealing to ‘both the gut anti-EEC vote in Scotland’ 
and those sympathetic to the idea of Europe but ‘sensitive to Scotland’s lack of political status 
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in European affairs’ (Maxwell, 1975, cited in Wilson, 2009: 101). Winnie Ewing (2004: 167)  
explains its opposition in the 1975 campaign on continued membership 'not because we were 
implacably opposed to the EEC but because we felt it was essential that Scottish membership was 
undertaken on Scottish terms,' citing concern over fisheries and other vital industries.  Posters 
proclaimed: 'No - On Anyone Else's Terms', which suggested the party might be supportive 
of membership if Scotland had a voice at the negotiating table (Harvie, 1998: 190). 
This contingent approach throughout the campaigned allowed the party some flexibility 
as they sought to redefine its position following the 1975 EEC referendum and 1979 
devolution referendum and subsequent defeat. Although the party’s position didn’t 
formally shift until the 1988 conference, there were signs of changing attitudes within the 
leadership. The 1983 manifesto stated:  
‘many of the fears that the Common Market would become a super state have been eased 
by experience. Far from becoming a new European despotism where bureaucracy triumphed 
over national rights, the enlarging of the Community in recent years has diluted some of the 
dangers of centralism. The bigger it gets, the looser it comes’ 
 SNP, 1983.  
Winnie Ewing won a seat in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 
(having been appointed to the European Parliament directly in 1975) and actively engaged 
in the promotion of Europe in Scotland and the promotion of Scotland at the European 
level (Mitchell 1990). Jim Sillars’ entry to the SNP, as well as a broader modernising 
tendency, facilitated the shift toward a more pro-European position. This frame of 
contingency allowed the party to adapt its position on Europe as the project became more 
ideologically acceptable. 
3. Pragmatic support for European integration 
The change in favour of ‘independence in Europe’ was framed as a pragmatic choice, with 
European integration facilitating Scottish self-government. Sillars (1986: 189) described 
seeking independence outwith the EC as ‘a futile waste of Scottish political energy’, with the 
European Community enabling self-government and cooperation with England. This 
positive position was adopted in 1988 and remains central to the party’s independence 
proposals, although Jim Sillars went on to campaign for Brexit in 2016. The party noted 
the growing impact of the European Community on the daily lives of Scots, a reality which 
made it ‘essential that Scotland has a voice at the top table of Europe, defending our interests and taking 
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full advantage of the opportunities for Scotland’ (SNP, 1989).  Speaking in 1992 on the Maastricht 
Treaty, Alex Salmond spoke of the potential of full European Union membership for 
Scotland, to coincide with the furtherance of European integration, and coming at the 
expense of Westminster control.  
‘I admit that I am attracted by the idea—I make no secret of it—of this place losing powers 
to the European Parliament, to European institutions and to the people of Scotland. I want 
to see the Parliament of Westminster squeezed between those two elements. I shall certainly 
vote for the Bill.’ 
         HC Deb 21 May 1992 vol 208 cc509. 
Independence in Europe was a logical position, enabling independence without political 
or economic dislocation. European integration, according to the party, ‘created a forum for 
Scottish independence’ (SNP, 1997). In a speech in the US, Salmond described the European 
Union as having ‘permanently changed the nature of Scottish membership of the United Kingdom’ 
(Salmond, 2008). Reflecting on the SNP’s changing position towards Europe, Kenny 
MacAskill (2004) explains the adoption of the platform as ‘a necessary political change to end 
the perceived difficulties of separation and isolation’. This was explicit in discussions of the 
currency of an independent Scotland, with the 1999 and 2001 manifestos speaking 
positively about the potential of the currency union. The European project provided ‘a 
bridge to independence across the turbulent waters from the Union’ (MacAskill, 2004) but also 
provided a means of ensuring cooperation with the rest of the United Kingdom. It sought 
coordination at the European level with the states of the British Isles and integration 
would, according to the party, facilitate free trade and the maintenance of the social union 
between Scotland and England (SNP, 1997).  
The SNP was not, however, uncritical of European integration and developments at the 
European level, positioning itself as a critical friend. It rejected efforts at centralisation, 
dismissing the prospect of a ‘United States of Europe’ as well as the European Community’s 
forays into core Scottish industries (SNP, 1987; 1989). It was also less supportive of the 
prospect of the Europe of the Regions than its Flemish counterpart, arguing  
‘At present our status in Europe is not that of a full member state, but of a region. And 
while we support moves to involve regional governments more fully, in the decision-making 
processes of the EU, regional status will always be second best’  
SNP, 2004.  
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Despite increasing interdependence, independence was the ticket to participation in this 
space.  The nation-state formed ‘the building block upon which interdependency and international 
co-operation are founded’ (MacAskill, 2004: 26).  As a result, the party was not prepared to 
accept full integration, particularly when contrasted to the positions of the VU and the 
N-VA, discussed below, rejecting EU control over taxation, constitutional matters, and 
fisheries (SNP, 2004). Its position on further integration also variedshifting on the Euro 
and opting out of provisions which would make continued cooperation with the rest of 
the United Kingdom more challenging. 
4.1.3 International and European identities 
The SNP's discussion of identities focused more generally on the compatibility of Scottish 
identity with British, European, and international ties. Scottish nationality was presumed 
to be open to those living in Scotland and taking part in Scottish society. In his text, 100 
Home Rule Questions, Sandy McIntosh (1966) described a ‘true Scot’ as ‘a Nationalist and 
Internationalist at the same time’ with multiple Scottish, British, European, Atlantic, and global 
identities. Robert Shirley, a prospective MP, defined a Scot as ‘someone who chooses to live in 
Scotland, and values the best things in Scottish life. English, Italian, Canadian, or any other, you can be 
welcome and rightful citizens of Scotland', stressing Scotland's openness to outsiders (Shirley, 
1974). The party repeatedly referred to Scotland's legacy and links with the broader world. 
However, its focus on these identities within a European context focused on defining 
Scots as a global people but also included an implicit contrast with the English, who were 
considered more isolationist. 
1. Global Scots v Little Englanders 
The SNP's discussions of identities beyond Scotland focused on global reach, ties, and 
influence, but also a clear contrast with the internationalism of Scots, and the narrow-
mindedness of the English. A manifesto from the 1960s argued ‘The people of Scotland, 
international in outlook, learned to play their part in European culture and trade centuries ago’ (SNP, 
1968; see also Ewing’s contribution to HC Deb 11 June 1974 vol 874 c1527). From the 
1980s onwards, Scotland was constructed as a European nation, and one which would 
take part willingly, in contrast to the ‘little Englander’ mentality exhibited by the rest of the 
United Kingdom.  
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The 1989 European election manifesto argued a vote for parties other than the SNP 
would ‘isolate Scotland’, placing it at both the periphery of the UK and Europe (SNP, 1989). 
Scots were presented with a choice between ‘integration into Thatcher’s England’, and 
independence, an opportunity to ‘free ourselves from the centralist and monetarist Thatcherite 
policies of Westminster’ (SNP, 1989). Independence in Europe challenged the ‘sterile, out of 
date and bankrupt British political system and looks above it to the brighter prospects that await us in 
Europe and the world’ (SNP, 1997). Speaking in favour of EC membership, Andrew Welsh, 
MP said  
 ‘Scotland has always had an internationalist outlook. I mean sovereignty is actually a 
problem for the English. It's not a problem for us. We pooled our sovereignty with the 
English in a common market three hundred years ago and what we are now saying is we 
wish to regain that sovereignty to once again pool it in a wider three hundred million 
European community'  
Welsh, 1992. 
At the party’s 1993 conference, Winnie Ewing returned to Scotland’s European identity 
and roots, contrasting England and Scotland.  
‘Scotland on the other hand is a European nation in spirit and history. Bruce's first act 
was to join the Hanseatic League. Our students went regularly to Leiden, Paris, Bologna, 
Vallollidad. We have a Euro system of law. We had an Alliance with France for 800 
years, with joint citizenship - a forerunner of the EC itself. In 1707 we got England and 
lost Europe. It was not a good bargain'  
Ewing, 1993. 
In a 1999 speech at the LSE, Alex Salmond described the UK as both ‘America’s poodle’ 
and a member of ‘Europe’s awkward squad', arguing that an independent Scotland would 
enjoy an enhanced rather than a diminished role in the European Union. The nature of 
the UK's current relationship meant ‘There is precious little evidence of that influence given the 
uneasy relationship of the UK with the rest of the community of Europe' (Salmond, 1999). Ewing 
developed similar themes in her 2004 memoirs:  
‘We are frequently contrasted with the English, whose attitude in Europe has been to tell 
other nations what to do, rather than seek to find ways of doing things together. Much of 
Europe would welcome us with open arms as soon as we have the confidence to demand 
equality rather than subservience’  
Ewing, 2004: 346-7. 
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In Alex Salmond’s speech upon entry to government, he noted ‘the people and institutions of 
the European Union are central to my vision for Scotland. It will, I hope, be recognised that Scotland 
requires to rediscover the sense of internationalism that once defined our nation’ (Salmond, 2007). This 
suggested Scottish identity was more inclusive and more European, than those of the 
English – a message to both Scots, that they were distinctive from their English 
neighbours, and their counterparts in the European Union. An independent Scotland, 
suggested the SNP, would play a more positive role. 
The SNP's approach towards the international and European context was characterised 
both by continuity, consistently situating self-government within the international 
dimension, and by change, with the forum in which Scottish self-government was to take 
place shifting from the Empire to the Commonwealth, to the European Community / 
European Union, to both Europe and the British Isles, which becomes even more explicit 
in the party's proposals for the 2014 referendum, discussed in chapter seven. The framing 
of these issues was also consistent, constructed as a rational choice, reflecting the interests 
of Scotland and what was politically and economically feasible, rarely based on value 
rational claims to self-government.  
As a result, shifts can be identified, particularly in the framing of Europe and self-
government. European membership was framed early on as a threat to Scottish 
sovereignty and later as a pragmatic force which would facilitate Scottish independence. 
This reflected developments both external and internal to the party, including the 
development of a programme of a social Europe which coincided with the adoption of a 
social democratic ideology by the SNP (Newell 1998: 112; Harvie 1998: 200; Cameron 
2010: 316; Keating, 2001: 58). European and global identities were also employed 
instrumentally to underline differences between Scotland and the rest of the United 
Kingdom.  
4.2 The Volksunie: Evolving towards Europe 
The Volksunie, with a more moderate self-government goal of federalism, did not engage 
with the international and European dimension in any significant detail until later in its 
lifespan, focusing on the reform of the Belgian state as an internal, domestic matter. 
However, when it adopted a position on the European project, it did so wholeheartedly, 
seeing the future of Flanders, whether as a federal unit of Belgium or as an independent 
The Art of the Possible 
4 Europe and the world  128 
state, as thoroughly embedded within Europe. The party went beyond supporting the 
European project from afar, but instead developed a distinctive vision of  a ‘Europa der 
Volkeren' or a Europe of the people. It benefited from the relatively uncontested nature 
of European integration within the Belgian party system (Deschouwer & Van Assche, 
2008; Pilet & van Haute, 2007) 
The Volksunie's self-government goals were, at their origins, internal, focusing on the 
reorganisation of the Belgian state to allow for autonomy over areas of cultural, social, 
and economic policy. The federalisation of the Belgian state was considered a domestic 
matter. The party, at its origins, made little reference to its position within the broader 
world, prioritising internal recognition. However, a link was drawn between the necessity 
of federalisation and the protection of Flemish cultural and linguistic identities in a 
European context (VU, 1954). The VU expressed some concern about the risk to Flemish 
language, culture and national identity of a burgeoning European project built on old 
states and dominated by Francophones (VU, 1955). Beyond this, however, the salience of 
the international context was minimal.  
The salience remained low until the late 1970s when the Belgian state seemed unable to 
accommodate the needs and demands of the Flemish. At this point, the European 
Economic Community appeared as an alternative or substitute for the Belgian state, a 
supporting structure in which Flemish self-government could be achieved. The party 
foresaw the transfer of Belgian competences up to European and down to Flanders, with 
the Belgian state supplanted by these forces. In the 1980s, the VU developed a more 
distinctive, and optimistic vision of the European project, seeing the potential for self-
government within a European context. As a founding member of the European Free 
Alliance, it highlighted its role at the European level, serving as one of the leading 
proponents of a European project built on regions and nations, rather than nation states. 
In the VU's view, the cultural and regional communities were to supplant the old states 
of Europe (VU, 1979). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, on the way to achieving its initial federalist objectives, the VU 
looked towards Europe to enable further self-government. European integration 
presented a means of pursuing self-government goals, whether through a Europe of the 
Regions or as an independent member state in Europe. It advocated coordinated 
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European action in the domains of defence and foreign policy, environmental policy, 
social protection, public debt, employment standards and unemployment, offloading the 
core functions of the Belgian federation (VU, 1990)  Its self-government goal 'a federated 
state of a confederation which is still currently Belgian but will be European' was explicitly embedded 
in this context (VU, 1991). This Europe was to consist of a federal state, made up of 
‘nations and regions’ (VU, 1993).   In 1993, the party opposed the Maastricht Treaty, 
supporting monetary union but criticising the agreement for its failure to address the 
democratic deficit and to entrench representation for regions and sub-state nation (Lynch, 
1996; Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008). Despite these shortcomings, the party defined 
its self-government goal as ‘full membership in the international community, in both the European 
Union and the United Nations as well as in other international organisations’ (VU, 1995).  
Like the SNP, the Volksunie framed its self-government goals with reference to the 
external context. However, European integration was prioritised, reflecting the party's 
focus, for much of its lifespan, of self-government within a Belgian and European 
context. The VU's framing of the first dimension, self-government and the broader world, 
took the form of (1) self-government as allowing for engagement with the broader world 
rather than isolation. Its framing of European integration stressed (1) the necessity of 
federalisation before Europeanisation; (2) Europe as an enabler of Flemish self-
government, and finally, (3) a distinctive vision of Europe. In contrast with both the SNP 
and the N-VA, the Volksunie demonstrated little engagement with identity, whether 
global or European. Instead, arguments about identity were embedded in the discussion 
of European integration, with self-government necessary to preserve Flemish identities in 
an integrating world.   
4.2.1 Self-government and the world: the limited salience of 
international issues 
In comparison with the Scottish National Party, which continually referenced the 
international dimension when discussing self-government, the international context had 
little salience in Volksunie manifestos and party documents. Federalism was defined as a 
domestic project and the party pledged not to rely on support from elsewhere when 
realising its goals. It argued ‘we have to solve our own problems, expecting nothing from foreign states 
(including the Netherlands) or international or supranational institutions' (VU, 1957). Internal 
matters were to have the priority, with the 1957 congress text stating ‘We must not let 
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ourselves be distracted from the domestic struggle by considerations of foreign politics’ (VU, 1957).  The 
VU, like its Scottish counterpart, did employ the language of decolonisation and liberation 
and cited examples from elsewhere. In its 1965 manifesto, it declared ‘Every person has the 
inalienable right to take their fate in their own hands…’ making reference to independence 
movements in Asia and Africa and asking ‘What could be more normal than that we claim this 
right for ourselves?’ (VU, 1965).  
1. Engagement not isolation 
At the same time, the VU did employ a frame which suggested self-government would 
allow for positive engagement on the global stage rather than isolation. Federalism, 
according to the party,  
‘does not mean a defensive masonry for Flanders, but on the contrary, means acquiring the 
tools to enable the Flemish people to contribute to world civilization. We are not impeded 
by historical, ideological, party political or constitutional obstacles, which are by the way the 
hallmarks of the 19th century, and carries no valid meaning for the future.’ 
         VU, 1967. 
Federalism was ‘not a ghetto: it is consistent with the federalist tendencies in Europe and the world’ 
(VU, 1968). This internationalism, according to the party, was not possible without 
‘Volksnationalisme’ a statement which echoes the SNP’s Douglas Young, who argued true 
internationalism required Scottish nationalism (VU, 1979; Young, 1947). However, little 
reference was made to events and actors beyond the European context, although it 
attempted to situate Flanders within a progressive sphere in the 1970s and 
discussionsdecolonisation, global peace, and disarmaments appeared (VU, 1979). The 
party argued Belgian state reform should be aimed at providing ‘Flanders the opportunity to 
move in international forums’ with the Flemish people and especially Flemish youth able to 
move freely and confidently in the wider world (VU, 1987).  
These statements represent a comparatively minimal level of engagement with 
international issues which can be understood with reference to its focus, from its origins 
through the 1970s, on internal self-government and the interests of its core supporters 
who were concerned about cultural and economic issues rather than defining the state in 
the larger world. It engaged less than its Scottish counterparts with issues of sovereignty, 
and indeed when it did refer to sovereignty, it referred to the sovereignty of the Belgian 
state rather than the Flemish nation (VU, 1955). It did, however, develop a distinctive 
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understanding and vision of European integration and relied on European integration to 
support and further its self-government goals, particularly as these goals became external 
rather than exclusively internal.  
4.2.2 The role of Europe: necessitating and enabling Flemish 
self-government 
The role Europe played in the VU’s self-government goals shifted over time. At 
first,European integration was framed as a force which necessitated self-government in 
order to preserve a distinct Flemish culture and protect the status of the Dutch 
language.Later, European integration was perceived as enabling Flemish self-government, 
replacing the failing Belgian state with a new, and more secure democratic structure. The 
party, unique among sub-state nationalist parties, also advanced a distinctive vision of 
European integration, leading the charge for a Europe of the nations but also promoting 
further integration.  
1. Federalisation before Europeanisation 
Like the SNP at its origins, the VU welcomed European integration as a mechanism for 
peace-keeping in the abstract but expressed fears that this integration would threaten 
Flemish identity. For the Volksunie, impending European integration amplified the need 
for federalism as a means of protecting languages and cultures against threats, necessary 
to ‘safeguard our people’s existence in the future Europe' (VU, 1957). The status of Brussels as a 
national capital needed to be clarified before it was to become a European one (VU, 
1961). The party's 1955 Congress put forth a motion ‘warn[ing] against egotistical policies of the 
large states and against any premature and naïve surrender of sovereign rights’ (VU, 1955).  
However, its opposition to the project was contingent on the maintenance of a unitary 
Belgian state structure which did not allow for the recognition and realisation of 
distinctive Flemish identity and structure. ‘The dangers of the world as well as of a unified Europe 
means that the transformation of Belgium on a federalist basis, and the statute of political autonomy is 
urgently needed' (VU, 1955). This sentiment was reiterated in 1957 when it stated ‘we cannot 
help but see danger and distrust for our people in the current policy on Europe’ as it fails to ‘take into 
account the existence of ethnic communities and national cultures’ (VU, 1957) 
This emphasis on the cultural dimension also shaped its vision of the basis on which 
European integration should take place, linking the political structures with the identity 
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of the community. The VU adopted the position of early twentieth-century thinker 
August Vermeylen, who in 1990 argued in favour of the Flemish language and identities, 
saying ‘We want to be Flemings in order to become Europeans’. These identities were to be the 
basis on which European integration must take place. The party said it would welcome 
European confederation, on the proviso that it rested on ‘the basis of respect for constituent 
nationalities’ as well as allowed for the maintenance of independent foreign policy and did 
not infringe on the sovereignty of member states (VU, 1955). In 1961, a resolution was 
passed noting ‘an ethnic-federalist base is necessary for the promotion of co-operation and European 
unification because only federalism guarantees the survival of ethnic communities within a supranational 
community', a statement reiterated in later documents (VU, 1961). They also advocated a 
European Senate where small peoples and historic lands could be represented (VU, 1962). 
This emphasis on the preservation of distinctive national identities and languages 
remained important throughout the party's lifespan.  
2. Europe as an enabler of self-government 
In the 1960s, the VU became more consistent in its support for the European project, a 
reflection of its more moderate goal of federalism, the position of Belgium and Flanders 
at the geographic centre of the project, and the broad consensus on Europe within the 
Belgian party system. In the party’s framing, Europe became an enabling force, allowing 
for the delegation of contentious political issues to a higher level. The European project 
was continually framed by the Volksunie as an enabler of self-government, not by 
mitigating the costs of self-government, as in the case of the SNP, but by allowing for the 
hollowing of the Belgian state which would be supplanted by European coordination on 
international affairs and the delegation of domestic issues to Flanders and Wallonia (VU, 
1973).  
In the 1970s, the Volksunie began to offer more concrete proposals for the development 
of the European Community – rooted in both its construction of the nation and 
nationalism and its self-government goal of dual federalism.  However, this use of the 
European Union as an enabler was contingent on developments at the European level. It 
proposed a model of self-government, whether federal or confederal, that relied on the 
existence and the development of the European project to fill gaps which the Flemish 
state could not and mitigate some of the complications of the management of Brussels. 
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Belgium was increasingly considered a temporary supporting structure for a self-
governing Flanders and Wallonia, a construction which is also found in the self-
government goals of the N-VA. As Belgium approached official federalisation, the party 
stated ‘[w]e consider the national power as an interim transitional arrangement until the time that 
European integration is a reality, and communities can operate directly within the European context' 
(VU, 1987). This position was understood by a former leader of the Volksunie as a rational 
choice, rooted in the unsustainability of the Belgian state structure. He explained ‘They all 
want Europe to be more important than the federal level, because we want to have a house to live in when 
ours has burned down’ (former VU leader, interview by author, 2014). Belgian support for 
Europe was rooted in rational self-interest, ‘If you already have a nice house, like the French and 
the Germans, perhaps it’s a bit less interesting to move’ As a result, the party had a distinctive 
vision of what the European Union should become, both regarding its structure, and 
competences. 
3. A distinctive vision of Europe 
From the 1960s onwards, the VU developed a distinctive vision of what European 
integration should look like – one informed by its focus on democratic accountability and 
the needs of a self-governing Flanders. At the outset, Belgium was to serve as a model for 
this European project, an example of the successful coexistence of distinct ethnic group 
(VU, 1962) and federalism was to be the basis of both European integration and Belgian 
state reform (VU, 1960). On a practical level, it foresaw the transfer of key competences 
upward to Europe, in areas which included defence, foreign policy, and economic 
management, allowing Belgium to offload some contentious policy issues (VU, 1973; VU, 
1984 VU, 1993). It was not uncritical of the European project and proposed reforms to 
improve democracy and ensure the European Community was strong enough to replace 
the central state. These included a second chamber in the European Parliament to 
represent the regions, increased power for the Parliament and Commission to undermine 
intergovernmentalism, a reduced role for the nation-states, and the removal of the veto 
of member-states. The party also supported an extended role for the European 
Community in social and regional policy (VU, 1991) 
The building blocks of European cooperation were to be the nations and regions of 
Europe, which provided the ‘essential framework for human development’ (VU, 1973). The VU 
described a multilevel system of government and political organisation, identifying three 
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main communities for the political organisation of society: the municipality, the 
community of nations and the European federation in which decisions are taken by 
democratically elected parliaments (VU, 1993). The VU imagined a federal rather than 
supranational ‘political Europe of nations', foreseeing further integration at the European level 
(VU, 1973; VU, 1984). This can be contrasted with the position of the SNP in the 1980s 
and 1990s which stressed the primacy of the member states, a status which the SNP 
sought to achieve for Scotland. In the VU's eyes, integration could be criticised for failing 
to go far enough, as was the case with the Maastricht Treaty, rather than going too far.  
(Lynch, 1996; Deschouwer and Van Assche 2008) 
The VU’s focus on a distinctive vision of Europe and commitment to further European 
integration, far beyond the visions of other sub-state nationalist parties, was a result of 
the domestic context in which it operated. European integration would allow Flanders to 
act on the European state, but without a decisive break with the Belgian state. The 
European Union would, over time, supplant Belgium while reducing the need for direct 
action on some of the contentious political issues, such as the monarchy and the status of 
Brussels.  
Although the Volksunie was comparatively slow to engage with the external dimension, 
throughout its lifespan, the party was unique, from the 1970s onwards, with its 
engagement with the European project. Its goals, from this point onwards, were firmly 
embedded within a European context and the development of Flanders and the 
development of Europe were considered linked and dependent processes.  
On the surface level, the VU's framing of self-government and the external dimension is 
characterised by change. It moved from proposing a federalist restructure of the Belgian 
state, focusing entirely on the internal dimension, to external self-government, whether 
described as integral federalism, confederalism, or independence.  At the same time, the 
framing of its goal was consistent over time, focused on pragmatic considerations and a 
notion of post-sovereignty, with the old state structure becoming less important in the 
face of decentralisation to the nations and communities within these states and the 
supranational level. 
The VU's consistently positive stance on European integration, even in the face of 
setbacks and disappointments is reflective of both the consensus within Belgian politics 
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on Europe as a good thing making it politically unprofitable to mobilise on an anti-
European stance, but also on the party’s understanding of self-government as heavily 
contingent and integrated within broader structures.  
Europe was considered a substitute for the failing Belgian states. For the Volksunie, 
European integration was not a factor which merely enabled self-government but without 
it, self-government would not be possible. Even as it advanced more radical goals in the 
1980s and 1990s, these were always made with reference to European integration. When 
Europe fell short of the ambitions the Volksunie held for it, its response was not to adopt 
a more traditional conception of self-government but to call more vocally for European 
integration. 
4.3 The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie: Seeking an 
independent Flanders in a European context 
While the N-VA adopted a broadly more radical self-government goal than its 
predecessor, it did so within the context of an integrated, and further integrating Europe. 
It has been identified as a unique case – possessing a centre-right political profile, seeking 
independence, and speaking out in favour of more European integration (Massetti, 2009). 
Like the Volksunie, the N-VA demonstrated little engagement with broader international 
events. 
It did, however, place European Union membership, and further integration at the 
European level, at the centre of its self-government goals. While it has been, at times, 
vague on these goals, moving between confederalism and independence, the role of 
Europe in self-government was always explicit. ‘It will end in whatever you name it, autonomy, 
independence, something, but always within the European context’ (Bracke, 2014). The party's 
founding documents situated its self-government goals in a European context, with article 
one of its statutes calling for ‘an independent Flemish republic, member state of a democratic Europe’ 
(N-VA, 2001). According to the N-VA, Flanders was a ‘European member-state in the making’ 
(N-VA, 2007). Like its predecessor, the N-VA sought more than economic integration, 
looking to the European Union to develop further, supplanting the Belgian federal state 
(N-VA, 2004). The goal of a self-governing or independent Flanders is always qualified 
by an expression of commitment to Europe. ‘We have never spoken of an independent Flanders 
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tout court. What one always forgets is that, for the N-VA, we want a Flanders in Europe’ (de Wever, 
2008).  
The N-VA's framing of self-government and the international and European arena can 
be understood with reference to three key dimensions. Firstly, it engages less with a 
broader conception of the international arena but invokes the frame (1) of sovereignty as 
an outdated concept. In regards to European integration, three key frames come to the 
fore: (1) the idea of Europe as a force which enables Flemish self-government; (2) the 
party's critical and constructive approach to further integration; and (3) and quite 
interestingly, a frame which equates the problems of Europe with those of Belgium. Like 
its predecessors, the N-VA did not engage in any detail with European identities, 
operating on the assumption that the European nature of Flanders is assumed and does 
not need to be discussed in detail. 
4.3.1 Self-government and the world: a rejection of traditional 
forms of sovereignty 
For the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, the international dimension played a minimal role in its 
discourse around self-government. When the international dimension was discussed, it 
focused on international threats – the global economic crisis, the risk of terrorism and 
concerns about security, and the need for Europe to provide solutions (N-VA, 2010: 70).  
A purist vision of an independent Flanders, or ‘Fort Flanders’ would be ‘a dream that ends in 
a nightmare’ (Francken, 2008).   
1. Sovereignty as an outdated concept 
While the SNP acknowledged the challenges to the exercise of sovereignty and the 
necessary interdependence, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie dismissed the concept entirely. 
It did so by drawing a distinction between the ‘19th-century nationalism’, which ‘wants to keep 
the world out of Flanders' and the twenty first century nationalism of the N-VA, which builds 
community at home in order to engage with the world (De Wever 2008: 30). This 
nationalism provides ‘a warm nest for all the Flemings’, promising them certainty and 
protection in times of uncertainty.  (N‐VA 2001). When asked about his vision of Flemish 
self-government, de Wever rejected the ideal of traditional independence, saying, ‘We are 
not in Kosovo or in the nineteenth century. We are a member of the European Union which today decides 
60 percent of our laws. We will never be completely independent’ (Buxant, 2008). In the 2012 
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Flemish Government publication, the Charter for Flanders, which the N-VA, as a party 
of government, played a role in drafting, the concept of sovereignty was largely dismissed, 
‘of absolute sovereignty’ described as a ‘fiction’. Instead, ‘[d]ecision-making processes and policy 
competences are no longer the monopoly of one authority but are shared by authorities at different levels, 
all of them interconnected’ (Flemish Government, 2012). This formed the basis for an 
argument in favour of the transfer of powers up to Europe and down towards Flanders.  
4.3.2 European integration: enabling Flemish self-government  
The party was clear that external self-government was dependent on the further 
development of the European Union and it has been outspoken in its support, at least 
until recently, of continued integration. An intrinsic link was drawn between Flanders and 
Europe, ‘The future of 6.5 million Flemings lies in Europe. The European Union has brought us 60 
years of peace and contributes to our prosperity and well-being. Our story is and remains a European 
story’ (N-VA, 2007). 
1. Europe as an enabler of Flemish self-government 
Both the goal of self-government and the process by which it was to be achieved were 
articulated with reference to European integration. Given the failure of the Europe of the 
Regions to materialise and limited mechanisms for input by the units of federal member 
states, independence was necessary. ‘The EU consists of states alone and so Belgium sits alone at 
the European table’, a state of affairs which saw Flanders poorly represented in Europe (N-
VA, 2004). 
In 2010, the party situated its 
self-government goals firmly 
within a European context, 
saying ‘Flanders as an EU member 
state provides the best opportunity to 
organise an effective and democratic self-
government in a rapidly changing 
world’ (N-VA, 2010: 9).  The 
embedded image shows Bart de 
Wever in front of a European 
flag, in which one of the stars has 
A photo of Bart de Wever in front of an image of the European 
flag, in which one of the stars has been replaced by a Flemish 
lion, suggesting that Flanders would soon join those nations.  
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been replaced by a Flemish lion, suggesting Flanders would one day be one of the member 
states these stars represent.  
Although the N-VA was vague on time frame, speaking of the gradual evaporation of the 
Belgian state, the transition towards independence within the European Union was 
inevitable, as the Belgian federal state was no longer fit for purpose, having ‘been overtaken 
by national and international developments’ (N-VA, 2010: 5). At the present moment ‘The Belgian 
roof is leaking and should be replaced with a solid European roof over our heads’ (N-VA, 2009: 87).  
Europe was therefore framed as a force which both necessitated and enabled the 
achievement of Flemish self-government, making up for the inadequacies of the Belgian 
state and providing opportunities for participation and engagement.  
The N-VA was direct in this frame, motivated by rational concerns about the sustainability 
of a small state and the prospects of European integration. The leader of the party in the 
federal Chamber described the European context as providing ‘solutions which we should not 
have without the European Union' (Jambon, 2014).  Bart de Wever described his thinking 
before the introduction of the Euro, saying ‘I used to think that if we got rid of the Belgian franc, 
it would lead to economic disaster. Today both parts of Belgium simply continue to use the Euro’ (Spiegel, 
2010). In an interview with Diplomatic World, Bart de Wever spoke frankly about the 
centrality of the European Union to Flemish independence, saying, ‘Without the Euro, the 
pursuit of the objective, in time, of an independent Flanders, would be particularly difficult. The N-VA 
is a staunchly pro-European party’ (Diplomatic World, 2013).  
As a result, this was not a bonus, mitigating some of the costs of self-government, but 
was necessary to pursue self-government at all. 
2. Critical and constructive 
While in favour of European integration, both on principles and in consideration of 
pragmatic concerns about the viability of the Flemish state, the N-VA was more critical 
than its predecessor. The N-VA positioned itself, from its origins, as offering ‘a critical voice 
to European centralisation', demanding respect for each unit and the maintenance of cultural 
and linguistic diversity as well as sensible economic policy (N-VA, 2001). Its 2004 
manifesto heralded the achievements of the European Union as the ‘most advanced form of 
international cooperation in history’ but noted its shortcomings in its structure, decision-making 
mechanisms and policy (N-VA, 2004). The party’s pursuit of its self-government goals 
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was contingent on developments at the European Union level, with the institutions of the 
European Union taking on the remaining functions of the Belgian state. As a result, a 
strong Europe was integral to its objectives, and setbacks at the European level were 
considered detrimental to the party and its goals.  
The N-VA employed a ‘critical and constructive’ frame in its approach towards the EU, 
identifying inadequacies in the set-up of the European Union, particularly in the domains 
of economic coordination, the regulation of the Eurozone, and its handling of the 
democratic deficit. This criticism set it apart from political rivals, with the N-VA 
characterising itself as ‘the only real Flemish-European party in the country’, as it was willing to 
call for change rather than using Europe as a scapegoat for Belgium’s ills (N-VA, 2009). 
It described itself as ‘needed in Flanders, useful in Europe’ putting forth a Euro-realist position 
(N-VA, 2009). It rejected both Euro-scepticism and Europhilia, positioning itself as a 
party calling for European reform, a critical but also constructive position. 
Although this discourse would imply a disaffection with European integration and might 
suggest a rejection of the European project, the N-VA did not call for less European 
integration but more. Like its predecessor the Volksunie, the N-VA developed a 
distinctive vision for a reformed Europe. Its tagline called for ‘stronger Flanders, stronger 
Europe, less crisis’.  (N-VA, 2009). In 2009, the party remained broadly positive about 
Europe, proposing the transfer of further powers and seeing the European Union as a 
source of stability and comfort. It focused on deepening the relationship between existing 
member states before expanding further, ensuring the European Union was a political 
rather than exclusively economic project (N-VA, 2009). It called on members to ‘put the 
European house in order’ which included further reforms (N-VA, 2010). 
Both confederalism and European reforms were linked - two necessary and 
interdependent processes which would affect the future health and prosperity of the 
Flemish people. Voters were reminded that ‘Europe can no longer be considered as abroad, in 
good times and bad’ (N-VA, 2010: 5). In his 2012 national day speech Bart de Wever was 
explicit about this: 
‘European integration and the creation of the Flemish state run increasingly parallel. The 
coming years will be critical for the shaping of our future direction. Should Europe be a debt 
union where economic competitiveness is undermined? Shall Flanders remain stuck in the 
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Belgian institutional web which causes us to sink deeper into the economic swamp? Or will 
we choose real economic and institutional reforms…’  
De Wever, 2012.  
This was closely linked with a frame which emerged linking the problems of Europe and 
the problems of Belgium, suggesting both were in urgent need of reform.  
3. The problems of Europe = the problems of Belgium 
The N-VA also drew parallels between the dysfunctions of the Belgian state – divided 
between a productive north and an ailing south, and the European Union. In an interview 
with Knack de Wever argued ‘the border between the two runs across our country’ inhibited 
cooperation, just like the North South divide at the European level (Knack, 2012). Europe 
can be understood, in this framing, as Belgium writ large. This tendency was identified by 
Huysenne and Dalle Mulle (2015) who note the N-VA positions Flanders among the 
fiscally responsible states of Northern Europe and Wallonia with those of the south, seen 
as ‘Greece on the Meuse’. De Wever drew these parallels ‘What is taking place now on the European 
level is what has been happening in our country for some time. Germany must pay, but cannot make the 
decision’ (Knack, 2012). Germany was in danger of becoming the ‘Flanders of Europe’, 
punished for its economic responsibility and forced to subsidise its irresponsible 
neighbours (Diplomatic World, 2013).  
As a remedy to both the problems of Belgium and of Europe, party manifestos and 
statements called for two tracks of European integration, distinguishing between 
prosperous states of the North and the struggling states of the South and allowing for 
deepening integration between states which met the financial requirement and were 
willing to participate (N-VA, 2010). The party called for stricter requirements, noting that 
failing to fulfil commitments would necessitate the withdrawal of these weaker states from 
the EU. These messages would be more pronounced in 2014, with the adoption of a 
Eurorealist position in response to failures of the refugee crisis. 
While the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie adopted a more radical self-government goal than its 
predecessor, the Volksunie, this is always framed with reference to the European context, 
never tout court or within a broader international dimension. This is further reinforced 
by the party's narrative of self-government coming about through a gradual process of 
evolution, with powers transferred up to the European Union and down to Flanders, 
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effectively rendering the Belgian state hollow. Europe, the N-VA argues, is an enabler of 
self-government, making this possible over time.  
With a vision for self-government so firmly embedded within the European Union, the 
N-VA was strongly impacted by dynamics at the European level, both successes and 
failures. Its commitment to independence only within the European Union suggests the 
feasibility of its self-government goals are heavily dependent on developments at the 
European level. As a result, the party maintains its commitment to Europe, even as it 
becomes more critical of its institutions. Its framing has shifted, not towards 
Euroscepticism as we might expect, but towards framing Europe in urgent need of 
reform, beset by some of the same challenges as the Belgian state. 
The crises faced by the European Union therefore present a challenge to the self-
government goals of the N-VA, particularly when coupled with the minimal investment 
in continued cooperation with the Belgian state or Wallonia, discussed in the following 
chapter. In recent years, confederalism has been emphasised as the immediate goal, 
representing a halfway house between the status quo and independence in an unstable 
European structure, discussed in detail in chapter seven.  
4.4 Comparing the framing self-government, Europe, 
and the world 
The framing of self-government and the external context by each of the three parties, can 
be understood as reflecting key aspects of the party's policy and strategy. Changes in the 
external context – the decline of the British Empire, the process of European integration 
and the various advances and setbacks this entails – also contributed to the content of the 
parties' self-government goals, informing the understanding of the feasibility and 
desirability of various forms of self-government. The Scottish National Party, the 
Volksunie, and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie framed their goals in light of the international 
and European contexts in which it operated, although the salience of the international 
dimension varied between parties and within parties over time. Variation was evident in 
(a) processes of moderation, radicalisation, and modification; (b) each party's 
understanding of a changing world and concepts of self-government and sovereignty in 
light of these concerns; (c) and rational considerations about the party's policy and public 
support.  
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As sub-state nationalist parties pursuing self-government goals which make reference to 
the international dimension, we would expect to see changes in these goals in light of 
changes in the context. For the Volksunie, we see a process of radicalisation, both as a 
result of fulfilling its original goals and therefore moving onto more radical goals, but also 
as the European project developed, opening an opportunity structure in which some of 
these goals may be realised. The European Community, and later the European Union, 
provided a supporting context for the Volksunie, an alternative to the failing Belgian state. 
As a result, its adoption of more radical self-government goals, although vaguely defined, 
took place as further European integration seemed imminent. The Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie, although possessing from its origins a more radical goal, adopted a similar 
framing as its predecessor. However, its commitment to European Union membership 
was employed to signal moderation, suggesting little would change in the event of self-
government. It moderated its goal further, focusing on confederalism as an interim 
solution, as it became clear that neither public opinion nor developments at the European 
level, would support Flemish independence. For the SNP, the process of moderation or 
radicalisation is less clear, suggesting a process of modification. The party has always 
pursued external self-government, a goal of independence although it uses different 
The Art of the Possible 
4 Europe and the world  143 
names over time, this independence has always been embedded in an international 
context, whether Empire, Commonwealth, or Europe. In the run-up to the 2014 
referendum, this became even more explicit, with the SNP proposing the maintenance of 
British and European Unions.  
Given its radical self-government goal, held from the outset, the SNP was more invested 
in concepts of sovereignty, although recognising sovereignty must be shared. This 
commitment to Scottish sovereignty shaped its initial scepticism towards European 
integration, with the argument made that an independent Scotland would not be willing 
to cede its recently won sovereignty to another centralised power. It also shaped its 
eventual positive stance on Europe, with an independent Scotland possessing sovereignty 
which would entail the ability to decide when and with whom to share it. Both the 
Volksunie and the N-VA were less invested in sovereignty, viewing it as resting with the 
Belgian state, in the VU’s case, or an outdated concept.  
The framing of self-government and Europe by all three parties represent rational 
understandings of the opportunities and challenges of self-government in light of the 
international dimension. The SNP was more value oriented than its Flemish counterparts, 
pursuing Scottish independence in the near-term, whether or not the external conditions 
supported it. This is especially true in the party's early years, in which its policy proposals 
were quite limited. Its goals became more nuanced as the party achieved greater relevance 
and felt that its achievement of its goals was increasingly likely. For the Volksunie and the 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, both parties framed their self-government goals in light of 
European developments, both institutional developments but also the ideational concept 
of Europe. The pursuit of self-government, was heavily contingent on developments in 
this domain. They also, somewhat uniquely among sub-state nationalist parties, set out 
distinctive visions for Europe, proposing further integration on a variety of policy 
domains as well as enhanced representation for regions and nations without member state 
status. 
A discourse of contingency is present in the discourse of all three parties, suggesting self-
government is subject to a process of rational calculation. For the SNP, this contingency 
is explicit and found most often in its discussions of its opposition to European 
integration from the 1960s onwards. Its position was not rooted in a fundamental 
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objection to the EEC, or indeed the principles of European integration, but was 
contingent on membership taking place within the existing structure of the state which 
would fail to represent Scotland's interests. For the Volksunie and the Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie, this contingency was more veiled, with the self-government goals of both parties 
heavily rooted in the development of the European Union. Without further integration, 
the party's ultimate goals were not considered viable, although this was not often 
addressed directly. 
Politically, the SNP was able to use Europe, and the wider international dimension, as a 
marker of difference between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The party's 
objection to the EEC was a political opportunity to position itself standing up for 
Scotland and representing Scotland's diverse interests, while its adoption of a pro-
European platform in 1988 was contrasted with growing Euroscepticism at Westminster, 
something that remains relevant in the current context For the Volksunie and the Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie, operating within a party system in which parties could only be criticised 
for not being European enough, this was not an issue which could be fruitfully politicised 
and as a result is not present in the party's framing. 
The Eurozone crisis and subsequent setbacks in European integration have had a 
differential impact on the N-VA and the SNP.  In general, there is an implication that 
Flemish nationalists needed European integration more than the SNP. For the N-VA, the 
European Union presented a solution, both for Flemish self-government and for 
addressing the problem of Brussels, providing solutions to contentious issues. In contrast, 
the SNP engaged less with the European dimension and was less engaged with European 
issues, a result of the Euro-crisis having less political resonance but also the sense that the 
United Kingdom, and thus Scotland, remained at a distance from Europe. However, the 
international and European context is central to the discourse of both these parties, 
presenting self-government, whether internal or external, as a responsible option, 
providing for independence rather than isolation.  
The N-VA's desire for political integration was informed by its desire, in the long-term, 
for a European structure to replace the Belgian state one. By endowing the European 
Union with foreign policy, military and security competences, it could mitigate the 
economic and political displacement that independence might entail. In contrast, the SNP 
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pursues its self-government goals in the short to medium term, framing its entry into 
government as a mandate to pursue independence through a referendum upon entry into 
office. Strategically it is required to develop and maintain a fully fleshed proposal on what 
independence, whether within Europe, within the British Isles, or within a globalised 
world means. The N-VA faced similar pressures in advance of the 2014 elections, in which 
it was required by its competitors to define confederalism, which until that point had been 
underdeveloped as a concept. The party's gradualist approach, focused on the evaporation 
of the Belgian state rather than an abrupt move towards independence, accorded it more 
flexibility though, and it could afford to wait and see how developments occurred at the 
European level. 
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Chapter Five: Framing self-government and the 
state 
Just as sub-state nationalist parties engage with the international dimension, the structure 
and behaviour of the embedding state is important in shaping the content and framing of 
self-government goals. The centrality of the state is evident in Rokkan and Urwin’s (1982: 
142) definition of a self-government goal, viewed as ‘the relationship between the periphery in 
question and the core of the state after the conflict has been resolved, as perceived by the movement’. 
Accordingly, Dieckhoff (2011: 29) notes ‘oppositional nationalism’ does not emerge ‘in a 
vacuum, but through its interaction with the central state, which is itself a supplier of nationalism’ and 
these are expected to shape their goals.  
Whether they pursue accommodation within the state or exit from it, the state remains 
one of the primary reference points for sub-state nationalist parties, contributing to a 
definition of what form of self-government is both desirable and feasible. (Keating, 1992: 
45; Anderson 2007: 190, see also Clemens & Cook, 1998: 458). The literature suggests 
three main components of a party’s self-government goals and the relationship with the 
larger state. The first is the nature of the state and its link with the claims made by sub-
state nationalist parties, which is often used to justify the pursuit of self-government. 
(Keating & McGarry, 2001: 6; Hepburn, 2009: 483). This can be rooted in cultural, 
political, and economic grievances, summarised broadly as ‘a group has suffered and/or is 
suffering some form of injustice at the hands of another group or state’ (Lecours, 2012: 271). Secondly, 
is reaction of the central to these demands, particularly processes of decentralisation 
which can be understood to either have constraining effects on actors, reducing the 
salience of their demands, or provide further forums in which to mobilise. (Rokkan & 
Urwin, 1982: 144; Rudolph & Thompson, 1985: 299; Erk & Anderson, 2009: 192; Alonso, 
2012: 245; Detterbeck, 2012: 34; Hepburn, 2010: 28).  The final component is important 
but relatively under-examined, and takes the form of the relationship proposed between 
the sub-state nation and the embedding state after self-government has been achieved. 
(Lluch, 2014; 151; McEwen, 2013; Keating, 2012: 13).  
This chapter will assess the ways in which sub-state nationalist parties frame their self-
government goals in light of the state in which they operate – whether in opposition to 
its existence, supportive of its reforms, or in search of new relationships. I address three 
The Art of the Possible 
5 The State  147 
main dimensions of this issue: The first focuses on the ways in which existing state 
structures or the union are employed to justify self-government. All three question the 
utility of the embedding state and its ability to adequately represent the interest of the 
nation but the ways in which they frame these issues reflects the individual dynamics 
between the state and the sub-state nation. The second captures the parties’ responses to 
proposed and realised state reform. Both within and cross-case variation is identified here, 
reflecting divides and preferences within each party. Finally, I examine the relationship 
with the state that the parties seek for their nation once their ideal form of self-
government is achieved. Interestingly, the SNP with its more radical goal of 
independence, commits more energy to developing these proposals.  
In analysing these dimensions, each party will be addressed in turn. In addition to 
presenting the frames, I will also briefly discuss the means by which self-government was 
to be pursued as this is contingent upon the structure and nature of each state. I then 
conclude the chapter with a comparison of the framing of the state and self-government 
in the three cases.  
5.1 The Scottish National Party and the United 
Kingdom 
Although the Scottish National Party, throughout its history, sought independence rather 
than being content with a reform of the British state to accommodate Scottish demands, 
this self-government goal was typically made with reference to British state structures. 
This took two forms: serving as a motivation for self-government due to the perceived 
threat posed to Scotland by the British state, and as an opportunity for renewed 
partnership and cooperation in the event of self-government. The party has also been, to 
varying degrees, open to the prospect of devolution or efforts to accommodate, at least 
partially, the SNP’s demands, viewing it as a stepping stone towards self-government. 
State reform has been a protracted, and often stalled project, with proposals made in the 
1970s but with the referendum on devolution in 1979 falling short of the required 
threshold. It was not, until 1999, that the SNP saw meaningful progress made towards a 
limited degree of self-government (Mau, 2005)  
The means by which self-government was to be achieved was largely consistent from its 
origins to devolution, shifting only with the restoration of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. 
The Art of the Possible 
5 The State  148 
Until this point, the majority of Scottish MPs hailing from the Scottish National Party was 
to be interpreted as a mandate for independence, allowing those MPs, and those Scottish 
MPs from other parties which wished to join, to negotiate with the UK government for 
Scotland’s independence. The deal would then be subject to a vote by the Scottish people. 
With the prospect of a Scottish Assembly in the 1970s, the party outlined two routes to 
independence in The New Scotland, through the securing of a majority of seats at 
Westminster, and a more gradual approach from within the Assembly and Westminster, 
working for ‘greatly increased powers for this Assembly until it becomes a proper Scottish government’ 
(SNP, 1974). Billy Wolfe (1973: 42) described this electoral route to self-government as ‘a 
long road and a hard road to travel’ but one which would ultimately pay dividends. 
Referendums and extra-parliamentary actions were rejected as counterproductive to the 
independence cause (TH Gibson, 1951; HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol 903 c525).  
With devolution, the SNP reoriented itself towards Holyrood and introduced a proposal 
for a referendum on self-government, a more realistic means of achieving its goals. 
MacAskill (2004: 37-38) questioned the feasibility of the party’s pre-devolution strategy, 
asking ‘How can you win in a Westminster Parliament dominated by English votes? How could a 
majority of Nationalist MPs deliver Independence against a Holyrood administration not supportive of 
it?’ arguing a majority in Holyrood would be necessary to serve as a mandate for a 
referendum. It was also consistent with the SNP’s claim that sovereignty rests with the 
people, rather than the government of the day (ScotGov, 2009). Strategically, this new 
tactic also suited the party’s renewed emphasis upon an office-seeking strategy, by 
encouraging people to vote for the SNP as a programmatic party, reassured that by doing 
so, they were not voting for a declaration of independence. 'Independence will only happen 
when people in Scotland vote for it. That is why independence is your choice' (SNP, 2011) 
The SNP's framing of the state and self-government took three forms. Firstly, it addressed 
the state and existing state structures. Within this dimension, two frames were identified: 
(1) the state as hostile to Scotland, used primarily until the 1980s, and then (2) as merely, 
as a result of its structure, as neglectful. This grievance has been rooted in concerns over 
cultural issues, economic underperformance or exploitation, and in democratic concerns, 
with these accorded different salience over time and reflects the expansion and 
contraction of the British state. Secondly, its approach to proposed and realised state 
reform also had a temporal component, with (1) initial proposals being viewed as a 
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dangerous distraction, before being cautiously embraced as (2) first step towards self-
government and (3) insufficient but workable. Finally, it addressed self-government and 
relations with the state post-independence, describing self-government as allowing for the 
creation of a partnership of equals, or a renewed relationship between Scotland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom. This frame was present albeit in varying forms and degrees. 
Each of these frames will be addressed in turn. 
5.1.1 The British state: Hostile and neglectful 
The framing of the United Kingdom was persistently negative, with the UK portrayed as 
at its worst, openly hostile towards the people of Scotland, and at best, merely neglectful 
of its needs and interests. These dynamics represented a threat to Scotland – both an 
existential one, undermining the Scottish nation, and a pragmatic one, rooted in economic 
deprivation and democratic underrepresentation which the UK was incapable of 
addressing. There was a temporal component to this framing, with the frame of hostility 
predominant between the party’s origins and devolution, replaced with the frame of 
neglect in the devolutionary period. By then, it was more difficult to argue that, having 
granted devolution, the British state was overtly hostile towards Scotland. The framing of 
hostility returned, to a degree, with the return of the Conservatives to power at 
Westminster in 2010.  
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1. Hostility towards Scotland 
For the Scottish National Party, the Acts of Union and the United Kingdom was 
consistently portrayed as a historical anachronism which had failed to serve Scottish 
interests, and were, at times, explicitly 
hostile towards Scotland. Douglas Young 
spoke in 1945 on the failure of the Union, 
particularly in social and economic policy, 
and sabotage by ‘London' departments 
(Young, 1945). In the 1945 election Arthur 
Donaldson, the SNP's candidate outlined 
the challenges facing Scotland, stating ‘[i]t is 
obvious that all is not well with Scotland and her 
people’, focusing on negative social and 
economic outcomes. He employed biblical 
language to describe the threat: ‘All this 
cannot go on without bringing our ancient nation to 
extinction and reducing our rich and fertile land to 
desolation. Yet these evils are not the will of 
Providence but the work of man’ (Donaldson, 
1945). A 1945 pamphlet, (see inset) written 
by Oliver Brown, who engaged with the 
SNP intermittently as a party member and prospective parliamentary candidate published 
by the party, described ‘Scotlandshire’ as ‘England’s Worst-Governed Province’, suggesting a 
hostile and colonial relationship. 
In a 1952 paper on Scotland’s Present Position, the party discussed this failure, focusing 
on the thwarted potential of Scotland as, ‘subjected to cruel, stifling, and frustrating measures which 
are needed to bolster up the failing economy of England’, at Scotland’s expense (SNP, 1952). This 
was, according to the SNP, a result of the structure of the British state, referred to 
repeatedly as a London government to emphasise its physical and practical distance from 
the Scottish people.   
Scotlandshire: England’s Worst 
Governed Province, authored by Oliver 
Brown suggested a hostile relationship.  
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Under Billy Wolfe’s leadership, the party’s framing of the Union became more negative, 
warning of the threat of assimilation as well as continued economic mismanagement.  In 
Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence, Wolfe discussed this risk, warning  
‘it is quite clear that if the Scottish people do not assert their right to independence, there 
will be no such thing as a Scottish problem in the course of a generation or so, because we 
will be assimilated by England and what are now Scottish problems will be English regional 
problems’.  
Wolfe, 1973: 132.  
By the 1970s, Unionism no longer held any value, as ‘The United Kingdom no longer means 
what it once meant. It is now a State that has been declining for many years’ (HC Deb 14 January 
1976 vol 903 c525). Douglas Crawford noted that affiliation with England, ‘one of the most 
bankrupt economies in Western Europe’, was detrimental for Scotland (HC Deb 1 July 1975 
vol 894 c1178). A pamphlet produced for the 1974 election by Robert Shirley described 
England with ‘her swollen population and lack of resources’ and its government as unable to 
address Scottish problems (Shirley, 1974). The 1979 text Return to Nationhood spoke 
directly to this legacy of neglect and exploitation. 
‘Scotland has never been regarded by the British Governments as a free and equal partner 
in the Union with England, but as a lesser province with reservoirs of manpower, ability, 
space and wealth which could be tapped as required’ 
          SNP, 1979. 
Only self-government was seen as a remedy to the threats posed to the Scottish nation, 
allowing Scots to preserve their culture and develop economically. Following the failed 
1979 referendum, the SNP defined itself as the only line of defence against the threats 
facing Scotland, both in its pursuit of self-government and its willingness to stand up for 
Scotland under the current constitutional arrangement. This frame was evident in its 
appeal to voters - 'If you have any hope left for Scotland, you have only one party to vote for - the SNP' 
(SNP, 1979).  
This sense of hostility and the threat this entailed was amplified by the perceived 
illegitimacy of Conservative rule in the 1980s and anti-Thatcherite tendencies, reflecting 
the intersection between the state and the party system (Finlay, 2012). The 1983 
introductory letter from party leader Gordon Wilson speaks of Scotland in crisis, with 
rising unemployment, failed industrial development, and rising emigration as a result of 
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policies at the centre (SNP, 1983). This frame of threat was employed to justify self-
government and underline the necessity of independence. ‘But there is an alternative - to choose 
Scotland. Never has the need for an independent Scottish Parliament and a Scottish Government been 
greater’ (SNP, 1983). Only the SNP could protect Scotland from Thatcherite policies, 
given Labour’s ineffectual opposition (SNP, 1987) 
Jim Sillars likens England in the 1980s to the Titanic, with Scotland, as a ‘self-sufficient, small 
ship drawn along by a tow rope’. While England ‘has hit the iceberg of reality’, Scotland is forced 
to choose to cut the rope or go down with her (Sillars, 1986: 30). Thatcherism was, 
according to the party, anathema to Scottish interests and symbolic of the divergence of 
values between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom (Finlay, 2012). In Alex 
Salmond’s introductory letter to the 1992 manifesto, the Scottish people  were faced with 
a stark choice faced ‘a choice between power and powerlessness: a choice between the dismal past and 
a better future. A choice to go forward into the mainstream of Europe, or to be stuck in a backwater of 
Britain' (SNP, 1992). In 1997, Scotland is portrayed as overshadowed by a neighbour who 
'speaks for us but not of us', and pursues policies which are against Scottish interests (SNP, 
1997) 
2. Neglectful of Scottish interests 
With the introduction of a Scottish Parliament, the language of threat and hostility had 
less resonance in Scottish political discourse. Ideologically, the SNP shared an affinity 
with both the Labour government at Westminster and the Labour-Liberal Democrat 
government at Holyrood. Having achieved devolution through a democratic vote, it was 
difficult to argue Scottish sovereignty was threatened or oppressed. Instead, the SNP 
focused on the divergence of values and the failure of statewide or ‘Westminster’ parties to 
adequately represent Scottish interests (SNP, 1999).  Salmond’s 2005 conference speech 
remained negative about the Union but less explicitly than during the 1980s, arguing 
Westminster and the Unionist parties which governed there were mediocre and stale 
rather than openly hostile. ‘But our objective is to break the grip of the London parties over Scotland 
– not just the political grip but their unionist mind-set of defeatism, can’t do and second best’ (Salmond, 
2005). In 2007, the Union was described as ‘no longer fit for purpose…well past its sell by date’ 
(SNP, 2007).  
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This framing was predominant until the 2008 economic crisis, when the perceived failure 
of Westminster to adequately respond was characterised as a threat to Scottish well-being. 
This intensified following the 2010 election, with the return of the Conservative Party to 
power (Salmond, 2011)). In the debate over the 2010 Scottish programme of government, 
Angela Constance described it as a ‘choice between a decade of despair, and independence’ echoing 
the language of the 1980s and 1990s (Constance, 2010). In his October 2011 conference 
speech, Salmond spoke of ‘Westminster’s agenda of disrespect – not of disrespect to the SNP but a 
fundamental disrespect for Scotland' (Salmond, 2011). Like in the 1980s, the relationship 
between the UK and Scotland was viewed and framed through the lens of party politics. 
Throughout its lifespan, the SNP emphasised the differences between Scotland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom and the adverse impact of Union. It did so with varying 
degrees of radicalism, at its origins, suggesting the British state was openly hostile or 
exploitative of Scotland, a discourse Hechter (1977) would label as internal colonialism. 
Later, it would argue that the UK state, by virtue of its structure rather than any 
intentionality, was unable to represent Scotland’s interests. Both frames supported its 
proposition that independence was the only solution to this unequal partnership. Despite 
this quite negative framing of the British state, the SNP remained, to varying degrees, 
open to the prospect of devolution, at least as an intermediate step towards independence 
as well as continued partnership post-independence.  
5.2.2 Framing state reform and devolution 
The SNP struggled with internal divides on state reform proposals falling short of its 
ultimate goals through much of its lifespan. Paterson (2015) identifies a process of conflict 
and cooperation, in which dissatisfaction with the UK grows, threatening the 
sustainability of the Union. The UK then ‘remembers its inherent flexibility and pragmatism, and 
concedes just enough not just to merely placate the discontent for the time being – which would be merely 
cynical – but actually, wisely enough appreciating what the real discontent is’. When this pragmatism 
prevails, the SNP is faced with a choice – whether to embrace efforts at accommodation, 
at the risk of undermining its ultimate objective – or reject them, and be viewed as 
obstructionist. 
The SNP was required to engage with various proposals put forth by political rivals and 
the central government, including the Conservative and Labour proposals of the 1960s 
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and 1970s; the model adopted by the Constitutional Convention and largely incorporated 
into the Labour Party’s platform for the 1997 election; and extensions to the devolution 
settlement proposed in the 2000s. Its response to these proposals, evidenced in its 
framing, reflected developments and debates internal to the party, notably strategic 
considerations over whether a more gradual or radical strategy would best serve Scotland’s 
interests, and the specific content of the proposals themselves. 
Although many within the SNP embraced any step towards self-government, tensions 
existed between those who felt the party should not settle for anything less than full 
independence, fearing this would undercut support for independence, and gradualists, 
who viewed some form of limited self-government as a first step (Mitchell, 1990 Kauppi, 
1982; Kidd, 2000; Finlay, 2009). These tendencies contributed to the party's response to 
proposals from the state and rival parties until the divide was settled in the 1980s 
(Cameron, 2010: 298; Mitchell, 1996: 212; Hutchison, 2001: 124).  
The SNP embraced devolution in 1997 and took an active role in the Scotland Forward 
campaign which campaigned for a yes vote, campaigning alongside statewide parties. It 
continually critiqued the proposals as insufficient but pledged to work within the devolved 
institutions to represent Scotland’s interests and pursue independence. By the first term 
of the Scottish Parliament, the fundamentalist gradualist split was reduced to 'little more 
than an easy way to describe the personality clashes and bitter power struggles still raging within the party' 
(MacKay, 2009). 
1. A dangerous distraction 
For some members, devolution represented a dangerous distraction from its ultimate aims 
and a source of internal division (Newman, 1992: 18). Following a meeting in Glasgow in 
1947, the SNP issued a statement entitled Scotland demands full control in which proposals 
made by local authorities and trade unionists were described as ‘so ineffectual that their only 
result could be that Scotland’s position would be worsened’ (SNP, 1947).  In 1960, Robert McIntyre 
framed proposals for a Scottish Assembly, made by the Scottish Covenant Association as 
‘a parochial Westminster Committee set up for the convenience of the Westminster Parliament and is not 
a halfway house or even a quarter milestone towards a national parliament for Scotland’ (SNP, 1960). 
In The New Scotland, the party described proposals as a deliberate attempt to confuse the 
Scottish people, ‘with futile fantasies ranging from the Conservatives' suggestion of some kind of puppet 
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state to the Labour Party's complacency in Scotland's subservience’ (SNP, 1974). These statements 
suggested an opposition to intermediate steps among some branches of the party. Levy 
(1986) documents divides within the party, rooted in the commitment of members to 
independence and scepticism expressed by party leaders on whether an Assembly would 
be acceptable.  
For some, devolution was a practical and perhaps necessary first step. The debate 
crystallised in the 1970s around the proposals made by the Labour government for a 
Scottish Assembly. Neil MacCormick's 1970 essay on constitutional change noted that 
prior to independence, a devolved Scottish Parliament would be desirable, providing the 
institutional infrastructure for independence and easing the transition. Taking a gradualist 
perspective, MacCormick (1970) argued the devolution scheme would not preclude or 
inhibit independence but would instead enable it, providing a platform for Scotland and 
the means of pursuing policy goals. At the party’s 1972 conference, a resolution was tabled 
which affirmed support for devolution but argued that sovereign statehood formed the 
core of the SNP’s policy but this was not open up to a larger debate (Levy, 1986: 241).  
The Kilbrandon Commission, or the Royal Commission on the Constitution, convened 
in 1969, issuing its report in 1973. Its recommendation was framed by SNP MPs as an 
opportunity, ‘not as a final development but as a first stage in the process of re-establishing an 
independent Scottish state’ (MacCormick, 1974). However, divides persisted within the party 
and a distinction can be drawn between MPs and the larger party. At the party’s 
conference in 1976, an amendment which would reject devolution was only narrowly 
defeated (Newman, 1992: 18). Douglas Stewart described the Scotland and Wales Bill, 
issued in 1976 and ultimately withdrawn, as ‘only a mouse, and a very anaemic one’, warning it 
was not within the power of the SNP to turn it into a ‘Scottish lion’ but pledging to 
strengthen the bill insofar as was possible (HC Deb 13 December 1976 vol 922 c1022). 
More sceptical voices argued the limited proposals presented a stumbling block, serving 
as a distraction from its ultimate aims.  
2. The first step towards self-government 
The SNP’s 1974 manifestos, issued in February and October, attempted to reconcile these 
two positions, pledging to support proposals as ‘a first step’ but warning they represented 
self-serving efforts by rivals to counteract growing support for the SNP (SNP, 1974a). 
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The party set out conditions under which it would support an Assembly in its October 
1974 manifesto: ‘The Scottish National party will support a Scottish Assembly as a step on the road 
to full self-government, provided it is to be directly elected and provided it is to possess significant economic 
and financial powers’ (SNP, 1974b). 
The message adopted by MPs at the time suggested they were welcoming but wary of 
proposals, keen to be seen as constructive but also warning these plans were ultimately 
insufficient. A 1977 publication addressed the issue directly, saying,   
'The SNP has always taken a consistent and straightforward approach to any intermediate 
steps towards self-government. If this involves the establishment of a directly-elected 
legislature for Scotland, then we will support it as a step in the right direction while 
continuing to work for the achievement of full political and economic powers’ 
SNP, 1977. 
SNP MPs consistently argued there was no contradiction in their support for devolution, 
even in a limited form, and independence. George Reid described the Assembly as falling 
far short of expectations, from the start ‘rammed into a constitutional straightjacket’ but at the 
same time, representing ‘the single greatest transfer of responsibility back to the people of Scotland in 
the 269 years since the Act of Union’ (HC Deb 14 December 1976 vol 922 c1354-5). He asked 
‘Is that somewhat less than an outright position of independence? Yes, of course it is, but it does not imply 
a diminution of what the SNP stands for’ (ibid). Support was justified on the basis it would 
further, even if only slightly, Scottish interests. This position would be employed by the 
party to square its independence aims with support for the further transfer of powers. 
Although sceptical about the potential of a Scottish Assembly, Gordon Wilson's 
contribution to the 1976 debate on the devolution bills seems to emphasise a stepping 
stone role, noting even without full powers, the Scottish Assembly would mobilise the 
Scottish public. Efforts to hobble the Assembly were expected to backfire. Lacking 
adequate economic powers, ‘the Scottish people will assume that they have no choice but to move on 
to more certain ways of getting the justice that Scotland requires’ (HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol 903 
c459). Devolution was framed as an opportunity to whet the appetite of the Scottish 
public for more power and convince them of both the need and ability to prosper 
independently. Reid argued ‘This certainly is not the end of the devolution road. To use Churchill’s 
phrase, it is not the beginning of the end but is perhaps the end of the beginning’ (HC Deb 14 December 
1976 vol 922 c1354-5). 
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Despite these pledges of support for a devolved Scottish Assembly, no matter how 
insubstantial, there were divides within the Parliamentary party and the party at large. It 
voted narrowly to join the campaign in favour of the 1979 referendum but its campaign 
was lacklustre, and when the measure failed, the SNP entered a period of reflection and 
re-evaluation. A pamphlet for the 1979 election described devolution cynically, saying 
‘The Labour Government won the last election in Scotland on the promise of a meaningful 
Scottish Assembly. In the end, after four weary years, they grudgingly offered us a less than 
meaningful Assembly, hobbled by a unique voting rule whereby 40 per cent of all the names 
on the electoral roll, whether their owners were dead or had moved away, were required to 
decide that Labour's Scotland Act should be put into force.’ 
         Shirley, 1979. 
Following the disappointment of the 1979 referendum, a resolution made at the party’s 
1979 conference suggested the SNP would no longer engage in ‘any more dealings in 
assemblies, devolution, or meaningful talks’, a more fundamentalist perspective (cited in 
Mitchell, 1988). However, an emerging consensus in Scottish civil society and the 
resolution of fundamentalist and gradualist divides over the course of the 1980s saw the 
party become more receptive to devolution.   
The party’s framing of devolution, as proposed by the Labour Party in the 1980s and 
1990s, was at the outset critical, reflective of a broader process of repositioning and 
internal conflict, softening as the prospect of devolution neared. In 1987, it described 
proposals cynically, saying ‘Decisions taken in London will be designed to divert Scotland's energies 
away from gaining real political power’, with the assemblies on offer described as ‘toy-town 
assemblies’ with no useful powers (SNP, 1987).  
In 1988, Alex Salmond warned devolution, ‘right or wrong, weak or strong’ is not on the 
political agenda, creating a stark choice between ‘a continuation of English Tory rule, or 
independence within the European Community’ (HC Deb 27 January 1988 vol 126 c372). 
Participation in the Convention was ultimately ruled out by the SNP. A statement from 
Gordon Wilson on 30 January 1989 explained its withdrawal, saying 'Scotland lost out in 
1979 because of a rigged referendum. It is our view that the SNP cannot take part in a rigged Convention 
which can neither reflect nor deliver Scottish demands’ (SNP, 1989a). Rather than allowing for 
Scottish self-government, the proposals would ‘result in endless feuds with Westminster’ (SNP, 
1992).  
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Kenny MacAskill (2004) explains its rejection of the Convention despite initial support as 
rooted in the failure to include independence as an option, leading the Convention to be 
‘perceived as a barrier to the Party's ultimate goal’. Devolution was portrayed as insufficient, 
unable to address all of the real problems facing Scotland. In its 1997 manifesto, Labour’s 
proposals were described negatively as ‘fatally flawed, and will deliver no real power’ (SNP, 
1997). However, as the Labour Government took power, having made a manifesto 
commitment to a referendum on devolution, the SNP supported a multi-option 
referendum which would include independence. It later endorsed devolution as a means 
by which independence could be achieved. MacAskill (2004: 35) explained rejecting 
devolution would have been politically untenable, and ‘would have baffled an electorate that 
would assume that the SNP would support any Parliament as opposed to no Parliament'. This rationale 
contributed to the party's final frame on devolution, one that suggested that the party 
would work within the limited powers of devolution to further Scotland's interests and 
build a case for independence. 
3. Insufficient but workable 
The SNP ultimately embraced the prospect of a Scottish Parliament, even if it fell short 
of its ultimate goal, framing it as insufficient but ultimately workable, or in Winnie Ewing’s 
words a ‘half a loaf’ (Ewing, 2004: 74). The party’s support was both pragmatic – bolstering 
confidence for independence and providing a forum in which the SNP could compete - 
and principled, in support of measures in the furtherance of Scottish interests.  A letter 
to voters from George Reid, member of the National Executive Committee said, in favour 
of a yes vote,  
‘Scotland needs a Parliament. The SNP believes this Parliament should be Independent, 
free to take Scotland’s decisions and to use Scotland’s wealth to invest in our future. But 
we recognise that we must move at the same pace as the people and believe that any progress 
towards a Scottish Parliament should be welcomed and helped’  
Reid, 1997. 
Winnie Ewing’s inaugural speech outlined this approach, saying ‘It is no secret that, to members 
of the Scottish  National Party, this Parliament is not quite the fulfilment of our dream, but it is a 
Parliament we can build a dream on’, situating devolution in a larger devolution journey 
(Ewing, 1999). Her memoirs returned to this frame: ‘[F]or although what we have now is only 
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‘half a loaf' and not our heart's desire, it would have been folly to refuse it. And it would also be folly not 
to attempt to use it in whatever productive and imaginative way we can’ (Ewing, 2004: 74).  
This was challenged by the difficult early years of the Scottish Parliament, with 
frustrations within Scottish society at large about the Scottish Parliament building and the 
outcome of the devolution settlement (Mitchell, 2004: 9). There were also concerns within 
the SNP over electoral results which fell short of expectations, leadership, and 
organisational issues. In his 2004 conference speech, Alex Salmond adopted a pessimistic 
tone, saying ‘Devolution is yesterday’s news. It has not responded to today’s reality, never mind the 
challenges of tomorrow’, using the weaknesses of devolution to advocate further steps.  
Kenny MacAskill’s 2004 book Building a Nation was designed to address some of these 
complexities and urged partisans and independence supporters to embrace devolution as 
a necessary stepping stone for independence and engage positively with the new 
parliament. 'For, if the Scots don't have some faith in their Parliament they won't have belief in 
themselves, or their Nation, never mind independence' (MacAskill, 2004: 37). Participation at the 
Scottish Parliament was the only ‘realistic route to independence’ (ibid: 36). The 2005 UK 
general election manifesto echoed these themes while identifying the shortcomings of the 
current arrangement and arguing for the further transfer of powers (SNP, 2005)  
The success of the SNP in the 2007 Scottish Parliament election led to action on the part 
of unionist parties to propose an extension of devolution, as an alternative to 
independence. The SNP critiqued these efforts as insufficient and unable to facilitate real 
self-government, another disingenuous attempt by political rivals to counter the rise of 
the SNP. MSP Michael Russell signalled his opposition to a commission on devolution, 
saying  
‘The simplest and best solution to the problems that Scotland faces is not another 
commission, nor is it a debate on devolution. The simplest and best solution is independence, 
and that is the choice that the Scottish people should be asked to make’  
SP Official Report, 6 December 2007, col. 4182.   
The Calman Commission was set up with the support of Scottish unionist parties as an 
alternative to the National Conversation, designed to strengthen the union and devolve 
further power to Scotland (McLean et al, 2013; Arnott & Ozga, 2010). The SNP critiqued 
the resulting proposals for their failure to explore the possibility of independence and for 
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being driven by the interest of Westminster elites (ScotGov, 2009; Salmond, 2008b). It 
also took credit for motivating further reform, noting Calman recognised the hunger for 
more power but ‘provided very limited nourishment’ (SNP, 2008). The product of this 
commission, the Scotland Bill (2012) was considered piecemeal and outdated at its origins 
(Salmond, 2011). However, in 2011, the partypledged to build on this legislation and 
improve it (SNP, 2011) 
Although rejecting the notion that Scotland’s needs could be accommodated within the 
existing state structure, the SNP accepted the transfer of further powers. In an interview, 
former MSP Andrew Wilson described the party's approach to devolution and 
intermediate steps as both a pragmatic position, furthering the goal of self-government, 
and a principled one, viewed as a route to independence ‘Standing in the name of independence 
obviously is not going to get you anywhere. And jumping on the stepping stones gets you home quicker’ 
(Wilson, 2014).  This view was consistent with its office-seeking strategy post-devolution, 
serving to bolster the confidence of the Scottish people in Scottish self-government and 
highlight the limitations of the devolution settlement, in order to increase support for 
independence. 
5.2.3 Framing relationships with the state after self-
government 
Despite employing quite a negative framing of the British state and its effects on 
Scotland's political and economic development, the policy of the party vis-à-vis the British 
state rarely called for independence tout court, a complete separation and schism of the 
historical union. Instead, the independence goal envisaged what McEwen (2013) labels as 
embedded independence and what Lluch (2014) might classify as ‘pactist’, foreseeing 
continued institutional, political and economic relationship with the British state. This 
took different forms over time, first pursued within the British Empire, the 
Commonwealth, and the British Isles but at all points made reference to some form of 
continued relationship within the British Isles and with the United Kingdom. It spoke of 
the maintenance of the social union, based on shared history as well as familial 
relationships, the monarchical union and some degree of economiccooperation.. This was 
justified as a desire for self-government, not separatism, as well as a pragmatic choice that 
would enable independence. Independence, according to the party, was an opportunity 
to recast the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom as a 
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partnership of equals. While dubbed ‘independence lite’ by critics in the context of the 2014 
campaign, the framing of independence as partnership was evident for much of the party’s 
history.  
1. A partnership of equals 
This frame of renewed partnership and cooperation was present from the party’s origins, 
with The Case for Scotland describing the opportunity for a harmonious, cooperative 
relationship: ‘The interests of even an independent Scotland would still be too closely bound up with 
those of her sister kingdom to permit the slightest danger of what they seem to dread’ (Black, 1930). The 
context of the Empire and later the Commonwealth as well as the geographical realities 
of a small shared island, would facilitate these continued ties, strengthened ‘by the fuller, 
more direct and more satisfying relationship which self-government would make possible’ (SNP, 1945). 
Its policy document outlined, in practical terms, cooperation in the domains of foreign 
policy and defence, participation in the Imperial conference, and a joint customs board 
(SNP, 1945).  
In his presentation of the party’s self-government goal, President Thomas H Gibson 
assured supporters that a ‘particularly intimate relationships with the other countries of the British 
Isles’, including a forum for the discussion and coordination of activities on matters of 
mutual concerns would be forged (Gibson 1951). This is in spite of what the SNP 
described as ‘cruel, stifling and frustrating measures which are needed to bolster up the failing economy 
of England’ (SNP, 1952). As it advanced, the narrative of independence under the crown 
became more explicit. MP George Reid looked to Norway and Sweden as a model of 
cooperation post-independence, with Norwegian independence fostering ‘a new, more open, 
honest relationship’ (HC Deb 14 December 1976 vol 922 c1354-5). 
The SNP proposed extensive cooperation which would allow for the development of a 
customs union,facilitating self-government without erecting borders between Scotland 
and the rest of the British Isles. However, the contemporary dependent status of Scotland 
inhibited these relationships, preventing a truly equal partnership. Self-government was 
necessary for cooperation, ‘We must be equals before we can talk of progress on these lines’ (SNP, 
1974). Gordon Wilson’s contribution to the 1976 debate on devolution denied charges of 
separation in favour of equality,  
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‘It is that instead of a master and servant relationship, which we have had before – with 
Scotland being dwarfed in this House and outnumbered by nine to one in population – we 
want to have proper harmony within these islands and a partnership with a new basis’  
HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol 903 c525. 
Its 1979 manifesto argued that rather than advocating the ‘break up of the UK’, it sought a 
‘new relationship under the crown’ which is largely consistent with its present position (SNP, 
1979). In the 1980s, Jim Sillars acknowledged that this focus on partnership might elicit 
concern amongst SNP activists, but argued in favour its practical function.  
'If the SNP is to ensure that the next major constitutional debate about independence places 
them on the offensive and not definitely grappling with the jibe of separatism, the party will 
have to grasp the nettle. A continuing form of customs union with England is unavoidable. 
Acceptance of that reality will most definitely place constraints on our independence'  
Sillars, 1986: 184-5.  
This allowed the party to propose a model of self-government which mitigated some of 
the costs of independence As it was traditionally understood. 
Until the adoption of an independence in Europe platform in the late 1980s, the British 
Isles was the main point of reference in the context of international integration. Some 
degree of partnership remained important to its vision of independence. In a somewhat 
contradictory fashion, after describing the British political system as ‘sterile, out of date, and 
bankrupt’, the party described the potential for renewed partnership with the rest of the 
UK, with England and Scotland enjoying ‘equal status as good neighbours’ (SNP, 1997). In a 
1999 speech at the LSE, Salmond described an opportunity to forge a new relationship,  
‘We must aspire to a whole new concordat between the two nations, one which adds a new 
momentum to the process of discovering and securing the identity of both of these nations 
and defining the best future for both on this island that we share, and this continent to 
which we are tied’  
Salmond, 1999. 
This framing continued into the devolutionary period, and while the Union was portrayed 
as a negative force for Scotland, some aspects of the union were to be worth maintaining 
(SNP, 2007). Kenny MacAskill describes the need to cooperate on an intra-island basis, 
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on the principle of Two Nations, One Island, foreseeing continued cooperation (MacAskill, 
2004: 28). As it entered government and developed a more comprehensive programme 
for independence, the frame of an equal partnership came to the fore, allowing for self-
government but also for collaboration in areas of mutual interest and the maintenance of 
the social and monarchical unions (ScotGov, 2009a). Independence, according to the 
party, 'is about updating the relationship between Scotland and England. It is about creating a new 
partnership of equals - a social union to replace the current political union' (SNP, 2010). Alex Salmond 
described the difference between the status quo and the independence proposals as the 
‘difference between partnership and subordination’, in which ‘the first encourages mutual respect’ while 
‘the second breeds resentment’ (Salmond, 2011a). 
The purpose of this framing of an interdependent form of independence was twofold: (a) 
from a pragmatic perspective, to avoid duplication of effort and to benefit from 
economies of scale; and (b) to allow for the maintenance of historical ties and the social 
union but on an equal footing. This was both in response to practical concerns about the 
structure and viability of an independent Scotland but also as an effort to reassure voters 
that independence was something reasonable rather than revolutionary. It was also used 
to counter charges of separatism made by political rivals.  
The SNP employed the structure and nature of the British state to justify its pursuit of 
self-government. According to the party, Scotland's survival could not be ensured, and its 
needs could not be met within the existing constitutional arrangement. However, the 
Union was not entirely without value and we see this throughout the SNP’s lifespan, in 
varying contexts. Although it sought independence, it also sought to retain some ties, 
whether social, political, or economic allowing for a more positive, equal relationship to 
flourish. 
Variation is, however, evident in the framing of the prospect of state reform, or a limited 
form of self-government. Variation was both internal to the party, with debates over the 
strategic approach to proposals falling short of its self-government goals, and over time, 
with the majority within the party accepting a stepping stone approach to self-
government. Although it has, since devolution, been critical of incremental steps, it has 
ultimately embraced them as a means of achieving self-government and furthering 
Scotland’s interests, consistent with the party’s two-fold objectives. 
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5.2 The Volksunie and the Belgian state 
From its origins, the Volksunie responded to the structure of the Belgian state, which it 
argued was Francophone-dominated, a historical anachronism, hostile to the Flemish 
people and their language. Despite this negative framing of Belgium, the party's self-
government goals were to be pursued largely within this state structure, with the 
federalisation and later confederalisation to accommodate both Flemish and Walloon 
interests. State reform in Belgium took place in stages, with four rounds of reform 
preceding the federalisation in 1993 occurring within the Volksunie’s lifespan 
(Stouthuysen & Jans, 2011; Govaert, 1993: 31).  
The fourth state reform which entailedthe federalisation of the Belgian state, posed a 
challenge to the Volksunie. This wasperceived to have settled the community issue, 
reducing its salience within the political space. The period from 1993 to the beginning of 
the 2000s, was characterised by a relative degree of institutional stability. What was 
perceived as a lack of further process created a demand for extensive reforms on the part 
of Flemish political actors and a commitment to the status quo on behalf of Francophones 
(De Winter, 2012: 17). The Volksunie, along with traditional counterparts, endorsed 
confederalism and set out the Roadmap for Flanders, published by the Flemish Parliament 
in 1999 (Swenden 2013: 6). Although the party contributed to the drafting of these 
resolutions, they called for further reform, advocating a confederal Belgium with the 
shared governance of Brussels, the abolition of language facilities for Francophones in 
the Brussels periphery, and further devolution of key sectors (de la Buissiere, 2005: 31). 
2001 saw a minor transfer of powers to the region, devolving agriculture, development 
aid and sub-regional governments. 
The Volksunie argued self-government would be achieved through negotiations at the 
centre and was consistent, throughout its lifespan, with its commitment to participation 
in government to further these goals. There was a brief departure from this stance, present 
in the 1962 and 1963 congress texts which proposed a constitutional referendum asking 
voters ‘Are you in favour of self-government for Flanders and Wallonia within the framework of a 
federal Belgium?’ (VU, 1962; 1963).  However, from this point onwards, it rejected the 
prospect of a plebiscite as detrimental to the cause of self-government, pledging instead 
to seek reform through participaton in government and respond with an open-mind to 
proposals which fell short, even when they came at a high political cost (VU, 1979) 
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The Volksunie’s framing of the state and self-government took place with reference to 
three dimensions. The first involved the state and existing state structures, and two frames 
are relevant here: (1) the Belgian state as hostile to the Flemish people and (2) of 
diminishing value or increasingly irrelevant. While the Volksunie declared itself open 
towards state reform, the party framed proposals made by rival parties as (1) insufficient; 
(2) more positively, as part of an incremental process; and (3) as inevitable, given 
centrifugal nature of the Belgian state. In regards to the third dimension, the maintenance 
of self-government and relations with the state, self-government provided an opportunity 
to recast this relationship, allowing Flanders and Wallonia to co-exist as good neighbours. 
5.2.1 The Belgian state: hostile, neglectful, and inefficient 
Throughout its lifespan, the Volksunie’s framing of the Belgian state largely focused on 
its deficiencies, rather than challenging its legitimacy – consistent with its focus on 
reforming rather than dissolving the state. The flaws of the Belgian state, highlighted by 
the VU, changed over time, with the Volksunie at its origins speaking of a Belgian state 
which was hostile to Flanders, both culturally and economically, and neglectful of Flemish 
interests. This claim was rooted in the economic underdevelopment of Flanders, the 
repression of the Flemish language, and the harsh punishments meted out to those who 
were perceived to have collaborated within the German occupation during the Second 
World War (Ladriere, 1970: 5). By the 1980s, in response to the shifting economic balance 
between Flanders and Wallonia, the Belgian state was declared of little value, an interim 
arrangement which would suffice until the point that it could be supplanted by a self-
governing Flanders and an extended European support structure (VU, 1979). 
1. The Belgian state as hostile 
At the VU’s origins, it viewed the Belgian state as hostile towards the Flemish people and 
the Dutch language.  As a unitary state dominated by Francophone elites, Belgium could 
not account for the needs and demands of Flemings. This was, according to the party, 
particularly relevant in the economic sphere, with heavy industry, the staple of the 
Walloon economy, favoured over investment in agriculture more relevant in Flanders 
(VU, 1955). Its 1956 manifesto spoke of this neglect, painting a ‘disturbing picture of decline 
and disadvantage’. The neglect by the unitary regime was not, according to the VU, a class 
issue, but a structural condition which ‘harms our nation as a whole’, through policies made 
for Wallonia, with little consideration of Flanders (VU, 1957). The perpetrator of this 
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neglect was not wholly attributed to Francophone elites, but also Flemish representatives 
who had failed to defend Flemish interests (VU, 1956). It warned of progressive 
centralization ‘a direct threat to our people’ in both Flanders, where economic interests were 
ignored by the Francophone central state and in Brussels and Flemish Brabant ‘which is 
threatened with colonisation’ (VU, 1961). 
The Belgian state was also considered more actively hostile, evidenced in its language 
policy, the lack of mobility for Flemish speakers, and the prosecution of Flemings for 
their war-time activities. Combined, these contributed to a narrative of victimisation, with 
Flemings portrayed as ‘victims of an anti-Flemish Belgian state’ (Art, 2008: 427). The Dutch 
language is described as repressed and marginalised, with French as the default. The 
language census, proposed as a solution to the issue of language use and education was 
considered a ‘theft of Flemish soil, a theft of Flemish posts’, which would ‘relegate Flemings to second-
class citizens’ (VU, 1957). A historical process of denationalisation and the influx of 
Francophone migrants to Brussels was characterised as a culmination of ‘a 150 year long 
deliberate policy of Frenchification by the Belgian unitary state’ (VU, 1961). This emphasis on 
linguistic parity was to subvert the traditional Flemish demographic majority (VU, 1961). 
The call for amnesty for those convicted of collaboration during the Germany occupation 
is present in every VU manifesto, although it largely faded in the party’s latter years. 
Self-government was a response to what the VU described as a ‘systemic suppression of 
Flanders by the unitary state’ (VU, 1959). It would allow Flemings to ‘protect our language and 
culture, our territory against Francophone imperialism’ (VU, 1965). These views persisted in the 
1970s, as conflicts over language and resources intensified. The current constitutional 
arrangement inhibited this, ‘If a nation does not have a sufficient degree of political autonomy, then, 
especially if it is a minority, it will soon be the object of oppression’ (VU 1973/1975). 
Evidence of suppression and neglect served as a call to arms to Flemish nationalists. 
‘The accumulation of all anti-Flemish forces in the battle of constitutional reform and the 
increased Francophone presence in Brussels, cannot disguise the fact that Flanders if it really 
wants to, can now make rapid progress on the road to its emancipation' 
VU, 1970.   
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In advance of the 150th anniversary of the Belgian state, the Volksunie asked ‘What is there 
to celebrate?’, saying, ‘the Volksunie wishes to emphasise that there is no reason for enlightened Flemings 
to commemorate the establishment of a state that has attempted to alienate us from our Dutch identity’ 
and remains an impediment to the development of the Flemish people (VU, 1979). By 
the 1980s, however, the party began to move away from the language of threat in favour 
of functional arguments about the nature of the Belgian state and the necessity of self-
government. 
2. Of diminishing value 
Although the Volksunie rarely called for the complete dismantlement of Belgium, it was 
of diminished relevance to the VU’s goals from the 1980s onwards as the party took a 
more radical stance on self-government.  Following the failed negotiations, Belgium was 
critiqued more harshly, considered to be unstable as a result of constant, and incomplete 
processes of state reform, with crises ‘following one another at an ever faster pace’ (VU, 1978). 
Belgium is no longer capable of managing its internal matters but is also less relevant on 
the international stage, given realised and prospective developments at the European level 
(VU, 1978). 
The Volksunie would pursue self-government through federal reforms, but ultimately, 
Belgium was framed as transitional, increasingly irrelevant in the light of broader 
European integration and the development of Flanders. For the VU, Belgium was ‘an 
interim transitional arrangement until the time that European integration is a reality, and the communities 
can operate directly within the European context’ (VU, 1987). While Belgium was an ‘an obstacle 
to the further development of Flanders’ (VU, 1995), it was a temporary obstacle, both a result of 
external developments and the inevitability of further state reform. In the face of severe 
intransigence on the part of Francophones more radical measures might be pursued, 
justified by the diminishing ‘political value of the Belgian political union for Flemings’ (VU, 1995). 
The VU’s framing of its self-government goal emphasised the idea of integral federalism 
which reflected the national ambitions of the Volksunie and the more progressive political 
perspective of its partner, the ID21. In a 2001 text by then member of the Volksunie, 
Sven Gatz  definedintegral federalism as ‘a bridge between the Flemish nationalists Volksunie 
and the radical democrats of ID21’. Integral federalism involved ‘circles of communities’, which 
relate to another in ‘non-hierarchical, non-symmetrical manner’. The key circles relevant to the 
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Flemish people include the commune or local community, Flanders, and a wider Europe. 
A confederal Belgium played a minimal role in this vision of integral federalism (Gatz, 
2001). The idea that Belgium would merely fade away, overtaken by events at the Flemish 
and European levels, was one which was adopted by the N-VA.  
5.2.2 State reform: insufficient, incremental, and inevitable 
Throughout its lifespan, the Volksunie adopted a gradualist position on state reform, 
willing to accept concessions, even if they fell short of its ultimate goal. While it was 
critical of the proposals of rivals, which failed to address the root of the problem, it was 
ultimately supportive and willing, as discussed in the following chapter, to enter into 
governing coalition to pursue these reforms. It argued that while only federalism would 
satisfy the ambitions of the party and the Flemish people ‘it confirms its willingness to cooperate 
with all responsible intermediate solutions, provided it does not inhibit the further development of 
federalism’ (VU, 1971).  Like the SNP, it affirmed its commitment to self-government but 
also to advance the national interest, and was to supporting intermediate steps falling 
short of its ultimate goal, providing certain issues were respected.  
The Baert Doctrine, named after VU MP Frans Baert who served in the 1960s and 1970s 
had three stipulations under which Flemish nationalists can support state reform: (1) it 
represents a significant leap forward for more autonomy for Flanders; (2) Flanders does 
not pay an unreasonable price in exchange; and (3) it does not complicate or stifle further 
steps towards Flemish state reform. This doctrine informed the party's approach to 
intermediate steps.  There was a brief period of radicalisation in the late 1970s, with the 
party saying 'That page has been turned. What might have been achieved in two or three stages must be 
demanded and conquered in one go' (VU, 1978). However, it recommitted itself to constructive 
participation in the manifestos which followed. The VU's support of these reforms was 
justified as evidence of its constructive approach towards politics and commitment to 
participation, a stance used to contrast the VU with the Vlaams Bloc. 
The VU's framing of state reform, both proposed and realised, took three forms. Firstly, 
the proposals made by political rivals and governments were ultimately insufficient; 
secondly, state reform was framed as an iterative and incremental process; and finally, 
state reform was considered inevitable, reflecting both the centrifugal nature of the 
Belgian state and its artificial nature. 
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1. Insufficient 
Early proposals by statewide parties were approached cautiously by the VU. These 
reforms, which largely focused on linguistic matters, were considered insufficient, they 
‘can only bring a partial solution, and cannot as such provide a satisfactory solution to the Flemish issue 
in its entirety’, failing to address economic and democratic concerns (VU, 1955). The party 
rejected early proposals for reform on the basis they failed to provide a complete solution 
and often included criteria which would be incompatible with its commitment to 
federalism. The party feared that they would entrench existing inequalities. Proposals for 
linguistic parity were critiqued particularly harshly, on the basis that they would subvert 
the Flemish demographic majority and failed to account for the broader economic and 
cultural concerns (VU, 1960).  
Piecemeal solutions were to be rejected as the broader ‘Flemish question cannot be solved, 
explained, or dismissed by partial solutions’ (VU, 1961). ‘A global solution is required’ (VU, 1961). 
It argued ‘We can only settle for a full-fledged form of federalism, based on the basic fact of the existence 
of two ethnic communities in Belgium', which must be granted ‘the greatest possible autonomy within 
the framework of a federal state' (VU, 1961). The Volksunie rejected proposed linguistic laws 
on 8 November 1962 because the legislation, while successful in part, was insufficient on 
the whole and the party condemned the ‘new unitarianism’ of traditional parties, with the 
50:50 split considered a mockery of democracy (VU, 1963). In the absence of progress, it 
made a direct appeal to Flemish voters, focused on the individual consequences of state 
reform made without the consent of the Volksunie and contrary to the interests of 
Flanders (VU, 1965).  
2. An incremental process 
By the 1970s, as the VU began to achieve systemic relevance, it moderated its approach 
to state reform, confirming ‘its willingness to cooperate with all responsible interim solutions provided 
that it does not inhibit the further development towards federalism', respects Flemish territory and 
the rights of the Flemish community (VU, 1971). ‘Substantial steps toward self-government 
should be undertaken, provided that they do not violate the fundamental principles' seen in the Baert 
Doctrine and do not inhibit the realisation of a Flemish state (VU, 1979). This was the 
approach adopted even after the failure of the Egmont Pact. Although proposals made 
by rival parties and coalition governments were to be viewed critically and were generally 
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considered as insufficient, they were to be supported as a means of furthering the cause 
of self-government. 
Belgian state reform was to be an incremental, gradual process, building on previous 
reforms. The party emphasised the dynamic nature of this process, the endpoint which 
could not be specified (VU, 1973). Although federalism was viewed as the only way 
forward, securing ‘a true and lasting peace and understanding between Flemings and Walloons’, it 
proposed interim reforms on the linguistic border, the status of Brussels, and the 
distribution of resources (VU, 1974). This signalled its willingness to enter into coalition 
even if full federalisation was not on offer. Proposals were to be supported, although 
criticised, provided they did not inhibit further moves towards self-government and 
respected the duality of the Belgian federalisation.  
This defined the VU’s approach toward proposals in the self-government in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Subsequent proposals were described as ‘half-hearted’, and negotiations 
characterised by ‘bickering and twisting’ (VU, 1981).  In 1981, the party portrayed itself as 
‘radical and realistic’, seeking Flemish self-government ‘Now!’ This was a relatively brief 
period of fundamentalism, and while it critiqued the reforms of 1980 as ‘proof that the current 
state structure has nothing to do with federalism’ it was ultimately supportive of any step towards 
self-government (VU, 1982). The VU voted with the government on the 1988 revision of 
the constitution while calling for more powers. The agreement on federalisation was 
approached similarly, with the party approving the accord while demanding further 
reforms, particularly on finance and fiscal transfers (Lentzen & Blaise, 1995: 18). 
Federalisation was regarded as ‘an extremely important step in the pursuit of political independence’, 
but was insufficient in addressing the needs of Flanders, particularly given the status of 
Brussels as a region (VU, 1995). 
3. Inevitable 
Layered on top of this frame of incrementalism was one of inevitability. This frame was 
rooted in the fact that the Belgian state had been overtaken by events and further reform, 
ending in self-government, was inevitable (VU, 1978).  
The party’s 1995 manifesto addressed this challenge directly, in an attempt to situate itself 
within this new system, saying ‘Now begins another job…’ to use the powers transferred to 
Flanders to address social and political issues (VU, 1995). Constitutional reform, 
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according to the VU is ‘not a single event, but in dynamic, continuous motion’ (VU, 1995).  It also 
called, with coalition partners, for the further transfer of powers through the 1999 
Resolutions of the Flemish Parliament, described as an ‘institutional shopping list’ (de la 
Buissiere, 2005: 34). They called for further transfers beyond the 1999 agreement, 
including a confederal Belgium and the abolition of language facilities for Francophones 
in the Brussels periphery (Deshouwer, 2013: 340).  
The VU was willing to accept more limited steps towards its ultimate goal, arguing self-
government was inevitable, and a result of the centrifugal nature of the Belgian state as 
well as the inefficiencies of the current arrangement. Although the VU was often vague 
on its ultimate aspirations for Flemish self-government, it was clear throughout its lifespan 
that self-government was a matter of when and not if, inevitable given the structure of 
the Belgian state as well as developments above the Belgian level. The process by which 
state reform had taken place in Belgium, through incremental changes, reinforced this 
sense of inevitability and allowed the party a certain degree of flexibility to support interim 
reforms, enter into government, and frame its role within the overall process.  
5.2.3 The state after self-government: good neighbours 
Discussions of relations between the centre and Flanders and Flanders and Wallonia after 
self-government were largely absent from the Volksunie’s manifestos, which is surprising 
particularly considering the relatively moderate self-government goals pursued by the 
Volksunie. While this was implicit in its model of self-government, it received 
comparatively little attention in manifestos, particularly when compared with those of the 
SNP.  Instead, its proposals focused, throughout its lifespan, on ways in which separating 
powers and functions would allow for the peaceful coexistence, largely living separately. 
The party argued ‘Only federalism can put an end to the constant national conflict between the peoples, 
as well as the paralysis and compromise imposed’ (VU, 1962). By dividing responsibilities, 
federalism was portrayed as enabling a ‘true and lasting peace and understanding between Flemings 
and Walloons’ and improving democratic representation (VU, 1974).  
1. Good neighbours 
The VU, at various points in its lifespan, employed a domestic metaphor to characterise 
the Belgian union and its self-government goals – a house divided with no one satisfied 
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with the status quo which should be replaced by a model of amicable separation. The VU 
describes a process in which Flanders and Wallonia have grown apart  
‘Now the two communities are so strongly manifest in their own being and show clear 
differences in their own opinions that a unitary government is no longer acceptable…only 
federalism can put an end to the constant nationalist conflict between peoples, as well as the 
paralysis and compromises imposed’  
VU, 1960.  
Belgium was now a ‘house in which Flemings and Walloons huddle together and quarrel’ (VU, 1965).  
Building on this language of domesticity, the VU proposed a federal arrangement, 
renovating this house in which Flanders and Wallonia would share ‘a single roof, behind a 
single façade’ but would ‘live as they like in their own apartments’ (VU, 1965). The VU focused 
on allowing both communities to go about their own business, under a single Belgian 
roof, but living largely independently (VU, 1965). The renovation of the Belgian state 
along federal lines would provide both the ability to pursue their individual interests and 
a common forum in which cooperation could take place, ‘as good neighbours’ and a strong 
sense of autonomy (VU, 1974).  
Self-government, as proposed by the VU, would allow for Flanders and Wallonia to be 
‘good neighbours’ but ones who lived largely separate lives (VU, 1974).  In this confederal 
structure, cooperation should be optional rather than required, motivated by ‘enlightened 
self-interest and neighbourliness’ (VU, 1981). This arrangement would render Flanders 'master 
of its own house, of its own territory, over its own resources' (VU, 1987). Its proposed confederal 
structure would allow for neighbourliness, but also, if necessary, a framework through 
which an amicable dissolution of the relationship could take place. ‘If one of the partners does 
not respect the rules, the confederal structure is the best vehicle with which to proceed with the disintegration 
of the economic and monetary union’ (VU, 1985). In sum, self-government would allow for 
peaceful coexistence and divorce if necessary, rather than the renewal or restoration of 
relationships between Flanders and Wallonia.  
In the party’s 1995 manifesto and the manifesto issued jointly in 1999 with ID21 in a 
progressive coalition, it appeared to disregard the Belgian state structure altogether, 
speaking of the key ‘circles’ or communities as the local area, the Flemish nation, and the 
European state, with no reference to Belgium (VU, 1995, VU &ID21, 1999). This can be 
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understood to reflect two key tendencies of the party – the sense that Flemish self-
government, within a European context, was an inevitability and the sense that the Belgian 
state was inefficient and ineffectual. 
The Volksunie’s framing of the Belgian state, the prospects of state reform, and the 
relationship between Flanders and the larger state was broadly consistent over time. 
Belgium was failing to serve the interests of Flanders, a deficiency which necessitated self-
government, and further reforms were inevitable. The party did however, take a gradualist 
approach to self-government, with the exception of the period which followed the failure 
of the Egmont Pact. It was, throughout its lifespan, open to any reasonable intermediate 
steps which would benefit Flanders and allow for further reform. The centrifugal dynamic 
of Belgian state reform allowed any concessions to be viewed as stepping stones towards 
self-government. What the party failed to address in detail, which is particularly striking 
in contrast with the SNP, was the relationship between Flanders and Wallonia, and 
Flanders and the federal or confederal Belgium, once the party's goals were achieved. This 
can be understood in light of the self-government goal held by the party, often ambiguous, 
and the sense that self-government would evolve, and did not require immediate 
clarification. 
The Volksunie’s positioning set the stage for its successor, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. 
While the N-VA adopted a more radical self-government goal, it employed a similar 
language of evolution and inevitability, rather than calling for a radical break.  
5.3 The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and the Belgian state 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie emerged at a time of relative institutional stability, after 
three decades of protracted constitutional change, and in its first election, struggled to 
mobilise the electorate with its calls for self-government. The collapse of the Volksunie 
suggested that Flemish self-government would be carried forward by mainstream parties 
(De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 295). The Lambermont and Lombard Accords came 
into effect in 2001 and entailed relatively minor transfers of powers in a variety of domains 
(Delwit & Hellings, 2002). While there was a consensus among the Flemish parties on the 
need for further reforms, taking the form of the 1999 resolutions of the Flemish 
Parliament, these were met with a Francophone preference for the status quo (de la 
Burssiere, 2005: 31; Sinardet, 2008: 1023).  
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However, the future of Belgium returned to the spotlight following the 2007 federal 
elections, in which the Flemish CD&V and N-VA cartel received 18.5% of the total 
Belgian vote. The coalition negotiations which followed contributed to a 
narrativeperpetuated by politicians and the media that Belgium was in a period of crisis. 
This was exacerbated by the larger financial crisis and an even longer period of 
government formation following the 2010 elections (Rochtus, 2012: 278). 
Like its predecessor, the N-VA committed to pursuing self-government within the 
traditional structure of the Belgian state, through the process of negotiation at the centre 
rather than through a referendum or action at the Flemish Parliamentary level. Despite 
possessing, at its origins, the more radical self-government goal of political independence, 
the N-VA suggested this would be achieved through a gradual process, employing the 
language of the hollowing of Belgian state, the evolution, dissolution, and evaporation, 
rather than a sharp break with the existing state structure. The means by which self-
government was to be pursued has rarely been made explicit by the N-VA, and means 
used by other parties, including referendums, have been dismissed as incompatible with 
the nature of Flemish democracy and Belgian political tradition. 
Confederalism, as the N-VA’s near-term goal, was to be pursued through the entry into a 
federal governing coalition by the N-VA, which would negotiate far-reaching reforms as 
part of the process of government formation. The goal of independence within the 
European Union was to follow, but the process by which this would happen was abstract. 
The party argued ‘We believe that Flanders must evolve into a European member state. Over time, the 
Belgian level will evaporate’ (N-VA, 2010: 5). In a 2010 speech in the Flemish Parliament, Jan 
Peumans referred to the party’s self-government goal as an ‘open question’, saying the 
Flemish Parliament is ‘the product of a dream of autonomy’ which will be followed by the further 
transfer of powers as a part of a gradual process of evolution (Peumans, 2010). Bart de 
Wever described this process, ‘I think Belgium will be snuffed out slowly. Slowly, like a candle, 
barely noticed by anyone’ (Baruma, 2010). Independence, therefore, was not to be pursued 
directly, but passively, as a result of an organic process rather than the action of the N-
VA.  
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s framing of the Belgian state and Flemish self-government 
engaged with the three dimensions identified at the outset and found in the other cases. 
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The Belgian state and its structures were framed as (1) artificial, lacking in substance and 
(2) inefficient and increasingly irrelevant. This framing was more negative than that of its 
predecessor. Proposed and realised state reforms were viewed as (1) a futile effort, or too 
little, too late to save a federal Belgium. The party offered a distinct vision of self-
government and relations between Flanders and Wallonia within the context of a 
confederal structure, viewing it as (1) in the near term, a letterbox for Flanders and 
Wallonia but (2) ultimately disappearing.  
5.3.1The Belgian state: artificial and inefficient  
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie's language around the Belgian state was more hostile than 
its predecessor and it focused on two key arguments: firstly, that Belgium was artificial 
and secondly, that the Belgian state was inefficient and increasingly irrelevant, an 
argument also employed by the Volksunie. This frame was further bolstered by European 
integration and the economic crisis. The N-VA argued it was the only one brave enough 
to make these critiques, saying ‘The separation of the minds has long been there, but one dares not 
face the facts. The N-VA is not plagued by this conservative tendency, nor by the fear of new, future 
challenges' (N-VA, 2003). These arguments about the artificiality and inefficiency of the 
Belgian state were used to substantiate the N-VA's position that Belgium, as a moribund 
institution, should gradually fade away (Baruma, 2010). 
1. Belgium as an artificial construct 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie has consistently employed an argument which sees the 
Belgian state characterised as a historical accident rather than as a genuine nation,therefore 
destined for failure. De Wever described the origin and history of Belgium in this 
historical context. Belgium is portrayed, not as a proper union, but as a ‘sum of two 
democracies', accidentally joined by an accident of history and dominated by Francophones 
(de Wever, cited in Rochtus, 2012). This language of historical accident is pervasive within 
the party, repeated in manifestos as well as in interviews conducted as part of this research. 
Farhat et al. demonstrate that the framing of Belgium as an artificial state is not unique to 
the N-VA but is more widespread among Flemish parties which employ the past ‘to 
corroborate the idea that the end of Belgium is logical since its creation was – symmetrically – artificial’ 
(Farhat et al, 2015). However, it is the N-VA which continually stresses this narrative as 
a way of bolstering support for Flemish self-government, as evidenced by nearly all 
interviews conducted over the course of this research with representatives of the N-VA.  
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This historical accident has resulted in a deeply divided and artificial society, lacking the 
necessary common ground to govern together. De Wever argued Belgium was ‘a land with 
different democracies, different public opinions, different media’ (Brand, 2010). Historical and 
contemporary differences resulted in a ‘separation of minds’ (N-VA, 2003). In a 2010 speech 
on the Flemish national day Jan Peumans, the N-VA leader in the Flemish Parliament, 
described the markers of national identity, nationalism, and nation building. Before 
addressing the ‘problem’ of Belgium, which lacked a common nation-state or national 
project. Peumans argued ‘In the European Union, nation-states rule. Belgium is the exception’ 
(Peumans, 2010). As a result, the ‘objective basis’ for Belgium has been removed through a 
process of unravelling of the two communities, culturally, socially, economically, and 
democratically (de Wever, 2011a). Bart de Wever described Belgium as ‘a permanent 
diplomatic conference’, with no common ground on which to build a shared identity. (de 
Wever, 2010a).  
‘The unravelling of the communities culturally, socially, economically, and democratically, 
now loose or completely separate from one another, has washed away the objective basis for 
the Belgian nation. The subjective basis, the will to form one community, is more present 
but comes less from classic patriotism than from nurturing Belgium as a non-nation, a 
country bound mainly by surrealism’  
De Wever, 2011a. 
Employing this language of Surrealism, de Wever characterises Belgium, saying she ‘exists 
but she exists no longer’ (Buxant, 2008). Although the N-VA rejects traditional conceptions 
of sovereignty and positions itself as a civic nationalist party, the characterisation of the 
Belgian state as artificial because of its diversity, suggests a traditional viewpoint in which 
nation and state should be congruent.   
2. Inefficient and irrelevant 
In addition to its artificiality, Belgium is inefficient, by virtue of the piecemeal processes 
of reform and the absence of a cohesive demos, and in light of competing structures, 
increasingly irrelevant. While the Volksunie focused, at its origins on issues of cultural 
oppression, economic neglect, and underdevelopment, before shifting to concerns about 
democratic representation and efficiency, from the outset, the N-VA stressed the 
inefficiencies of the Belgian state and its failure to serve Flemish interests. These failures 
are attributed to the labyrinthine structures of the Belgian state, which sees the 
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proliferation of governmental bureaucracy and red tape and detrimental transfers between 
Flanders and Wallonia.  
In the party’s 2003 manifesto, Belgium was viewed as blocked, inhibiting the welfare and 
well-being of both Flemings and Walloons, and it called for ‘Flemish solutions instead of 
Belgian blocks’, arguing in favour of the transfer of taxation, economic policy, employment 
policy, and health and family policy (N-VA, 2003). Belgium was by its problems, 
underscoring the need for radical reform. In a 2008 interview, Bart de Wever described 
Belgium as ‘an enormous debt, constant community fighting, large difficulties in making compromises. 
For Flanders, Belgium is the level where there are only problems’ (Buxant, 2008). The construction 
of this discussion is of particular interest, with Belgium as an enormous debt rather than 
having an enormous debt, suggesting something essential about the nature of the Belgian 
state (de Wever, 2008).  In a 2011 interview with the New Yorker, the party leader expanded 
on these themes, describing Belgium as ‘a labyrinth of institutions’, inexplicable to even those 
who were in charge, ‘If you were to ask the average member of the federal parliament to explain how 
the system works, and who has authority to do what, he would run away in a panic’ (Baruma, 2011). 
Exogenous events, particularly the economic crisis and the protracted period of 
government formation which took place simultaneously, reinforced this discourse and 
was employed by the party to justify its goals. In a 2011 interview with Christophe 
Deboursu, Bart de Wever said, ‘If the ecologists wish to win elections, they must hope horrible things 
happen in the environment. Like Fukushima. There, they will profit by saying, ‘Good, see, our programme 
is the right one’. The 2009 manifesto portrays a ‘quagmire at the federal level in the face of the 
economic crisis’ (N-VA, 2009). Framing Belgium as an inefficient state, one unable to cope 
with the demands of the contemporary world, supported the party’s calls for self-
government.  
In his letter to party members explaining his motivations for joining the party and standing 
for office, former journalist Siegfried Bracke attributed his actions to the poor functioning 
of the Belgian government in the face of the crisis, describing Belgium as ‘stalled’ and 
calling for things to be to set to right (Bracke, 2010b).  De Wever’s controversial interview 
with the German Spiegel returned to this theme, with dramatic language: ‘Belgium, after 
endless political quarrels, is the sick man of Europe’, unable to cope with the challenges 
facilitating it (Spiegel, 2010).  This was a result of the Belgian stalemate and particularly, 
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the continued dominance of the Parti Socialiste. ‘Belgium isn’t working anymore. Belgium is a 
failed nation’ (Spiegel, 2010). This failed nation should therefore, in the vision of the party, 
be replaced by a clear and transparent confederal system rather than further tinkering 
around the edges.  
In sum, Belgium was considered irredeemable, even with further reforms. In a 2011 
column in De Standaard, de Wever critiqued opponents of Flemish nationalism and those 
who sought to restore Belgian identity. ‘If opponents of Flemish nationalism speak about Belgium, 
they should perhaps consider a wisdom of Edmund Burke: To make us love our country, our country 
ought to be lovely’ (de Wever, 2011b).  
5.3.2 The futility of further reforms 
Throughout its lifespan, the N-VA was deeply critical of further rounds of reform within 
the confines of the federal model, arguing more fundamental change was required. This 
framing of state reform was rooted in the nature of the Belgian state and the inevitable 
processes set in motion. This was not unique to the N-VA, with other Flemish parties 
stressing the continuous nature of reform. CD&V leader Jean Luc Dehaene noted that 
‘Each phase of the State reform is fraught with the following one, the next reform exists in the present 
reform in an embryonic form’ (quoted by Martínez de Rituerto in El País, 1 August 2008). 
However, for the N-VA, the status quo, or this continual process of incremental reform 
was insufficient and would merely delay the inevitable, at a high cost. 
As discussed in the previous section, the N-VA viewed Belgian state was inefficient and 
irrelevant, with little redeeming value. Therefore, further reforms within the federal 
structure of the Belgian state would be futile, as the problems of the Belgian state were so 
deeply entrenched. This cemented the party’s position that it was the only actor advancing 
far-reaching reforms, or a Copernican revolution, a reversal of the relationship between 
Wallonia and Flanders and the central state, which would end this endless cycle of reform.  
1. The futility of further reforms 
Further incremental reforms within the federal structure were framed as futile, given the 
dysfunctions and the failings of the Belgian state, which could not take into account the 
needs of Flemings. These proposed reforms had already been overtaken by events (N-
VA, 2010: 5).   
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Previous rounds of reform were understood to have taken place at the expense of 
Flemings, with Flemings exchanging bags of money for incremental powers, a result of 
the system in which Flemish parties sought further powers, and Walloons demanded the 
maintenance and increase of transfers in return. Further reforms would only encourage 
the proliferation of rules, bureaucracy, and complications which made the efficient 
working of government more difficult. 
Bart de Wever described the results of the Octopus Group, a group of eight prominent 
Flemish politicians, in January 2008 in response to prolonged negotiations as 
‘a text developed by people who couldn’t agree on anything and who were convinced that they 
could talk about everything’. It makes me think of what Napoleon said of the Bible, ‘there 
are lots of promises, lots of good intentions, but nothing concrete’’  
Buxant, 2008. 
Accordingly, he justified his party's decision not to participate on pragmatic grounds, 
saying ‘What party president can be asked to enter a government when he is almost certain that he will 
not realise anything about his program?' (Buxant, 2008). 
Proposals to introduce a single federal constituency in which politicians would campaign 
in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, detailed by Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009) and 
presented as a possible means of renewing Belgian democracy, were also rejected. This 
was considered ineffectual, and incompatible with the realities of the Belgian state and the 
existence of two separate demos. Speaking in response to proposals put forth by the Pavia 
Group, de Wever confirmed: 
‘I am not at all afraid of the establishment of a federal constituency. It will only confirm the 
historical process: the francophone parties will receive almost no votes in Flanders, and vice 
versa. The pursuit of more Belgium will paradoxically demonstrate that the country no 
longer exists’ 
         Knack, 2007. 
He continued on this theme in a 2008 interview, saying   
‘It makes no sense, a single constituency in Belgium because it does not correspond with 
society. The media is divided, the culture is divided, and public opinion. You cannot 
construct a constituency for two distinct communities. This country no longer exists' 
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Buxant, 2008. 
The N-VA’s 2010 manifesto deals the issue directly, arguing ‘It is the summation of Flemish 
and French speaking democracy that keeps this country in a permanent stranglehold of diplomacy, not the 
secession of different elections’ (N-VA, 2010: 69). This argument against a federal constituency 
was rooted in the absence of a common community and the futility of attempts to create 
one, due to the artificial nature of the Belgian state. 
The sixth state reform, the Butterfly Agreement, named after the bow tie worn by Elio Di 
Rupo, was agreed following the prolonged federal government formation process in 2010 
and 2011.  It was negotiated by the governing coalition that excluded the N-VA. The 
reform reduced the powers of the Belgian Senate, transforming it into an assembly of 
regional parliaments, arranged for the split of Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde, transferred some 
competences to the regions, and reformed the financing of the regions and communities, 
fulfilling some of the 1999 demands made by the Flemish Parliament (Reuchamps, 2013; 
Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013).  
While it was an important reform, Deschouwer and Reuchamps (2013) note it does not 
‘fundamentally change the nature of the Belgian federation’ and as a result, would fall short of the 
radical state reform that the N-VA envisaged and argued was necessary. In a 2012 speech 
at the University of Heidelberg, Bart de Wever described the Belgian system as a constant 
compromise which leaves everyone dissatisfied, ‘The result of that clash of vision is a policy 
nobody wants and which doesn’t go far enough’ (De Wever, 2012). Further incremental reforms, 
according to the N-VA, would do little to remedy this situation.  Jan Jambon, then party 
leader within the House of Representatives critiqued the proposals as ‘mediocrity, tinkering 
at the margins, half measures’ (Jambon, 2012). Siegfried Bracke described it as insufficient, 
lacking the necessary economic competences to increase economic output, saying ‘A 
Copernican revolution? We think not’ (Bracke, 2013).  
State reforms, both proposed and realised, were considered to be futile, serving to 
compound existing problems, owing to essential flaws in the Belgian state structure. The 
traditional processes by which state reform took place in Belgium were critiqued by the 
N-VA as costly and ineffectual, standing in the way of the more fundamental changes that 
were necessary. Only the N-VA could achieve these reforms, first through a confederal 
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arrangement, which was presented as an evolutionary step which would set the stage for 
further reforms. 
5.3.3 Ties after self-government: a hollowed Belgium 
While the SNP framed independence as an opportunity to facilitate an equal partnership 
between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom and the Volksunie spoke of 
opportunities to live as ‘good neighbours’, the N-VA adopted a different approach when 
discussing its confederal model. In the near-term and under a confederalist arrangement, 
the Belgian state would be hollowed, serving as a ‘letterbox’ for Flanders and Wallonia, 
through which the two confederal states would engage with the European Union. In the 
long-term, Belgium was ephemeral, and would gradually fade away. 
1. Belgium as a glove 
From 2003 onwards, the N-VA proposed a confederal model for Belgium, at least in the 
near to medium-term. The confederal model required the maintenance of the Belgian 
state – as an international actor, as a monarchical union, and as the glove, or alternatively, 
a letterbox for Flanders and Wallonia at the EU level (N-VA, 2007: 53). While the 
Volksunie once proposed living in separate apartments under one Belgian roof, the N-
VA reduced the Belgian house to a messaging service. 
The purpose of this was functional, not facilitating a strengthening of ties but allowing 
Flanders and Wallonia to engage at the European level. This would provide time for the 
European Union to develop and ultimately supplant the functions of the Belgian state.  
To employ the metaphor of the party and many Belgian political commentators, 
confederalism was not an attempt to revitalise a troubled marriage but to facilitate an 
amicable separation. This emphasis on what De Winter (2012) would call ‘living together 
apart’ can be understood with regard to three key elements: the party’s persistent framing 
of the Belgian state as ineffectual and without value, the objective of gradual change, and 
perceptions of Flemings and Walloons as lacking shared interests which would facilitate 
a renewed partnership. The party’s framing and proposals are justified with reference to 
the negative characteristics of the Belgian state, beyond hope of redemption.  
2. The gradual disappearance of Belgium 
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At the same time, the party did not propose Flemish independence in the near term, 
emphasising the lack of democratic support for such a move. De Wever consistently 
highlighted his party’s conservative leanings, proposing evolution rather than revolution 
(de Wever, 2008). Siegfried Bracke’s speech at the 2010 congress, suggested a peaceful, 
gradual process which would result in an independent Flanders in a highly integrated 
Europe. It was a ‘story written in the stars’, but a gradual process, ‘[t]hat will happen without a 
fight, without noise or compromises, it will be very nearly nature itself, or political Darwinism’ (Bracke, 
2010a). Confederalism was botha necessary and radical step, and part of a more gradual 
process. When questioned on the life expectancy of the Belgian state, de Wever responded 
‘Impossible to say. It’s a long-term evolution’, referring to it as a historical process which, having 
been set in motion, would continue (Buxant, 2012). 
In a contribution to Carl Devos’ book Quo Vadis Belgica, Bart de Wever explained this as 
a result of an emerging consensus in Flanders on further reforms. Situating this in a 
historical perspective, he argued  
‘Whoever demanded federalism is today separatist. Who later joined the debate over 
federalism is today a confederalist. Who used to be unitary, is today federalist. Every step 
to more Flanders seems to automatically open the door to new steps’ 
         De Wever, 2006: 207. 
In a 2010 blog post entitled Independence or Confederalism, Theo Francken, then a member 
of the Chamber of Representatives, discussed the party's gradualist approach, reaffirming 
its long-term commitment to independence but noting that, ‘to achieve that goal, some reform 
steps must be taken’ (Francken, 2010).  According to the N-VA’s framing, Belgium would 
not be missed by anyone, a result of the artificiality of the Belgian state from its origins 
and the distance between Francophones and Walloons (De Wever, 2011a).  
The gradual evolution proposed by the N-VA was to allow for the separation of Flanders 
and Wallonia rather than a renewal of partnership on a more equitable footing, pactist in 
function but not in principle. It sought to maintain some of the trappings of the Belgian 
state, but for pragmatic reasons, rather than motivated by some intrinsic value or a desire 
to preserve historical or social unions. There was no real discussion of an opportunity to 
reset relationships or renew ties between Flanders and Wallonia beyond the functional 
necessities of joint management of Brussels, the necessary criteria of European Union 
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membership and the temporary maintenance of the solidarity mechanism (de Wever, 
2011a).  
This negative framing of the state and the prospect of further state reform was employed 
as justification for Flemish self-government. The goals of the Flemish people, according 
to the N-VA, would not be pursued within the existing structure of the Belgian state – a 
more radical reform, whether confederalism or independence within the European Union 
was required. The party’s position on self-government, both the content of the goal and 
the means by which it would be pursued, has been characterised by ambiguity, perhaps 
resulting from the idea that Belgium would inevitably, and gradually, fade away. Although 
its position can be characterised as pactist, preserving several core functions, it was a 
pragmatic position, rooted in the needs to mitigate the costs of self-government rather 
than allow for a renewal of relationships. 
5.4 Comparing the framing of the state and self-
government 
Despite significant differences in the structures of the Belgian and British states, as well 
as the context in which the three parties have competed, similarities in the framing of the 
state and the prospect of state reform can be identified. Change over time, within each 
party, in response to shifts in the composition or behaviour of the state, is also evident. 
The framing of the state is consistent between the three parties, reflecting the political 
and economic dynamics in their respective systems. The Belgian and British unions were 
framed, not as undemocratic oppressors who must be overthrown, but as an anachronism 
of history, past their expiry date, and failing, by virtue of their structure and power 
dynamics, to serve the interests of the nations in question. At times, they were also framed 
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as directly hostile towards the nations. Changes in the framing can be identified in each 
case.   
Both the SNP and the Volksunie, at their origins, spoke of the hostility of the central state 
towards their respective regions, with this hostility taking cultural and economic forms. 
This language shifted in light of political and economic developments, particularly the 
granting of a limited degree of self-government, which made these arguments less tenable. 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie was more negative than its predecessor towards the state 
but its arguments focused on the artificial nature of Belgium and its inefficiencies rather 
than accusing it of repression. The language of exploitation is, however, present in 
discussions of the economic relations between Flanders and Wallonia. The framing of the 
Volksunie and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie was heavily influenced by demographic and 
economic realities, with Flanders the dominant partner in the Belgian union. 
In each case, proposals for state reform or devolution were made by the centre and by 
political rivals. This presents a challenge to sub-state nationalist parties - are they a 
distraction from the ultimate aims or a meaningful step forward? The SNP faced divisions 
on this topic, with internal debates occurring over whether the party should engage with 
these proposals or hold out for its ultimate goal and this shaped the party’s behaviour. By 
the 1980s, however, we can identify a distinct stepping stone approach, in which 
devolution proposals were critiqued as insufficient, but ultimately considered to be a 
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positive first step towards self-government. It embraced devolution in 1999, embracing it 
not enthusiastically, but with the understanding that it could be a viable platform for 
which self-government could be pursued, and Scotland's interests advanced. 
The Volksunie, from its origins, was more amenable to the further transfer of powers, 
critiquing proposals which fell short of federalisation in the 1960s and 1970s but 
ultimately pledging to support any step which would not hinder further self-government. 
It was aided, in some ways, by the exit of more radical elements in response to the failure 
of the Egmont Pact. The incremental nature of Belgian state reform, which suggested the 
seeds for subsequent rounds of reform were always embedded in the current round also 
supported this gradualist position. Federalisation, according to the VU, was a matter of 
when and not if, and the VU could afford to be patient. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, 
particularly in its early years, was more radical, dismissing further reforms which would 
not see a fundamental reversal in the relationships between the centre and Flanders and 
Wallonia, as insufficient. It sought to challenge the tendencies of the Belgian state and 
governing coalitions, which were constantly tinkering at the margins rather than 
undertaking genuine reform. These reforms were, in the eyes of the party, another 
example of the dysfunctions of the Belgian state. It was also viewed through the lens of 
the party system, a means of underlining the difference between the N-VA as an outsider 
and parties which had been co-opted in the Belgian state system, discussed in greater 
detail in the chapter which follows. All three parties demonstrated pragmatism, being 
critical of proposed reforms, but ultimately embracing them as a stepping stone toward 
further self-government.  
Returning to Lluch’s conception of pactists versus principled independentist standpoints, 
we can assess the proposals and framing of self-government and relations with the 
embedding state. The content of the self-government goals as proposed by all three 
parties suggest pactists positions, with some degree of cooperation and coordination 
maintained. However, the framing of this differs. Interestingly, all three employ domestic 
metaphors, with the SNP focusing on equal partnerships, social ties, but also the 
opportunity to recast these relationships in a more positive light, turning ‘surly tenants into 
good neighbours’ (Salmond, 1999). The Volksunie's initial proposals involved Flemings and 
Walloons living separately under one roof. This later shifted, with a narrative of good 
neighbours within the European Union taking its place. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
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engaged less with this concept, reducing the Belgian state to a letterbox, and a transitory 
one at that, a proposal which foresaw what De Winter (2012) described as ‘living together 
apart’, dividing competences to reduce conflict rather than to revitalise relationships.  
In conclusion, for all three parties, the state is central to their self-government goals – 
whether as a factor which motivates self-government or accommodates it. The state is 
utilised as a justification for self-government, underlining its failure to accommodate the 
goals of the nation, but also retains some resonance in the event of self-government, 
providing, to varying degrees, a supporting structure through which self-government 
can be pursued. This suggests self-government, even in its most radical forms, continues 
to be closely linked with the embedding state. This is also encapsulated in each party's 
discussion of the party system, which draws a distinction between parties and processes 
which represent the nation and those which represent the larger state.
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Chapter Six: Framing self-government and the 
party system 
Sub-state nationalist objectives can be pursued through larger social movements or 
political parties. In both Scotland and Flanders, sub-state nationalism has primarily 
manifested in the form of political parties, and as a result, the pursuit of self-government 
goals is situated mainly within this domain. The SNP, VU, and N-VA have  pursued their 
self-government goals through electoral means, although there is variation in the ways 
which these electoral gains are employed to further the cause. The pursuit of self-
government goals, as a result, reflects the dynamic interaction between the party itself, the 
system in which it competes, and the position and behaviour of political rivals. Two 
aspects of the party system are analysed here: the party as an agent of self-government, 
positioning itself vis-à-vis its political rivals and the party as an actor which can pursue 
self-government directly.   
Sub-state nationalist parties are expected to position themselves as the defender of the 
nation, challenge the credibility of rivals who attempt to speak for the nation and respond 
to the opening or closing of political opportunity structures within the party system. They 
are considered strategic actors, responding to events and behaving differently in response 
to events and across levels. They face challenges when traditional or statewide parties 
begin to co-opt their positions (Rudolph & Thompson, 1985).  
Party systems are ‘not immutable', and can shift in response to external forces as well as 
changes in the form of the state (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 167). Sub-state nationalist parties 
are expected to account for these changing dynamics. In this chapter, I examine sub-state 
nationalist responses to changes within the party system, including changes in the 
organisation of political rivals, but also in response to state reform which requires a 
reorientation of parties in a political space. I examine this with reference to a party’s 
understanding of its systemic relevance within the party system, drawing inspiration from 
Sartori’s concepts of blackmail and coalition relevance. Rather than assessing their actual 
relevance within the party system, I examine each party's self-understanding and framing 
of its relevance. 
In all three cases, evidence of party system change is present. For the SNP, party system 
change took place late in the party's lifespan in response to devolution, which saw the 
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reorientation of statewide parties to better compete in a multi-level space. For the 
Volksunie, party system change took place much earlier, with the regionalisation of the 
Belgian party system occuring the 1960s and 1970s and preceding significant changes in 
the structure of the state. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie faced a static but very crowded 
political space, defined by a degree of consensus on the desirability of further self-
government. 
In this chapter, I examine two key dimensions in my analysis of the way self-government 
is framed with reference to the party system. Firstly, I address how sub-state nationalist 
political position themselves as credible agents of self-government and question the ability 
of their political rivals to adequately do so. Secondly, I address the means available to the 
party and its framing of its blackmail or coalition relevance, particularly in light of changes 
in the party system and the introduction of multilevel government. This speaks to the 
means that a party has at is disposal and explores the way means may influence the goals 
themselves. What this chapter does not do is analyse the counter-framing, or charges 
levied by political rivals or internal party system dynamics. I will begin with the SNP, 
before turning to the Volksunie and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and conclude with 
comparison of the three parties. 
6.1 The Scottish National Party in a shifting party 
system 
The Scottish National Party emerged in a party system dominated by two main parties 
and struggled to achieve any systemic relevance until the 1960s. It failed to secure 
consistent representation within the House of Commons until the 1970s. Although it 
succeeded in by-elections in 1945 and 1967, it lost these seats in the subsequent general 
election. The SNP was considered in its early days as ‘a modest family business’ with the 
‘simplicity of eighteenth-century Scottish religious dissent: a single political tenet which was one thing 
needful’ (Harvie, 1998: 173). Until 1967, Gordon Wilson (2009) described it as ‘a very 
successful protest movement’ which menaced the statewide parties but had not yet experienced 
a significant victory. The success of Winnie Ewing increased the SNP’s systemic 
relevance, putting Labour on notice and establishing the SNP ‘as a potential threat to 
practically every seat in Scotland, no matter how safe’ (Kellas, 1968: 203). This triggered the 
development of proposals by both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party for a 
limited form of Scottish self-government, an effort to accommodate the SNP and counter 
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the electoral threat posed by the party (Mitchell, 1996: 46). The party's responses to 
proposed and realised state reform was discussed in the preceding chapter. 
The party’s relevance grew as it gained votes and seats in the 1970s. This increased its 
blackmail potential, placing the issue of devolution on the political agenda and challenging 
traditional parties for votes (Brand et al, 1994: 616).  It also had ownership over the 
independence issue, with 87.9% of the electorate knowing about its independence 
ambitions (Newman, 1992: 13). The party had limited coalition potential in the 
Westminster system as a result of 
its commitment to independence 
but did agree to support the 
Labour minority government, 
formed following the October 
1974 elections as long as the party 
maintained its commitment to 
securing devolution. It did, 
however, often vote against the 
government (Fusaro, 1979). 
The 1979 referendum on 
devolution was ultimately 
unsuccessful and the issue was 
removed from the political agenda 
and the SNP returned to political 
obscurity for some time (Lynch, 
2009: 620). Reflecting on the 
SNP’s performance in the 1970s, 
Alex Salmond characterised it as 
‘boom and bust’ nationalism, in 
which ‘support would rise like a rocket, only to fall back like the stick’, limiting the party’s 
blackmail potential (Salmond, 1999). The SNP’s relevance was exercised, with the party 
moving against the Labour Government in a vote of no confidence, and subsequently 
diminished, with the loss of nine seats in the subsequent election (Newman, 1996: 38; 
Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998: 142). 
Image: The SNP's poster suggested that Labour was unable to stand up 
against Thatcher's Conservative Government and represent Scottish 
interests 
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The party was weakened in the 1980s but remained relevant, challenging Labour on its 
ability to represent Scotland’s interest at Westminster, and threatening the party’s 
predominance in the Labour heartlands. A political poster (see inset) described Labour’s 
MPs as the ‘feeble fifty’, unable to protect Scotland from the punitive policies of Margaret 
Thatcher. In his maiden speech in the House of Commons, Alex Salmond described 
Labour’s broken promises, saying ‘We are now four years on and the dogs of war not only have not 
bitten very hard but have lost their bark' (HC Deb 29 June 1987 vol 118 c280). The Labour 
Party’s role in the Scottish Constitutional Convention served to challenge the SNP’s 
ownership of self-government.. The Govan by-election, in which Labour lost to Jim 
Sillars reinforced its commitment to some form of self-government and led to its 
leadership role in the convention. (Macwhirter, 1990: 26).  
Although Labour was able to take credit for devolution, the introduction of the Scottish 
Parliament provided new opportunity structures for the SNP, allowing them to standas a 
party of government (Lynch, 2009: 632). Its entry into government in 2007 and return in 
2011 cemented its position within the Scottish political system but required it to draw a 
distinction between the business of government and the business of independence. 
Following the victory of the party in 2011, the business of government and the business 
of independence became intertwined. 
In this section, I will analyse the party’s framing of itself and its role within its system. 
Firstly, I examine the framing of the SNP and its pursuit of self-government, identifying 
two key frames (1) the frame of Scotland’s party, Scotland’s voice, used to stress that only 
the SNP could pursue self-government and (2) the frame of the illegitimacy of political 
rivals, both in their ability to defend Scottish interests and advance the cause of self-
government, even in a more limited form. Secondly, I look to the framing of the means 
and the role and relevance of the party, from its own view, which includes a temporal 
component, shifting with devolution in 1997. In this section, three key frames are 
identified and discussed: (1) a party of action, pursuing self-government directly should it 
receive the required number of seats at Westminster; (2) a party of blackmail, placing 
pressure on mainstream parties to take an interest in Scottish concerns; and finally, (3) a 
party of government, a frame which emerged with devolution. The party’s framing shifted 
with devolution, reflecting the multi-level space in which it competed, stressing blackmail 
at Westminster and government at Holyrood.  
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6.1.2 The SNP and its rivals: exclusivity and illegitimacy 
The SNP benefited from a claim to exclusivity. With limited exceptions, it stood alone as 
vote-seeking party calling for self-government until the 1960s, when its electoral success 
provoked a response from statewide rivals. It was also, until recently, when it was joined 
by the Greens, the only party calling for political independence. In the absence of credible 
claims to the contrary, it was able to position itself as speaking for Scotland, while 
Scotland’s interests were ignored and neglected by statewide parties. ‘The idea that a party 
might somehow embody an entire national movement acquired a legitimacy in the absence of any serious 
alternative home rule organisation’ (Mitchell, 1996: 99). This provided it with an opportunity 
to frame itself and its rivals vis-à-vis self-government in two distinctive ways. Firstly, it 
positioned itself as Scotland’s party and Scotland’s voice. Secondly, it challenged the 
legitimacy of statewide parties on their ability to speak for Scotland, framing their attempts 
to do so asdisingenuous. Together, these frames were employed to bolster the argument 
that only the SNP could pursue and deliver self-government. They were, however, 
contested, particularly from the 1980s onwards, when the Labour Party took a leadership 
role in the Constitutional Convention, and ultimately delivered devolution in 1997. The 
reorientation of the political system towards Holyrood also made these claims less 
credible.  
1. Scotland’s party, Scotland’s voice 
The SNP presented itself throughout its lifespan as the party which could speak credibly, 
both on behalf of Scottish self-government and in favour of the broader Scottish interests, 
employing the frame of Scotland’s party, Scotland’s voice. This framing, present pre-1999, 
became more challenging in the devolutionary period, as political rivals reorganised in 
response to devolution. However, the party continued to employ this label of Scotland’s 
Party, particularly at Westminster.  
The party’s documents made an explicit claim to speak on behalf of the nation, presenting 
itself as unified and singularly focused on Scottish interests, something it argued could 
not be claimed by its competitors (SNP, 1960).  Support for the SNP and the Scottish 
nation were closely linked in party discourse, as ‘Scotland does well when the SNP does well’, 
emphasising the blackmail relevance of the party, or its ability to extract concessions from 
the UK government. It was the ‘the only force in politics which can conceivably achieve any degree of 
self-government for Scotland’ (I. MacCormick, 1970: 91). Lacking the ability, or will, to pursue 
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self-government directly, the party positioned itself as a defender of Scottish interests and 
a threat to statewide parties, a point which was continually reiterated in core texts. It 
focused on its unique ability to ‘Put Scotland First’, which was ‘a slogan which no other politicians 
can use because the National party is the only Scottish political party’ (SNP, 1968). Voters were 
urged in 1983 to ‘choose Scotland by voting for the Scottish National Party, the only party to put 
Scotland’s interests first’ (SNP, 1983) and in 1987 to ‘play the Scottish card’ (SNP, 1987).  
This emphasis on the Scottish identity of the party was contrasted with those of political 
rivals, who were at various points described as ‘English’, ‘London’ or ‘Westminster’ parties, 
all terms employed to emphasise their distance from Scotland and Scottish interests. 
Parties were characterised as ‘pseudo-Scottish and London political parties under the domination of 
English thought’ (SNP, 1952). Iain McCormick summed up the traditional political system 
as cutting across the interests of Scotland with ‘the political squabbling between right and left’ as 
the ‘chief raison d’ être of the English-based parties’ (I. MacCormick, 1970: 91). This frame was 
also employed to challenge the credibility of rivals proposing devolution, with their 
credentials and motivations considered suspect. 
This frame continued to be employed in with devolution, with little modification.  
However, these claims of exclusivity became more difficult as rival parties reorganised 
themselves for competition at Holyrood and increasingly challenging the SNP's 
ownership of the self-government issue, albeit while maintaining opposition to 
independence. In his review of the first ten years of the Scottish Parliament, Jeffery (2009: 
155) notes statewide parties are increasingly drawn towards ‘the SNP’s turf’ in their 
articulation of their political programmes. Ichijo (2012: 24) describes the post-devolution 
Scottish political space as a ‘nationalist or nationalised discursive framework’ in which all parties 
showcased their Scottish credentials.  
Its independence and outsider position was portrayed as an advantage rather than a 
hindrance. ‘Scotland’s Parliament needs Scotland’s Party. A Party in tune with Scottish needs and 
hopes, and always with Scottish priorities at the forefront of our thinking. A party that does not dance to 
Westminster’s tune’ (SNP, 1999). It was the only party which could advance the cause of 
Scottish independence, although it attempted to situate itself in a broader movement. 
'Independence won't be won by one Party alone but delivered by many with the support of the people. The 
SNP, though, remains fundamental to achieving that goal' (MacAskill, 2004: 16). 
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At Westminster, the SNP positioned itself as ‘Scotland’s Party’, again contrasted with 
‘London parties’ which were at a remove from Scotland and focused their attention on 
English constituents (SNP, 2005; 2010). ‘The SNP has no split loyalty; we work first, last and 
always for the Scottish interest’ (SNP, 2001).  They were, as a result, unable to act in Scotland's 
interests due to their organisational arrangements (SNP, 2010).  
‘Labour and Tory MPs have voted against the Scottish interest time and again, while the 
Liberal Democrats run down Labour at Westminster but prop them up in Scotland. Only 
the SNP can be trusted ALWAYS to stand up for Scotland’ 
          SNP, 2005. 
This framing was closely linked with its framing of its rivals, whose credibility and 
legitimacy – in speaking for Scotland and in delivering some degree of self-government – 
was consistently challenged. 
2. The illegitimacy of political rivals 
Statewide parties were portrayed as lacking the legitimacy to speak on behalf of Scotland 
and pursue even a limited degree of self-government. This illegitimacy was a persistent 
frame and was bolstered by several arguments: the divided loyalties of statewide parties, 
the lack of confidence that unionist parties, and their Scottish members, had in Scotland’s 
ability to govern itself, and an insufficient or disingenuous commitment to Scottish self-
government.  
Statewide parties were accused of having divided loyalties, by virtue of their reliance on 
English voters and therefore, focus on English interests. TH Gibson (1951) described the 
SNP’s opposition to both of the dominant statewide parties, arguing ‘We are in effect more 
opposed to each of the political parties than the Tory Party is to the Labour Party and vice versa, for we 
oppose the whole set-up of their parties and their method of operating’. At times, these parties were 
described as ‘English parties', representing English interests at Scotland's expense. They 
were unable to solve the problems of Scotland, beholden to Anglo-Scottish class interests 
and the needs of England (SNP, 1968). They were later labelled as London or 
Westminster parties, which supported the party's argument they were at a remove from 
Scotland but also avoided critiques of ethnic nationalism (SNP, 1974). In Scotland Lives, 
Billy Wolfe's 1973 publication, he described the complicity of statewide parties and ‘these 
minions of the English parties’.  
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‘Surely the people of Scotland want to be free for ever from the control of those who, for 
generations, have appeared to be Scottish, have spoken (some of them) with Scottish accents 
but who have been content merely with representing their constituencies in London, instead 
of acting for Scotland in relation to Scottish needs and aspirations’.  
Wolfe, 1973: 41. 
From the 1980s onwards, Conservatives were labelled as an English party, at their core, 
hostile to Scotland (SNP, 1987). Labour rivals were considered powerless to defend 
Scotland. This narrative was challenged in the 1980s when the leadership of Labour in the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention, an attempt to ‘recapture the mantle of Scotland’s national 
party’ (Mitchell, 1996: 129).  On the eve of the opening of the Scottish Parliament, Alex 
Salmond contested the notion that a Scottish Labour government could adequately 
represent Scotland, as ‘ultimately decisions will be made not in Scotland, but in Millbank or Downing 
St. That means that decisions will be made not because they are right for Scotland, but because they are 
acceptable to Tony Blair’ (Salmond, 1999). 
The organisational arrangements were not the only source of critique for the SNP. It also 
accused statewide parties and in particular, Scottish politicians within these parties, of a 
lack of confidencein Scotland. This was persistently employed both before 1999 and after 
but was employed in different ways. Pre-devolution, it was used to undermine critiques 
of self-government while later, it was used to counter criticism of devolution. 
Robert McIntyre, in a 1960 speech entitled Speaking for Scotland called into question the 
ability of statewide parties to adequately represent Scotland, saying ‘After all, they cannot 
speak for Scotland. They do not believe in their country; so how can they represent it?’ (McIntyre, 1960). 
Jim Sillars (1991) spoke of Scotland as subject to ‘a deliberate policy of undermining its self-
assurance and respectability’, and to a lie told by Unionist parties that Scotland was too poor 
to go it alone. In a 1995 speech, Salmond described this as intentional, ‘it has been the Labour 
Party’s strategy for half a century to sap the self-confidence of Scotland, and deliver it bound and tied into 
the voting lobbies of Westminster’ (Salmond, 1995). In 1999, Salmond described a process of 
diminishing Scotland,   ‘For much of the last 300 years Scotland has been told that it is too small, 
too distant, too poor, or too stupid to govern itself’ (Salmond, 1999). He returned to this theme in 
his 2005 conference speech ‘Unionism depends on the notion that somehow our nation of Scotland 
is incapable of making the big decisions…The truth is that Scotland is good enough, big enough, and 
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talented enough to be independent’ (Salmond, 2005). This was also employed throughout the 
referendum campaign.  
Returning to the SNP's core purpose, the commitment of political rivals to self-
government was persistently called into question, considered to be motivated by electoral 
calculations rather than a genuine commitment to self-government. This was especially 
salient when statewide parties attempted, as Brand (1993: 42) described it, to ‘steal the 
Nationalists’ clothes’ in the 1970s by proposing a more limited form of self-government. In 
a debate on devolution, Iain MacCormick described proposals as an attempt at ‘weathering 
a temporary nationalist storm by holding out the hope that they are genuinely interested in legislative 
devolution’ (I. MacCormick, 1970: 100-101). These were described as ‘cynical electoral 
calculations’ rather than ‘settled convictions was to what constitutes Scotland’s best interests’ (SNP, 
1974). The past behaviour of its rivals informed the party’s contemporary approach to 
further devolution, with Alex Salmond asking, in 2005, ‘If Tory and Labour politicians were 
prepared to lie and cheat Scotland in the 1970s why should anyone believe a word they have to say about 
Scotland in 2005 or in 2007?’ (Salmond, 2005).  
These two frames were closely interconnected – the party positioned itself as the only 
party which could credibly speak for Scotland while challenging the legitimacy of its 
political rivals to do so. Together these suggested Scotland’s interests were not achievable 
within the existing system, self-government was required.  
6.1.3 The pursuit of self-government: action, blackmail, and 
government 
The party system in which the SNP stood can be understood with reference to three key 
phases. The first was one in which Labour and Conservatives dominated, and little room 
existed for smaller rivals, including the SNP, and persisted between the party’s origins 
through the 1970s. The second phase was one of increasing challenge to two-party 
dominance in Scotland, with the electoral breakthrough and rise of the SNP (and 
subsequent decline), an increase in support for the Labour party and a dramatic decline 
in Conservative support (Webb, 2000: 16; Jaensch, 1976). The system shifted yet again, 
and more dramatically, in 1999, with devolution (Hopkin, 2003; 2009). Devolution 
presented an opportunity, providing the prospect of government for the first time, but 
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also a challenge, as unionist parties reoriented themselves towards this space and 
challenged the SNP’s claims to exclusivity.  
Three key frames come to the fore here, and they each have a temporal dimension. Firstly, 
the party framed itself as a party of action, detailing how the party was to pursue self-
government. Pre-devolution, this was through participation in Westminster elections and 
the achievement of the majority of seats, which would provide a mandate to open 
negotiations for independence. Post-devolution, this shifted, with action taking place 
from within government with legislation for a referendum. Secondly, the party framed 
itself as a party of blackmail, attempting to exert pressure on statewide rivals. This frame 
was present both pre and post-1999, and could be employed in pursuit of the party’s twin 
aims – Scottish independence and the furtherance of Scottish interests. The final frame 
came with devolution, portraying the party as one of government, both prospective and 
realised. These frames address the party’s understanding of its own means and relevance 
within the political party system. 
1. A party of action 
From its origins, the SNP sought to pursue self-government directly, not through a 
plebiscite or political protest but through action at Westminster, a position maintained 
until devolution. A majority of Scottish seats secured by the SNP would be translated into 
a mandate to open negotiations for independence. This agreement would then be subject 
to a vote by the Scottish people (SNP, 1967). Unlike Sinn Fein, which competed in 
Westminster elections but declined to occupy seats won, the SNP was committed to full 
and constructive participation at Westminster. It rejected, in its early years, a referendum, 
saying: 
‘Plebiscites of any description, while they may be useful in ascertaining the views of the 
public, have in themselves no force or effect until it is enacted that they should have. They 
may be dangerous, if by trying to induce people to believe that they do have such force, they 
divert attention away from the proper method of enforcing the wishes of the people’  
TH Gibson, 1951. 
The SNP and You, first published in 1967, clarified the party’s position, saying ‘Until SNP 
M.P.s hold a majority of Scottish seats, they will take part in the UK Parliament, voting and working 
in the interests of the people in Scotland, in support of legislation which is in accord with the SNP policy’. 
These goals were to be pursued through parliamentary means. Faced with critiques at 
The Art of the Possible 
6 The party system  197 
Westminster, Iain MacCormick countered criticisms, saying ‘We have already proved, time and 
time again, that we are not prepared to use any other means of furthering our aims than the purely 
constitutional mans of the ballot box. Our very presence here proves that’ (HC Deb 14 January 1976 
vol 903 c526). 
With the prospect of devolution in the 1970s, the SNP reinforced its commitment to 
pursuing self-government within this forum. While it pledged to work within the Scottish 
Assembly, it was at Westminster through which independence would be achieved. Iain 
MacCormick stressed this commitment, ‘First, we will go to the Scottish Assembly and fight 
democratically – as we have always fought – to win seats. We shall help make that Assembly work and 
work well’ (HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol 903 c526). At the same time, the party's 
commitment to contest seats at Westminster would remain unchanged (HC Deb 14 
December 1976 vol 922 c1354-5). 
Although this was an unlikely strategy, described by MacAskill as the ‘big bang’ theory of 
nationalism (2004: 37-38), it was one which allowed it to pursue self-government but also 
attempt to fulfil its second aim, the ‘furtherance of all Scottish interests’ by attempting to stand 
up for Scotland in at the centre.  
Devolution presented a new forum for pursuing self-government, and from this point 
onward it was through government, discussed in frame 3 below, that it would be achieved. 
In a devolved context, the SNP sought to form a government and pass legislation for a 
referendum on Scottish independence (SNP, 1999). 
2. A party of blackmail 
Although the SNP did not achieve systemic relevance until the 1960s and 1970s, it 
portrayed itself as a blackmail actor throughout its lifespan, seeking to further the cause 
of Scottish self-government and represent Scottish interests through pressure on 
statewide actors. Within this context, the SNP acted as both a party and a pressure group, 
given the nearly non-existent prospects of being included in government at the centre.  
During his brief tenure at Westminster, party leader Robert McIntyre told fellow MPs 
‘I will never tire of pointing out to members of this House that if they do not want to hear 
more about Scotland, they have a solution in their own hands. I do not want to be here 
anymore than they want to listen to me here; I want to be elsewhere, in an Assembly directly 
responsible to the Scottish people’ 
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HC Deb 06 June 1945 vol 411 c1010 
It justified its position as a blackmail actor by making reference to proposals made by 
statewide parties in the 1960s and 1970s. In the view of the SNP, Labour and 
Conservatives were frightened by the uptick in support for the Nationalists and would 
make concessions in order to counter this threat. In Speaking for Scotland, similarities were 
noted between proposals made by statewide parties and those of the SNP, characterising 
this as political plagiarism, as ‘No one can speak even half honestly about Scotland and not sound 
like a Nationalist – or fail to borrow extensively from the National Party’s policies and speakers’ (SNP, 
1960). The success of this strategy was evidenced by a subsequent ‘flood of concessions to 
Scotland from the London political parties’ (SNP, 1974).  
The party’s blackmail relevance was used to justify its support of the Labour minority 
government between 1974 and 1979,offering an opportunity to further a limited form of 
self-government. The strength and durability of these reforms was contingent on 
continued pressure by the SNP, ‘Any economic concessions which Scotland may win from 
Westminster, and any steps towards self-government which maybe conceded will depend entirely on the size 
of the SNP vote and the number of SNP M.P.s elected’ (SNP, 1977). It stressed to voters the 
necessity of supporting the SNP, not as a party of government but a party which could 
exert pressure and ensure that promises were fulfilled.  
Even amidst a period of electoral decline which followed the failed referendum on 
Scottish devolution and the collapse of the minority Labour government, a move aided 
by the support of the SNP for a no confidence motion, the SNP continued to stress its 
relevance as a blackmail actor. With the prospect of devolution unlikely under a 
Conservative government, the SNP continued to emphasise its blackmail role. The failed 
referendum and the party’s defeat at the polls reinforced this tactic, and voters were urged 
to ‘play the nationalist card’ by voting for the SNP and implicitly, against statewide parties 
(SNP, 1983). It reminded voters ‘Nothing will happen unless the SNP is strong and determined 
and attracting the support of the people’ (SNP, 1987) and pledged in the event of a Doomsday 
scenario, to support Labour in exchange for genuine reform. Salmond cited attacks on 
the SNP as evidence of its influence, saying ‘When the SNP is under attack that is a sure sign 
that it is rising and that the Government are frightened’ (HC Deb 06 July 1988 vol 136 c1114).  
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With devolution, the SNP continued to stress its blackmail influence at Westminster while 
positioning itself as a party of government at Holyrood. A vote for the SNP at 
Westminster elections was to support Scotland and the Scottish Parliament viewed as a 
‘vote to win more powers for the Scottish Parliament and a vote for MPs who will always put Scotland 
first’ (SNP, 2001). In his 2004 conference speech, Salmond spoke of the opportunity to 
‘make Westminster dance to a Scottish tune’ (Salmond, 2004). Although it focused its attentions 
on Holyrood, it justified its continued pursuit of seats at Westminster elections as 
representing a distinct need and opportunity. ‘As long as we are still partly governed by 
Westminster we need strong SNP voices speaking up for Scotland’ (SNP, 2005). 
The SNP failed to make gains at Westminster during this period, returning six seats in 
2001, 2005, and 2010 and securing roughly one-fifth of the overall vote. Its manifestos 
were shorter, and its expenditures were lower for these contests than those which took 
place at Holyrood. However, SNP MPs retained a focus on their blackmail potential, 
necessary to extract further concessions from Westminster. In 2010, it also sought to play 
an enhanced role should the election result in a hung parliament, saying ‘it is with a balanced 
parliament that Scotland’s greatest opportunity exists’ (SNP, 2010). It also focused, in this 
election, on ideological issues, as it urged voters to elect a ‘local champion’ to combat a policy 
of austerity at Westminster. Adopting the ‘Nat’ label it typically rejected, the party argued 
‘more votes means more Nats, and more Nats mean less cuts’ (SNP, 2010).  This positioned the 
SNP as a voice for Scotland but also as a progressive voice against austerity, in Scotland 
but also at the centre, a theme that became more pronounced from 2010 onwards.  
In 1999, the SNP largely reoriented its attention to Holyrood, allocating many of its 
institutional and human resources towards campaigning and participation at this level. 
Westminster remained important as a venue in which Scotland’s interests must be 
represented. Although beyond the scope of this study, the party’s positioning of itself in 
the 2015 Westminster election saw both frames of blackmail, through its support of a 
predicted minority Labour government, and of the unique ability to stand up for Scotland, 
in contrast to its competitors.  
3. A party of government 
At the Scottish Parliamentary level, the SNP framed itself as a party of prospective 
government, given the opportunities available to it in this new space. Five of six MPs 
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elected to Westminster in 1997 stood down in 2001, a move designed to symbolise ‘the 
transfer of day to day politics to Holyrood’ (Mitchell et al, 2012: 11). The new parliament was a 
platform through which the party could pursue government, and through government, 
independence. It pledged in the event of a majority government to hold a referendum on 
Scottish independence. Lynch describes the SNP’s future as ‘now inextricably bound up with 
this devolved parliament, in terms of the party's ability to use the institution as a platform for independence’ 
(Lynch, 2002:  3).  
At Holyrood, the party oriented itself as a party of government, no longer able to maintain 
its traditional role, in the ‘normal comfort of opposition’ (Mitchell 1996: 208). MacAskill (2004: 
41) documented the challenges inherent in this process, saying ‘the SNP must outline a 
coherent manifesto for a Devolved Administration as well as a clear vision for an Independent Nation’.  
In its Holyrood manifesto, the SNP described itself as ‘Scotland’s Party for Scotland’s 
Parliament’, stressing its pursuit of government rather than independence and its unique 
claim to represent Scotland exclusively (SNP, 1999). By promising that voters would have 
an opportunity to vote in a referendum on independence, the SNP behaved strategically 
‘separating party from policy’ (Leith & Steven, 2010: 293). Its ability to govern was understood 
to help support the case for independence, ‘to make as much of a difference as we can with the 
current powers of the Scottish Parliament, and to show why we need the powers of Independence' (SNP, 
1999). It pledged to act constructively to maximise Scotland's powers within the existing 
constitutional settlement and make a case for independence (SNP, 2003). In response to 
growing disillusionment with devolution, a result of overrunning costs of the Scottish 
Parliament building, expense scandals, the SNP positioned itself as a voice for reform and 
progress. Speaking in 2005, Salmond argued ‘Scotland needs independence, self-determination and 
self-respect’, adding ‘And right now Scotland needs the SNP’ (Salmond, 2005) 
Having formed a minority government in 2007, the party had to balance its pursuit of 
policy within the devolved institutions and self-government in the near to medium-term. 
Salmond's first speech as First Minister described its dual role, to ‘work immediately within 
devolved government to deliver on core domestic policies’ and to explore ‘the next stage in Scotland’s 
constitutional journey’ (Salmond, 2007). Support for the SNP was separated from support 
for independence, and the First Minister argued the business of government ‘That can be 
done while also exploring the next stage in Scotland's constitutional journey’ (Salmond, 2007). The 
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National Conversations process was introduced as an alternative, a consultative process 
designed to outline the choices available to Scotland.  
The party’s 2011 manifesto, Re-elect a Scottish Government Working for Scotland, prioritised a 
message of competence in government rather than independence. It drew a distinction 
between the party as one of government, proposing a range of policies, and the party 
which would advance independence. 'Independence will only happen when people in Scotland vote 
for it. That is why independence is your choice' (SNP, 2011). The party's 2011 programme for 
government, presented by Alex Salmond, focused on jobs, economic growth, health, and 
social policy, coming to independence only at the very end. The party attributed its 
support to recognition by the voter of the party's ‘proven competence and commitment’ but also 
to its positive position on Scotland’s constitutional future (Salmond, 2011).  
The framing of the pursuit of self-government – in the form of action, blackmail and 
government - captures the challenges and opportunities available to the party in a multi-
level space as well as the need to balance electoral concerns with the pursuit of self-
government. The introduction of devolution provided an opportunity, unavailable to 
statewide rivals, to stress both blackmail and governing potential – serving as a strident 
voice in defence of the nation at the centre, and a party of responsible government at the 
sub-state level.  
6.2 The Volksunie: Self-government in a fragmented 
party system 
The Volksunie was one of the most successful sub-state nationalist parties, notable for 
incentivising the process of state reform, its entry into government at the centre, and its 
impact on the highly pillarised Belgian party system. Originating in the 1950s, it made a 
rapid rise to systemic relevance, both as a blackmail actor and as a prospective coalition 
partner at the centre. It was, however, a victim of its own success, struggling to define 
itself in a party space increasingly focused on Flanders.  
The Volksunie came into being in a highly pillarised Belgian party system, dominated by 
the three main political factions - Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats (Delwit & 
Van Haute, 2001: 15). In the 1950 general election, these three parties received 94% of 
the vote. However, the environment in which it emerged was a fertile one, with the School 
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Pact deemphasising religious issues, and public concern over the linguistic census, the 
Belgian Congo, and the state of the economy (Deschouwer, 2009: 39).  
The main change in the party system did not come with state reform, a protracted process 
which culminated in federalisation in 1993, but was a response to divergent interests 
within the main parties and the emergence of regionalist parties in Wallonia, Brussels, and 
Flanders in the 1960s and 1970s (De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 285; De Winter et al, 
2006: 934; Deschouwer, 2013: 338). The Belgian party system became, in the postwar 
period, increasingly complex, with the split of Christian Democrats, Liberal, and Socialist 
parties into Dutch and Francophone parties in 1968, 1972, and 1978 respectively, allowing 
them to mobilise and counter the regionalist threat (De Winter et al, 2006: 934). The 
Belgian party system is characterised by a high number of effective parties and high 
degrees of fragmentation (De Winter at al., 2006). This fragmentation provided 
opportunities for the Volksunie to participate directly in government but also created 
obstacles because of intense competition between parties. After the split of the traditional 
parties, calls for further transfers of powers and the federalisation of the Belgian state 
became a strategy to win office at the centre (Sorens, 2009: 256). This challenged the VU’s 
issue ownership over self-government.  
The Volksunie was included in government from 1977 to 1978, a party to the failed 
Egmont Pact which would have seen the federalisation of the Belgian state and the 
transfer of competences to Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. The party returned to the 
federal government from 1988 to 1991. However, following the federalisation of Belgium 
in 1993, the ‘regional branches of the mainstream Flemish parties had become the main protagonists in 
the post-federalization phase’ (De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009: 295). This left the Volksunie 
searching for purpose and ultimately, the party dissolved in 2001 into three rival factions 
representing different ideological viewpoints and degrees of radicalism emerged. 
The party's framing of itself and its role recognised these challenging conditions, but it 
argued, as did the SNP, that it provided the most credible means of advancing the cause 
of self-government. In framing itself and its goals, the party  (1) stressed its role as a voice 
for Flanders and self-government and (2) challenged the legitimacy of rival political parties 
to make the same claim. It then discussed its pursuit of self-government, simultaneously 
The Art of the Possible 
6 The party system  203 
emphasising its role as a (1) party of blackmail and (2) a party which embark upon 
principled participation.  
6.2.2 The VU and its rivals: credibility and illegitimacy 
The Volksunie argued that it alone could credibly advance the cause of self-government, 
serving as a genuine voice for Flanders in contrast to traditional rivals. A vote for the 
Volksunie was considered a vote for a party which could defend Flemish interests and 
advance the cause of self-government. It positioned itself as a democratic party, drawing 
a distinction between the anti-democratic tendencies of Flemish nationalism in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and one which stood apart from the highly pillarised Belgian system, allowing 
it to legitimately speak for Flanders. 
The party's framing took two primary forms. Firstly, it focused on providing a voice for 
Flanders and Flemish self-government. The party avoided, in its early years, positioning 
itself ideologically but instead positioned itself as a big tent for all interested in the 
advancement of Flemish interests. This was closely linked with the VU’s second frame, 
which challenged the legitimacy of traditional political rivals to speak for Flanders on the 
basis of their need to balance Flemish and Walloon interests. This frame had less 
resonance following the split of the traditional parties in the 1960s and 1970s. For the 
Volksunie, these two frames culminated in an argument that Flemish self-government 
was urgently needed and could only be achieved through the participation of the VU.  
1. A voice for Flanders and Flemish self-government 
Unlike the SNP which was able to credibly claim exclusivity in speaking on behalf of the 
Scottish nation, the Volksunie faced increasing competition in doing so, particularly as 
the traditional Belgian parties split and the Vlaams Blok emerged. However, it framed 
itself, like its Scottish counterpart, as a voice for Flanders – both for Flemish interests and 
for Flemish self-government. It did so by emphasising its outsider status, one that rose 
above what it considered as petty concerns about pillars and class.  
The Volksunie took various ideological standpoints throughout its history, but the 
prevailing narrative of the party focused on its ability to transcend the deep divisions of 
class and religion of the pillarised Belgian system. This transcendence was to allow the 
Volksunie to faithfully and fully represent Flemish interests. As a result, it advocated a big 
tent nationalism, appealing to ‘young and old, to farmers and workers, for labourers and intellectuals, 
The Art of the Possible 
6 The party system  204 
for self-employed people’ (VU, 1955). The VU, unique amongst its counterparts, was to reject 
pillarisation, saying ‘we believe that the Flemish question is a national matter for the Flemish people, 
as such it includes all sectors of society, it is not just a language issue, a cultural issue, a social or economic 
issue, but these together’, a critique of attempts by traditional parties to come to an agreement 
on the language issues (VU, 1961). It was to be a party that did not align itself along 
traditional lines and was therefore unencumbered by entrenched interests, as ‘a democratic 
party that does not favour the left, nor the right, but forward!’ (VU, 1965). It was ‘different from the 
others', independent from both big business and the unions (VU, 1965). It could, therefore, 
speak for all Flemings. 
Even as it achieved a high degree of systemic relevance, the VU continued to stress its 
outsider status, positioning itself as both able to maintain its independence, in contrast to 
traditional rivals, while engaging constructively in favour of state reform. It was, as a result 
of this outsider status, the only engine of innovation, acting without constraint from other 
actors (VU, 1971). 
The fate of Flanders and the fate of the Volksunie were closely linked, with the party 
arguing ‘It is no coincidence that the undeniable rise of Flanders coincides with the rise of the People’s 
Union’ (VU, 1971). It was, in its self-definition, uniquely positioned to represent all of 
Flanders, positioning itself ‘in the service of the national community’ (VU, 1979). It framed itself 
as a necessary actor given the inability of traditional parties to adequately represent the 
interests of Flemish voters. It described itself as the Flemish National Party (Vlaamse 
Nationale Partij) and in the 1990s, the party added ‘Volksnationale partij’ to its descriptor as 
a means of distinguishing between the VU and rivals who had all increasingly emphasised 
their Flemish identities.  
2. The illegitimacy of political rivals 
Closely linked with the framing of the VU as a voice for Flanders, and for Flemish self-
government was a critique of political rivals – in their ability to speak for Flanders and to 
credibly pursue federalisation and far-reaching state reform. This was true for both 
traditional rivals, with Flemish leaders called out for particular censure, and for the Vlaams 
Blok which emerged as a faction within the Volksunie and throughout the 1980s and 
1990s challenged the party on self-government (Govaert, 1993: 18).  
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In the VU’s 1956 congress text, it outlined the problems of the Belgian state and its 
negative effects on Flanders, including the underrepresentation of Flemings, the failure 
to enforce the language border, and discrimination. These problems were not placed at 
the feet of Francophones exclusively, but to the failure of Flemings within the traditional 
parties to defend Flemish interests (VU, 1956). These parties, and in particular, Flemings 
within them, were challenged on their track record and ability to speak for Flanders, due 
to the ‘lamentable attitude of Flemish regional representatives of the Flemish people’ (VU, 1955). The 
Christian Democrats, the largest party in Belgium, was targeted for its failure to wield its 
Flemish majority, and its efforts to block the Volksunie were described as ‘Machiavellian 
political processes' (VU, 1959). Within the unitary party system, socialist, liberal, and Christian 
Democrat rivals were painted with a broad brush, denounced for selling out Flanders, 
lacking pride, courage, and engaging in a slavish submission to Brussels and Wallonia (VU, 
1965). A vote for traditional parties was ‘a lost vote for Flanders’ with ‘only the Volksunie having 
the power and capability to use Flemish votes to guarantee a better and happier future for the people’ (VU, 
1965).  
These parties, according to the Volksunie, were unable to deliver meaningful self-
government and were merely responding to the electoral threat posed by the Volksunie 
rather than possessing a real commitment to state reform. Proposals for further reforms 
were rejected as they represented efforts to thwart the Flemish majority and viewed as a 
conspiracy against real reform (VU, 1959; VU, 1962; VU, 1965). The VU described 
proposed changes to the linguistic laws in the 1960s as mechanisms which would ‘render 
us forever helpless and deprives us of the only weapon we have as Flemings: the power of our democratic 
number’ (VU, 1965). The failure of traditional rivals to block these reforms was evidence 
that ‘there is no freedom of action for the Flemings. Against his better judgement, the Flemish 
parliamentarian must vote with the major parties’ (VU, 1965).  
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The failure of efforts by traditional parties 
to deliver on their promises of state reform 
was attributed to internal divisions within 
the traditional parties, an insufficient 
commitment to genuine reform, and their 
collusion within the Belgian state. 
Proposals for further reform or efforts to 
co-opt the position of the VU were met 
with scepticism. Following the failure of 
the Egmont Pact negotiations, the 
Volksunie attributed blame to these parties, saying ‘The so-called Traditional parties are 
mutually and internally so deeply divided on the constitutional reform that they do not have the strength 
to set a clear course and deliver a sustained policy' (VU, 1978). In the aftermath, the party 
intensified its rhetoric, continually calling into question the credibility and commitment 
of rivals to Flemish interests and good politics (VU, 1979). Within the ranks of the 
Flemish traditional parties were unionists, who had attempted to thwart state reform (VU, 
1978). Even as the parties split along linguistic lines and reoriented towards the region, 
the VU challenged the credibility of these claims given their past behaviour. 
The party’s emphasis on its democratic credentials had relevance early on in its lifespan, 
as it saw the need to distance itself from predecessors who were associated with fascism 
and collaboration with German occupiers and later on, when the Vlaams Blok emerged, 
adopting a platform in favour of Flemish independence and against immigration. By the 
elections of 1991, the VB had surpassed the VU in electoral support (Mudde, 1995: 6).  
The Vlaams Blok was rarely named directly in the party’s documents, instead referring to 
Flemish nationalism ‘as represented by other parties’ (VU, 1979). The VU focused on 
reaffirming its commitment to the democratic pursuit of self-government and an open 
nationalism, encompassing ‘respect for the well-being and individualism of other people’ and ‘at once 
pluralist, tolerant, hospitable and altruistic' (VU, 1979; VU, 1995).  The electoral breakthroughs 
of the Vlaams Bloc encouraged the Volksunie to further emphasise its democratic 
credentials, positioning itself as the democratic manifestation of Flemish nationalism, in 
contrast to the anti-democratic, narrow nationalism espoused by its radical rivals. It 
reaffirmed its commitment to participation – both in the democratic process and in 
A 1982 flyer published by the Volksunie in Ostende portrayed 
a unified Volksunie in contrast to increasingly fragmented 
political rivals. 
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government to emphasise these differences from the VB which had become a party of 
permanent opposition (VU, 1995). Flemish self-government could not, in the view of the 
VU, be credibly pursued by anti-democratic parties.  
The behaviour of both the traditional parties, with their disingenuous commitment to 
self-government, and the Vlaams Blok, with its anti-system stance, was used to justify the 
VU’s claim to be a voice for Flanders, and the only party which could genuinely advance 
the cause of self-government. This was done through both blackmail and participation at 
the centre, a position from which it could hold traditional parties to account.  
6.2.3 The pursuit of self-government: blackmail and coalition 
The Belgian party system has been characterised by dramatic changes – the split of the 
traditional parties, the emergence of regionalist parties in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, 
and the rise of far-right parties with a nationalist orientation. Belgium moved from a 
highly pillarised system to one characterised by plurality (De Winter et al, 2006). While 
the Scottish party system underwent its most significant changes with devolution, party 
system change in Belgium preceded federalisation. By the time federalisation occurred in 
1993, the party system had been split for nearly two decades. These party system 
dynamics, as well as the norm of coalition governments, shaped the party's understanding 
of how self-government could be pursued. 
Rather than be excluded from coalition, regionalist parties were considered for inclusion, 
allowing traditional parties to bolster their regionalist credentials whilst and seek 
consensus on state reform, as well as secure the necessary majority. The Volksunie was a 
particularly attractive partner; their inclusion was viewed it as a means of bolstering 
support for traditional parties in Flanders and 'forcing them to make policy compromises and share 
responsibility for some unpopular socio-economic policies' (De Winter, 1998: 235-7). 
The party's framing of its role within the party system took two forms, with a distinct 
temporal dimension. Until the 1960s, it framed itself as a party of opposition, stressing its 
blackmail potential and ability to place the issue of Flemish self-government on the 
political agenda. From the 1970s onwards, as support for the party grew and opportunities 
emerged in the increasingly fragmented party space, it employed a frame of principled 
participation, open to participation in governing coalitions. The party justified this 
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approach by arguing genuine Flemish nationalist input, in contrast to the obstructionist 
approach of the VB, was necessary at the centre.  
1. A party of blackmail 
The VU’s success within the 
electoral arena was notable, 
passing the threshold of 
representation at its first 
election and gaining seats 
thereafter. In 1965, the 
Volksunie became the fourth 
largest party in Belgium, 
achieving systemic relevance 
and challenging traditional 
parties to take a stance on the 
community issue. At this point, 
it saw itself as a party of opposition – focused on holding the government to account and 
challenging the traditional parties who were indebted to the traditional regime. It describes 
the desperate need for a Flemish party   
‘because the other parties and the government are neglecting traditional Flemish interests 
and set us back. An independent, strong Flemish opposition is required to denounce this 
backwards movement, neglect, discrimination, and place pressure’  
VU, 1965.  
However, this emphasis on the party as one of blackmail was short-lived, as its electoral 
success increased and the issue of state reform settled on the agenda.  
2. A party of principled participation 
Unlike many of its sub-state nationalist counterparts elsewhere, the Volksunie explicitly 
oriented itself towards government, believing genuine self-government could only be 
achieved with the cooperation of the Volksunie. It situated its participation within a frame 
of principles and bravery, made more salient by the fact that its participation often came 
at a high cost to the party.  
Volksunie election advert depicting the party as a jockey for 
Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Socialist horses, 
encouraging them to adopt state reform. 
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While sometimes sceptical of the motives of traditional parties in their pursuit of state 
reform, it was willing to participate – both to ensure reforms took place and improve 
them (Van Haute, 2011: 212). This frame of participation was stressed alongside blackmail 
potential – not across a multilevel system or from outside of government but from inside 
the governing coalition, with the VU pledging to hold coalition partners to account. In 
1971, with the inclusion of regionalist parties in coalition mooted, the VU stressed that 
while only federalism could provide a solution to Belgium’s problems, ‘it confirms its 
willingness to cooperate with all responsible intermediate solutions, provided it does not inhibit the further 
development of federalism’ (VU, 1971). It declared itself willing to join a coalition government 
in 1973 and asserted its relevance in 1974, saying ‘The Volksunie, therefore, has real power. The 
other parties are obliged to be called to account’ (VU, 1974). 
This power, according to the VU, could be exercised inside or outside of government. 
Although talks failed, the party was well situated to enter into government after the 1977 
election, where it had again performed well, receiving 10% of the total Belgian vote and 
20 seats. Participation was principled and brave and the inclusion of the Volksunie was 
necessary - serving as an engine of innovation but also as a threat to traditional parties 
within the coalition. This participationist frame was contested within the party, and led, 
following the failure of the Egmont Pact, to more radical actors peeling off into different 
factions. 
Despite its negative experience in government following the 1978 elections and the 
internal disputes which followed, the party stressed its commitment to participate in 
government, focusing on this as a principled choice (VU, 1979). It was in the words of 
the party ‘a valiant attempt to break through this paralysis. By participating in government, we wanted 
to implement irreversible reforms: creating a Flemish deelstaat that, despite imperfections, would allow for 
further growth’ (VU, 1978). Although it adopted a more radical position on self-government 
in this period, it remained committed to participation, ‘even in difficult and unpopular 
conditions’ (VU, 1978). It argued genuine Flemish nationalists ‘should focus on the pursuit of 
effective participation and the presence of conscious nationalists in the political process’ (VU, 1979). 
Faced with a nascent Vlaams Blok, the VU focused on its democratic objectives, defining 
itself as pursuing ‘power through parliamentary democracy and consequentially by acquiring voters from 
competition in elections’ (VU, 1979). The reforms of 1970 and 1980, made in the absence of 
the Volksunie, were considered weaker for it (VU, 1987).  The party asserted its continued 
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relevance, arguing that it was ‘much more than a whip party’, and could not be reduced to an 
‘electoral bogeyman' to incentivize the achievement of Flemish demands by rival parties, but 
should be seen as a legitimate operator (VU, 1989). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as state reform appeared inevitable, the VU reaffirmed 
its commitment to participation, saying ‘Someone needs to stick his neck out’, stressing the need 
for principled participation (VU, 1991). The party employed a dual frame of principled 
participation and blackmail to justify both its entry and exit from government. 
‘We do not have to be ashamed for our participation in government. Only our programme, 
for which we have a mandate from voters, counted for us. That’s why we left power 
voluntarily when we determined that they wanted to send us off. We were the only ones who 
dared to say “No!” to the dictates of the Walloons, while the other parties clung to power’  
VU, 1991.  
The party continued to emphasise its blackmail role, attributing federalisation to the 
pressure it had applied to mainstream parties.  (VU, 1993). However, for the Volksunie, 
participation at the centre would further the cause of Flemish self-government, even if it 
took place at a slower pace than the party might have preferred. It continued to highlight 
the importance of elections in the ‘struggle for political independence’ and explained ‘It is the 
great merit of the Flemish Movement that the Volksunie, as a political party, has always opted for 
evolution', emphasising the peaceful and democratic nature of the movement (VU, 1995). 
Federalisation did little to change this – with state reform presumed to originate at the 
centre rather than at sub-state level of government. 
The VU's rapid rise to relevance, as well as its early participation in government at the 
centre, placed challenges on it to define itself, particularly vis-à-vis rivals who increasingly 
claimed to represent the Flemish nation. The Volksunie's framing of itself and the party 
system reflected a need to be seen as both an outsider, willing to transcend pillarization 
and disrupt the status quo, but also to be acceptable as a prospective partner of coalition. 
It, therefore, spoke simultaneously of blackmail and coalition, framed as principled 
participation. 
The VU’s approach to participation was enabled by several factors: its more moderate 
self-government goals which could be pursued gradually and within the context of the 
Belgian system, the structure of the party system where it was conceivable regionalist 
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parties would be included, and a sense that, both pre- and post-federalisation, self-
government would come from negotiations at the centre rather than direct action at the 
sub-state level. Federalisation had an effect on the Belgian party system, contributing to 
increasing asymmetry between the parties of Wallonia and Flanders but did not require a 
fundamental change in the party system. It did, however, make it more challenging for 
the VU to claim exclusivity in representing the Flemish cause. Squeezed between the 
increasingly Flemish-oriented traditional parties and the more radical nationalist Vlaams 
Blok, it struggled to retain its systemic relevance. This had important implications for the 
strategy of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.  
6.3 The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie in a regionalised 
Flemish party space 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie emerged into a crowded and fragmented party space, and 
the dissolution of the Volksunie into three separate parties further contributed to this 
fragmentation. De Winter et al (2006: 939) identifies a tendency towards the ‘volksunie-
sation’ of Flemish parties as MPs and members disbanded to the Christian Democrats, 
Liberals, and Socialists, taking their calls for further Flemish self-government with them.  
In response to the fragmentation, an electoral threshold of five percent was introduced, 
aimed at the successors of the Volksunie, with the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie to be the 
principal victim (Cadrenel, 2003: 59; Onclin, 2009: 11; Hooghe et al, 2006: 357; Hooghe 
and Deschouwer, 2011: 638). Flemish Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Socialists were 
also undertaking processes of organisational reforms, evident in the name changes with 
all three undertaking rebranding between 1999 and 2007, adding Vlaams to their names 
to stress their Flemish identity (Erk, 2005; Trefois & Faniel, 2007). There was a consensus 
on the need for further reforms found in the 1999 Handvest voor Vlaanderen and the 
resolutions by the Flemish Parliament in favour of the further transfer of power to 
Flanders (Swenden, 2013: 5). As a result, there is ‘outbidding' amongst the traditional parties 
to position themselves as the party which best reflects Flemish interests (De Winter, 2012: 
17).  
To ensure its survival, the N-VA entered into an alliance under the header of a Flemish 
Cartel in 2004 with the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) who were outside of office 
and keen to burnish their Flemish nationalist credentials (Van Haute, 2011: 205; Hooghe 
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et al, 2006: 365). This put the party in an interesting position, clearly an outsider but allied 
with a traditional party.  The alliance was perceived as a ‘radicalisation' by the traditional 
Flemish parties and led to a reiteration of the Francophone parties' commitment to the 
status quo (Deschouwer, 2013: 341). The cartel was at the outset, a success. The so-called 
Flemish Cartel gained 26 percent of the votes at the Flemish regional elections, allowing 
CD&V to head the regional government and N-VA to enter the governing coalition as 
well as secure six seats in the Flemish Parliament. The parties were able to join together 
in the federal elections to push forward their manifesto commitments (Deschouwer, 
2007). However, the parties remained distinct, issuing separate manifestos in addition to 
a common electoral platform (Dandoy et al, 2013: 334). Although closely aligned 
ideologically, tensions emerged between the parties over how the parties should behave 
in and outside of government. In the government formation process following the 2007 
election, N-VA decided to support the government while not joining it (Van Haute, 2011: 
205). In September 2007, in response to tensions between the two parties, party founder 
Geert Bourgeois resigned from his post in the Flemish Government, placing the N-VA 
in opposition at the federal and regional level (Van Haute, 2011: 205).  
As a party which emerged from the disintegration of the Volksunie, the Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie faced unique challenges as well as opportunities in defining itself – ideologically, 
politically, and strategically – in a crowded Flemish party space. In the first dimension of 
interest in this research, the framing of the party and its political rivals in pursuit of self-
government, the party employs several frames: (1) the N-VA as a moral leader in pursuit 
of self-government; (2) the complicity of traditional rivals; and (3) the futility of the 
Vlaams Belang and its cause.  It also frames the pursuit of self-government directly, 
employing one key frame in its comparatively short lifespan (1), the courage to abstain, 
particularly at the centre. This frame is linked with the limited opportunities available to 
it, given the Parti Socialiste's rejection of any further Flemish demands as well as the 
party's frame of moral leadership. Unlike its rivals, the N-VA claims, it is a policy-seeking 
party rather than office-seeking. This position shifted in advance of the 2014 elections 
and will be discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
6.3.1 The N-VA and its rivals: morality, complicity, and futility 
Given the fragmented nature of the Belgian party system and the circumstances of its 
origins, the N-VA had to define itself and its self-government goal in the context of a 
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regionalised Flemish party space and in light of its own political legacy. It attempted to 
do so by positioning itself as a new party, representing a departure from traditional 
methods, as well as an old one, building on the legacy of the Volksunie. Beyens et al (2015) 
assess the ‘newness’ of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, examining its electoral functions and 
strategy, membership, and supporters. They conclude that the party at its origins owed 
much to the Volksunie, but became more new over time, ‘a result of a conscious choice to really 
build a new party’ (Beyens et al, 2015). In the party’s statement of principles, it stressed both 
history and novelty, ‘building on 45 years of successful work’, but with a ‘renewed, ambitious task’ 
(N-VA, 2001). It described itself as having risen from the ‘ruins' of the Volksunie and 
having its lessons (Beyens et al, 2015). It rejected some of the more recent Volksunie 
proposals which represented an attempts to reposition the VU as a more socially 
progressive party. The N-VA continually made reference to the positive legacy of the 
Volksunie but also pledged to learn from its mistakes, most notably its repeated entry into 
government at such a high cost.  
It positioned itself and its role within the party system by emphasising two key frames. 
Firstly, the N-VA framed itself as a moral leader, an outlier in the Belgian political system, 
a position linked with its abstention from government and its gradualist pursuit of self-
government. Secondly, and closely linked to this first frame, it critiqued its Flemish rivals, 
both nationalist and mainstream for their behaviour within the Belgian political space.   
1. A moral leader 
The party framed itself as a moral leader – in contrast with its traditional counterparts 
who were willing to abandon principles to enter office, and the Vlaams Belang which was 
detrimental to the Flemish nationalist cause. This moral leadership was closely linked with 
its stance on participation in government and also with its gradualist pursuit of its self-
government goals. 
The party adopted a clear ideological standpoint, but maintained the outsider ethos of the 
Volksunie, pledging to act in the Flemish interests and the name of Flemish self-
government, rather than catering to more narrow pillars that defined traditional Flemish 
parties. It described itself as ‘uniquely unbound’, rather than beholden to pillars, pressure 
groups, or financial interests (N-VA, 2003). Although its ideological position differed 
from its predecessor, the party adopted the VU’s call for clean politics, pledging to offer 
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‘more content, less packaging’, with a code of ethics for its representatives (N-VA, 2001; 2003). 
This consistent narrative of the party as a moral outsider was supported by Bart de 
Wever’s position outside of government, which allowed him to critique both the regional 
and federal government (Rochtus, 2012). Critiques of the N-VA as an outsider suggested 
to the party it was doing something right, refusing to be co-opted by the Belgian state and 
its entrenched political interests.  
The party also employed this frame of moral leadership to justify its gradualist approach 
to the pursuit of self-government, saying it was wholly committed to Flemish 
independence within Europe but acknowledging public opinion did not support this. In 
an interview in the media, Eric Defoort, one of the party’s co-founders explained why the 
N-VA would not take action towards independence. ‘The N-VA has no intention of betraying 
the million voters who placed their trust in us last June. The 27% of Flemings who voted for us did not 
vote for Flemish independence but the fundamental restructuring of this state’ (Le Soir, 2012). Jan 
Jambon, head of the N-VA in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives says of 
independence ‘Flemish independence, it is in our statute. But we are also a democratic party, and we 
know very well that in Flanders, there is not a majority which wants Flemish independence’ (Jambon, 
2014). Its commitment to respecting public preferences was used to fend off charges of 
radicalism as well as justify its gradualist approach to its supporters..  
2. The complicity of traditional Flemish rivals 
Traditional Flemish rivals were understood as complicit, co-opted into the Belgian system 
and possessing an insufficient commitment to Flemish self-government. Traditional 
Flemish parties have advocated for the further transfer of powers and have each included, 
at various points, confederalism in their political platforms. However, for the traditional 
parties, confederalism is used ‘to signal that they want to go beyond the current state of federalism, 
but without envisaging the split-up of Belgium' (De Winter, 2012: 28). As a result, the party faced 
competition on its self-government goals from more established political rivals. It 
responded by attacking Flemish rivals aggressively, challenging their credibility in 
pursuing self-government, their failed records, and their behaviour, both in and out of 
government. These charges were rooted in a core argument, that Flemish parties had been 
corrupted by their participation in government at the centre, motivated by self-interest 
and harbouring Belgiciste tendencies. As a result, in the eyes of the N-VA, they were 
unable to defend Flemish interests and serve as an engine of change. 
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The N-VA focused its critiques on the moral frailty of its Flemish counterparts, lacking 
the convictions of the Flemish nationalists. This was a result of their participation at the 
centre, which is perceived to have a corrupting influence. The party called, in the context 
of the coalition negotiations, on other Flemish parties to commit themselves, to ‘have for 
once the Flemish ambition to persevere’ (Kukula, 2008). Until 2014, entry into government was 
portrayed as motivated by self-interest rather than the interests of Flanders. 
The N-VA’s critiques shifted, shaped by perceptions of competition as well as the 
constraints of electoral cartels. While in an electoral cartel with the CD&V, the party 
focused its critiques on the Liberals, as a party of government, accusing it of betrayal of 
Flemish interests. In its 2007 manifesto, the party claimed ‘Liberals can no longer call themselves 
Flemings but are Flamingante Belgians, and Flanders deserves better’ (N-VA, 2007). The CD&V, 
outside of government in 1999 for the first time since 1958, and keen to burnish its 
Flemish nationalist credentials, was described carefully. As the two parties entered into 
cartel, the N-VA stressed that while they were distinct, they shared a common goal of a 
more radical reform of the state (N-VA, 2004).  
The end of the cartel and the party’s exit from regional government allowed it to sharpen 
its criticisms, and situate itself as the moral party in advance of the 2009 regional elections. 
The decision of the CD&V to participate in government at the centre, taking on the Prime 
Minister post, was described by De Wever in a media interview as ‘incredible’ and as ‘crossing 
the valley of shame’ (La Libre, 2008). Its decision was taken as a betrayalof the N-VA, the 
principles of self-government, and the interest of Flanders. When asked about the 
possibility of a renewed cartel in advance of the 2009 elections, De Wever replied ‘The 
cartel, it’s finished. The CD&V did not keep any of its electoral promises. The king is naked, the 
CD&V is naked’ (La Libre, 2008). The decision to form a government on the basis of the 
proposals of the Parti Socialiste was discussed as a betrayal, ‘a clear decision made by the 
CD&V and all of the traditional Flemish parties’ to enter into government and abandon any 
prospect of institutional reform (N-VA, 2011). The party continued to stress its 
disappointment with the actions of Flemish parties, with de Wever saying,following the 
formation of a federal government in 2011, ‘I am disappointed, and I hope that they will gain or 
regain the political courage to say, ‘no, we were mistaken’ (Daout, 2011).  
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This focus on political rivals – as a disappointment, having sold out Flemish interests in 
the pursuit of office – was to position the party to capitalise on disillusionment with 
traditional parties as well as distinguish itself in a crowded party space – both in terms of 
the overall number of parties but also one in which multiple visions of state reform, 
beyond federalism, were on offer. The failure of these parties to achieve significant state 
reform whilst in government suggested only the N-VA, as an outsider and one willing to 
maintain its moral position, could achieve meaningful progress on state reform and stand 
up to the Parti Socialiste.  
3. The futility of the Vlaams Belang and its cause 
The N-VA, like its predecessor, was squeezed – between the traditional Flemish parties 
which called for further state reform and emphasised their Flemish credentials, and the 
far-right Vlaams Belang, which co-opted, and in the view of the N-VA, tainted the cause 
of Flemish nationalism (Wauters, 2005: 336). In 2004, the VB received 24.15% of the 
votes in the Flemish Parliamentary elections, and while it declined in subsequent years, it 
posed a threat to the nascent N-VA. In response, the party framed the VB as pursuing a 
futile cause and serving as a hindrance to Flemish nationalism. The N-VA was careful to 
draw a distinction between its own civic, democratic nationalism with the ethnic, 
xenophobic nationalism of the VB, arguing Flemish self-government could not be 
pursued in such a manner. 
The N-VA acknowledged both parties were Flemish nationalists, but beyond their belief 
in Flemish self-government, they shared no similarities. De Wever described the VB as 
waving the same flag, but with insurmountable differences in both motives and content. 
De Wever explained ‘The N-VA is in favour of negotiation, it is for the European Union. It is for 
the negotiated independence of Flanders in the European framework....’ and pledged to respect the 
cordon sanitaire imposed by Flemish parties (La Libre, 2008). De Wever described the 
differences directly: ‘There are two choices when one is a Flemish nationalist: one can wish, like us, 
to change things by participating in change or one can be hostile to Belgium, like the Vlaams Belang, in 
rejecting all participation in the system’ (La Libre, 2008). Self-government was not within the 
remit of the VB and it in fact served as a hindrance to those seeking self-government.  
‘And it complicates the task of others. Because it places the demand for Flemish autonomy 
in the context of racism and the extreme right. It has become very easy for Francophones to 
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say ‘You’ve seen who the Flemish autonomists are, their project has a very interesting tone’. 
If the Vlaams Belang did not exist, the Francophones would have to invent it’  
de Wever, 2008.   
The collapse of the Vlaams Belang and the rise of the N-VA allowed for Flemings to 
advocate for self-government in a democratic and respectable fashion. The success of the 
N-VA was a victory for Flemish nationalists in pursuit of their goals but also a moral 
victory, ensuring ‘Flanders no longer has to bear the stigma of an extreme right’ (De Morgen, 2012).  
The VB’s losses in the 2009 contest were hailed as allowing Flemish independence to 
become a ‘negotiable and honourable endeavour’ (Van Baelen, 2009).  For those who voted for 
the VB on the basis of its independence platform, the N-VA provided a credible 
alternative.   
6.3.2 The pursuit of self-government: principled abstention 
From its origins, the N-VA declared itself open to participation in the federal government, 
using its willingness to participate as a marker of distinction between itself and its far-
right political rivals. It did, however, set out conditions under which it would do so, 
requiring the 1999 resolutions of the Flemish Parliament be honoured in the coalition 
agreement. It learnt lessons from the Volksunie, which had entered into government 
without securing a sufficient commitment to self-government. As a result, the party opted 
to exercise its blackmail rather than coalition potential at the centre, focusing on 
influencing traditional Flemish parties. De Winter (2012: 19) attributes this to the party’s 
unique approach to office, noting it is ‘not an office-seeking party in the pure sense…Government 
participation is only considered legitimate by its militant rank-and-file when clear policy (and eventually 
electoral) gains are to be expected’.  
As a result, the N-VA employs a single frame during this period, reflecting competition 
across levels but also in response to emergent events. Although it declared itself open to 
participation, the majority of its discussions focused on the politics of abstention. It argues 
that it, unique among the Flemish parties, possesses the courage to abstain from 
government, a position which is closely linked with its frame of moral leadership. The 
party only formally committed itself to participation in the context of the 2014 election, 
discussed in the following chapter 
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1. The courage to abstain 
While the Volksunie stressed its courage to participate, its successor focused on its 
courage to abstain, both from government entirely or from agreements or activities which 
it would violate its principles. In its 2003 manifesto, it pledged to refuse to join a federal 
government without an agreement on the transfer of powers on the economy, health, 
family policy, mobility, and taxation and it continued in this vein throughout its lifespan, 
arguing it would enter into government only if certain conditions were met (N-VA, 2003). 
Traditional Flemish parties, according to the N-VA, lacked this moral courage and were 
more interested in the spoils of office than the needs and interests of their Flemish 
constituents.   
When in electoral cartel at the Flemish level, the N-VA employed what Deschouwer 
defines as a halfway house strategy ‘supporting the government only on those items for which the 
party ideology and the policy proposals do not need to be stretched too far, allows a party to keep its 
ideological identity much 'cleaner' than when it has to share responsibility for all government decisions' 
(2008: 13). In general, though, it focused on building support. At the Flemish 
Government level, it was more likely to participate in governing coalition, seeing it as an 
opportunity to further Flemish interests, even if state reform was not to be pursued at 
this level. The 2009 manifesto for the Flemish Parliament elections had an interesting 
introduction to its policy proposals: ‘This programme is written on the basis of the expansionary 
use of powers Flanders has already. The power to carry out further measures to ensure welfare and 
prosperity for six million Flemings unfortunately still belong to the Belgian state’ (N-VA, 2009).  
The 2010 federal elections brought the divergence between Francophones and Flemings 
into sharper focus, the victory of the N-VA in Flanders and the Parti Socialiste in Wallonia 
emphasising the ‘radicalization in the electoral politics of Belgium’  (Abts et al, 2012). The N-VA 
called on Flemish parties to refuse to participate in federal governments which lacked a 
majority in Flanders.  (N-VA, 2010: 6). It acknowledged the risks of participation were 
acute. ‘If we join such a government, there is a great risk of losing the next election. We were elected 
because we support radical changes and because the voters trust us not to cave after six months of 
negotiations’ (de Wever, 2010). The decision to form a government on the basis of the 
proposals of the Parti Socialiste was discussed as a betrayal, ‘a clear decision made by the 
CD&V and all of the traditional Flemish parties’ to enter into government and abandon any 
prospect of institutional reform (N-VA, 2011).  
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This positon was linked with the N-VA’s moral leadership vis-à-vis political rivals, which 
were characterised as office-seeking with an insufficient commitment to the principle of 
Flemish self-government. Both its initial participation and its ultimate withdrawal were 
portrayed as brave choices, with a potential cost to the N-VA but a cost worth paying in 
order to hold fast to the party's principles. The failure of government negotiations was 
also employed as an opportunity to demonstrate that Belgium was dysfunctional, unable 
to govern itself because of the divergent interests contained within it.  Abstention allowed 
it to make the case that, between 2010 and 2014, there was not a parliamentary majority 
among Flemish parties, further highlighting the undemocratic and dysfunctional nature 
of the Belgian state.  
Unlike its predecessor, which approached participation as an obligation of a responsible 
nationalist party, the N-VA was, until 2014, more willing to emphasise its systemic 
relevance in the form of its blackmail, focusing on the threat it posed to traditional parties 
and its moral leadership in the face of their actions, feeling more could be achieved by 
abstention than participation. This changed in the run-up to the 2014 election when 
political rivals began to brand the N-VA as obstructionist, or a party of permanent 
opposition. Its move from a party of principled abstention to one of coalition was 
attributed to principles rather than opportunism.  
The N-VA had a unique opportunity to build on the legacy and achievements of the 
Volksunie, maintaining many of its institutional resources. It also faced significant 
constraints – a crowded party system, the introduction of an electoral threshold which 
seemed designed to eliminate the N-VA, and the existence and high levels of support for 
a more radical nationalist competitor. These conditions shaped the party’s framing of 
itself and its self-government goal.  
In response, it attempted to position itself as an outsider and a moral leader and used 
these frames to justify both abstention from the government at the centre, and 
participation at the Flemish level where Flemish interests, if not self-government, could 
be advanced. It also shaped the framing of its political rivals, particularly from the ranks 
of the traditional Flemish parties – who lacked convictions and were office-seeking, 
willing to enter into government at the expense of policy. 
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The N-VA’s positioning of itself within the Belgian party system shared many similarities 
with its predecessor – it stressed the necessity of a democratic Flemish nationalist party 
to serve as a voice for Flanders and a moral arbiter, pressuring Flemish counterparts into 
taking state reform seriously. However, it argued it had learned the lessons of the 
Volksunie and would take a harder line on participation. 
6.4 Self-government and the party system: 
understandings of the self, the other, and the system 
In all three cases, self-government was considered to be subject to electoral competition 
rather than broader public mobilisation or revolution. As a result, the parties and their 
goals were made with reference to the party system. This was evident in how they framed 
themselves and their political rivals and the pursuit of self-government within a party 
system.  All three made a claim to speak for the nation and its interests and challenged 
the credibility of rivals in doing so. For the SNP and the Volksunie, this was more explicit, 
focusing on the two parties as a voice for Scotland and Flanders respectively. This was 
less apparent in the N-VA's framing, which focused on the party as a moral leader.   
 
However, self-government was not the only purpose of the parties in question. They also 
sought, in the absence of self-government, to pursue and defend the interests of their 
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respective nations and these two goals were used to justify their participation, in legislative 
bodies and some instances, in government. 
The means by which self-government was to be pursued and the emphasis of each party 
on its systemic relevance also reflected the nature of their respective party system. For the 
SNP pre-devolution, this took the form of securing the majority of Scottish seats at 
Westminster, a vote for the SNP seen as providing a mandate for a declaration of 
independence. As a result, it pledged to participate in parliament, if not in government, 
and pursue both self-government and, in the interim, Scottish interests. It continually 
made reference to its blackmail relevance – placing Scottish issues on the political agenda, 
threatening the seats of statewide parties, and encouraging  statewide parties to support a 
limited form of self-government for Scotland. The SNP was, until devolution, able to 
frame itself as the sole supporter of Scottish self-government, challenging parties who 
were organisationally centralised. Devolution required a new strategy – positioning itself 
within the Scottish Parliament as a party of prospective government, and by virtue of its 
participation, of independence, and at Westminster as a party of opposition or a blackmail 
actor.  
For the VU and N-VA, self-government was to be negotiated at the centre and 
participation in the governing coalition was necessary to further these goals. Early on, the 
Volksunie  saw the opportunity from participation at the centre and framed this as a 
necessary and courageous act, justifying participation as an opportunity to make better 
policy and hold parties to account. State reform and the shift in political opportunity 
structures took place in threekey stages: the split of the traditional parties along linguistic 
lines, the introduction of a directly elected sub-state government, and finally the 
federalisation of the Belgian state. The Volksunie was largely willing to enter into 
government in order to be seen as participationist and pursue incremental reforms. This 
was a means both of pursuing self-government through negotiations at the centre but 
also, from the 1980s onwards, distinguishing itself from the anti-participationist Vlaams 
Blok. Participation in government was considered a brave choice, described as principled 
participation, and one which came at significant political costs.   
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie at its origins was cognisant of threats to its political survival, 
particularly in light of the introduction of the electoral threshold, but also of the demise 
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of its predecessor. Although declaring itself willing to enter into government at the centre 
should sufficient progress on state reform be achieved over the course of negotiations, it 
had stipulations for doing so and emphasised the courage to abstain when negotiations at 
the centre failed. While the Volksunie focused on its participation as a brave choice, the 
N-VA argued that its willingness to abstain was a symbol of its bravery – forsaking the 
spoils of office in pursuit of policy.  The N-VA was, until 2014, willing to exercise its 
blackmail potential, using its exclusion from coalition as a means to undermine the Belgian 
system, highlighting that between 2010 and 2014, the government lacked a majority in 
Flanders. It was, however, conscious of the risk of being branded as a party of permanent 
opposition like the VB and this consideration informed its shift in advance of the 2014 
elections.  
The nature of the self-government pursued and the means by which it was to be achieved 
shaped each party’s framing of itself, its rivals, and the system in which they operated. For 
both Flemish nationalist parties, self-government or the ‘divorce des Belges' was to be 
negotiated and achieved at the centre and participation in coalition (De Winter & 
Baudewyns, 2009: 297). The Volksunie, with a more moderate self-government goal 
throughout much of its lifespan, was often willing to enter into government to pursue 
more modest aims. For the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, which seeks confederalism in the 
short-term and independence in the long-term, a more radical ambition than that of its 
competitor, the centre remains important although the party continued to stress the moral 
virtue of abstention. As a result, it had to outbid its traditional competitors but also render 
itself eligible for coalition.   In contrast, post-devolution, Scottish independence was to 
be pursued through an SNP government, in power in Scotland, endorsed by the people 
at a referendum. Participation at this level served to position the party as one of 
government, providing the tools necessary to pursue its self-government objectives. It 
was also an opportunity to demonstrate Scotland’s potential and the possibility that, 
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Chapter Seven: Self-government in 2014 
The period between 2011 and 2014 was critical for the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and the 
Scottish National Party, with the mother of all elections taking place in Belgium in May 2014 
and Scotland’s referendum on independence following in September. These events had 
their origins in 2011, with the SNP securing a majority and the N-VA abstaining from 
participation in the federal government, following the 2010 elections.  
In autumn 2013, both parties published comprehensive accounts of their self-government 
goals: Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, the SNP-led Scottish 
Government’s white paper on independence (ScotGov, 2013), and the N-VA’s congress 
text and later manifesto, Change for Progress (N-VA, 2013). These represented the most 
comprehensive statements to date on the self-government goals of each party. The 
context in they were published differed, with Scotland’s Future taking the form of a 
blueprint for constitutional change, detailing what might happen in the event of a yes 
vote. In contrast, the N-VA’s proposal was presented as a more traditional party 
manifesto. Given the structure of the Belgian system, it was to serve as the basis for 
coalition negotiations should the party become incontournable, its participation 
mathematically necessary for any governing coalition. 
Although 2014 was ultimately anti-climactic for both parties, with the SNP failing to 
secure a majority in favour of independence, and the N-VA placing its proposals for 
confederalism on the backburner in order to pursue more pressing socioeconomic 
reforms, the publications represent an important development in the lifespan of the two 
parties and provide an opportunity to compare the two proposals in detail.   
In this final empirical chapter, I analyse the framing of independence and confederalism 
in the 2014 campaigns, drawing on the two documents as well as speeches, debates, media 
coverage, and interviews with party leadership, conducted in Flanders in February 2014 
and in Scotland in summer 2014, and media coverage. My analysis focuses on the 
empirical contexts assessed in the three preceding chapters, examining the way in which 
self-government was framed in light of the international and European context, the 
existing state structure, and the party system. Given the level of detail included in these 
proposals, the 2014 campaigns provide a unique opportunity to assess meanings of self-
government in the twenty-first century.  
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Each party will be addressed individually, beginning with a contextual introduction to 
each campaign and an assessment of (1) the ways in which self-government is defined and 
justified; and the framing of the (2) the international and European context; (3) the 
respective states and state structures; and (4) the party system in which these goals are 
pursued. I then conclude with a comparative discussion.  
7.1 The Scottish National Party and a 2014 vision of 
independence 
The Scottish National Party’s journey towards a referendum began in May 2007, with the 
formation of the minority government. As a minority, it was unable to pass legislation on 
a referendum, or to argue that it had a mandate for doing so. It instead proceeded with 
the National Conversations, a series of public consultations which explored the options 
available to Scotland, defined as the status quo, further devolution as proposed by the 
Calman Commission, which was dismissed as overtaken by events,  a more radical form 
of devolution ‘devolution max’ and independence (ScotGov, 2000). It focused during this 
period on the business of government, aiming to showcase competent government and 
build support for Scottish independence (Leith & Steven, 2010). Mitchell (2016: 79) 
described the party’s strategy as representing ‘a fairly long campaign to get elected but not in 
making the case for independence’.  
The SNP was returned to government as a majority in 2011, following an election 
characterised as ‘more Scottish than British’ (Carman et al, 2014). This victory, considered by 
political commentators as an ‘emphatic victory’ and a ‘watershed’ moment, was all the more 
notable for its occurrence in a system designed to prevent such an achievement (Hassan, 
2011; see also Johns et al, 2013). Analysis of the 2011 election suggested the victory was 
won on the basis of ‘performance politics’, or perceptions of the SNP as more competent 
than its rivals (Johns et al, 2013; Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). The party’s campaign 
reflected this strategy, with the 2011 manifesto titled Re-elect a Scottish Government Working 
for Scotland stressing competence rather than constitution (SNP, 2011). Increases in 
support for the party were not accompanied by increases in support for independence 
(Mitchell, 2016: 79). 
The referendum was not within the powers of the Scottish Parliament, and required the 
temporary transfer of powers from Westminster to Holyrood. When this was agreed, 
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issues of process could give way to issues of substance, and the SNP set out 
comprehensive arguments in favour of independence as well as of outline how an 
independent Scotland would function. Following the election, the Edinburgh Agreement 
was negotiated with the UK government, allowing the referendum to take place and have 
binding effect (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 29). The campaign was launched with the publication, 
on St Andrew’s Day 2013, of Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. The 
campaign took place under the aegis of Yes Scotland, with the SNP as the dominant 
partner. In a Holyrood Magazine interview before the 2013 conference, Alex Salmond 
described the changing context in which the SNP operated, ‘most SNP conferences have been 
dominated by the how we become independent…’ while in 2013, ‘the job of this conference is to articulate 
the why’ (Rhodes, 2013).  
The SNP’s discussions of its self-government goal of political independence consisted of 
four main aspects, which will be discussed in turn in the following section. Firstly, it 
defined and justified self-government, stressing independence as a modern manifestation 
of this goal - one allowing for the realisation of self-determination but also specific policy 
objectives. Secondly, the party discussed independence in an international context, 
stressing that rather than isolating Scotland, independence would allow for an end to the 
separation imposed on Scotland by the union. Thirdly, it stressed self-government as a 
response to the state system which failed to serve Scotland, while simultaneously 
identifying aspects of the state which it wished to preserve. Finally, the SNP placed itself 
and its goals in the larger context of the party system, calling into question the ability of 
rivals to adequately represent Scottish interests.  
7.1.1 Defining and contextualizing self-government 
The Scottish Government defined independence simply as ‘bring[ing] all the possibilities of 
full devolution with the additional responsibilities that could not be devolved within the United Kingdom, 
such as foreign affairs and defence’ (ScotGov, 2009). In 2013, with the publication of Scotland’s 
Future, we saw increased detail about the party’s conception of independence. From a legal 
perspective, independence was defined in traditional terms as the possession of 
international legal personality and membership in international organisations (ScotGov, 
2013: 3). However, the SNP advanced a unique vision of independence. In his 2012 
Arthur Donaldson speech at the SNP party conference, former MSP Andrew Wilson 
captured the nuances of the party’s conception of independence, describing it as ‘a 
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changing, elusive and tantalising objective’ but also as ‘an imperative for creating the economy and society 
we seek’ (Wilson, 2013a).  
The party’s definition of independence becomes more complex when we examine the 
content of the SNP’s proposals. This can be understood, in the party’s view, in light of 
six unions which an independent Scotland would leave, maintain, or modify. The SNP 
proposed to (1) end the parliamentary union, transferring sovereignty from the UK 
Parliament to the Scottish people; (2) whilst remaining in the Union of Crowns; (3) and 
the European Union as a successor; (4) preserving the social union of the British Isles; (5) 
and the sterling currency union, with the addition of direct input on the management of 
the currency for Scotland; (6) and NATO membership, although Trident would be 
removed from Scottish waters and Scotland would participate as a non-nuclear weapons 
state (ScotGov, 2013).  
The SNP acknowledged the changing meaning of independence as reflecting both the 
limits of states and the role played by the international community. It used these 
interdependencies to justify cooperation with the rest of the UK and a high degree of 
international cooperation, arguing these were not inconsistent with independent 
statehood. Stephen Noon, research director at Yes Scotland and formerly a special adviser 
to the SNP Government, drew a distinction between twenty-first century independence, 
as advanced by the SNP and ‘old-fashioned views’ of statehood. He contested the notion that 
this was a strategic retreat, arguing rather that it was ‘a reflection of deeply-held principles and a 
world view that sees partnership and co-operation as the best way or ordering relationships between nations’ 
(Noon, 2013). In this context, relationships could be pursued on equal terms. ‘The 
independence we propose reflects the realities of an increasingly inter-dependent world and is based upon a 
firm commitment to partnership and co-operation’ (ScotGov, 2013). Independence was 
understood as the ability to integrate rather than separate Scotland from the rest of the 
world.  
Although commentators argued this version of independence was independence-lite, the 
party countered with the argument that all nations operate within constraints and have 
chosen to pool sovereignty to tackle common challenges. Independence, in the view of 
the SNP, would provide Scotland with the means of participating directly in this process. 
The frame of ‘normal nationhood’ returned, entailing ‘the ability to take our own decisions, in the 
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same way as other countries’, with both the opportunities and constraints that entails (SNP, 
2011).  
1. Independence as a tool: framing the purpose of self-government 
In speeches, policy documents, and the white paper, independence was repeatedly 
framed as an instrumental goal, rooted in specific policy goals, rather than value 
rationality, or a matter of principle. The campaign stressed pragmatic aspects of 
independence which would provide the tools necessary to further Scotland’s 
prosperity and wellbeing. In a June 2014 speech at the Edinburgh Centre for 
Constitutional Law, then Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon addressed the issue of 
the purpose of nationalism and independence directly, drawing on Neil MacCormick’s 
distinction between existential nationalists, those who support independence as a 
fundamental principle, and utilitarian nationalists, who associate independence with the 
ability to pursue policy goals.  
‘The debate we are having is a very practical debate. A utilitarian debate. It is about the 
economy. It is about jobs. It is about welfare. It’s about our natural resources, the provision 
of childcare, membership of the EU. And whether with independence we would be better off 
or not’  
Sturgeon, 2014. 
The Art of the Possible 
7 Self-government in 2014  229 
Independence is motivated by policy or a commitment to democracy and social 
justice rather than identity (Sturgeon, 2012).The argument in favour of independence 
was consistently framed in these terms, with Alex Salmond writing in the introductory 
letter of the Scottish Government’s pre-referendum document, Your Scotland, Your 
Referendum ‘Scotland is not oppressed and we have no need to be liberated. Independence matters because 
we do not have the powers to reach our potential. We are limited in what we can do to create jobs, grow 
the economy and help the vulnerable’ 
(ScotGov, 2012). MSP Bruce 
Crawford’s Scotsman lecture 
on the referendum legislation 
stressed independence as a 
means, rather than an end goal, 
‘Our purpose is to reform the 
relationship between the people and 
the state, and to have a state which 
better reflects the will of the people’ 
(Crawford, 2012). Former 
MSP Andrew Wilson reiterates 
this in his Donaldson lecture, 
saying ‘There is no pot of gold, 
black or otherwise, at the end of the independence rainbow, but there is a toolbox. And that is the most 
important point’ (Wilson, 2013a). These arguments focused on two elements – the ability 
of an independent Scottish Government to pursue policies which would make Scotland 
more equal and more prosperous, and the democratic argument, ensuring Scotland gets 
the government it voted for.  
The SNP argued UK-wide economic policy has prevented Scotland from pursuing 
policies which would address its distinct needs. This economic argument stressed the 
inability of the Scottish Government to mitigate the impact of Westminster policy 
decisions. One of the most resonant images of the campaign (see inset) stressed the 
necessity of independence in order to combat child poverty (Yes Scotland, 2014). 
Independence, according to the SNP, would enable the pursuit of progressive policies 
reflecting the needs of Scotland. 
Yes Scotland campaign poster on child poverty and 
independence – stressing the opportunity that independence 
provides to address socioeconomic challenges. 
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In addition to the socioeconomic rationale for independence, democratic arguments were 
employed, namely the ability to ensure Scotland gets the government it votes for. In the 
white paper, this democratic deficit was elaborated, noting the number of years in which 
Scotland was ruled by a UK government which lacked a majority in Scotland and this was 
a recurrent theme in speeches by party leaders (Sturgeon, 2013a). The First Minister 
described the situation in a 2013 interview with Russia Today: 
‘I am 58 years old, and for two thirds of my life Scotland hasn’t had the governments we 
vote for. For two thirds of my entire lifetime, Scotland has voted in one direction, England 
has voted in a different direction. And because England is so much larger than Scotland, 
we end up with a government in Westminster, which isn’t chosen by the Scottish people. 
The first argument is essentially a democratic one – that nations and Scotland is a nation 
have the right of self-determination’  
           Salmond, 2013.  
This was the result of the ‘arithmetic of the United Kingdom parliament which renders Scotland 
subordinate’ (Salmond, 2011c).  
The referendum itself was portrayed as an opportunity to renew Scottish democracy, a 
‘fundamental democratic choice’ resulting in ‘the power to choose who we should be governed by and the 
power to build a country that reflects our priorities as a society and our values as a people’ (ScotGov, 
2013).  By voting for independence, voters would be choosing to abandon the ‘outdated 
and profoundly undemocratic Westminster system’ which had failed to adequately reflect Scottish 
values for one based on the preferences of the people (Salmond, 2013a).   
7.1.2 Self-government in Europe and the world 
The SNP’s framing of its self-government goal has historically been made with reference 
to the international dimension, a natural result of its focus on external self-government 
rather than accommodation within the existing state. This was particularly true in the 2014 
debate in which questions and claims about Scotland’s role in the international 
community, and particularly, in the European Union came to the fore. The party 
throughout the campaign insisted an independent Scotland would remain a member of 
the European Union, a knowledge claim contested by political rivals (Douglas-Scott, 
2016). The party’s framing of the international context took two main forms: (1) a focus 
on independence as allowing for integration rather than isolation, reflecting the realities 
of interdependence in the contemporary era; (2) the opportunity for Scotland to play a 
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positive role in the world, which is both implicitly and explicitly contrasted with the role 
played by the United Kingdom. Both of these frames are found in earlier time periods but 
are more pronounced in the context of the 2014 campaign. 
1. Integration, interdependence, and independence 
The SNP rejects efforts by Unionist parties to suggest independence equates to separation 
and isolation within the world, countering this by acknowledging the realities of 
interdependence. Independence was paired with interdependence in this frame as the 
party reiterated that it was not ignorant of the realities of a globalised world. It 
acknowledged the myth of absolute sovereignty but sought to play its rightful role 
(Salmond, 2013b). 
According to the SNP, independence is an outward-looking act which will redress 
centuries of isolation of Scotland imposed on Scotland by the current state structure. 
Fiona Hyslop, Cabinet Secretary for Culture and External Affairs, addressed this directly, 
saying, ‘I want to stress that independence is not separation. Independence will mean strong, new 
relationships between Scotland and the rest of the UK and with other members of the European Union’ 
(Hyslop, 2013). Not only will independence allow for a more positive relationship with 
the international community but with the rest of the United Kingdom, addressed in 
section three. Andrew Wilson’s 2013 Arthur Donaldson lecture discussed the constraints 
of independence but argued it was better than the status quo.  
‘We truly will have the best of both worlds: the most modern nation and closest partnership 
in the world but with the tools of a normal country to carve our own destiny and make our 
own choices, albeit constrained by the realities 193 other countries face every day’  
Wilson, 2013a. 
Globalisation and the challenges posed by an increasingly interdependent world is both a 
motivating factor for self-government and for integration within global structures. In the 
introduction to Scotland’s Future, these were acknowledged but it was argued self-
government would provide the tools to respond to these challenges, contributing to global 
and European solutions (ScotGov, 2013). ‘In the conduct of international affairs no country 
operates in isolation. The global and regional context creates the conditions and defines the range of choices 
and options that each state must address’ (ScotGov, 2013). The party and its supporters 
acknowledged that ultimate sovereignty was a myth and must be shared, ‘In reality, of course, 
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all countries must cede and share sovereignty and power with others if they are to pursue the best interests 
of their people’ (Wilson, 2013b). But this sharing of sovereignty, according to the SNP, 
would strengthen Scotland’s place in the world. Salmond recognised this in a 2013 
conference speech that ‘no-one in this party claims that an independent Scotland will be able to wish 
away global competition. We will still be affected by it, influenced by it and often challenged by it’ but he 
argued that self-government provided an opportunity to address challenges directly 
(Salmond, 2013c) 
This framing represented an effort by the SNP to counter critiques made by political rivals 
that independence would leave Scotland cut off from the world. Instead, it argued that 
meanings of independence and sovereignty had changed and independence was necessary 
to cope with these challenges. 
2. Scotland as a positive actor in the world 
The second frame employed by the SNP positioned Scotland as a positive actor on the 
global stage, in implicit, and sometimes explicit contrast to the role played by the United 
Kingdom. While references were made to broader international tendencies, specifically 
engagement in the Iraq War, it focused its attention on the European Union and what it 
argued were different viewpoints and attitudes between Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom, particularly in regards to  European Union membership.  
Scotland was defined as a European nation, ‘Our culture, history, trade and international alliances 
have long been defined by relations with our Continental neighbours’ (SNP, 2014). It juxtaposed little 
England and pro-European Scotland, a narrative which first emerged in the 1980s. An 
independent Scotland would be enthusiastic about participation in EU and would be ‘free 
from the visceral distrust of Europe which stifles political engagement at a UK level’ (Salmond, 2013b). 
In Brussels, Nicola Sturgeon appealed to the members of the European Union to 
recognise that Scotland’s approach to Europe differed from that of the UK. She noted 
differences in public opinion and described David Cameron’s efforts at reform as running 
the risk of ‘sleepwalking towards the exit’ (Sturgeon, 2013b).   
At the same time, the SNP did not fully embrace the European project, a response to 
crises and challenges that had emerged at the European level since its independence in 
Europe platform was first articulated. In Scotland’s Future, the party’s approach to Europe 
can be characterised as positive but maintaining a degree of distance, seeking to preserve 
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some ties with the United Kingdom and to opt out of EU policies understood as 
detrimental to Scottish interests (ScotGov, 2013). While in the early 2000s the SNP 
proposed integration within the Eurozone, it now proposed a sterling currency union. 
The SNP’s 2014 European Parliament manifesto described the party as ‘unashamedly, though 
not uncritically, pro-European’ (SNP, 2014).  However, despite criticisms the party’s approach 
was to be different to that of the UK parties, building the case for reform  through 
‘constructive dialogue and alliance building’ rather than threats of exit (Sturgeon, 2013b).  
The salience of the international, and in particular, the European context, in the SNP’s 
framing of self-government was high, a natural outcome of the party’s commitment to 
external self-government in the form of political independence as well as the prospect of 
a UK referendum on Europe. Beasley and Kaarbo (2017) describe the behaviour of 
Scotland and the response of the international community as the ‘pre-socialisation’ of what 
they call an ‘aspirant state’. It involved both an assertion of Scottish sovereignty and an 
attempt to position Scotland as an aspirant state which would play a positive role on the 
global stage. This was both implicitly and explicitly contrasted with the role played by the 
United Kingdom, particularly at the European level, suggesting fundamental differences 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK.  
7.1.3 Self-government, the British state, and state reform 
The message of difference, seen in the SNP’s approach to self-government and the 
international context, was also present in discussions of the state and further state reform, 
and the party continually stressed these in an effort to justify its pursuit of self-
government. At the same time, it sought to recast the relationship between the United 
Kingdom and an independent Scotland, focusing on the positive potential.  The framing 
of the British state structure vis-à-vis Scotland and Scottish self-government took four 
main forms. Firstly, the British state was framed as an outdated institution, failing to serve 
Scotland’s interests. Secondly, at times, the British state, or more commonly Westminster, 
was viewed as hostile to Scotland’s prosperity and well-being, a frame which became more 
pronounced in response to the politics of austerity pursued by the UK government. 
Thirdly, proposals for state reform falling short of full political independence were 
welcomed, but ultimately considered insufficient. Finally, and in apparent contradiction 
to the negative framing of the UK state, the SNP developed its vision of maintaining 
relationships with the rest of the UK.  
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1. The British state as an outdated institution 
The United Kingdom is portrayed as outdated, unable to cope with a changing world, and 
its changing, and diminished role in it, as well as unable to serve Scottish interests. Nicola 
Sturgeon described the United Kingdom as a ‘deeply indebted state’, one ‘adrift from Europe 
and increasingly isolated on the wider stage’ (Sturgeon, 2013a). She noted a country ‘facing 
joblessness, bankruptcy, falling living standards, a sense of uncertainty about the future’ (ibid). In a 
2014 debate published in The Independent between Alex Massie and former MSP Andrew 
Wilson, Wilson described the Union as having fulfilled its function and overdue for 
replacement. He wrote ‘my appeal to you is not out of a disrespect for the story of the UK or Britain. 
That was a joint project that delivered much for many. But I feel it has run its course’ (cited in Paterson, 
2015). While the UK is rarely described as intentionally anti-Scottish, it is portrayed as 
unable, by virtue of its structure, to adequately represent Scotland’s interest. ‘It’s not just 
that a government in London is unwilling to do what is best for Scotland. It is incapable of putting the 
people of Scotland first’ (Salmond, 2012). This framing of the British State was used to justify 
the SNP’s pursuit of self-government, with no interim accommodation possible.  
2. Divergence between the UK and Scotland 
The framing of the UK as outdated was closely linked with a framing of difference 
between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The SNP argued Scots vote for 
different parties, subscribe to different values, and should be able to pursue these values 
through self-government. Events like the Iraq War, the handling of the economic crisis 
and subsequent policies of austerity were used to highlight this. Importantly, the party did 
not suggest these differences existed between Scotland and England but between Scotland 
and the central institutions of the British State. It focuses on ‘Westminster’, ‘London parties’ 
and the ‘UK government’ rather than the United Kingdom or England.  
This framing was always present in the SNP’s manifestos but found further support with 
the return of the Conservative Party to government. The party described a choice between 
a fair and prosperous Scotland and a Britain ravaged by austerity. Alex Salmond’s 2013 
conference speech described a government ‘hell bent on pulling our society apart at the seams’ 
(Salmond, 2013c).  The party focused on UK government policies which wouldin its 
viewnever have been passed in an independent Scotland, including the bedroom tax and 
the renewal of Trident (Salmond, 2013d). ‘With each passing day it becomes clearer that the 
Westminster system is not fit for any purpose – it is further away than ever from Scotland’s values, and 
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past its time’ (Salmond, 2013c). The failure of Westminster – to pursue social justice, to 
implement appropriate policies, and to adequately represent Scotland’s interests - was 
seen as a justification for independence, as only independence would allow for different 
choices to be made.  
3. Devolution as a journey with a final destination 
As a result of these fundamental differences, proposals for constitutional change which 
fell short of independence were met with scepticism by the SNP. However, devolution 
was quickly embraced by the party in 1999 and throughout the referendum campaign, it 
was portrayed as a necessary stop on the journey to Scotland’s ultimate destination. In a 
2012 speech at Strathclyde University, Nicola Sturgeon described the Scotland Act 1998 
in glowing terms, saying it ‘may come to be seen as one of the finest pieces of legislation ever. It set up 
a parliament which was fit for the 21st century. We have in place a great foundation – it was designed to 
be built on’ (Sturgeon, 2013a). In a speech for The Times debate, Alex Salmond linked ‘a 
successful, efficient, confident Scottish Parliament’ with growing support for independence 
(Salmond, 2012b). The Scottish Government white paper portrayed devolution positively, 
allowing the people of Scotland to experience some of the benefits of self-government 
but ultimately, illustrating the need for more. ‘Progress under devolution has shown us what is 
possible, but it is not enough’ (ScotGov, 2013). Speaking of the opportunity to revitalise 
relationships through independence, Sturgeon portrayed independence as a natural next 
step, consistent with the process of devolution, a ‘logical continuation of the devolution journey’ 
rather than a radical act.  (Sturgeon, 2013c).  
Despite this adoption of devolution into the narrative of the party, further devolution 
was, throughout the campaign period, considered unfeasible and the White Paper stated, 
unlikely. ‘Despite much talk of further devolution and more powers for Scotland, with a No vote there 
is no assurance that there will be any new powers for the Scottish Parliament within the UK’, citing the 
absence of concrete proposals (ScotGov, 2013). The White Paper also noted that 
‘Westminster would also maintain its claim of sovereignty over Scotland in all matters’, warning while 
convention suggests otherwise, Westminster could change the powers or abolish the 
Scottish Parliament.  Only a vote for independence, the party stressed, would guarantee 
change.  
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In response to the Vow made by unionist party leaders on the 16th of September, Alex 
Salmond called the proposal a ‘last minute desperate offer of nothing’ (Johnson, 2014). A 
statement from Yes Scotland attributed the offer further powers to panic amongst Better 
Together, saying ‘It's clear that project panic is willing to say anything in the last few days of the 
campaign to try to halt the Yes momentum - anything except what new powers, if any, they might be 
willing to offer’ (Yes Scotland, 2014). 
4. A renewed partnership 
Despite consistently negative framing of the Union – as either outdated or explicitly 
hostile to Scottish interests and a rejection of proposals to strengthen Scotland within the 
Union – the SNP continued to stress that ties between Scotland and the rest of the United 
Kingdom would survive and would even be strengthened post-independence, recasting 
the relationship to one of equality.  Its proposals emphasised continuity, through the 
maintenance of social, currency, and monarchical unions and opportunities to maintain 
ties and restore relationships which had been hindered by the inequalities of the UK state 
structure.  
For the SNP, independence was an opportunity to renew and reinvigorate partnerships 
within the United Kingdom and the broader British Isles, cooperating when desired and 
acting as equal partners. Strategically, this de-radicalised the idea of independence, 
stressing what would remain the same rather than what would change. In the 2011 
manifesto, it proposed replacing the current political union with a social union and 
foresaw cooperation under the umbrella of the European Union, which allowed for open 
borders, trade, and cooperation (SNP, 2011). Salmond emphasised these ties in the 
preface to the White Paper: 
‘I also believe that the bonds of family, friendship, history and culture between Scotland and 
the other parts of the British Isles are precious. England, Wales and Northern Ireland will 
always be our family, friends and closest neighbours. But with Scotland as an independent 
country, our relationship will be one of equals. I have no doubt that it will flourish’ 
          ScotGov, 2013.  
Stephen Noon of Yes Scotland redefined independence as co-operative independence, 
with ‘new united kingdoms’ (Noon, 2013). Independence was an opportunity to reset and 
foster new, more positive relationships, with the rest of the UK and within the British 
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Isles. Salmond described the social union, which he argued would be strengthened rather 
than undermined by Scottish independence.  
‘The social union unites all the peoples of these islands. After independence we will still 
watch the X-Factor or EastEnders. People in England will still cheer Andy Murray, and 
people in Scotland will still support the Lions at rugby – even when there aren’t many Scots 
in the team! People will still change jobs and move from Dundee to Dublin, or from 
Manchester to Glasgow. That’s the reality of the social union – it’s not about border controls 
or whatever else is the Whitehall scare of the day’  
           Salmond, 2013d.  
This may have served a strategic purpose. Continued institutional, economic, cultural and 
political ties to the rest of the UK may make independence more palatable to undecided 
voters. 
While this framing of the state structure, including the relationship with Scotland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom both today and in an independence scenario, seemed quite 
novel, it was consistent, albeit in a more pronounced form, with previous visions of 
independence. The party had always stressed continued relationship and cooperation 
between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, as discussed in chapter five. 
However, the degree of integration was more pronounced, informed by pragmatic 
considerations and constraints imposed by the larger context – the global financial crisis 
and concerns about the sustainability of the European project, as well as strategic 
concerns about whether voters would accept radical change.  
7.1.4 The independence debate and the party politics 
Linked with the SNP’s framing of the structure of the British state and self-government 
was its framing of the party system, which focused on issues of representation and 
democracy. Paterson (2015) notes the SNP was challenged by a consensus within the 
Scottish party system, even among unionist campaigners, on the recognition of Scottish 
sovereignty, leaving the debate focused on the question of whether a sovereign Scotland 
should have sovereign institutions. As a result, the SNP would struggle to credibly portray 
its competitors as anti-Scottish but challenged them on their ability to represent Scotland, 
due to their tendency to ‘do Scotland down’.  
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The Better Together campaign was understood as an unholy alliance between Labour, 
Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats. In his 2012 conference speech, Alex Salmond 
described the campaign with incredulity, ‘Just think of it. Labour, the party which brought the 
country to its financial knees, unites with the Tories, the party of omnishambles, to tell Scotland that we 
are uniquely incapable as a nation’ (Salmond, 2012b).  
The failure of these parties to adequately serve Scotland and instances in which Scotland 
failed to get the government it voted for, served as justification for self-government, and 
this argument was closely linked with discussions of the state. 
1. Doing Scotland down 
Although the referendum was not an electoral contest, the SNP consistently portrayed 
unionist parties as failing to speak for Scotland and in fact, undermining its potential. 
Hearn’s analysis of the campaign identified the SNP’s tactic as contrasting ‘courage versus 
cowardice’, arguing Unionist parties were too ‘feart’ to do what was right for Scotland 
(Hearn, 2014).   
Alex Salmond engaged with this frame directly throughout the campaign, making repeated 
reference to what he perceived as an inherent tendency to undermine Scotland. Alex 
Salmond’s October 2011 conference speech spoke of unionist parties as leaderless and 
out of touch, focusing on ‘doing down’ Scotland rather than building her up, a common 
refrain (Salmond, 2011b). It was not just opposition to the SNP and what it stood for but 
opposition to Scotland as a nation, ‘This is Westminster’s agenda of disrespect – not of disrespect 
to the SNP but of fundamental disrespect for Scotland’ (Salmond, 2011b). In assessing the unionist 
position, Salmond described opposition to independence as rooted in the fact that ‘an 
independent Scotland would be run by the people of Scotland, for the people of Scotland. Instead of telling 
people in Scotland what they can do, they tell us what we can’t do’ (Salmond, 2011b). He returned 
to this frame in a 2013 interview with Holyrood Magazine, critiquing the no campaign’s 
strategy, saying ‘I don’t think you can win a referendum by telling the Scottish people that they are not 
good enough, rich enough, confident enough to be an independent country’ (Rhodes, 2013). The 
Unionist campaign, according to the SNP, relied on a negative view of Scotland, and 
offered no positive solutions. ‘Without a clear statement of what Scotland might look like in future 
within the union, the case against independence is inevitably based more on a negative view of Scotland’s 
potential than a positive vision of the future’ (Salmond, 2012b).  
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The party also drew on historical opposition to devolution to emphasise independence as 
the natural next step. ‘Every old discredited jalopy of an argument from the 1970s and – as we have 
just heard – the 1990s - is being wheeled out of the garage’ (Salmond, 2012b). Stale arguments 
were revisited, ones that were relevant in the two previous devolution debates, and 
subsequently disproven. Nicola Sturgeon employed the same frame, ‘Because devolution 
wasn’t the status quo, it was easy to characterise it as a leap in the dark - to spread and create uncertainty. 
Just as the No campaign is seeking to do today about independence’ (Sturgeon, 2013c). The success 
of devolution, it was implied, would be followed by a successful independence.  
7.1.5 Analysing independence in 2014 
The SNP’s framing of its self-government goal – of independence – was broadly 
consistent in 2014 with previous iterations from devolution onwards, but with some key 
changes in the detail, reflecting economic, European, and strategic considerations. The 
most significant variation is evident in the details of the goal itself, rather than its framing, 
with the SNP emphasising, in the details of independence, a greater degree of 
interdependence. This was not entirely new. In 2004, Kenny MacAskill suggested an 
independent Scotland should maintain some shared services and cooperate on a range of 
issue and these proposals were included in the 2013 White Paper (MacAskill, 2004; 
ScotGov, 2013).  
The SNP made a pragmatic case for self-government, arguing independence was not to 
fulfil a romantic ideal but was a tool, one which would allow for Scotland to become more 
equitable, prosperous, and democratic. What was striking both to voters and political 
commentators was the emphasis on what would remain the same in the event of a yes 
vote. Rather than framing independence as a radical departure from what came before, 
the party stressed continuity, with independence as a natural next step, a scenario in which 
many of the same policies and institutions would remain in place. This ensured stability 
and would, the party assumed, reassure voters who supported further devolution. 
It also reflected broader international and European dynamics. Since the 1980s the SNP’s 
independence in Europe platform stressed deeper European integration, including in 
social policy and currency, presuming that the United Kingdom would also engage more 
fully with the European project. Crisis at the European level and the refusal of the UK 
government to enter into such an arrangement required a rethink of the party’s support 
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of the Euro (Brown Swan & Petersohn, 2017). Beyond these details, the SNP’s framing 
of the international context and self-government seemed to shift from independence in 
Europe to a solution to some of the challenges posed to a small state, to a form of 
independence embedded within the context of the British Isles. European Union 
membership was layered on top of this, serving as an umbrella which would facilitate 
cooperation with Europe and the rest of the UK.  
This focus on continued cooperation and close ties with the rest of the United Kingdom 
is perhaps surprising given the quite negative framing of the British state and its 
institutions, which is at best neglectful, at worst, openly hostile to Scotland’s interests. 
However, it is explained by an emphasis on the party system and the structure of the state. 
It isn’t that Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom are enemies, it is the fact that 
Scotland’s needs and interests cannot be accommodated within the existing stare 
structures. The focus is on the unionist parties and their actions as a justification for 
Scottish self-government rather than an intrinsic animosity between Scotland and 
England.  
The SNP’s framing was, at points, challenged from within and outwith the party. The 
party’s proposals, which to a large degree emphasised what would remain the same with 
independence rather than what would change, were critiqued internally as well as by Yes 
Scotland coalition partners as being overly cautious. In a referendum post-mortem, 
former party leader Gordon Wilson argued that to win a future referendum, the 
movement must go on the offensive (Wilson, 2015).  
As the party moves forward, reflecting on the unsuccessful referendum of 2014, shifts in 
Scottish and UK-wide party politics, and the process of Brexit, these frames are likely to 
be modified, reflecting new dynamics at the European, state, and party system level.  
7.2 The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and confederalism 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s rapid rise to systemic relevance accorded the party 
influence, both from its blackmail and coalition potential (Abts et al, 2012). The 2010 
federal elections were a victory for the N-VA but also for the Walloon Parti Socialiste and 
these voting patterns helped highlight growing divergence between the North and South 
(Abts et al, 2012). They also cemented the party’s leadership among Flemish parties, who 
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appeared increasingly willing to follow the N-VA’s lead on state reform for fear of ceding 
further votes (De Winter, 2012: 18; André and Depauw, 2015: 229). Its victory in the 2012 
elections, particularly its success in Antwerp, allowed the party to stress that progress was 
inevitable (Dandoy, 2013). 
The N-VA withdrew from government negotiations in 2007 and 2011 and was aware, at 
the federal and regional elections of 2014, of the risk of being seen as obstructionist, 
characterised, along with the Vlaams Belang, as a party of permanent opposition. Bart de 
Wever declared 2013 the year of confederalism, stating he and his colleagues would spend 
the year preparing its confederal goals in advance of the 2014 election. His 2014 congress 
speech suggested this was not only a manifesto for the coming term but for the future of 
Flanders. ‘These texts will determine the political action of our party in the coming years’ (de Wever, 
2014a). He continued, ‘We have often written history together. Today we have written the future. The 
future of our country’ (de Wever, 2014a).   
Success at the polls would not set a process of state reform in motion as it would in 
Scotland but would require government formation and negotiation. The party’s goal, 
announced prior to the election, was 30% of the Flemish vote, a significant percentage in 
the highly fragmented Belgian party system and one that would make a federal coalition 
without the N-VA numerically impossible rendering the party incontournable (André and 
Depauw, 2015: 230). It stressed its office-holding ambitions, with an introductory letter 
from Ben Weyts calling the party to have courage:  
‘Courage to govern without parties that stand in the way of structural reforms. Courage to 
form a government which would take immediate action on socio-economic recovery, but at 
the same time, anchors structural change in the future’  
N-VA, 2013: 3.  
However, in a 2012 article on the prospects of the N-VA, De Winter argued that it had 
two ‘opposite but equally winning’ strategies available to it, firstly, to enter into negotiations 
and achieve state reform, or conversely, to enter into protracted negotiations but 
ultimately withdraw, claiming Francophone intransigence, cementing its role as the party 
speaking for Flanders (De Winter, 2012: 18).  
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There was some debate within the N-VA about the primacy of self-government goals and 
whether, given the urgency of the economic situation, other goals should be pursued 
(André & Depauw, 2015: 230). Siegfried Bracke caused controversy in August 2013 when 
he suggested socioeconomic reforms should be the priority in 2014 and argued that the 
N-VA would enter into coalition with this in mind. Liesbeth Homans, a prominent figure 
within the party, contradicted him, saying that the party would not enter into coalition 
without an agreement on state reform. ‘No coalition without agreement to the N-VA’s terms’ 
Bracke later retracted this statement, saying socioeconomic goals and state reforms should 
be pursued simultaneously (Pauli, 2014). The party stressed this commitment throughout 
the campaign, although ultimately ceding it over the course of the negotiations.  
The 2014 elections, taking place at the European, federal, and regional community level 
were described as the ‘mother of all elections’ due to their scale and for their implications for 
Belgium’s future. For the N-VA, this represented an opportunity to capitalise on recent 
successes and growingdisillusionment with the status quo in order to enter into 
government at both levels and pursue self-government and socioeconomic policies.  
The N-VA proposals, published in autumn 2013 and approved at the party’s January 2014 
congress, represent the most explicit articulation of its self-government goals to date. 
These goals consisted of four main components, each of which will be addressed in turn. 
Firstly, it defined and justified confederalism, rejecting academic definitions in favour of 
ones in keeping with the goals of the party and to some degree, the traditions of the 
Belgian state. Secondly, it situated confederalism in an international context, focusing 
exclusively on the European dimension, which is consistent with previous iterations. 
Thirdly, the party stressed self-government as a response to the state system which had 
failed to serve both Flemings and Francophones. Finally, it placed itself and its goals in 
the larger context of the party system, questioning the ability of Flemish rivals to 
adequately represent Flemish interests and pledging to demonstrate courage and 
responsibility in its pursuit of office. 
7.2.1 Defining and contextualizing self-government 
The confederal model proposed by the N-VA in 2014 was consistent with that advanced 
by the N-VA since 2009, but included substantially more detail. Confederalism, according 
to the party, differs from the current federal arrangement in the sense that the federal 
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logic was reversed, with Flanders and Wallonia as the main actors, ‘own[ing] all powers’ and 
exercising them independently or together when in their mutual interest. The ethos of a 
Belgian confederation would see each acting ‘according to their own views, their own responsibility, 
and with their own funds’ (N-VA, 2013: 21). In his speech at the 2014 congress, Vice 
President Ben Weyts described confederalism by its purpose ‘In order to address our own 
problems with our own solutions and our own money’ (Weyts, 2014a). He acknowledged this was 
not the ‘expensive academic, professorial definition’ but a practical solution to the considerable 
problems of the Belgian state (Weyts, 2014a).    
Rather than proposing yet another round of state reform, it proposed a Treaty of 
Confederation between Flanders and Wallonia, a text which would include the basic rules 
and functions of the confederal institutions, a summary of rights and freedoms applicable 
to all residents, and a list of powers exercised jointly (N-VA, 2013: 69). The institutions 
of the Belgian confederation would be modelled on the European Union and a governing 
council would be charged with ensuring cooperation, resolving conflict, preparing the 
confederation’s international position, and holding consultations on Brussels. The party 
did not claim sovereignty, although the hollowed Belgian state was to act as a ‘glove for 
Flanders’ and Wallonia, with little right of initiative (N-VA, 2007; 2010). 
The proposed Belgian confederation would consist of two deelstaten: Flanders and 
Wallonia, with a special status for both the Brussels Capital and the German-speaking 
region (N-VA, 2013: 21). Brussels as a capital would fall within the territories of both 
Flanders and Wallonia, and the city would remain the capital of Flanders. (N-VA, 2013).  
This was consistent with the long-held preference of the N-VA and the Volksunie for a 
two-state model of bilateral federalism, avoiding according full status to Brussels, which 
was considered an unjust counterbalance to a Flemish democratic majority.  
For the N-VA, the relationship between confederalism and independence is ambiguous. 
The original conference text did not mention Flemish independence, and it has been 
excluded in recent election manifestos. However, this was a subject of debate for party 
members at the 2014 party congress, leading to the insertion of a discussion of 
independence in the final draft of the party proposals. Flemish Parliamentarian Matthias 
Dipendaele stressed that ‘An independent Flanders remains well and truly the first objective in the 
statutes of the party’.  This was also reiterated on the party’s website, responding to questions 
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about its goals ‘Our final goal is, in effect, an independent Flanders and membership in Europe’ (N-
VA, 2014).  
However, the party stressed this process was made up in steps, a long-term goal rather 
than something to be pursued in the context of the current campaign. It described this as 
a strategic choice, with Ben Weyts noting the party’s commitment to independence but 
an absence of public support (Weyts, 2014). Independence is thus portrayed in two ways 
- firstly, as a natural outcome of confederalism, with the Belgian centre gradually reduced 
in importance, and secondly, as an alternative to Francophone resistance to proposed 
reforms. The timeline is vague and independence is not an urgent demand. Jan Jambon 
explained this timeline in personal terms, ‘I’m 60 at the moment and I’m not quite sure whether 
I will have the possibility to have a little party on independence’ (Jambon, 2014). But he noted the 
pace of change would be set by Francophones and Flemish mainstream parties, with 
intransigence on their part leading to acceleration.  
1. Confederalism as a tool 
Perhaps even more than its Scottish counterpart, the N-VA focused on confederalism 
as a tool to enable policy – both economic improvements and democratic ones - 
rather than on the basis of principle. Weyts described the purpose of Flemish 
nationalism and self-government, explaining ‘it’s about proving that it’s not about just a 
nationalist struggle. It’s about what I call the de-instrumentalization of nationalism. Meaning that it’s 
about socioeconomic reforms’ (Weyts, 2014b). This emphasis was strategic and many within the 
party acknowledged that they possessedan emotional attachment to the idea of an 
independent Flanders, the voting population needed to be persuaded by the opportunity 
for meaningful social and economic gains (Jambon, 2014). The goal for the party, 
explained a prominent N-VA MP was ‘health and wealth for our region and our people’ rather 
than institutional structures (Jambon, 2014).  
In an introductory letter from congress president Ben Weyts, the Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie’s rationale for seeking confederalism was outlined. This was rooted in a 
critique of the current system and its failure to deliver socioeconomic returns rather 
than a historical or value rational argument.  
‘We pay skyrocketing federal taxes, but don’t receive efficient services in return. We 
pay enormous social contributions, and yet our social security is neither social nor 
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secure. Our businesses and entrepreneurs pay through the nose, but they don’t receive 
a favourable economic and investment climate’  
N-VA, 2013: 3.  
The N-VA’s congress text was heavily policy focused; in total, 438 specific policy 
proposals were made in areas including defence, social security, pensions, the 
European Union, economic development, Brussels, and foreign affairs (N-VA, 2013). 
The move to a confederal model would allow for the implementation of urgent social and 
economic reforms (N-VA, 2013: 76). It would also allow both communities to get the 
policies they vote for.  
The specific policy proposals reflect the party’s centre right orientation, emphasising 
entrepreneurship, low taxes and spending cuts, and a strict approach to immigration and 
integration (N-VA, 2013). The current systems of solidarity transfers is subject to 
particular scrutiny as a symptom of Belgian dysfunction, and is consistent with Jamin’s 
(2011) analysis of a producerist narrative in Flanders which juxtaposes hardworking 
Flanders with a dependent Wallonia. Flemings are described as committed to some degree 
of solidarity but the annual transfer is ‘no longer reasonable’ (N-VA, 2013: 67). Under the 
proposed confederal model, solidarity would be regulated by the constituent units, 
providing for a fixed term mechanism throughout the transition from federalism to 
confederalism.  
Describing the process of constitutional reform, the N-VA rebukes participants for 
having failed to recognise the democratic majority of Flemings, whose preferences have 
been suppressed by special majority laws, alarm bell procedures, and the process of 
government formation. These procedures are understood to have given ‘4 million 
Francophones a de facto veto which they use to politically side-line 6.5 million Flemings’ (N-VA, 2013: 
18). In an interview in Knack, shortly after joining the party, long-time activist of the 
Flemish movement Peter de Roover offers a more nuanced analysis,  
‘Belgium is the sum of two democracies and therefore there is no direct translation of electoral 
results into policy. Not in Flanders, not in Wallonia. It is sometimes said that 
Francophones lead this country, but that is not true. Those who defend the status quo are 
in control. And they are often the Francophones’  
Demeulemeester & Zuallaert, 2014.  
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Confederalism was to represent an alternative to this democratic deficit, dividing key 
competences so socioeconomic policies could be pursued which aligned with the 
ideological tendencies of the population and, crucially, ensuring each is responsible for 
their own spending. 'Confederalism gives the Flemings the long-term policies that they vote for. 
Flemings and Francophones can take their destiny into their own hands' (N-VA, 2013: 3). When 
cooperation is required, it would be entered into freely. ‘Forced cooperation is replaced by 
voluntary cooperation’ (N-VA, 2013: 68). It would also improve the efficiency and efficacy of 
government.  
Together, these proposals linked the pursuit of centre-right policies – of low public 
spending, personal responsibility, and efficient government with the pursuit of self-
government which was an important component of explaining the party’s meteoric 
success. Beyens et al (2015) document a shift in its profile, with the N-VA’s electorate 
remaining committed to more authority for Flanders but also moving further to the right 
ideologically between 2003 and 2009 and their 2014 proposals reflect these preferences.  
7.2.2 Self-government and the European Union 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s 2014 self-government goals were to be achieved within 
the structure of the Belgian state, in contrast to the SNP’s external goals. Despite this, the 
N-VA made extensive reference to Europe, which it argued provided a supporting 
structure for Flemish self-government, as well as a model, both positive and negative for 
Belgium. Its engagement with the broader international context was more limited and it 
proposed European solutions for larger problems around security, asylum, and defence 
rather than direct participation in international structures.  
Although it acknowledged that only states are recognised as members, this does not, in 
its view, exclude Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels and the German-speaking region from 
participation in the decision-making process, drawing on the existing principle of ‘In foro 
interno, in foro externo’ which allows the regions and communities input (N-VA, 2013: 83). 
In a confederalist scenario, the constituent units would participate in the coordination 
process, led by the Belgian Council of Ministers. Specific issue areas would be divided 
between the two, and both would be present in meetings. The confederal state would take 
the form of a ‘letterbox’ in which stability and reform programmes and action plans would 
be deposited with the confederal state for transfer to the relevant European authority. 
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Europe would then in turn deal directly with Flanders and Wallonia (N-VA, 2013: 83). 
Legally, the proposed structure of the Belgian state represents the minimum definition of 
statehood required for European Union membership. 
The N-VA’s framing of the international dimension in relation to its self-government 
goals took three key forms: (1) positioning Flanders as a European nation and Europe as 
a force which would enable self-government; (2) acknowledging interdependence as a 
modern condition; (3) discussing the challenges facing Europe, often linking them with 
the challenges facing Belgium.  
1. Flanders as a European nation 
In its 2013 proposal, the N-VA continually stressed the European identity of Flanders, 
which was compatible and complimentary to a strong Flemish identity. Flemings were 
described as ‘European Flemings’ and ‘world citizens’, seeking to be ‘self-confident, open, and 
inclusive to the outside' (N-VA, 2013: 15). The party asserts that ‘The future of 6.5 million Flemings 
is in Europe’ (N-VA, 2013: 80). Confederalism would therefore allow for full participation 
in the European project, currently limited by the structure of the Belgian state, playing a 
positive and constructive role. This stress on European identity was used to position the 
N-VA in the political mainstream, and draw a distinction between the more closed identity 
proposed by the Vlaams Belang. However, European identities are not politicised in 
Flanders to the same degree as they are in the United Kingdom, and European identity 
was rarely employed as a marker of difference within Belgium, as it was in the Scottish 
case. 
2. The interdependence of self-government 
The party recognised interdependence and global challenges but argued self-government 
would allow Flanders, in cooperation with Europe, to address them. It acknowledged the 
realities of globalisation, saying 'We live in a small country with a big abroad, developments in the 
world effect Flanders. The more globalization progresses, the bigger the impact’ (N-VA, 2013: 81). Like 
the SNP, this served as a justification for self-government rather than a weakness, as 
Flanders needed to find its own place and contribute to European responses. 
Developments at the European level were to enable self-government, as it ‘provides us 
solutions which we should not have without the European Union’ (Bracke, 2014). In an 
interdependent and an increasingly interconnected world, Belgium was not an appropriate 
level, simultaneously too big to serve Flanders and too small to tackle the world’s 
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problems. Despite criticisms of Europe, it remained central to the party’s goals, with no 
prospect of strengthening the Belgian state. Voters were asked ‘Who wants to return to the 
Belgian franc, long queues at border crossings or complicated paperwork for the import or export of 
products?’ (N-VA, 2014). 
While the party proposed strong integration within Europe, it was not entirely uncritical 
of what it perceived as counterproductive developments at the European level. The 
party’s original draft of the congress text suggested a degree of what the N-VA describes 
as ‘Eurorealism’ but this was ultimately removed because of fears that it might be 
interpreted as Euroscepticism. Although the party proposed further transfer of powers 
towards Europe, the identity and sovereignty of the individual member states remained 
central and this frame of Eurorealism, while fully present in the party’s 2014 campaign 
became more salient following the elections. These objections were rooted in a perception 
that the European project had structural problems, symbolised by recent crises, which 
undermined its potential.  
3. The challenges of Europe and Belgium 
For the N-VA, the crisis at European level was the crisis of the Belgian state writ large, a 
frame it had employed in the past. ‘The European Union is more and more like an XL Belgium’ 
as a result of divisions between the north and south (N-VA, 2013: 80). While the 
Volksunie once proposed Belgium as a model of peaceful coexistence for a nascent 
Europe, the N-VA employed Belgium as a cautionary tale. Divisions in performance and 
attitudes between the North and South, both within Belgium and the EU, were at the root 
of this problem.  In a 2012 feast day speech, Bart de Wever stressed the importance of 
these issues noting ‘there is growing awareness that the European Union is becoming like Belgium’, 
referencing growing German opposition to Southern transfers to countries who failed to 
implement necessary socio-economic reforms (de Wever, 2012) This frame re-emerged 
in the context of the 2014 campaign, with the party calling for subsidiarity and 
accountability, not a Belgium XL (N-VA, 2013: 81). This frame was also captured in 
interviews, with leaders noting ‘The European Union is, in a way, Belgium XL, and that’s the 
negative way of comparing the two’ and raising concerns over whether the European Union 
could adequately support Flemish ambitions of self-government (Bracke, 2014).  
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While the N-VA referenced broader international concerns of climate change, migration 
and security, its international engagement was always filtered through a European lens, 
seeking European coordination on key challenges. Despite the concerns expressed about 
the sustainability of the European project, the party continually advocated further 
development at the European level and at no point questioned the role of Europe in 
Flanders’ future. Whether it advanced an idea of confederalism in the near-term or 
independence in the future, attention was on self-government within Europe, never 
outwith it. The party’s leader in the Chamber of Representatives said of Flanders’ journey 
towards self-government as ‘it will go on until I think independence, but within the European 
context’ (Bracke, 2014). However, the party encouraged reform of the European Union, 
allowing for a greater degree of Flemish self-government and the transfer of important 
Belgian competences upward.  
The idea of Flemish self-government outside of the European Union was inconceivable 
to the N-VA which saw independent statehood as unnecessarily risky in an increasingly 
interdependent world. This had broader implications for the party’s strategic pursuit of 
its self-government goals, making Flemish independence, still listed as its primary aim, 
contingent on the ability of the European Union to supplant the Belgian state. The party’s 
decision to enter into government without a firm commitment on confederalism, despite 
earlier pledges, might be seen in this light.   
7.2.3 Self-government and the Belgian state 
While the European Union was viewed as source of support for Flemish ambitions for 
self-government, the Belgian state was considered a negative force, necessitating self-
government. This negative framing of the Belgian state was persistent throughout the 
party’s texts and had important implications on its views of the relationship between the 
state and the Flemish nation, the prospect of further state reform, and relationships 
between Flanders and the Belgian centre and Walloon counterparts in the event 
confederalism was achieved.  
While the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie proposes the maintenance of the Belgian state, albeit 
in a dramatically hollowed form, its framing of the Belgian state is highly critical. Three 
frames are employed by the party: (1) the artificial nature of the Belgian state; (2) the 
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current state of dysfunction and interaction; and (3) in response to alternative proposals 
for state reform, as too little, too late for a divided Belgium.  
1. Belgium as an artificial state 
In interviews with figures within the N-VA, conducted over the course of this research, 
the history of Belgium was repeatedly referenced, with Belgium described as an artificial 
unit, lacking the necessary coherence to exist as a nation. This was a consistent frame 
throughout the party’s history but one which Bart de Wever has recently sought to 
downplay.  
This artificiality, according to the party, was a result of both the origins of the Belgian 
state and its subsequent political development. The party’s vice president stressed these 
differences, focusing on the existence of ‘two democracies’, resulting in a ‘clash of two different 
points of view, two different cultures, two different backgrounds’ (Weyts, 2014b). The party’s leader 
in the Chamber of Representative argued these differences manifested in everyday life 
and within the sphere of politics, ‘We do not want any French policies. We don’t want Francois 
Hollande, we want Frau Merkel’ (Bracke, 2014). In an open letter to King Phillipe, published 
by Theo Francken, member of the Chamber of Representatives described the Belgian 
state and people, echoing Jules Destrée’s statement ‘Sire, there are no Belgians’. Warning the 
king of challenges to come, and making a statement against monarchical intervention in 
politics, Francken said:  
‘You will stand at the head of a state called Belgium, where two nations live side by side: 
Flanders and Francophone Belgium. Each with their own political parties, their own media, 
their own language, music, culture, and their own humour. Do not assume that you can 
bring any change therein’ 
Francken, 2013. 
This absence of a demos, with shared values, interests, and a shared language, had negative 
implications for Belgium’s future and served as a justification for self-government. This 
framing was consistent from the party’s early years, discussed in chapter five. 
2. Belgian dysfunction 
Belgium is characterised as a standstill, with questions raised about the legitimacy of the 
Belgian democracy. It is portrayed as a country in decline, stymied by roadblocks, 
institutional gridlock and increasingly disconnected from the preferences of the 
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population on both sides of the institutional divide (N-VA, 2013: 16). The process of 
constitutional reform had left the government with ‘bits and pieces of delegated powers’, with 
key social and economic levers residing at the federal level, hindering the process of good 
government (N-VA, 2013: 20). This led to poor outcomes for both Flemings and 
Francophones.  
The Belgian government in particular, which for 25 years had included the Francophone 
Parti Socialiste, was characterised by its irresponsible economic policy, with a preference 
for ‘more taxes, more debt, and more government spending’ at the expense of a more productive 
and fiscally responsible Flanders. At the party congress, Ben Weyts spoke of the 
consensus within the Flemish party system and the failure for these preferences to 
materialise in meaningful reforms, a product both of the structure of the Belgian state and 
the complicity of traditional Flemish parties, discussed in the following section (Weyts, 
2014). This was consistent with previous characterisations of the Belgian state, as the 
‘sickman of Europe’, discussed in the previous chapter. 
In contrast, confederalism is promoted as a solution, and a means of promoting good 
government. Confederalism ‘creates an orderly democratic structure, with clear responsibilities, makes 
policy closer to the citizens and gives them greater control over the services and decision-making institutions. 
It has a more valuable democratic voice’ (N-VA, 2013: 69). This government is ‘slim and 
transparent’, and built on institutions which work effectively (N-VA, 2013: 69). The party’s 
critique of the Belgian state were closely linked with the purposes of self-government, 
arguing both economic reform and democratic transparency could not be achieved within 
the current Belgian state structure.  
3. State reform - too little, too late 
Previous reforms were described by the N-VA as important steps, placing Flanders on a 
journey towards self-government. However, they were presented as ultimately 
insufficient, having institutionalised the dysfunctions of the Belgian system. The constant 
and costly processes of reforms were used to justify more radical self-government. As a 
result, the N-VA rejected steps proposed by rival parties, including alternative models of 
confederalism and approached proposals made by rival parties to transfer powers within 
the existing constitutional framework with scepticism. In a research interview, Ben Weyts 
described previous rounds as the ‘steps of mice’, ‘just small reforms but hey, that’s Belgium. We do 
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make some progress. It’s not the progress we need or the Flemish want, it’s just the progress we can deliver’ 
(Weyts, 2014b). Peter De Roover, a leader in the broader Flemish Movement who joined 
the party in advance of the 2014 campaign, summed up the reforms as another costly 
layer of complexity ‘Installing two stoves in a kitchen does not create a nicer meal, but is expensive to 
install and the gas bill will be higher’ (De Roover, 2013). 
The continuous process was considered to be inefficient and undemocratic, with the party 
noting proponents of the sixth round of state reform went into the process pledging 
another round. This process of reform resulted in a ‘pointless and costly perpetual exercise’ (N-
VA, 2013: 20). Previous reforms, while welcome, were also described quite cynically, as 
processes in which ‘Flemings exchanged big bags of money for a further reduction of their democratic 
majority, a weakened position in Brussels, and a few bits and bobs of powers’ (N-VA, 2013: 21). It 
also served to weaken ties between the North and the South, encouraging a conflictual 
relationship (Bracke, 2014).  
Confederalism was viewed as a natural remedy, a response to the failures of incremental 
state reforms to adequately address the needs of both Flemings and Walloons. Although 
proposing a radical change, the party was careful to speak of it in evolutionary terms. Bart 
de Wever spoke nostalgically of the first party congress of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
and situated the party within a larger historical frame which included the Volksunie and 
its efforts towards federalism. His 2014 congress speech suggested confederal reforms 
were inevitable,  
‘For any reform that our movement has asked for has come eventually. And the others 
always said no, they said impossible, never, jamais…until they happened 
anyways…Because nothing can stop an idea whose time has come. The power of change, 
the will to progress, will always prevail’  
de Wever, 2014a. 
The party asked ‘If it was once possible to take these steps, why should we not take further steps and 
transform?’ (N-VA, 2013: 25). However, a more dramatic reform than the one on offer 
from rival parties was required. This theme of inevitability was a message to both 
Flemings, who sought further reforms, and Francophones, who would need to keep pace.  
Although presenting a more moderate self-government goal than its Scottish 
counterparts, the language of partnership and a continued relationship were largely absent 
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from the N-VA’s proposals. When cooperation is required, it would be entered into freely. 
‘Forced cooperation is replaced by voluntary cooperation’ (N-VA, 2013: 68) but it was not 
emphasised in these proposals. De Winter’s analysis of the party strategy in advance of 
the 2014 election explains this with reference to the structure of the Belgian state, largely 
as a result of Brussels. Belgians ‘are condemned to stick together…They cannot divorce. They can 
make hell out of each other’s life in this forced marriage. Or they can try to make the best out of it, 
probably by enhancing their ‘living apart together’ relationship’ (De Winter, 2012: 29). The 
historically Flemish, overwhelmingly Francophone city of Brussels was to be jointly 
administered by Flanders and Wallonia. A party leader argued, off the record, that of not 
for the ‘problem’ of Brussels, the Belgian state would have been dissolved much earlier. 
The issue of Brussels can be understood as an explanation for what De Winter describes 
as a proposal for ‘living together apart’. The party’s spokesperson in the Chamber explained  
‘if you compare Belgium to a marriage, the only reason why we're still together is because of 
the children. And the children, that is, that is, Brussels and also the German speaking 
region which has always been so much like the special brother’  
Pohlmann, 2014.  
The party’s publications and many of its representatives stressed the centrality of Brussels, 
acknowledging Flemish independence, in a traditional sense, was not possible due to an 
unwillingness to sacrifice Brussels.   
Extending the analogy of marriage and divorce, frequently used in analyses of the Belgian 
state, the confederal structure proposed can be understood as investing in separate 
bedrooms and dividing finances, rather than undergoing marriage counselling. While the 
N-VA moderated its language, no longer referring to Walloon counterparts pejoratively 
as subsidy junkies and dependents, self-government was not, as in the case of the SNP, 
an opportunity to renew partnerships, but was to serve an exclusively functional purpose.  
Throughout the party’s congress text and the campaign which followed, the inadequacies 
of the Belgian state were identified. It was both undemocratic and dysfunctional, a result 
of compromises which served neither Flemings nor Walloons. As a result, confederalism 
was proposed as a solution, a means of preserving certain components of the Belgian state 
necessary for participation in the European Union and the management of Brussels, but 
largely allowing for autonomy for Flanders and Wallonia. This was a functional argument, 
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made on the basis of the ability to pursue economic and social policies which aligned with 
public preferences, rather than an opportunity to renew relationships.   
7.2.4 The party politics of self-government 
The structure of the Belgian party system, deeply divided along linguistic lines, and with 
a multitude of mainstream and fringe parties, as well as the nature and process by which 
state reform would take place, shaped the N-VA’s framing of its self-government goals. 
It advocated for the radical reform of the Belgian state but pursued this goal through 
traditional channels, the negotiation of a coalition agreement and the formation of a 
federal government. Unlike its Scottish counterpart, it rejected a direct vote on its goals, 
arguing this was anathema to the party’s ethos as well as processes of Belgian 
policymaking.  
In the Belgian political context, the main driver of further state reform has been the 
presence and success of nationalist voices in Flanders (Deschouwer, 2013). As a result of 
the continued relevance of the Volksunie and its successor, all traditional parties have 
called for further reform beyond the current federal structure, as exemplified in the 1999 
resolutions of the Flemish Parliament.  (Deschouwer, 2013). A confederal model for 
Belgium is not exclusive to the N-VA but has been proposed at various points by the 
Christian Democrats and Liberals (Dandoy et al, 2013).  
As a result of a crowded party space and the demands of government formation, the N-
VA’s framing of the party system and self-government was shaped by two considerations: 
the need to become incontournable, or necessary for the formation of a governing coalition 
at the centre and the need to be viewed as a responsible, and acceptable partner in 
coalition, both by the voters themselves and by prospective partners.  
The party’s messages were aimed at voters and Flemish and Francophone counterparts, 
and they emphasised both self-government and necessary socioeconomic reforms. This 
message can be understood to appeal to Flemish voters, who preferred centre-right 
economic policies, and to warn Francophones, suggesting budgetary cuts and changes in 
provisions for social services would be the outcome of the N-VA’s success. Geert 
Bourgeois, party founder and then Vice Minister President in the Flemish Government, 
explained the party’s governing objectives, arguing that it would allow the party to place 
pressure on the Francophones. ‘If N-VA becomes incontournable, then the French speakers will 
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just have to follow. If in a marriage one partner says ‘I want this’, and the other says ‘no’, then it’s 
finished’. (Otte, 2013).  The party spokesperson explained this strategy in a research 
interview, arguing that the strength of the N-VA and the prospects of implementing its 
socioeconomic policy would motivate state reform ‘We believe that if they are confronted with 
a policy of tax reductions, smaller government and reducing of the debt, their reaction will be to demand 
devolution themselves’ (Pohlman, 2014).  
With this in mind, the party engaged with the Belgian party system through the employ 
of three key frames. Firstly, it argued that it possessed the courage to govern, even at high 
political cost to itself, a move to counter charges of obstruction or permanent opposition. 
Secondly, and closely linked with the frame of courage was that of taking responsibility at 
all levels. Finally, traditional Flemish political parties were framed as complicit in the 
system, unable to pursue self-government in a meaningful way.   
1. The courage to govern 
The N-VA positioned itself as a party of prospective government, seeking office at both 
the Flemish and federal level in order to pursue socioeconomic and confederal policies. 
It stressed its democratic credentials, as a means of distinguishing itself from the Vlaams 
Belang, but also stressed its outsider status, arguing that unlike traditional Flemish parties, 
the N-VA was wholly committed to state reform (N-VA, 2013). The party had the courage 
to govern, not for its own interests, but for the pursuit of self-government and for the 
benefit of Flanders. This was symbolised by two key components: an emphasis on courage 
and the focus on seeking office, not for themselves, but for their cause.  The party 
repeatedly stressed its courage in the context of the 2014 debate. 'Change requires 
courage' was a frequent message (N-VA, 2013: 15). In an introductory letter, Ben Weyts 
explained the party would act with the: 
‘Courage to govern without parties that stand in the way of structural reforms. Courage to 
form a government which would take immediate action on socio-economic recovery, but at 
the same time, anchors structural change in the future’  
N-VA, 2013: 3.  
The portrayal of the N-VA and its leadership as courageous was not a new but was 
employed differently in the run-up to the 2014 election. Its abstention from government 
in 2007 and 2011 were framed as courageous acts, forsaking the spoils of office in order 
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to engage in the principled pursuit of policy, as discussed in chapter six. In 2014, with 
polls suggesting strong results, it was now employing this courage in order to secure its 
entry into government, even at a cost to itself. Bart de Wever’s 2014 congress speech 
returned to this theme of courage, paraphrasing Martin Luther, ‘Here I stand: I cannot do 
otherwise’ (De Wever, 2014a). This positioned the N-VA as a force which would speak 
truth to power, countering the forces of the status quo with ‘conviction and unwavering courage’ 
(De Wever, 2014a). De Wever continued in this vein, quoting political opponents labelled 
the party and its members as dangerous intellectual terrorists. This radical language was 
cited as evidence of the principles of the N-VA, ‘we are indeed heretical, we are indeed dangerous’ 
(De Wever, 2014a).  
The political system was described as under pressure by the N-VA, which argued radical 
change was necessary. Strong results on the 25th of May would provide the party with a 
political mandate to enter into office and enact change once there. De Wever immediately 
returned to the theme of courage in his victory speech, saying Vicit vim virtus, or ‘Virtue 
conquered force. Flemings have chosen change’, pledging to take its place in the coalition (de 
Wever, 2014b). However, it maintained this outsider ethos, even as it began the 
government formation process. ‘Never before have there been attempts this powerful to put out the 
Flemish. But the Flemish have cast their vote, and they have voted for change’ (de Wever, 2014b). 
2. Taking responsibility 
Despite attempts to situate the N-VA as a threat to the status quo, it was direct in its 
pursuit of participation at the centre. The party was explicitly office-seeking, motivated 
both by the opportunity presented by increases in political support, and the need to avoid 
becoming a party of permanent opposition. This represents a change from its position 
previously, in which abstention was framed as a courageous act, with the party forsaking 
the spoils of office in favour of principled opposition. Weyts (2014b) explained its office-
seeking strategy, which focused on the formation of government at both the Flemish level 
and the federal level, arguing this was a crucial step, both for the N-VA and for the process 
of state reform. In 2014, it responded to a question on its website on its status as a party 
of government or of opposition. It explained its purpose, saying ‘The N-VA does not want 
to continue speaking from the side-lines in the hopes of maintaining its political purity. We are not a 
perpetual opposition party, but we stand separate from other traditional Belgian parties’. (N-VA, 2014)  
The Art of the Possible 
7 Self-government in 2014  257 
This frame of taking responsibility was employed throughout the campaign. Entry into 
government at the federal level would mark an important stage for the party, symbolising 
political maturity and positioning it as a legitimate actor in wider Belgian politics as well 
as providing the means to pursue its self-government and socioeconomic goals directly.  
At the same time, the focus on entry into government was to be in pursuit of principles 
rather than the spoils of office.  ‘The exercise of power is not an end in itself for the N-VA, it 
represents only an instrument that allows us to realize our programme’ in contrast with its traditional 
rivals (N-VA, 2014). It assigned itself purer motives than those of its political rivals and 
maintained an outsider ethos, despite its meteoric rise. This became most clear when 
contrasted with the framing of political rivals, particularly traditional Flemish parties, who 
are accused of lacking the necessary courage, co-opted by the Belgian state system.  
3. The complicity of Flemish rivals 
In 2014, the party returned to the frame of complicity of traditional Flemish rivals. The 
behaviour of traditional Flemish parties, particularly those who had participated in recent 
governments, is contrasted with the courage of the N-VA. The Christian Democrats in 
particular, are criticised for their willingness to enter into office without an agreement on 
significant state reform and the party employs a frame of complicity consistently. ‘One time 
federalist, sometimes confederalist, sometimes federalist ... That is simply because they determine their 
program through their strategy. Let us define our strategy through our program’ (Weyts, 2014a). Bart 
de Wever argued in his 2014 conference speech:  
‘Because it goes sometimes with traditional powers, they cling to their power and fight the 
power of change for as long as they can. It requires conviction and courage not to bend. So 
here we are, with that conviction and with that daring’  
De Wever, 2014a. 
In his speech at the party’s 2014 congress Ben Weyts described the consensus on the need 
for reform within Flemish parties, but claimed despite this consensus, progress had not 
been made. ‘But time after time, the traditional Flemish parties stepped into a federal government which 
did the exact opposite of what the Flemish voters wanted. And afterwards, they say sorry’ (Weyts, 
2014a). He argued in a research interview that they lacked the moral courage, and were 
easily discouraged by the difficulties of the Belgian system. They say, ‘Yeah, it’s true. It’s very 
The Art of the Possible 
7 Self-government in 2014  258 
hard to govern this country…’ and use this as an excuse for their failure to enact meaningful 
reform (Weyts, 2014b) 
The N-VA presented a threat to these parties, warning them of the consequences of their 
behaviour and their complicity with the Parti Socialiste.  
‘We are dangerous to parties who have come to find it normal that they support a PS 
government without a majority in Flanders. We are dangerous to politicians who think that 
it then suffices to apologise for the policies they pursued. We are dangerous to those who 
think it is not up to the voter but up to them who is allowed in the next government’  
De Wever, 2014a. 
The message to Flemish voters was that these parties could no longer be trusted to further 
Flemish interests -  only the N-VA possessed the courage and moral fibre to stand up for 
Flanders. 
The N-VA’s self-government goal – the restructuring of the Belgian state along confederal 
lines – was shaped by the specificities of the Belgian electoral and party system. The party’s 
2014 proposals represented a starting point for coalition negotiations at the federal level, 
as well as a benchmark against which traditional Flemish rivals could be evaluated and 
critiqued. While it did not compete in Wallonia, its campaign message was aimed at both 
Flemings and Francophones. To Flemings, the party suggested it was the most reliable 
vehicle to pursue self-government and socioeconomic reform, to Francophones, it called 
into question the sustainability of the existing social system and encouraged them to 
consider their own demands.   
7.2.5 A distinct vision of confederalism 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s 2014 proposals reflected a de-radicalisation from its 
origins but were consistent with the party’s platform since 2007. There was no focus on 
independence in the near to medium term, although when pressed, it did stress an 
independent Flanders as a European member state remained the first statute of the party 
(Diependaele, 2014). This reflected an acknowledgement of public opinion and political 
preferences in Belgium. In the immediate term, confederalism was to be the solution to 
some of the serious problems facing Flanders and Belgium.  
Confederalism was first and foremost a tool, allowing Flanders to pursue its own 
socioeconomic policies and ensure that prosperity could be achieved. There was no 
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acknowledgement of value rational arguments in favour of Flemish self-government and 
the party seemed to attempt to distance itself from romantic concepts of nationalism. 
Confederalism was to be a first step in advancing these interests.  
The European Union played a central role in this model, allowing for the Belgian state to 
be further hollowed, providing an intermediate step between independence. However, 
recent developments at the European level had to be addressed, and the party’s historically 
positive support for integration was tempered, with a frame that equated the problems of 
Belgium and the problems of Europe. 
Although the party stressed confederalism as a departure from previous piecemeal state 
reform processes, reversing the relationship between the centre and the regions, it also 
stressed this was an evolutionary process. Confederalism was therefore used as a symbol 
of moderation, a workable plan which could facilitate the N-VA’s entry into government 
and kick-start reform. 
7.3 Comparing independence and confederalism in 
2014 
Although labelled differently, confederalism and independence were functionally similar 
proposals in terms of competences and structures. The SNP called for international 
recognition and membership within international bodies, but also sought a high degree of 
integration with the United Kingdom and the European Union. While the N-VA did not 
seek legal recognition, it sought the ability to engage directly in some of these forums.  
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The proposals put forward by the two parties reflected the art of the possible, a merger 
of the party’s preferences for self-government and strategic considerations which took 
into account the international and European context, the structure of the Belgian and 
British states, and the party system in which the self-government goals were pursued. 
They also reflected what was considered politically achievable, with the N-VA stressing 
that while it was committed to independence within the European Union, the political 
will for it did not exist in Flanders.  
Similarities can also be identified in the framing of these goals. These findings will be 
discussed in the analysis, which begins with a discussion of the purpose of self-
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government, the primacy of self-government vis-à-vis other policy goals, and self-
government and the three external contexts identified at the outset of this work.  
Both parties framed self-government as a purposeful act rather than rooted entirely in the 
principle of self-determination – emphasising instrumental rational arguments rather than 
value rational concerns. For the SNP, independence was a tool – to improve Scotland’s 
standing in the world, to better Scotland’s economic performance and to end austerity 
policies. For the N-VA, confederalism was framed similarly, allowing for the pursuit of 
ideologically driven policies, including pursuing lower taxes, more social responsibility, 
and the end of transfers between Wallonia and Flanders. The details of these policies 
reflected the ideological positioning of each party but the purpose was similar.. 
Where we can see a degree of difference is the primacy of the self-government goal vis-
à-vis other policy objectives. Both parties, like others within their party family, present 
comprehensive ideological programmes, to be pursued immediately as a party of 
government and in the event self-government was achieved. This conflict came to the 
fore for the N-VA, with internal conflict over whether confederalism or socioeconomic 
reforms were more pressing. This became more evident following the 2014 elections, in 
which the N-VA chose to place confederalism on the backburner until 2019. The coalition 
agreement emphasised institutional stability and promising further reform to come ‘At the 
end of this legislature, as provided for by the electoral system and allowed by the constitution, it will be for 
the voters to decide between different political projects’ (BeGov, 2014). Following the failed 
referendum in Scotland, the SNP reaffirmed its commitment to independence, even in 
the uncertain scenario presented by the June 2016 Brexit vote. 
Both parties proposed external self-government, although to different degrees of 
externality, with the SNP seeking a more traditional form of independence, although one 
well integrated within international structures while the N-VA’s position was less clear. It 
sought a confederation in which the Belgian state would serve as a glove for Flanders and 
Wallonia, making no claims to international legal personality. Both acknowledge the 
constraints posed by an interdependent world and those constraints unique to small states 
but argue self-government is needed to allow Scotland and Flanders to play their rightful 
role. Self-government is framed as an opportunity for integration, not isolation, ending 
the unnatural separation imposed upon them by incorporation within the existing union. 
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Each also sees the European project as an umbrella under which ties between the 
embedding state and the self-governing nation could be maintained. 
However, variation is evident in the salience and focus of the international dimension, 
with the SNP focusing on Scotland’s role in the broader world and within the European 
Union, while the N-VA focuses exclusively on the European level. As a result of this, the 
salience accorded to the international, and more specifically European dimension, 
represented strategic considerations by each party. For the SNP, Europe was 
instrumentalised, with higher levels of support for European integration and higher 
European identities employed as a marker of difference between Scotland and the rest of 
the United Kingdom. In contrast, this was less salient and therefore less instrumentalised 
in the case of the N-VA, operating in a context in which support for European integration 
were assumed. This has shifted since 2014 but the EU remains less politicised than in 
other member states.  
Both parties respond to and elicit responses from their respective state contexts. Each 
has been critical of the state, arguing the structure and dynamics within the British and 
Belgian states necessitate and justify self-government as they fail to serve Scottish and 
Flemish interests. In doing so, they draw on social, economic, and democratic arguments, 
focusing on the failure to realise the policy preferences of Scots and Flemings. As a result 
of the historical failures of the state to adequately account for the need of the sub-state 
nations, both parties were sceptical of further reform falling short of their goals, seeing 
them as insufficient.  
The SNP, despite its more radical self-government goal,proposed a significant degree of 
integration, proposing to maintain the social, currency, and monarchical unions and 
cooperate within the European Union, dissolving only the political union. Self-
government, according to the party, was an opportunity to reset and renew relationships 
on more equal terms, a factor which did not emerge in the vision of the N-VA. The N-
VA proposes the maintenance of a minimal Belgian state with international level 
personality but invests less attention to the maintenance or renewal of relationships, 
seeing self-government as an opportunity to separate. Implicit in this was a hope that the 
Belgian state structure would eventually become unnecessary, supplanted in its functions 
by the EU.   
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The party system and broader electoral context in which self-government was pursued 
very different in each case but ultimately, manifested in some important similarities and 
the way in which the campaigns were filtered through the lens of party politics was 
striking. For the SNP, the referendum was to be an extraordinary event, but one in which 
the party engaged with party allegiances and identities to justify self-government. The N-
VA’s pursuit of radical state reform was situated within the realm of normal politics, 
taking place, like previous rounds, through the negotiation of a governing coalition at the 
centre. The language used to characterise the parties themselves and their political rivals 
was broadly consistent with previous campaigns with the two parties stressing their 
legitimacy and courage, and critiquing the frailty and complicity of its political rivals. 
In 2014 the SNP and N-VA pursued self-government – although different degrees of it 
– providing the opportunity to analyse proposals in detail and in light of their respective 
contexts, whether international, state, or party system. The interaction between the ideal 
of self-government and the context in which it was articulated is clear. Both are pursuing 
self-government from a strategic perspective, being shaped by conditions external to the 
party.  
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Chapter Eight: Discussion 
The self-government goals advanced by the Scottish National Party, the Volksunie, and 
the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie represent the ‘art of the possible’, what was feasible and 
desirable given the environment in which the goals were formed. They took into account 
international and European dynamics, the nature of the embedding state and the prospect 
of accommodation within that structure, and the electoral and party system through which 
these goals might be achieved. The goals of each party were mapped and analysed over 
time, culminating in the analysis of the proposals for Scottish independence and the 
restructuring of the Belgian state along confederal lines in 2014.  
Although 2014 did not see the dramatic constitutional changes that the Scottish National 
Party and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie had campaigned for, self-government remains on 
the agenda. Issues of self-government, self-determination, and sub-state nationalism are 
salient today, perhaps even more so at the time of writing than in 2014 when this research 
concludes. Although the form which Brexit will take remains to be decided, it is clear the 
SNP’s proposal, with its emphasis on the European Union as an umbrella under which 
cooperation with the rest of the United Kingdom would take place, will require substantial 
revision. In 2014, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie chose to enter into government at the 
centre without an agreement on state reform, a clear departure from the principles it 
articulated in advance of the election. In doing so, the party effectively placed self-
government on the backburner until 2019. It justified this decision with reference to 
functional concerns – the social and economic reforms which could be pursued in the 
absence of the Parti Socialiste in governing coalition. Beyond the scope of this study but 
salient to discussions of sub-state nationalism and self-government include recent events 
in Catalonia. The response of the European Union to demands for self-government and 
the constitutional structure and political response of the Spanish state, has shaped what 
forms of self-government are possible in the Catalan case.  
Together, these events underline the importance of understanding the core questions set 
out in this research, both from the perspective of theory and practice. In this research, I 
sought to address several questions. I first asked what sub-state nationalist parties wanted 
– examining the labelling and definition of self-government over time in each of the three 
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parties. I then delved more deeply into the content of their goals, which were assumed to 
reflect strategic considerations, the understanding of a given party of the context in which 
it was expressed, and their historical positioning. Finally, I examined how variation in 
context might manifest in variation in the articulation of sub-state nationalist goals. I did 
not set out specific hypotheses in the course of this research, choosing instead to examine 
the dynamic interaction between the goals themselves and the context in which they were 
articulated.  
In this concluding chapter, I will highlight primary findings as well as address alternative 
explanations, situate my work on self-government goals within the broader literature on 
sub-state nationalism, and discuss the strengths and limitations of the methods employed 
in this research. Finally, I will identify several avenues for future research. Before turning 
to this, however, I’ll first outline the key contributions of this work which are threefold 
and related to the empirical data gathered and analysed for this research, the impact of its 
interpretation on the meanings of self-government, and the methodology employed 
during this research.  
The empirical contribution was a product of the cases selected for inclusion and the 
timeframe studied. The cases selected for comparison in this research can be seen as an 
unusual pairing, but one which strengths the findings. In many ways, the Scottish National 
Party, the Volksunie, and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie are quite different parties – evident 
in their ideology, strategy, and goals as well as the states in which they mobilise. However, 
they each engaged, to varying degrees, with the world around them in articulating their 
goal, enabling comparison. The longitudinal approach allowed for me to capture internal 
consistency as well as change over time within and across parties in response to changes 
in the empirical contexts. The extension of the project to include the 2014 campaigns in 
Flanders and Scotland also facilitated the examination of comprehensive proposals for 
self-government at a single point in time.  
This close study of a small number of cases allowed me to discuss the meaning of self-
government, in a limited number of cases, but in a high level of detail. Building on this 
rich empirical dataset, conclusions could be drawn about the nature of self-government 
and the ways in which self-government goals are formed and expressed, which are detailed 
below. Particularly important was the model of value and instrumental rationality, inspired 
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by Varshney (2004) which allowed us to understand how parties framed their goals with 
regards to ideational principles rooted in the sense of nationhood and pragmatic concerns. 
It also allowed for the development of a model which takes into account multiple 
empirical contexts and dimensions which are often assessed in isolation in the existing 
literature.  
This was carried out methodologically through an analysis of frames employed by each 
party. Framing analysis has not yet been fully utilised by political scientists and but 
represents an interesting tool for the analysis of party statements and discourse. The 
analysis of frames, both diagnostic and prognostic, rather than content or discourse more 
generally allowed me to focus on specific arguments in favour of self-government – asking 
and answering the question of how parties viewed empirical contexts vis-à-vis the issue 
of self-government. The focus on dimensions and frames within them, rather than 
specific frames, also enabled comparison across cases. While the analysis of frames for 
political discourse is relatively new, it seems to be a fruitful means of conducting 
qualitative research, although I will discuss some of the limitations below. 
8.1 Key empirical findings  
In this research, I was concerned with the nature of self-government as advanced by sub-
state nationalist parties. At the outset, the ways in which parties spoke of their self-
government goals, using terms like ‘federalism’, ‘confederalism’, and ‘independence’ with 
while rejecting academic or legalistic definitions suggested that these concepts were more 
complex than the literature would suggest. How did parties engage with the broader 
environment in which they operated? How did these contexts shape their self-government 
goals? 
My goal was to go beyond a mechanistic analysis which would map empirical changes 
with changes in the self-government goal in an attempt to understand (a) the nature of 
self-government goals themselves; (b) how they represent rational considerations of 
opportunities and constraints, looking beyond explanations of whether things like state 
reform hinder or help the pursuit of self-government to how parties understand things 
external to themselves; and (c) what this says more generally about the nature of sub-state 
nationalist parties and self-government in the twenty-first century. Given the small 
number of cases and length of the time period under investigation, this research was not 
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designed to discover precise causal mechanisms but to explore the dynamic interaction 
between the empirical context and self-government goals themselves. It is also, of course, 
limited in the scope of its conclusions, given the small number of cases.  
As each empirical chapter concludes with a comprehensive comparison and analysis of 
the three parties, this discussion will focus more broadly on the findings of this research 
as relevant to the meanings of self-government, the ways in which parties articulate their 
goals and what these suggest about and add to our understand of self-government, parties, 
and party goals.  
1. Defining and labelling self-government and sub-state nationalist parties 
Sub-state nationalist parties have been categorised, defined, and labelled on the basis of 
their self-government goals. Self-government, whether taking the form of 
accommodation within the existing state or exit from that state, is the raison d’être of sub-
state nationalist parties and is expected to be a core message for the party. The analysis of 
each party’s self-government goal – both in name and in form – brings up some 
interesting conclusions.  
Firstly, we see significant variation in the ways in which party goals have been labelled and 
this is present in all three parties. Labelling appears to matter less, with variation in the 
language used over time. In all three cases, a tendency to reject academic or legalistic terms 
was present. Each employed modifiers, suggesting their policies were sui generis, 
reflecting the individual circumstances of their nation and territory. The SNP did this by 
referring to its self-government goals euphemistically as freedom or normal nationhood 
and more vaguely as self-government or home rule. At various points, the word 
independence disappeared from its manifestos. When it did appear, it often did so with a 
modifier, as ‘21st century’ independence which suggested an acknowledgement that the 
nature of self-government had changed. Variation in labelling by the VU reflected changes 
to the content itself as the party radicalised but also represented a creative approach to 
academic terms with the party speaking of integral federalism and confederalism in quite 
unique ways. The N-VA’s ultimate goal of independence is always presented in the 
context of European integration and it has argued that its vision of confederalism is 
something unique to the Flemish context, rejecting what it described as ‘professorial’ 
definitions.  
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Secondly, we can map moves on the spectrum of self-government, but not necessarily in 
the direction of continuous radicalisation which the existing literature may suggest. The 
Volksunie’s self-government goals radicalised, beginning with federalism and moving 
towards a vaguely defined but externally oriented form of self-government. By its 
dissolution, it sought independence but always within the European Union. It was, 
throughout its history, strategically ambiguous, seemingly less concerned about the form 
self-government would take rather than the gains that could be realised as a result. In 
contrast, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie has moderated during its comparatively brief 
lifespan. However, this moderation was tempered by a rhetorical distinction between 
short-term and long-term goals as well as the emphasis on self-government as a means of 
pursuing policy goals suggesting an important strategic dimension. The SNP, in contrast 
to the Flemish parties, was more consistent, pursuing independence from its origins to 
the present day, although the party at times used vague or abstract language in place of 
the word independence, as discussed above. However, this consistency may obscure 
changes in the content of the goals themselves, with various relationships and supporting 
structures to be maintained.  
These findings suggest the need to look beyond labels to the content and justification of 
goals. They also may suggest that parties are strategically ambiguous, emphasising or 
downplaying their goals to gain electoral support. The emphasis on defining parties by 
their self-government goals has hindered comparison of parties, both in different contexts 
and over time. (Fagerholm, 2016). The labels employed can obscure important similarities 
and differences. The parties studied here are largely at the more radical end of the 
spectrum, however, this research could be applied more broadly to the party family more 
generally. By artificially restricting our analysis to parties on one end of the spectrum or 
the other, we may inhibit useful comparison and draw an artificial distinction between 
parties.  
2. Self-government for purpose and principle 
The pursuit of self-government has at times been portrayed as principled, driven by a 
desire for a nation-state, regardless of practical concerns or material consequences. 
However, the literature has increasingly acknowledged that sub-state nationalist parties 
are rational actors. (Hechter, 2000: 3; Meadwell, 2005; Urwin, 1992). In this research, I’ve 
attempted to unpack the purpose of self-government through the employ of Varshney’s 
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(2003) value and instrumental rationality. The construction of the arguments in favour of 
self-government are interesting in and of themselves but also because of their influence 
on the behaviour of parties in pursuit of their goals. All three parties employed value and 
instrumental frames but they are accorded various degrees of salience, both within cases 
over time and between cases. The SNP makes more value rational arguments, stressing 
the need of a nation to have a state but these are de-emphasised in the latter years of the 
party. This emphasis is likely to reflect its more radical self-government goal and 
Scotland’s history of political independence which would be ‘restored’ in the event of 
independence from the United Kingdom. In contrast, the Volksunie’s framing was more 
instrumental from its origins, stressing pragmatic considerations in the pursuit of 
federalism and later confederalism. Self-government would, in a value rational frame, 
allow for the self-actualisation of the Flemish community but largely would have material 
as well as social benefits. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie stressed this rationality to an even 
greater degree, focusing on the political and economic benefits of self-government and 
limiting and at points even  denying value rational concerns. In 2014, the arguments made 
by the SNP and the N-VA were almost wholly focused on instrumental or material 
concerns – the ability of self-government to allow the respective nations to prosper 
culturally, politically, and economically.  
The emphasis on instrumental concerns has important strategic and political implications. 
In all three cases, the purposes of self-government become more instrumental as the 
electoral success of the party increases and they are required to present their proposals to 
the voter. They therefore stress issues of concern to the voters – the ability of self-
government to improve the economic performance, democratic representation, and social 
policy of a given nation. An emphasis on instrumental concerns also provides a party with 
greater flexibility when it comes to intermediate steps or the form that self-government 
can take. If the practical objectives of the party can be achieved within a different 
structure, they should do so. For the SNP, this translated into an ability to support 
devolution as consistent with the ‘furtherance of Scottish interests’ while for the Volksunie, this 
led to support for more gradual reforms. In 2014, the N-VA used this as justification for 
entry into government in the absence of an agreement on state reform.  
The analysis of a party’s balance of value rational versus instrumental rational claims can 
contribute to our understanding of their behaviour and approach to government as well 
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as intermediate steps. A party for whom value rational framing dominated would likely be 
less open to compromise on goals or receptive to entry into government whilst one who 
stressed instrumental concerns might be accommodated with proposals falling short of 
their goals but which entailed material concessions or a significant degree of autonomy.  
3. Context matters 
In addition to positioning their self-government goals as having an ideational purpose, 
parties acknowledged a broad range of factors which shaped the form that self-
government might take. Their understandings went beyond the ways in which 
international dynamics, European integration, and the state helped or hindered the cause 
of self-government to positioning self-government within these contexts, with the use of 
prognostic and diagnostic frames. International developments, European integration, 
state structures, and party competition were all used by the parties to justify self-
government more generally but also to define the content of self-government goals. As 
the findings from each empirical context are presented in detail within each empirical 
chapter, I will focus here on my more general findings regarding the salience of issues. 
Each party engaged deeply with the broader context in which it operates. This was evident 
in both the content of goals, which spoke to international dimension and state structure, 
its pursuit through electoral and party systems, and the framing of goals – with the three 
contexts motivating, enabling, or necessitating self-government. The importance of these 
contexts increased as goals of each party became increasingly comprehensive, largely as a 
result of party growth, increased research capacity, and the need to present a 
comprehensive programme to the voter. However, there is variation as to the degree each 
party engaged with the various contexts.  
We see variation in the salience of the empirical context and this is particularly evident in 
the area of international and European integration. The SNP, with its goal of political 
independence, engaged intensively with both international and European issues from its 
origins to the present day while the two Flemish parties largely ignored the international 
dimension. The Volksunie, with its more moderate original goal of federalism, largely 
ignored issues of international politics, focusing on domestic concerns. However, since 
the 1970s, European integration has been more fundamental to the Flemish parties’ vision 
of self-government while the SNP has engaged more selectively, and more critically.  
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The variation discussed here does point to one of the key limitations of this research, in 
that it does not directly take into account factors internal to the nation in attempting to 
explain a party’s positioning. Issues of demography, geography, and public opinion should 
be accounted for in future research.  
4. Sub-state nationalist parties as rational actors 
 
Together, these findings support the larger argument that sub-state nationalist parties are 
rational actors and this rationality extends beyond their behaviour to the content of the 
goals themselves. The modification of the content and framing of self-government goals 
in response to opportunities and constraints presented by the system suggests a rationality 
that is underexplored in our analyses of sub-state nationalism thus far. Although an 
increasingly common assumption in the literature, this has been largely viewed through 
the lens of electoral politics, with a focus on how parties compete on secondary or 
ideological dimensions rather than how they modify their self-government goals or their 
framing of goals in light of these considerations (Lecours, 2012: 279; Alonso, 2012). We 
may conclude, with reference to these three cases, that sub-state nationalist parties are 
rational actors, but this rationality is bounded, they are not unconstrained actors 
employing Downsian strategies of vote maximisation. Limits to their rationality are found 
in self-government as a founding principle as well as a defining characteristic within the 
electoral marketplace, the preference of members and leaders who have a higher level of 
commitment to self-government, and the response of voters to what could be perceived 
as cynical electoral calculations. These considerations are similar to those faced by so-
called mainstream parties, thus situating sub-state nationalist party politics within the 
realm of normal party politics.  
The parties analysed here have found ways to operate within these constraints, modifying 
the nature, framing, and the timing of their goals to ensure electoral appeal and thus the 
survival of the party. This flexibility is evident within the approach of all three parties to 
intermediate steps or proposals made which fell short of their ultimate goals. Although 
all three faced internal debates about the wisdom of supporting proposals made by the 
state or statewide actors, all did so, justifying their actions as furthering the interests of 
their respective communities. These concessions or changes were to be stepping stones 
towards the ultimate goal of self-government. The N-VA does this even more explicitly, 
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arguing that it possesses a long-term goal of independence within Europe and a short-
term goal of confederalism. This allows parties to position themselves as reasonable 
actors, willing to compromise in their pursuit of self-government. 
It is this assumption of rationality and the strategic flexibility this provides which should 
underpin future research on sub-state nationalist parties. While their room for manoeuvre 
on their core dimension is more constrained than mainstream competitors, it does exist.  
8.2 Sub-state nationalism and the nature of self-government 
My interest in this subject represents a broader attempt to uncover something about the 
nature of self-government, statehood, and sovereignty. What do these concepts mean in 
the contemporary era? Are they of diminished relevance and value? The analysis of the 
self-government goals – their labelling, content, and framing – as expressed by sub-state 
nationalist parties allows us to address issues which are increasingly relevant but rarely 
questioned in the context of existing states and the parties and governments that operate 
within them. These actors each face constraints and struggle to negotiate their relationship 
in an increasingly interdependent world. It is just that sub-state nationalist parties are the 
ones forced to explicitly engage with these issues when setting out their self-government 
goals. 
In seeking to understand self-government, I drew on a large and growing literature on 
sub-state nationalism but one which struggles to adequately capture and explore the ‘thorny 
problem’ of party goals, particularly in reference to the broader context in which they are 
articulated (Schlesinger, 1975: 840). Research on how political parties form their platforms 
more generally has focused on the domains of electoral competition but has not always 
addressed how parties engage with the broader milieu. The Downsian assumption that 
party policies are motivated by the pursuit and maximisation of votes, and therefore office 
prevails.  
Similar tendencies have been found on the literature on sub-state nationalist parties, which 
has focused on how parties define themselves vis-à-vis nationalist or statewide 
competitors. In chapter one, I identify several limitations of our understanding of self-
government goals as present in the extant literature. These are related to the nature of 
parties themselves as well as their goals. In regards to the parties themselves, we tend to 
treat them as static actors and unitary actors. As it concerns their goals, the emphasis on 
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labelling presents problems for researchers, inhibiting cross-case comparison because of 
differences in labels as well as a suspicion, increasingly challenged, that all parties 
ultimately seek political independence. My work attempts, in these three cases, to address 
some of these challenges to better inform our understanding of sub-state nationalism and 
the objectives they hold.  
By adopting a longitudinal approach which examines parties from their origins to 
dissolution or through 2014, I am able to pinpoint and analyse changes in the party’s 
position as well as its framing. This allows how a party’s current position may have its 
roots in earlier periods in the party history. It also allows us to capture more gradual 
changes – present in both the goals and context. This is evident in several key areas. The 
SNP’s position on European integration has undergone only minor modification since its 
articulation of the independence in Europe platform in the 1980s but this represents a 
significant departure from what came before it and reflects both domestic and European 
developments. An analysis focusing on only the more recent period of the party’s lifespan 
would overlook this. The Volksunie’s position on Europe also shifted, with caution being 
replaced with a high level of enthusiasm for the European project and the development 
of a unique vision of European integration. Its framing of the nation and the Belgian state 
also became more radical as the party and Flanders grew in confidence.  
Cross-case comparison is often made difficult by a focus on segmenting parties according 
to their self-government goals, treating parties which seek accommodation within the 
state as somehow fundamentally different than those who seek its exit as well as accepting 
labels at face value. While there is a legitimate basis in doing so, it does obscure some 
important commonalities and limits the scope of our research. The labels used by the 
parties over time, which include more ambiguous terms of self-government, autonomy, 
home rule, freedom and more legalistic terms of federalism, confederalism, and 
independence, should not be taken at face value. Labelling can obscure significant 
similarities and differences between the content of the goals themselves. Although the 
three parties explored here express different self-government goals, although ones 
clustered on the more radical end of the spectrum, they all engage with the broader 
context in which they operate. Parties which pursue more moderate goals of 
accommodation within the state may engage less intensively with the international context 
but those within EU member states are increasingly engaged with issues at this level. The 
The Art of the Possible 
8 Discussion  274 
state remains an object of attention for parties at all levels. Sub-state nationalist parties 
can thus be compared more broadly.  
There is also a tendency to treat all sub-state nationalist parties as seeking independence, 
whether overtly or covertly. This is despite the fact that independence demands are 
relatively rare, and success in achieving independence even less so. (Keating, 2001: 11). 
This research does not present a direct challenge to this if we take the VU and the N-VA 
as a single movement, there is a clear pattern of radicalisation towards an independence 
objective. However, both parties were quite flexible on the form that self-government 
might take, provided their other goals could be advanced. The analysis of the SNP does 
however suggest something important about independence goals which may be 
overlooked in the literature. The SNP acknowledges its goals do not involve 
independence without constraint, stressing interdependencies and integration, both at the 
international level and with the British state. It has, however, never renounced its 
independence objectives, despite a long period in which its pursuit and achievement 
seems impossible, suggesting that while it is a rational actor, its actions are constrained by 
its core ethos, its supporters, and its historical position. 
In light of these findings, several broader conclusions can be drawn about the nature of 
sub-state nationalism and self-government. The first conclusion concerns the rationality 
of sub-state nationalist parties while the second concerns the nature of self-government 
in the twenty-first century.  
Sub-state nationalist parties are defined by their pursuit of self-government. However, the 
parties studied here are not blindly pursuing a single objective, but multifaceted 
organisations pursuing self-government, what they view as the interest of the nation, and 
more traditional goals of votes, office, and policy. As a result, they behave as rational 
actors. Typically, discussions of the rationality or strategy of sub-state nationalist parties 
have focused on the secondary dimension of ideology (Detterbeck, 2012: 46). However, 
self-government goals are also subject to strategic calculation and this is demonstrated in 
changes in the goal itself, changes in the framing of the goal to boost support, and 
decisions to accept concessions which fall short. They also increasingly can enter into 
government. As a result, we can approach sub-state nationalist parties in many of the 
same ways we analyse more traditional parties, situating them within the domain of normal 
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politics whilst acknowledging that they face constraints that statewide parties, increasingly 
prone to catch-allism, may not.  
Self-government is a nuanced concept and can take a multitude of forms and our study 
of it is further complicated by a mismatch of the language used by sub-state nationalist 
parties and academic researchers. However, several broad conclusions can be drawn about 
the nature of self-government from this research. Firstly, self-government is complex and 
parties themselves struggle to define the structures it may take. Secondly, the purpose of 
self-government goes beyond the idea that a nation must be accompanied by a state 
structure. When speaking to the voter, the parties studied here argued that self-
government was necessary to pursue a broad array of public policy objectives. Finally, 
goals are made in acknowledgement of the increasing complexity and interdependence of 
the modern world. Integration within international structures as well as continued 
cooperation with the embedding states are present in proposals and considered consistent 
with self-government, even in its more radical form. Self-government is not diminished 
by this.  
This understanding of self-government may also provide a lens through which to view 
statehood and sovereignty more generally. In setting out their self-government goals, sub-
state nationalist parties are required to account for the international context and 
acknowledge some of the limitations of self-government. However, states face those same 
constraints and this may be worthy of further exploration.  
8.3 Research limitations 
While this research offers important insights on self-government, some significant 
limitations remain, a result of the necessary compromises of research design and case 
selection. Alternative explanations for party behaviour that were not explored in this 
research are likely to exist. The primary explanation is linked to one of the weaknesses 
identified in the literature above – the failure to account for internal dynamics in shaping 
a party’s self-government goal.  
This research was unable to capture and assess the internal dynamics within parties and 
the way this manifested in the party’s self-government goals and their framing. As a result 
of my longitudinal approach and issues of access, discussion and analysis of internal party 
dynamics which may have impacted the framing and content of self-government goals. 
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We know from the empirical literature on the case studies that tensions existed within 
each party about the self-government goal itself and the means by which these goals were 
to be achieved. Individual leaders or factions within each party may have contributed to 
changes in the goals themselves or their framing, with the SNP’s shift on European 
integration serving as one notable example. The dominant personality and intellectual 
leadership of Bart de Wever in the N-VA could also be explored as a potential explanation 
for the party’s positioning. However, a decision was made to treat the party as a unitary 
actor, obscuring internal decision making processes and factionalism. This was a result of 
an interest in the self-government proposals made in a public forum and the challenge of 
identifying these internal dynamics over the extended time frame of this research. It would 
be difficult to accurately capture internal decision making processes at the origins of the 
SNP and the VU because of the duration of time that has passed.  
There were additional factors internal to the state and nation which were not considered 
in detail over the course of this research. A broad interpretation of the ‘art of the possible’ 
may include characteristics of each nation – historical, economic, political, cultural, and 
geographic factors – which may influence the desirability and feasibility of various forms 
of self-government. The most salient of these is found in the two Flemish cases, described 
by one interviewee as the ‘whale in the aquarium’ or the salient explanation for the N-
VA’s strategic approach to self-government. This is Brussels – the Flemish capital, 
international centre, and Francophone city, situated within the territory of Flanders. The 
issue of Brussels has likely served as a moderator for self-government goals throughout 
the lifespan of both Flemish parties. The Flemish demographic majority also enhances 
the ability of Flemish nationalists to pursue accommodation within the state. In the 
Scottish case, a history of political independence which grants legitimacy to current calls 
as well as the historical position of the party makes moderation on the goal more difficult, 
although the party has gained flexibility with its support for further steps.  
There also caveats about the generalisability of this research. Are other sub-state 
nationalist parties expected to engage in similar ways? Can we say something broader 
about the nature of sub-state nationalism and self-government as a result of this research? 
While the generalisability is limited by the focus on qualitative research methods and the 
limited number of cases, important takeaways remain. The three cases analysed were not 
selected as ideal types but are strong examples of sub-state nationalist parties which 
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articulate clear self-government goals. They demonstrated important similarities – having 
experienced success, both in electoral terms and in securing some form of self-
government, albeit falling short of their ultimate goals. However, they differed in their 
goals and operated within very different contexts. Despite this, similarities in how they 
approached self-government, engaging with the ‘art of the possible’ when articulating their 
goals. While we have seen that sub-state nationalist parties can differ on their approach 
to the international dimension, European integration, the state, and competition within a 
party system, they are all likely to engage to some degree with these issues. As a result, the 
model presented here could be applied to other cases and we would expect to see similar 
dynamics in other sub-state nationalist parties.  
However, this may be restricted to a smaller segment of parties within the sub-state 
nationalist party family, more specifically those which compete for office regularly and 
have developed comprehensive policy platforms. These parties, unlike anti-system parties 
or those which operate on the fringes, will have engaged more explicitly in rational, 
pragmatic calculations about the feasibility and pursuit of self-government and tailored 
their framing of self-government to reflect opportunities and constraints inherent in the 
system.  
8.4 The framing of self-government goals: methodological 
reflections 
This research sought to capture the content of self-government goals and the ways in 
which these goals interacted with the contexts in which they were articulated. I did so 
through the analysis of frames – identifying the arguments made in support of self-
government goals which referenced the empirical context which informed these goals. 
Framing is an underutilised but potentially promising tool for political scientists, allowing 
for the identification of arguments in a more systematic way than a more generalised 
content analysis. However, there are important limitations, both in the methodology more 
generally and specific to this research, which I will discuss below. 
The analysis of frames allowed me to identify arguments in favour of self-government 
goals, both more fundamentally through value-oriented and instrumental frames, and with 
reference to the context in which they were articulated. The use of frames in support of 
self-governmental goals rather than of goals more generally enhanced the analytical depth 
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of the research – I was examining the goals themselves but also how they were expressed 
and justified. At the origins of this research, I suspected more variation in the goals of 
each party than was ultimately identified, it was in the arguments in favour of the goals 
where changes took place. The analysis of frames also allowed for comparison – both 
within a single case, as frames emerged and disappeared, and between cases, with the 
analysis of how an empirical context might be interpreted by different parties. The use of 
similar frames or the absence or presence of frames in one case and not another may 
suggest something about the party’s interpretation of self-government.  
However, there are several key concerns with the analysis of frames which must be 
considered and these regard the replicability, the identification of relationships, and the 
nature of the party as a frame-maker. 
The identification, analysis and interpretation of frames are heavily reliant on the 
interpretation of the individual researcher. Frames which I identified over the course of 
this research may not be evident, or accorded the same significance, by another researcher 
using the same dataset. Frames are also plentiful and the selection of key frames may 
mean that important components are overlooked. This is partially remedied by the 
frequent referencing of data sources and extended quotations, allowing examiners and 
readers to evaluate my interpretation of these frames for themselves, but ultimately 
framing analysis, like other methods of qualitative analysis, does present challenges in 
terms of replicability and validity. 
Another perhaps more fundamental concern speaks to the relationship between empirical 
contexts and changes therein and the frames employed by the party. My explicit 
assumption was that there was an interaction between the empirical contexts identified 
and the goals and frames employed by the party. While I did not set out hypotheses to be 
tested, this assumption underpinned my research. However, it was one that was difficult 
to examine directly, except in cases where parties directly cited a change in the context as 
responsible for the change in the frames employed, for example, increasing European 
integration as an enabler of self-government.  
The analysis of frames tends, as I did in this research, to treat an organisation as a single 
coherent actor, overlooking variation or divisions within the parties themselves. All three 
parties have had experiences of factionalism, conflict, and differing viewpoints on both 
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goals and strategies and this research is unable to take into account these internal 
dynamics. Manifestos and public facing documents serve as evidence of the party’s 
position but may disguise divisions within the party or represent the view of an influential 
leader. Changes in framing may in fact be a result in changes in the balance of power or 
leadership within the party rather than a direct response to the empirical contexts in which 
the party competes. I was also unable to capture the process of framing and counter-
framing.  
Despite these concerns, the analysis of frames allowed for the tracing and analysis of party 
goals over time and in interaction with the empirical context. An attempt to quantify these 
relationships would have reduced a rich dataset to an analysis of salience and ultimately 
failed to capture self-government goals in all their complexity. 
8.5 Avenues for further research 
The findings of this research suggests three key avenues for future empirical work which 
I hope to pursue in the coming years, as well as work on framing as a method for political 
scientists. 
Firstly, the Scottish and Flemish cases remain relevant and worthy cases for further study, 
particularly in light of recent changes to the context in which their goals are situated. In 
the case of the SNP, the ongoing process of Brexit seems to present a paradox. It provides 
a justification for independence, given the divergence in voting between Scotland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom, but also calls into question the viability of the pactist vision 
of independence presented by the party in 2014. The emphasis on continued partnership 
and the maintenance of many of the British institutions and unions under a European 
umbrella seen in 2014 is likely no longer viable. In Flanders too, the vision of self-
government has undergone a shift. Although the N-VA agreed, upon entering into 
government, in 2014, to maintain a period of institutional stability, changes in the party’s 
platform and strategy seem to be likely. As a party of government at the centre, harsh 
critiques of the Belgian state structure seem less likely. The party has also focused more 
critically on the process of European integration, particularly the EU’s handling of the 
refugee crisis, calling into question the party’s commitment to more integration and 
therefore, its long-term goal of political independence within a highly integrated European 
structure. 
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Secondly, the model developed here, with its emphasis on empirical contexts may be 
fruitfully applied to other sub-state nationalist parties, providing a template for the 
identification and analysis of self-government goals. As discussed in the theoretical 
framework, each of these contexts has been studied in isolation, but studying them 
together, we can better understand the nature of goals themselves and how this would be 
pursued. In a national context in which multiple parties are advancing different visions of 
self-government, this model would provide a useful mechanism for comparison. Upon 
reflection, this model would benefit from the inclusion of the broader socio-political 
context rather than its focus on the party system exclusively, allowing for the examination 
of public opinion and debates.  
Finally, this model may be applied to broader constitutional debates within a single 
national setting, examining mechanisms of framing and counter-framing which were 
unable to be captured in the scope of this research. For example, a specific constitutional 
moment could be captured and analysed from multiple perspectives. We could return to 
the 2014 referendum and explore how both unionist and nationalist actors have engaged 
with these contexts in arguing their position.  
Together, this work and further research, will deepen our understanding of self-
government and its pursuit, a topic which continues to be relevant both in Western 
Europe, as events unfold in Catalonia, and further afield.  
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Appendix One: Codebook 
Frames by chapter 
Chapter 3: Self-government for purpose and principle 
Value rationality and self-
government 
Messages which suggest that a nation and a state should be 
congruent and speaks of the importance of nationhood for 
the realisation of essential or existential goals. This can be 
understood with reference to MacCormick's (1970) 
concept of 'pure' nationalism.  
 A nation must have the state: (SNP) Frame suggests that 
nation and statehood must be congruent, that this is the 
natural order.   
Self-actualisation: (SNP / VU) Frame suggests that self-
government would allow the nation to realise its full 
potential or self-actualisation.  
The nation as a building block: (N-VA) Frame suggests 
the nation as a natural unit and one necessary to build a 
society which is cohesive. There is some overlap with 
instrumental rationality here.  
Instrumental rationality 
and self-government 
This can be understood with reference 
to MacCormick's (1970) utilitarian nationalism, or self-
government and nationalism as a rational act, designed to 
serve as a means to pursue specific policy goals.  
 Self-government as a means: (SNP, VU, N-VA) Frame 
emphasises that self-government is a means of pursuing 
specific policy goals, acting in the interest of the 
nation. Variation in the policies which would be pursued 
but similar frames employed by all three parties. 
 
Chapter 4: Self-government, Europe, and the World  
Self-government in the 
world 
Statements which engage with the intersection of self-
government and the world, or the international dimension 
of self-government. This dimension captures ideas of 
sovereignty, legal understandings of self-government, and 
the nation and the broader world.   
 Changing conceptions of sovereignty: (SNP) Frame 
suggests that the nature of sovereignty has changed, often 
used to justify self-government more generally but also the 
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content of self-government goals with constitutional 
structures reflecting changing nature of statehood.  
Integration not isolation: (SNP / VU) Frame challenges 
narrative that sub-state nationalist parties seek to isolate 
themselves, arguing instead that self-government allows for 
integration into the broader world rather than the isolation 
forced upon them by integration within the embedding 
state.  No longer working through intermediary of the state. 
Normal nationhood: (SNP) Frame argues that self-
government is the 'normal' state of affairs and the status 
quo is abnormal. Scotland would not be exceptional but 
would instead take its normal and natural place in the 
world.   
Sovereignty as an outdated concept: (N-VA) Frame 
challenges the concept of sovereignty in an interconnected 
and interdependent world, arguing that sovereignty is 
outdated. Allows for more flexibility in the form self-




This dimension includes discourse which engages with the 
idea of self-government and European integration, 
including frames in favour of against, or reflecting the 
party's interpretation of the opportunities and costs of 
integration.  
The European threat: (SNP) European integration 
represents a specific threat, whether cultural, political, or 
economic, to the existence and prosperity of the given 
nation.    
Opposition as contingent: (SNP) Frame suggests that 
while the party is opposed to European integration, this 
opposition is contingent on domestic and international 
developments which might allow for a more favourable 
position. Seen in statements of ‘no voice, no entry’ 
Pragmatic support: (SNP) Frame suggests that the 
European Union is a means which would facilitate or 
enable self-government, a pragmatic rather 
than ideational approach to European integration.   
Federalisation before Europeanisation: (VU) The 
reform of the state must precede European integration, 
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allowing for the constituent units of the Belgian state to be 
properly represented at the European level.   
A distinctive vision of Europe: (VU) This descriptive 
frame suggests that the Volksunie offers a distinct vision of 
European integration, one which will facilitate and support 
Flemish self-government.  
Europe as an enabler: (N-VA) Frame takes the form of 
an argument that Europe will facilitate or enable self-
government, reducing some of the costs and the need for a 
Belgian state structure to act as an intermediary 
force. Similar to the SNP’s frame of pragmatic support. 
Critical and constructive: (N-VA) Frame defines the 
party's support for European integration as both critical of 
developments but offering a constructive proposal rather 
than rejecting Europe outright.  
The problems of Europe, the problems of Belgium: 
(N-VA) Frame equates the problems of Europe (a 
productive North, a dependent South, mismanagement and 
bureaucracy) with those of Belgium, suggesting that the EU 





This engagement with identity did not come through to any 
significant degree in the discourse of the Volksunie and 
the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie but was present in the SNP's 
discourse, largely as a marker of difference  
 Global Scots v Little Englanders: Frame which suggests 
that Scots are by their nature more globally oriented, in 
contrast to the English which are more isolationist and less 
in favour of integration.   
 
 
Chapter 5: The state and existing state structures 
 
The state and existing state 
structures  
 
This dimension examines ways in which existing state 
structures or the union are employed to justify self-
government. 
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 Hostile: (SNP / VU) Frame portrays the central state as 
overtly hostile to the nation, whether this takes the form of 
political or cultural oppression or economic exploitation. 
This frame often employs language identified by Hechter 
(1977) as internal colonialism.  
Neglectful: (SNP) Frame describes the central state as 
neglectful, whether by virtue of its structure or by its 
purposeful disregard of the nation. In this frame, it is 
argued that Scottish needs cannot be met by the centre, 
calling into the question the utility of the state. 
Of diminishing value: (VU) This frame suggests that the 
Belgian state is increasingly irrelevant in the light of broader 
European integration and the development of Flanders as 
an actor with a greater degree of power and prosperity. 
Artificial: (N-VA) This frame portrays Belgium as 
artificial, characterised as a historical accident rather than as 
a genuine nation and is therefore destined for failure. Often 
this frame is bolstered by references to the lack of common 
language or demos.  
Inefficient and irrelevant: (N-VA) Similar to the VU’s 
frame which suggests that the Belgian state is of 
diminishing value, the N-VA describes Belgium as 
inefficient and increasingly irrelevant in the lives of 
Flemings. 
Proposed and realised 
state reform  
 
This dimension captures the parties’ responses to proposed 
and realised state reform, identifying the party’s position on 
whether intermediate steps falling short of its ultimate goal 
should be rejected or embraced.  
 A dangerous distraction: (SNP) This frame embodies 
fundamentalist approaches to self-government, rejecting 
intermediate steps in the form of decentralization or 
devolution as structures which would undercut the Scottish 
bid for independence. 
A first step toward self-government: (SNP) In contrast 
to the preceding frame, this frame represents a gradualist 
view, which suggests that devolution could be seen as a first 
step toward independence or a platform on which an 
independence bid could be launched. 
Insufficient but workable: (SNP) This frame suggests 
that while the realized devolution settlement was 
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insufficient, it was ultimately workable, a pragmatic 
approach adopted by the SNP with devolution. 
Insufficient: (VU) This frame involves the dismissal of 
alternative proposals, made by other parties and at the 
centre, as insufficient, unable to address the concerns of the 
Scottish nations.  
An incremental process: (VU) This frame describes the 
process of self-government as an incremental one, 
requiring a gradual or stepping stone approach. Each 
reform builds on the last. This can be used to justify 
acceptance of more moderate steps. 
Inevitable: (VU) Closely linked to the preceding frame, 
this frame argues that a centrifugal process has been set in 
motion by the VU and that self-government is inevitable, 
even if it takes time. This frame can be used to justify 
participation in intermediate steps. 
The futility of further reforms: (VU) A more radical 
frame which suggests that the nature of reform is 
insufficient to meet the needs of Flanders and more radical 
action is required. 
Self-government and 
relations with the state 
This final dimension examines the relationship with the 
state that the parties seek for their nation once their ideal 
form of self-government is achieved, drawing on ideas of 
pactists or principled independentist goals presented by 
Lluch.  
 A partnership of equals: (SNP) This frame embodies a 
pactists understanding of self-government, allowing 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom to reconcile 
and cooperate on a basis of equality rather than the current 
unequal relations. 
Good neighbours: (VU) Similar to the partnership of 
equals frame employed by the SNP, this frame suggests that 
Flanders and Wallonia could live as good neighbours, 
cooperating when it suited them. 
A letterbox for Flanders and Wallonia: (N-VA) This 
descriptive frame sets out the party’s view of the central 
state, serving not as a meeting point or as a forum for 
cooperation, but as a letterbox. 
Gradually disappearing: (N-VA) A frame which suggests 
that the Belgian state is transient, a temporary structure 
which will gradually disappear over time. This frame implies 
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Chapter 6:  Self-government and the party system  
The party and its rivals  
 
This dimension explores how sub-state nationalist political 
position themselves as credible agents of self-government 
and question the ability of their political rivals to adequately 
do so.  
 Scotland's Party, Scotland's voice: (SNP) This frame 
positioned the SNP as the party which represented 
Scotland’s interests and was able to speak up for Scotland. 
The illegitimacy of political rivals: (SNP) Closely linked 
with the preceding frame, this frame suggested that political 
rivals were illegitimate in their claims to represent Scottish 
interests at the centre. 
A voice for Flanders and self-government: (VU) Similar 
to frame employed by the SNP, the Volksunie used this 
frame to position itself as the party speaking for Flanders 
and for self-government, in contrast with its statewide 
rivals. 
A moral leader: (N-VA) The N-VA employed this frame 
to suggest a principled stance, both in how the party 
comported itself and to participation in government. It 
suggested that it was driven by principles rather than a 
desire for power. 
The complicity of traditional rivals: (N-VA) In contrast 
to the preceding frame, this frame argued that traditional 
Flemish rivals were complicit in the Belgian system and this 
frame takes the form of accusations of Belgicisme and of 
an interest in power rather than the cause of Flemish self-
government. 
The futility of the VB: (N-VA) The Vlaams Belang were 
framed by the N-VA as representing a futile cause, with no 
hopes of entering into government and pursuing their self-
government goals. 
The party and its pursuit of 
self-government  
This dimension addresses how the party views itself as an 
agent of self-government within the party system. It draws 
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 on Sartorian concepts of blackmail and coalition relevance 
as well as approaches to participation.  
 
 A party of action: (SNP) This frame detailed how the party 
would use its votes, office, and policy to pursue its self-
government goal. Included within this frame are 
discussions of how a majority of seats at Westminster 
would be seen as a mandate for independence. 
A party of blackmail: (SNP / VU) This frame draws on 
Sartorian understandings of party relevance, with the party 
portraying itself as an influential actor from outside of 
government, holding the government to account and 
wielding its votes and seats to extract concessions. 
A party of government: (SNP) This post-devolutionary 
frame situated the party as a party of government, 
effectively separating its independence objectives from its 
role in government at the devolved level. 
A party of principled participation: (VU) This frame was 
used to justify the participation of the Volksunie in 
government, drawing a distinction between the party and 
the Vlaams Blok. Using this frame, the party argued it 
would participate even at cost to itself. 
The courage to abstain: (N-VA) In contrast to the frame 
of principled participation employed by the VU, the N-VA 
employed a frame of abstention, arguing that it would 
abstain in order to pursue true state reform rather than 
being coopted into the Belgian system. Frame is closely 
linked with the party’s portrayal of itself as a moral leader. 
 
Chapter 7: Self-government in 2014  
 
The meaning of self-
government:  
 
This dimension examines the meaning of self-government 
and the purposes of self-government in the 2014 
campaigns. 
 Self-government as a tool: (SNP / N-VA) Frame suggests 
that self-government is a tool, allowing for the pursuit of 
specific policy goals, whether social or economic. 
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Self-government, Europe, 
and the world  
 
This dimension addresses how self-government is framed 
in relationship to Europe, the European Union and the 
broader world in the context of the 2014 debate. 
Integration, interdependence, and independence: 
(SNP) This frame argues that independence is closely 
linked with integration (with the United Kingdom, with 
Europe, and with the world) and suggests that the party’s 
proposals are cognisant of the interdependences present in 
the existing system. 
Scotland as a positive force in the world: (SNP) This 
frame suggests that an independent Scotland would play a 
positive role in the broader role, and this frame is implicitly 
and explicitly contrasted with the UK’s role.  
Flanders as a European nation: (N-VA) This identity 
frame situates Flanders as a European nation and Flemings 
as possessing a Flemish as well as European identity. It is 
often used to contrast democratic Flemish nationalist 
voices with more radical Flemish rivals. 
The interdependence of self-government: (N-VA) This 
frame implies that self-government in the contemporary era 
is by nature interdependent. It suggests that the structures 
of self-government are less important than their practice.  
The challenges for Europe and for Belgium: (N-VA) 
This frame suggests that both Europe and Belgium face 
similar challenges, in the form of geographical economic 
disparities. 
Self-government and the 
state  
This dimension explores the ways in which self-
government goals are framed vis-à-vis the embedding state, 
both in the form of the state as a justification for self-
government and the potential for partnership in the event 
that the party’s self-government goals are achieved. 
 The British state as an outdated institution: (SNP) This 
frame suggests that the British state is no longer fit for 
purse, failing to serve the needs of its constituents. 
Divergence between Scotland and the UK: (SNP) This 
frame identifies different preferences and behaviours and 
these differences are used to necessitate self-government. 
Devolution as a journey: (SNP) This frame situates 
devolution as part of a journey towards self-government or 
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independence, and is found in language of stepping stones 
or stations en route to an ultimate destination.  
A renewed partnership: (SNP) This frame embodies a 
pactists understanding of self-government, allowing 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom to reconcile 
and cooperate on a basis of equality rather than the current 
unequal relations. 
Belgium as an artificial state: (N-VA) Frame suggests 
Belgium is artificial, lacking a demos, a historical accident 
rather than possessing the essence of nationhood required 
for cohesion and effective government. 
Belgian dysfunction: (N-VA) This frame cites Belgian 
dysfunction as an incentive for self-government, 
characterizing the Belgian system as flawed and inefficient. 
State reform as too little, too late: (N-VA) Proposals for 
further reforms are critiqued as insufficient and unable to 
address the fundamental flaws of the Belgian state in this 
frame. 
Self-government and the 
party  
 
This dimension was explored how the parties positioned 
themselves and their political rivals in the context of the 
party system. 
 Doing Scotland down: (SNP) This frame serves as a 
critique of Unionist rivals, who are accused of lacking faith 
or confidence in Scotland’s ability to govern itself, ie ‘too 
wee, too poor…’ 
The courage to govern: (N-VA) This frame is contrasted 
with previous frames adopted by the N-VA focused on its 
policy of principled abstention. Instead, in 2014, the party 
positions itself as willing to participate in government, even 
if it comes at a cost.  
Taking responsibility: (N-VA) This frame focuses on the 
party itself and is closely linked with the preceding frame. 
In it, the party argues that it will take responsibility for its 
own actions and participate at the centre. 
Flemish rivals as complicit: (N-VA) This frame suggests 
that Flemish rivals are corrupted or complicit in the Belgian 
system, more interested in accruing power at the central 
level than representing the needs and interests of Flanders. 
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Appendix Two: List of interviewees 
Interviews were conducted over the course of this research in Flanders and Scotland and 
encompassed members of the Scottish National Party, Volksunie, and the Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie. Fieldwork was conducted in February 2014 in Flanders and spring and 
summer 2014 in Scotland. Several respondents asked to remain anonymous in the 
publication and are noted as such. 
Anonymous, former leader of the Volksunie, interview conducted in Antwerp, Belgium, 
February 2014.  
Anonymous, former leader of the Volksunie, interview conducted in Leuven, Belgium, 
February 2014.  
Bracke, Siegfried, MP, interview conducted in Brussels, February 2014. 
Crawford, Bruce, MSP, interview conducted in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 2014. 
Fabiana, Linda, MSP, interview conducted in Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2014. 
Jambon, Jan, MP, interview conducted in Brussels, February 2014. 
Macaskill, Kenny, MSP, interview conducted in Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2014. 
Pohlmann, Joachim, N-VA spokesman, interview conducted in Brussels, February 2014. 
Watt, Maureen, MSP, interview conducted in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 2014. 
Weyts, Ben, President of the N-VA, interview conducted in Brussels, February 2014. 
Wilson, Andrew, former MSP, interview conducted in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 2014. 
Wilson, Gordon, former leader of the SNP, interview conducted in Broughty Ferry, June 
2014. 
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